利潤(rùn)及其操縱外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　中文3482字</b></p><p>　　THE PROFIT AND ITS MANIPULATION</p><p>　　Masca Ema </p><p>　　Universitatea “Petru Maior”, Tg. Mures, bld. 1 Decembrie 1918, nr. 13/1

2、0, 0265266237, E-mail: </p><p>　　masca_ema@yahoo.com</p><p>　　In the light of recent corporate scandals, accounting today as an objective way of presenting economic reality is suffering from a r

3、eal crisis of confidence. Central to the Anglo-Saxon system of corporate governance, it has been pushed into the public spotlight, where its impartiality and objectivity is being questioned.</p><p>　　Keyword

4、s: profit, manipulation, management</p><p>　　The Positive Accounting Theory and profit manipulation</p><p>　　Even though most of the scandals have taken place in the United States, the crisis of

5、 confidence has had an impact far beyond U.S. borders, as the Anglo-Saxon system of governance is spreading throughout continental Europe and particularly in France. </p><p>　　In order to contain the crisis,

6、 the United States and France are committed to institutional and legal reform. Moreover, those identified as having perpetrated such manipulation, essentially auditors and financial directors, have been legally sanctione

7、d. We should nonetheless question whether these legal and legislative measures will be sufficient to restore long-term confidence in the system. Bernard Collase is asking himself if shouldn’t the social dimension of the

8、issue be taken into account? </p><p>　　Tenants of Positive Accounting Theory have represented the mainstream of accounting research since the early 80s. They see profit manipulation, which they euphemistical

9、ly call “earnings management”, from an exclusively economic standpoint.</p><p>　　How and why do management controllers take part in profit manipulation?</p><p>　　That shareholder pressure leads

10、management controllers to manipulate their firm’s profits. Going beyond individual responsibility, the organization imposed on a company by its shareholders with the aim of respecting criteria of Anglo-Saxon corporate go

11、vernance is itself the cause of accounting manipulation at all levels.</p><p>　　First, we will define the notion of “earnings management”, present a range of practices, and assess the role of management cont

12、rollers in this phenomenon. We will observe that management controllers implement different methods for manipulating profit.</p><p>　　Skill in profit manipulation enables management controllers to gain legit

13、imacy in the eyes of managers working in a cultural context that is traditionally difficult for them. They soon become indispensable strategic allies playing the role of arbiter between the markets’ short-sightedness and

14、 the imperatives of operational management.</p><p>　　Schipper proposes a representative academic definition of profit manipulation that she refers to as “earnings management”, similarly to the vast majority

15、of literature on this subject. She defines profit manipulation as: “a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain”. Healy and Walhen identify two ma

16、in incentives for profit manipulation: contracts written in terms of accounting numbers; and capital market expectations and v</p><p>　　The first perspective is supported by the tenants of Positive Accountin

17、g Theory. They suggest that contracts between the firm and its stakeholders create incentives for earnings management. Precisely, they propose three hypotheses: the bonus plan hypothesis (directors who benefit from bonus

18、es tied to profits are more prone to using accounting techniques that transfer future profits into the present); the debt/equity hypothesis (the more a company is in debt, the more it is in its interest to foc</p>

19、<p>　　The second perspective suggests that the goal of earnings manipulation is to be in line with the expectations of the financial markets. Dechow and Skinner underline that academics have mainly focused on contr

20、actual incentives, much more than on the influence of capital markets on earnings management and that “this focus has been sustained by the assumption that markets are efficient”.</p><p>　　Profit manipulatio

21、n can take two forms: earnings management and falsification. Earnings management involves postponing the period affected by an operation by changing the measurement methods, speeding up a sale or delaying a purchase.<

22、/p><p>　　Here, we can make out in the background earnings management as limited to manipulating accounting figures,rather than to profit manipulation that involves acting on real business situations. Falsificat

23、ion involves disclosing wrongful data. In this case, such actions may be considered criminal. However, the fine line between these two types of manipulation remains blurred.</p><p>　　Several profit manipulat

24、ion strategies can be applied: smoothing reduces the variance of earnings and therefore to reduce perceived risk; big bath accounting wipes the slate clean for a new appointed director; or quite simply opportunistic mana

25、gement, the phenomenon supported by tenants of Positive Accounting Theory.</p><p>　　Some of these techniques are the privilege of “headquarters” level, i.e. boardrooms deciding to manipulate corporate result

26、s so that consolidated accounts provide the “expected” figures. Other practices presented beloware also used at other levels in the organizations.</p><p>　　Positive Accounting Theory researchers almost exclu

27、sively focus on top-management level profit manipulation.</p><p>　　We deny the hypothesis according to which the director is alone in making accounting decisions. Internal contracting, most often covered in

28、Positive Accounting Theory, deals with the compensation hypothesis. In this area, results from different studies are contradictory. Few studies in the context of Positive Accounting Theory look at internal earnings manag

29、ement. Smoothing could be destined to (1) external users of financial statements, such as investors and creditors, and (2) management itself</p><p>　　There are few empirical studies on internal profit manipu

30、lation. Pressure to reach net earnings or budgeted expenses encourages managers to move earnings from year to year by manipulating the accounts. That profit manipulation depends in large part on the forecasting process.

31、In fact, at each level in the organization expectations may be established in one of three ways. Firstly, an independent estimate can be reached independently from any other in the organization. Secondly, an estimate can

32、 be</p><p>　　The organization of such protection was an imaginative task for the accounting staff.</p><p>　　Lastly, another factor which explains profit manipulation: the result of these case st

33、udies indicates that the interdependence of forecasts at different levels when forecasts have been made by disaggregating may encourage managers to take a series of defensive positions and make the information and report

34、ing systems opaque. How much profit manipulation takes place does not only depend on how accounting is used to evaluate the performance of managers and their pay but also how forecasts are made </p><p>　　The

35、 agency model in a French context</p><p>　　Profit manipulation performed by management controllers must be put in perspective. The Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance is consistent with a specific cult

36、ural context, and lends factual data, and therefore accounts, a special status. Indeed, the American approach to collecting and handling factual data is intimately tied to the American way of life. Judicial or quasi-judi

37、cial procedures, which are held in high esteem, give fundamental value to material proof. The way data is collected </p><p>　　The French distinguish two roles factual data is likely to play: enabling us to u

38、nderstand better how things work; and providing a means of assessing people. In the French system, confusing these two roles (which is perfectly legitimate in the United States) generates resistance. The controller’s sen

39、se of responsibility alone (meaning what he feels responsible for, and not what he needs to account for) makes him pay attention to information he receives. The French model hardly encourages us to j</p><p>

40、　　As a consequence, it is the legitimacy of accounts that lies at the heart of the debate in a French context. In general, accounts can be seen as perfectly legitimate by an individual, when they are only seen as signals

41、 enabling him to see clearly the direct and indirect consequences of his actions, leaving him room to draw his own conclusions. Such an approach seems well adapted to the way one’s sense of duty is expressed in French so

42、ciety. It is expected that accounts would encourage stakeholde</p><p>　　In the Anglo-Saxon model of governance, accounts are part of a conception, which completely opposes what would most likely be accepted

43、in France. Designed as strictly financial instruments and short-term assessment criteria, they lose all legitimacy. Since factual data in France has no sacred value, changing or inventing it does not constitute a major t

44、ransgression. From that point on, manipulating accounts seems to be an ethical practice, almost natural, an act so anchored in everyday values th</p><p>　　The relevance of Positive Accounting Theory</p>

45、;<p>　　Positive Accounting Theory, which studies accounting choices, has been overly interested in earnings management. Despite this attention, academic research has shown limited evidence of earnings management.&

46、lt;/p><p>　　We focus on two points: the methodology chosen, and the model of man.</p><p>　　Theory positions itself in an objective perspective which consists in discerning earnings management from

47、accounting documents, and checking the validity of economic hypotheses formulated on the behavior of managers regarding earnings management.</p><p>　　Moreover, Positive Accounting Theory researchers examine

48、large samples of firms to make general statements about earnings management. Dechow and Skinner argue that researchers “tend to use statistical definition of earnings management that may not be very powerful in identifyi

49、ng earnings management”, and conclude that “the current research methodologies simply are not that good at identifying earnings management”.</p><p>　　The study of accounting is a social science, an accountin

50、g theory that seeks to explain and predict accounting cannot divorce accounting research from the study of people. The contracting approach to studying accounting requires researchers to understand the incentives of cont

51、racting parties. The positive accounting literature explains why accounting is used and provides a framework for predicting accounting choices; choices are made in terms of individual objectives and the effects of accoun

52、tin</p><p>　　Aren’t agency theoreticians victims of “scholastic fallacy” by portraying man as a rational calculator in all situations? Whilst studying the social realm can only be achieved by considering tha

53、t social agents don’t just do any old thing, that they are not mad, and that they don’t act without purpose, this doesn’t necessarily mean they are opportunists. We have sought to understand practices, to find the reason

54、s that drive people to act as they do.</p><p>　　We have noted that management controllers give reasons for manipulating profits that differ according to their position: a search for legitimacy or an ethical

55、stance. We cannot therefore reduce this behaviour to the level of opportunism as put forward by Positive Accounting Theory.</p><p>　　Trying to predict behavior without trying to understand it is an illusion.

56、 This way of modelling behavior therefore teaches us very little about what drives the behavior of accounting decision-makers. Does the Positive</p><p>　　Accounting Theory acceptance and use by the scientifi

57、c community necessarily imply its validity? Is this not simply the shadow of economic imperialism passing over the field of accounting research ?</p><p>　　References:</p><p>　　1. Colasse B. Audi

58、ter, une mission impossible? Sociétal 2003; No. 39, http://www.societal.fr</p><p>　　2. Dechow P, Skinner DJ. “Earnings management: reconciling the views of accounting academics,</p><p>　　pr

59、actitioners, and regulators”, “Accounting Horizons”, No. 14, 2000,</p><p>　　3. Lambert, C. and Sponem, S., “Corporate governance and profit manipulation: a French field study”,</p><p>　　“Critica

60、l Perspectives on Accounting”, No. 16, 2005,</p><p>　　4. Ristea, M., Olimid, L., Calu, A., “Sisteme contabile comparate”, Corpul Contabililor Autorizatidin</p><p>　　Romania, Bucuresti, 2006</

61、p><p>　　http://steconomice.uoradea.ro/anale/volume/2007/v2-finances-accounting-and-banks/95.pdf February 23,2012</p><p><b>　　利潤(rùn)及其操縱</b></p><p>　　摘要：最近的公司丑聞表明，會(huì)計(jì)作為現(xiàn)今一種體現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)事實(shí)

62、的客觀的方式，其正遭受到信任危機(jī)。作為盎格魯—撒克遜的公司治理體系的核心，它已經(jīng)成為公眾關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)，其公正性和客觀性正受到質(zhì)疑。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞：利潤(rùn)，操縱，管理</p><p>　　積極會(huì)計(jì)理論和利潤(rùn)操縱</p><p>　　盡管大部分的丑聞發(fā)生在美國(guó)，但信任危機(jī)的影響已遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出了美國(guó)邊界，盎格魯—撒克遜治理體系席卷整個(gè)歐洲大陸，特別是在法國(guó)的盛行。&

63、lt;/p><p>　　為了遏制危機(jī)，美國(guó)和法國(guó)都致力于體制與法律的改革。此外，被認(rèn)定為進(jìn)行了這樣的操縱的審計(jì)師及財(cái)務(wù)董事都已經(jīng)受到法律制裁。不過(guò)，我們應(yīng)該質(zhì)疑這些法律和立法措施是否將足以恢復(fù)系統(tǒng)的長(zhǎng)期信心。Bernard ? Collase反復(fù)問(wèn)自己，是否不應(yīng)該考慮社會(huì)層面的問(wèn)題呢？是不是有必要先了解背后操縱利潤(rùn)的原因，以及它如何在法律改變前運(yùn)作？</p><p>　　積極會(huì)計(jì)理論是80年代

64、初以來(lái)的會(huì)計(jì)研究的主流。他們從純經(jīng)濟(jì)的角度來(lái)看利潤(rùn)操縱，并委婉地稱(chēng)之為“盈余管理”。</p><p>　　為什么管理層要操縱利潤(rùn)？來(lái)自于股東的壓力使得管理層需要去操縱其公司的利潤(rùn)。其股東為了遵循盎格魯—撒克遜治理體系的目標(biāo)而對(duì)公司施壓，這就使得各個(gè)層次上均出現(xiàn)了會(huì)計(jì)操縱。</p><p>　　首先，我們將會(huì)以一系列目前常見(jiàn)的方法來(lái)定義“盈余管理”的概念，并評(píng)估管理層在這種現(xiàn)象中所起的作用。

65、我們將研究管理層實(shí)施操縱利潤(rùn)而采用的不同方法。利潤(rùn)操縱的技能，使得管理層能在經(jīng)理人員眼中找到合法性。而這些在傳統(tǒng)的文化背景下，對(duì)他們而言是十分困難的。他們很快就成為不可或缺的戰(zhàn)略盟友，在市場(chǎng)的短視和經(jīng)營(yíng)管理的必要性之間扮演仲裁者的角色。</p><p>　　Schipper提出了一個(gè)有代表性的學(xué)術(shù)定義，即“盈余管理”。在這一問(wèn)題上，大多數(shù)文獻(xiàn)的表述是像類(lèi)似。他對(duì)于利潤(rùn)操縱所下的定義為：“在對(duì)外財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的過(guò)程中有目

66、的的干預(yù)，并獲得一些私利的意圖”。 Healy 和Walhen認(rèn)為兩個(gè)操縱利潤(rùn)的主要誘因是：賬面的會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)字和資本市場(chǎng)的預(yù)期和估值。</p><p>　　第一個(gè)觀點(diǎn)是被積極會(huì)計(jì)理論的擁護(hù)者所支持。他們認(rèn)為，公司及其利益相關(guān)者之間的合同為盈余管理創(chuàng)造激勵(lì)。準(zhǔn)確地說(shuō)，他們提出了三種假設(shè)：獎(jiǎng)金計(jì)劃假設(shè)（董事將從利潤(rùn)中獲得獎(jiǎng)金，這使得其更容易使用會(huì)計(jì)方法，未來(lái)的利潤(rùn)轉(zhuǎn)移到當(dāng)前）；債務(wù)/權(quán)益假說(shuō)（公司的債務(wù)越多，則它越關(guān)注當(dāng)

67、前的盈利水平，因?yàn)樵诿绹?guó)債務(wù)契約都需要維持一定的盈利水平）；政治成本假說(shuō)（公司越大，則它越愿意推遲的利潤(rùn)到未來(lái)的會(huì)計(jì)期間，以面對(duì)任何正在實(shí)施的繁重的立法的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)）。</p><p>　　第二個(gè)觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，利潤(rùn)操縱的目標(biāo)是要符合金融市場(chǎng)的預(yù)期。Dechow和Skinner強(qiáng)調(diào)，學(xué)者的研究主要集中在合同的激勵(lì)機(jī)制，而不僅局限在資本市場(chǎng)盈余管理的影響，這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)的假設(shè)是市場(chǎng)是持續(xù)有效的。利潤(rùn)操縱行為可以采取兩種方式：盈余管理

68、和偽造。盈余管理涉及是一個(gè)推遲期間的操作，通過(guò)計(jì)量方法的改變，加快銷(xiāo)售或推遲購(gòu)買(mǎi)來(lái)影響利潤(rùn)。在這里，我們的盈余管理僅限操縱會(huì)計(jì)指標(biāo)，而不是人為操縱涉及到作用于實(shí)際的業(yè)務(wù)情況的利潤(rùn)。偽造涉及披露錯(cuò)誤的數(shù)據(jù)。在這種情況下，這種行為可能被視為犯罪。然而，利潤(rùn)操縱于兩種類(lèi)型的之間的界限目前仍然是模糊。</p><p>　　可應(yīng)用幾種利潤(rùn)操縱策略有：平滑地減少收益的方差，從而降低可感知風(fēng)險(xiǎn)；大浴盆操作，委任新的董事或采用簡(jiǎn)

69、單的機(jī)會(huì)主義管理，這些方法被積極會(huì)計(jì)理論所支持。其中的一些技術(shù)是處于首要位置上的，換而言之，董事會(huì)決定操縱公司業(yè)績(jī)以使得賬目能提供“預(yù)期”的數(shù)字。下面介紹的其他做法也可用于組織中其他層次。</p><p>　　積極會(huì)計(jì)理論的研究者幾乎全部集中于高層管理的利潤(rùn)操縱。</p><p>　　積極會(huì)計(jì)理論的研究者幾乎全部集中于高層管理的利潤(rùn)操縱。我們拒絕由董事單獨(dú)進(jìn)行會(huì)計(jì)決策的假設(shè)。內(nèi)部承包是積極

70、會(huì)計(jì)理論中最常見(jiàn)的內(nèi)容，其用來(lái)處理彌補(bǔ)假說(shuō)。在這方面，從不同的研究結(jié)果是矛盾的，而積極會(huì)計(jì)理論研究?jī)?nèi)部收益管理方面的較少。緩和可能是注定（1）財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的外部使用者，如投資者和債權(quán)人（2）管理者自身。更具體地說(shuō)，應(yīng)該指出的是，緩和收入的動(dòng)機(jī)并不局限于高層管理人員。較低層的管理人員可能會(huì)試圖高層管理人員。他們可能會(huì)盡量滿(mǎn)足預(yù)定的預(yù)算，預(yù)算除了有預(yù)測(cè)功能，也可作為評(píng)價(jià)的尺度。大多數(shù)的業(yè)務(wù)部分經(jīng)理人員僅操縱其所屬的部門(mén)。</p>

71、<p>　　很少有關(guān)于內(nèi)部利潤(rùn)操縱的積極研究。來(lái)自實(shí)現(xiàn)凈利潤(rùn)或預(yù)算開(kāi)支的目標(biāo)的壓力，這使得經(jīng)理人員通過(guò)操縱賬目來(lái)將盈利在個(gè)年度間轉(zhuǎn)移。利潤(rùn)操縱很大程度上取決于企業(yè)的預(yù)測(cè)活動(dòng)。事實(shí)上，企業(yè)每個(gè)層級(jí)的預(yù)測(cè)活動(dòng)都是建立在以下三種方法中的一種之上：首先，一個(gè)獨(dú)立的估計(jì)可以使結(jié)果獨(dú)立于企業(yè)中的其他部門(mén)。其次，上一級(jí)估計(jì)可以由下級(jí)組織所作的估計(jì)匯總得到。第三，估計(jì)可以通過(guò)分解達(dá)到更高的水平估。一個(gè)在未能達(dá)到預(yù)期的反應(yīng)，是做創(chuàng)造性的賬簿記錄

72、作為成本交叉分配的證據(jù)，以防止來(lái)自外部的批評(píng)的單位和保護(hù)聲譽(yù)。</p><p>　　這種組織保護(hù)的方式是對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)人員想象力的挑戰(zhàn)。</p><p>　　最后，還有另一個(gè)因素可解釋利潤(rùn)操縱：一些案例研究的結(jié)果表明，不同層次的預(yù)測(cè)相互依賴(lài)而當(dāng)預(yù)測(cè)被分解時(shí)，可能會(huì)鼓勵(lì)經(jīng)理采取了一系列的防御措施，使信息和報(bào)告制度變得不透明。多少利潤(rùn)操縱發(fā)生并不但取決于如何評(píng)價(jià)的管理人員的業(yè)績(jī)和影響他們的薪酬，而且也

73、將影響作為績(jī)效考核基準(zhǔn)的選擇。因此，積極會(huì)計(jì)理論所提出的薪酬假說(shuō)并不足以解釋內(nèi)部利潤(rùn)操縱。</p><p><b>　　代理模式在法國(guó)情況</b></p><p>　　管理層的利潤(rùn)操縱行為必須被正確地看待。 盎格魯—撒克遜公司治理體系應(yīng)當(dāng)與一個(gè)特定的文化背景、實(shí)際數(shù)據(jù)、那些賬戶(hù)和特殊的地位相一致。事實(shí)上，用美國(guó)的方法來(lái)收集和處理實(shí)際數(shù)據(jù)這是美國(guó)人的生活方式密切相關(guān)的。

74、崇高的司法或準(zhǔn)司法程序能為證明材料提供基本價(jià)值。數(shù)據(jù)收集和使用的方式反映對(duì)于賬戶(hù)美國(guó)式的偏好，每一個(gè)人都想公開(kāi)。會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)表完全符合這種思維方式。法國(guó)式區(qū)分兩種實(shí)際數(shù)據(jù)的方法像是：使我們更好地理解事情是如何工作，并提供了一個(gè)可評(píng)價(jià)人的手段。在法國(guó)的制度中，混淆??這兩個(gè)情況（而這在美國(guó)是完全合法的）會(huì)產(chǎn)生沖突。管理層法人責(zé)任意識(shí)，會(huì)使他注意他收到的信息（這意味著什么，他認(rèn)識(shí)到了什么他的負(fù)責(zé)，而不是他所需要負(fù)的責(zé)任）。法國(guó)模式很難鼓勵(lì)我們每個(gè)

75、人對(duì)這些數(shù)據(jù)的基礎(chǔ)上判斷，反而上級(jí)的要求過(guò)于嚴(yán)格的。下屬們可能會(huì)將他們的工作至于一個(gè)不透明的保護(hù)罩中來(lái)保護(hù)他們自身，但這樣做卻不會(huì)被視為非法行為。</p><p>　　因此，在法國(guó)方面的爭(zhēng)論的核心在于賬戶(hù)的合法性。在一般情況下，當(dāng)它們只被看作使人能夠清楚地看到行動(dòng)的直接和間接后果的標(biāo)志時(shí)，單個(gè)賬戶(hù)可以被認(rèn)為是完全合法的，并為其得出它的結(jié)論留下了空間。這種做法似乎很符合在法國(guó)社會(huì)中責(zé)任感的表達(dá)方式。狹隘或短期目標(biāo)會(huì)

76、導(dǎo)致他們忽視賬戶(hù)將鼓勵(lì)股東在他們的行動(dòng)考慮到了自己的責(zé)任。</p><p>　　在盎格魯—撒克遜模式治理體系中，賬戶(hù)作為概念的一部分，這完全否認(rèn)了最有可能在法國(guó)被接受的一部分。被設(shè)計(jì)為嚴(yán)苛的金融工具和短期評(píng)估標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，他們失去了所有的合法性。法國(guó)的實(shí)際數(shù)據(jù)沒(méi)有公允的價(jià)值，改變或創(chuàng)造它不構(gòu)成重大過(guò)錯(cuò)。從這一點(diǎn)上看，操縱賬戶(hù)似乎是一個(gè)道德行為，幾乎是自然的，且其深深扎根于日常生活中，每個(gè)人甚至可能沒(méi)有意識(shí)到這一點(diǎn)。<

77、;/p><p>　　積極會(huì)計(jì)理論的相關(guān)性</p><p>　　在積極會(huì)計(jì)理論所研究的領(lǐng)域，選擇研究盈余管理已經(jīng)是一個(gè)熱點(diǎn)。盡管這種學(xué)術(shù)研究已顯示出對(duì)于盈余管理中證據(jù)的有限。我們專(zhuān)注于兩點(diǎn)：方法的選擇和人的模型。理論定位在一個(gè)客觀的角度，包括來(lái)自于會(huì)計(jì)憑證管理的挑剔的盈利和檢查進(jìn)行盈余管理經(jīng)理的行為的經(jīng)濟(jì)假設(shè)的有效性。</p><p>　　此外，積極會(huì)計(jì)理論的研究人員通過(guò)

78、研究大量企業(yè)的樣本，得到有關(guān)盈余管理的一般性結(jié)論。Dechow和Skinner說(shuō)：“研究人員傾向于使用盈余管理的統(tǒng)計(jì)定義，這可能不能很有力的識(shí)別盈余管理”，并總結(jié)到，“目前的研究方法根本無(wú)法很好地識(shí)別盈余管理”。</p><p>　　會(huì)計(jì)研究是一門(mén)社會(huì)科學(xué)，其是目標(biāo)在于試圖解釋和預(yù)測(cè)。會(huì)計(jì)研究不能脫離對(duì)人的研究。合同激勵(lì)方法需要了會(huì)計(jì)研究人員了解締約雙方。積極會(huì)計(jì)文獻(xiàn)解釋了為什么使用會(huì)計(jì)和為預(yù)測(cè)會(huì)計(jì)選擇提供了一個(gè)

79、框架，選擇個(gè)人目標(biāo)和實(shí)現(xiàn)這些目標(biāo)的會(huì)計(jì)方法的影響。</p><p>　　理論上的“學(xué)術(shù)謬誤”不是代理的，所描繪人在所有情況下作為一個(gè)理性的計(jì)算的受害者？研究社會(huì)領(lǐng)域只能通過(guò)考慮社會(huì)代理不只是做任何舊的東西，他們是不是瘋了而不采取行動(dòng)，這并不一定意味著他們是機(jī)會(huì)主義者。我們力求理解這一做法，找到驅(qū)使來(lái)使得他們這么做的原因。</p><p>　　我們能注意到，管理層對(duì)于操縱利潤(rùn)，會(huì)根據(jù)自己的立

80、場(chǎng)有所不同的原因，而尋找合法性或道德立場(chǎng)的。因此，通過(guò)積極會(huì)計(jì)來(lái)理論，我們不能減少提出這種行為的機(jī)會(huì)主義水平。</p><p>　　試圖預(yù)測(cè)的行為，而不試圖去理解它是一種錯(cuò)覺(jué)。因此，這種建模行為方式很少告訴我們是什么驅(qū)使了會(huì)計(jì)決策者的行為，正如積極者那樣做得。</p><p>　　會(huì)計(jì)理論被科學(xué)界接受和使用一定意味著它的有效性？這不只是為了通過(guò)上述在會(huì)計(jì)領(lǐng)域內(nèi)的研究來(lái)驅(qū)散經(jīng)濟(jì)帝國(guó)主義的陰影