外文翻譯---智利高等教育的新型助學貸款制度

1、<p>　　外文題目：The new student loan system in Chile’s higher education </p><p>　　出 處：Higher Education </p>

2、<p>　　作 者：Christian Larraln , Salvador Zurita </p><p><b>　　原 文：</b></p><p>　　The new student loan system in Chile’s higher educa

3、tion</p><p><b>　　Abstract</b></p><p>　　Chile’s higher education system stands out as being one of the most privatized and open to the market in the world. Recently, the Chilean Congr

4、ess passed Law # 20.027 of 2005, which provides the legal framework for the creation of a student loan system guaranteed both by the State and by higher education institutions (HEIs), ?nanced by the private capital marke

5、t through the securitization of the loans. The system operated for the ?rst time in 2006, where approximately 21,000 students were able t</p><p>　　Keywords：Securitization, Higher education loans, State guara

6、ntees, Financial design</p><p>　　There is consensus among analysts that education has similar dynamics in most countries, with the possible exception of those with the lowest income. Among seven internationa

7、l tendencies identi?ed by Brunner et al. (2005), there is massi?cation of educational systems due to ever increasing access opportunities, diversi?cation and rationalization of sources for ?nancing higher education in re

8、sponse to the growing costs brought about by massi?cation, and displacement of the center of gravity of hi</p><p>　　Chile is at an intermediate massi?cation phase (34–50%), as are Argentina, Uruguay and Boli

9、via. Developed countries are generally at an advanced phase (51–74%), with only two countries at a universalization phase (75% or over), Korea and Finland, although four are close to that stage, New Zealand, United State

10、s, Norway and Sweden.</p><p>　　Brunner et al. (2005) conclude that the Chilean higher education system is of an intermediate size, with 650,000 registered students and 222 institutions in the sector, of whic

11、h 90% are private. The same authors conclude, however, that Chile is unique in the strength with which the forces of supply and demand operate, and in its high dependence on private ?nancing. In effect, these authors com

12、pare the Chilean higher education system with a sample of countries, which include the three main econom</p><p>　　The article is organized as follows: In the section ‘‘Participation of the State in education

13、’’ we brie?y present the case for participation of the State in ?nancing education; in the section ‘‘The Solidary System of University Loans (SSUL)’’ we provide a summary of the previous student loan system (the so-calle

14、d solidary loan), and its weaknesses. Finally, in the section ‘‘The student loan system of Law No. 20,027 of 2005’’ we address the new model, and discuss its foundations and possible vari</p><p>　　Participat

15、ion of the State in education</p><p>　　Education can be seen as an investment in human capital, understood as the stock of productive skills and knowledge developed in individuals. The decision to pursue a s

16、tudy program is similar to a decision to invest in physical capital; the individual that studies incurs in direct costs (registration, etc.), but mainly in opportunity costs (the income sacri?ced by not working), and hen

17、ce in order to have economic incentives to study, he or she must be compensated for this sacri?ce by way of grea</p><p>　　In both the human capital and the screening model focus on the private bene?ts of edu

18、cation, but education has also social bene?ts, for example, greater social cohesion, higher future taxes (due to higher income), and increased productivity of others (economies of scope). On this last aspect, Moretti (20

19、02) ?nds that, after controlling through other factors, if the number of university students rises by 1% in a city, this is related to increases in the salaries of employees with incomplete unive</p><p>　　Th

20、e analogy between education and any investment in physical capital has an important limitation, however, because of the different nature of the property rights between the two forms of capital. In effect, while physical

21、capital property rights can be freely transferred in a market economy, in a free society slavery is not allowed and hence human capital property rights are indissolubly connected to the person in which that human capital

22、 is embodied, the sale of human capital is not permitted. </p><p>　　Furthermore, the lack of relevant public information, as well as the existence of information asymmetries, makes it dif?cult for potential

23、lenders to evaluate the expected pro?tability of different careers. In effect, if a mortgage loan is compared to a student loan in terms of information, the purchaser of a house usually knows what he or she is purchasing

24、, having lived in a dwelling all his/her life; it is improbable that the house should cave-in (and there is insurance to cover this eventuali</p><p>　　The previous considerations have motivated most countrie

25、s to provide public education or public ?nancing of education, mainly due to its implications in distribution of income and poverty. The income of a person in a market economy re?ects the amount and value of the resource

26、s they control; therefore individuals that are permanently poor have less skills and skills of lower value than individuals that are not poor. Hence an attractive public policy to eliminate poverty consists in providing

27、more</p><p>　　The Solidary System of University Loans (SSUL)</p><p>　　Since the beginning of the 1980s, an important part of higher education costs in Chile are charged through registration fees

28、. In the case of technical and professional careers, 90% of annual fees ?uctuate between US$1,500 and US$5,000, depending on the type of institution and career. Considering that income per capita in Chile is approximatel

29、y US$9,900 (adjusted by PPP), one concludes that the cost of higher education in Chile is among the highest in the world. Although there can be careers whos</p><p>　　(pro?table) investment in education, part

30、icularly in a country like Chile, characterized byunequal distribution of income, in which no more than 20% of the population could ?nance the cost of higher education with their own resources.</p><p>　　Alth

31、ough the State student loan system started at the beginning of the 1980s, its current mode originated in 1994 and is denominated Solidary System of University Loans (SSUL). Under this system, the loan payments are contin

32、gent on income, with a maximum term of 15 years. </p><p>　　This traditional system has shown six main limitations. The Chilean education system can be characterized as dual, in the sense that two sectors coe

33、xist: the university sector, which offers academic and professional careers and another that is non-university, which offers technical–vocational programs. In this framework, a ?rst limitation is that the SSUL has insuf?

34、cient coverage, being restricted to less than half the university sector (the 25 public universities grouped in the Council of Presi</p><p>　　The student loan system of Law No. 20,027 of 2005</p><

35、p>　　In this section we ?rst analyze the challenges of the system, that is, the desirable characteristics that a student loan system should have from a public policy point of view. Then we describe the system, its play

36、ers and how they relate to each other.</p><p>　　Desirable characteristics of the loans</p><p>　　The new higher education student loans system (HESLS) was designed for the purpose of satisfying c

37、ertain requisites and/or desirable characteristics:</p><p>　　The new system should satisfy the loan needs for a signi?cant and growing number of students each year, and attend to the needs not only of the un

38、iversities grouped in the Council of Presidents, but also of private universities, professional institutes and technical formation centers.</p><p>　　The Chilean economy has had average growth rates of 6% ove

39、r the last 20 years , and this growth has brought higher real salaries, which has allowed more young people to access higher education, mainly middle class. However, there still remains a great gap between the opportunit

40、ies of the more accommodated sectors and the more modest sectors. In 2000, only 5.8 of every 100 higher education students came from the Chile’s poorest quintile, while 35.9 were from the richest quintile; hence the need

41、 t</p><p>　　In order to have a sense of the magnitude of the needs, in 2005, 650,000 students registered for higher education, and from here to the year 2010 projects an average growth of approximately 6% pe

42、r year. This projection is consistent with cross-section statistics, which show that while the percentage of students between 18 and 24 years old that are currently enrolled in higher education is comparable to other Lat

43、in American countries (35%), it is much lower than in developed countries such as Spa</p><p>　　Allocation of the loans based on need</p><p>　　Education in Chile is a pro?table investment; theref

44、ore to commit some of the scarce public resources to ?nance higher education is only justi?ed in the case of students that otherwise would not be able to obtain it. For example, Mizala and Romangera (2004) report a priva

45、te rate of return for education in Chile of 22%, much higher than the estimated return for countries of the OECD. According to the estimations of Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004), the return on university education is

46、8.4% in </p><p>　　Non-discrimination due to other variables</p><p>　　The system should ensure that there is no discrimination based on other variables. A strictly private assignation could tend

47、to discriminate in respect to, for instance, the gender of the student, the career he or she wishes to study, the year of studies he or she is currently taking, or the higher education institution in which he or she stud

48、ies. In effect, if these criteria are not explicitly stated, students from universities that are less prestigious and/or careers with higher desertion rate</p><p>　　外文題目：The new student loan system in Chile’

49、s higher education </p><p>　　出 處：Higher Education </p><p>　　作 者：Christian Larraln , Salvador Zuri

50、ta </p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p>　　智利高等教育的新型助學貸款制度</p><p><b>　　摘要 </b></p><p>　　智利的高等教育體制在世界上有名

51、，因為它是最具私有化和最開放的市場之一。最近，智利國會通過了2005年20.027號法律條案，提出了一個關(guān)于學生的貸款擔保體系。這是由國家和高等教育機構(gòu)（高校）共同創(chuàng)建的通過貸款在私人資本市場上的證券化進行融資的的法律框架。該系統(tǒng)在2006年首次實行，使得21000學生能夠在剩余的學習生涯中接受高等教育。隨著系統(tǒng)逐漸成熟，為學生和學校帶來了更明顯的好處，這將使得目前獲得資助的學生的數(shù)量在未來幾年內(nèi)顯著增加。本文的目的在于描述該系統(tǒng)的特征

52、以及解釋其基礎概念和分析能夠在公共政策中應用的部分理論。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞: 證券化,高等教育貸款,國家擔保,金融設計</p><p>　　很多分析師一致認為大部分國家的教育程度都是相似的，除了低收入國家。布倫納（2005）等人確定了七個國際趨勢：由于教育準入機會的增加而引起的教育的大眾化，由于教育成本的不斷增漲而使得資助的多樣化和合理化從而導致教育的大眾化以及教育重心正從國家和

53、培訓中心轉(zhuǎn)向市場和競爭領(lǐng)域。波爾（2002）等人通過分析一致認為，由于高等教育的大眾化以及其他原因，使得教育的商業(yè)化成為一種普遍的趨勢。實際上，在過去的幾十年里，高等教育體系變得更加以市場為導向。學校之間通過學生，教師，資源和聲譽進行市場競爭。國家也通過頒布政策來調(diào)節(jié)市場的私人競爭。正如巴爾（2003）和其他人一樣，意識到教育正在朝著大眾化這一趨勢發(fā)展。目前歷史和技術(shù)進步使得一個人在工作生活的各個階段都比以往更需要培訓。</p&g

54、t;<p>　　智利正處于大眾化中期階段（34-50%），其他國家比如阿根廷，烏拉圭和玻利維亞。發(fā)達國家一般處于先進階段（51-74%），只有兩個國家處于普及階段（75％或以上），韓國和芬蘭。盡管有四個國家接近這個階段，新西蘭，美國，挪威和瑞典。布倫納（2005）等人得出的結(jié)論是智利高等教育系統(tǒng)處于中期階段，是因為智力高等教育系統(tǒng)有65萬注冊學生和222個部門機構(gòu)，但其中有90%是私人機構(gòu)。他們一致認為，智利的供給和需求力

55、量都高度依賴私人融資，這種情況是非常少見的。實際上，這些是作者將智利高等教育系統(tǒng)跟多個國家進行比較得出的，其中包括三個拉丁美洲（阿根廷，巴西和墨西哥），三個中等高度收入的國家包括亞洲東南部（馬來西亞），歐洲中部（匈牙利和捷克共和國）以及一系列處于世界上不同地區(qū)的高收入國家，它們具有的特征都是小型或中型的人口規(guī)模和具有高度發(fā)達的高等教育體系（加拿大和芬蘭），或者是發(fā)展迅速（愛爾蘭，以色列，新西蘭和葡萄牙的特點）。作者認為，智利高等教育體制

56、出名是因為在樣本國家中它是最具有最私有化和最開放的市場，這能夠從其公共機構(gòu)結(jié)構(gòu)和私人參與水平，還有相對重要的國家和家庭推出。</p><p>　　文章結(jié)構(gòu)大致如下：在“國家參與教育”一章中簡要介紹了國家對教育資助的參與情況，在“高校貸款相關(guān)系統(tǒng)（SSUL）”一章中，我們提供了一個以前的學生貸款制度（即所謂的連帶貸款），以及分析其缺點總結(jié)。最后，在第“2005年學生貸款20.027號法律”這一章中我們講解新的模型，

57、并討論了其建立和可行性分析。</p><p><b>　　一、國家參與教育</b></p><p>　　教育可以被看做是對人的資本投資，換句話說就是以個人的學到的先進生產(chǎn)技能和知識作為回報。決定是否繼續(xù)學習的過程就好像是決定是否進行資本投資。個人學習的直接成本（學費等），主要是機會成本（由于不工作而犧牲的收入）。所以學習動因的經(jīng)濟解釋是，他或她必須完成學業(yè)來為過去能夠

58、得到的大部分的收入進行補償。人類資本理論的主要思想正是用以后的更多的收入為投資作出補償。</p><p>　　人力資本和篩選模型的重點都是教育的個人收益，但教育也是社會的收益。例如，加強社會凝聚力，未來高稅收（由于較高的收入），并增加其他生產(chǎn)力（經(jīng)濟范圍）。莫雷蒂（2002）發(fā)現(xiàn)，其他因素不變的情況下，如果城市大學生的人數(shù)上升了1％，將引起在不完全相關(guān)的員工薪酬增加，大學學生（1.9%），高中學生（1.6％）和其

59、他的學生（0.4％）。</p><p>　　教育與任何一種實物資本投資一樣都具有一個重要的限制，然而這兩種資本形式之間形成的財產(chǎn)權(quán)利的性質(zhì)卻是不同的。實際上，物質(zhì)資本能夠自由的在經(jīng)濟市場上轉(zhuǎn)移。但是在一個自由的社會，奴隸制度是不被允許的，因此人力資本不能夠在經(jīng)濟市場上自由轉(zhuǎn)移。工資和工作收入被視為等同于租用人力資本的報酬，甚至長期永久性的勞資關(guān)系更象是一場短期租賃合同序列概念化的承諾。</p>&l

60、t;p>　　此外，由于公共信息的缺乏，以及信息不對稱的存在，使得很難對潛在的不同職業(yè)的貸款人的預期收入進行評估。實際上，把國家助學貸款比作是按揭貸款，房子的買方通常都知道他或者她買的是什么，一輩子住的地方，房子不可能坍塌（而且為這種可能投遞保險，包括地震，火災，以及其他情況下的災難），而且是有關(guān)物業(yè)的價值及其在整個時間演變的歷史信息。但是學生不能確定所選擇的職業(yè)是不是不變的（因為他或者她面臨離職或者轉(zhuǎn)行的風險）。不被認可的學校的學

61、歷也是一種風險，某些職業(yè)有著面臨著明顯的就業(yè)風險，以及現(xiàn)有的關(guān)于智利勞工市場信息是稀缺的。原則上這些不對稱可能源于逆向選擇問題和道德風險（例如，一旦他/她收到的貸款，將不會努力學習），這些問題雖然能在貸款方案中能夠得到緩解，但是不能消除。</p><p>　　二、高校貸款相關(guān)的系統(tǒng)(SSUL)</p><p>　　自從20世紀80年代開始，學習費用是智利高等教育費用的一個重要的組成部分。9

62、0%的技術(shù)專業(yè)學校的學費根據(jù)學校和專業(yè)的不同，在1500美元到5000美元之間波動。鑒于在智利人均收入在9900美元（調(diào)整過的），得出了智利的高等教育的費用是在全世界最高的。雖然所花費的成本跟它們所產(chǎn)生的收入比例是不符合道理的，但是總得來說高等教育的收費是正當?shù)?，因為會產(chǎn)生的經(jīng)濟回報效益是較高的。正如付托路蘭博所推斷的，一個技術(shù)學院畢業(yè)的學生能夠獲得的工資是高中畢業(yè)的學生1.6倍，一個?？茖W校畢業(yè)的學生能夠獲得的工資是高中生2.8倍和大

63、學畢業(yè)的學生能夠獲得的工資是高中生的4倍?；緲藴室?guī)定下產(chǎn)生的學生貸款制度，使得投資在教育上的資金能夠產(chǎn)生盈利。特別是像智利這種存在收入分配特征的國家，超過20%的人都能夠通過自己的收入對高等教育成本進行融資。</p><p>　　雖然國家助學貸款制度在80年代初開始，但現(xiàn)在流行的模式起源于1994年被命名為大學貸款相關(guān)制度的制度。這項制度根據(jù)可能發(fā)生的未來收入來支付貸款，以15年為上限。這種傳統(tǒng)系統(tǒng)存在6個主要

64、限制。智利的教育系統(tǒng)可以被分為兩個部分，在這個意義上這兩種是并存的：一種是大學，學習綜合理論和專業(yè)技能的地方。另一種不是大學，提供職業(yè)技術(shù)培訓項目。在此框架內(nèi)，第一個限制是大學貸款相關(guān)制度沒有足夠的覆蓋面，只限于不到一半的大學（25個公共大學校長委員會（理事會全國）），不包括其余大學和非大學機構(gòu)（技術(shù)中心和技術(shù)專業(yè)學院）。其次，因為這是國家資金的融資，這種現(xiàn)行制度難以應對由于高等教育學生人數(shù)的高增長而產(chǎn)生的高增長的貸款需求，因此它的覆蓋

65、范圍將隨著時間的推移變得更加的不理想。第三，貸款收回率已經(jīng)非常低。第四，貸款利率只有一般貸款的2%，這意味著在智利個人在高等教育貸款上獲得的補貼是很大的，是該國收入水平的五分之一，即使其中大部分都來自貧困階層。第五，由于該貸款是資源的重新分配，獲得貸款的學生不需要就貸款產(chǎn)生提供任何的擔保。第六，分散管理使得分配缺乏公平，因為每個大學在學生的分配方式上都是自治的（因此很可能會</p><p>　　三、2005年頒布

66、的20027號助學貸款制度</p><p>　　在這個章節(jié)我們首先分析這個制度存在的挑戰(zhàn)，從公共政策的角度具體描述助學貸款制度。然后，我們描述這個系統(tǒng)的參與者是如何相互關(guān)聯(lián)影響的。</p><p>　?。ㄒ唬┵J款系統(tǒng)的描述</p><p>　　新的高等教育助學貸款制度（HESLS）是專門用來滿足某先決條件和/或者某種特征為目的的：新制度應該能夠滿足每年顯著增長的學生

67、貸款的數(shù)量的需要，不僅要滿足公共大學的需要還要滿足私人大學，專業(yè)機構(gòu)和技術(shù)中心的需要。</p><p>　　智利的過去20年的經(jīng)濟平均增長率為6%，這種增長帶來了更高的實際工資，使得更多的中產(chǎn)階級年輕人能夠進入高等教育。在2000年，每100個智利接受高等教育的學生之中來自最貧困的地方的只有5.8個，然而來自最富裕的地方的人有35.9個。因此新的貸款制度必須要提供足夠的覆蓋范圍。</p><p

68、>　　貸款需求是龐大的，因為在2005年高等教育注冊學生達到65萬人，并且以每年6%的增長速度一直增長到2010年。這一橫截面預測數(shù)據(jù)表明，目前18歲到24歲的學生接受高等教育的入學率相當于其他拉丁美洲國家（35%），比發(fā)達國家要低，比如西班牙（51％）或美國（74％）。</p><p>　　（二）根據(jù)需要分配貸款</p><p>　　在智利教育是一個有利可圖的投資。因此利用一些稀缺

69、的公共資源來資助接受高等教育的學生是明智的。例如，米扎拉和羅曼（2004）報告中指出在智利私人的高等教育回報率在22%，遠遠高于經(jīng)濟合作發(fā)展組織國家的估計。根據(jù)帕期奧普羅和帕特納斯（2004）估計，加拿大的高等教育回報率在8.4%，丹麥在7.9％，英國在18.1%，荷蘭在11.7%，匈牙利在13.4%，墨西哥在15.7%，新西蘭在11.9%和瑞典在9.4%。通過上述數(shù)據(jù)表明，高等教育獲得收益存在很大的困難，一個典型的可取制度是根據(jù)基本需

70、求的優(yōu)先來進行分別貸款，當學生達到最低要求標準，將給予適當?shù)馁J款。</p><p>　　（三）不歧視其他變數(shù)</p><p>　　該制度應確保其他基礎因素不受到歧視。嚴格的說，私人分配可能對某些因素差別對待。例如，對學生的性別，專業(yè)，目前所在的年級，接受高等教育的學校。實際上，如果這些標準沒有明確的規(guī)定，名望低的學校的學生和高離職率的專業(yè)的學生，在貸款成本方面將受到歧視對待。</p&