外文翻譯--跨境合并和收購歐洲、美國的經(jīng)驗

1、<p><b>　　Ⅲ.外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　外文原稿之一</b></p><p>　　Cross-border merges and acquisitions:</p><p>　　The European—US experience</p><p>　　Auth

2、or: R.J.Kish.</p><p>　　Nationality: America</p><p>　　Source: Journal of Multinational Financial Management 1998(8)</p><p><b>　　434-43</b></p><p>　　Original

3、text：</p><p>　　Factors motivating cross-border acquisition </p><p>　　In her extensive discussion of the merge and acquisition process McDonough Bergson (1990) proposes that the following factors

4、 motivate many companies to acquire firms: the desire to spread products and diversify risks geographically; to gain back-up products; to exploit synergies; and to attain economies of scale. However, she cautions that wo

5、rkforce problem, poor facilities, as well as social and technological difference may expose the acquiring company new risks. Other studies in the area of c</p><p>　　Favorable acquisition factors </p>

6、<p>　　Although there are a number of factors that favor acquisition activity, we focus on those that seem to affect cross-border acquisitions between the US and EU. These factors include exchange rates diversificati

7、ons, and economic conditions in the home country, as well as technology and human resource.</p><p>　　Exchange rates</p><p>　　Currents and foretasted future exchange rates affect the home currenc

8、y equivalent of acquisition prices, as well as the present value of future cash flows accruing to the acquired firm; </p><p>　　Therefore, the dominant effect in any particular case is ultimately an empirical

9、 question. Existing studies, predictably, arrive at different conclusions concerning the role of exchange rates. For example, foot and Stein (1991) propose that, while there is a relationship between the exchange-rates a

10、nd acquisition activity, there is no evidence that a change in the exchange rate improve the position of foreign acquirers relative to their US counterparts. They contend that when the dollar deprecia</p><p>

11、;　　Diversification</p><p>　　This argument is based on the empirical observation that covariance of returns across different economy. It follows that the prospective acquiring company must first decide on its

12、 desired levels of risk and return. Only then should it attempt to acquire ongoing foreign concerns, companies may be able to circumvent tariff and non-tariff barriers, thereby improving their risk-return trade-off by lo

13、wering the level of unsystematic risk.</p><p>　　Economic conditions in the acquiring firm’s home country should facilitate cross-border acquisitions as a means for increasing demand and levels of diversifica

14、tion. On the other hand, adverse economic conditions, such as a slump, recession, or capital market constraints, may cause prospective acquiring firms to concentrate on their domestic business while postponing any intern

15、ational strategic moves. </p><p>　　Acquisition of technological and human resources</p><p>　　If a firm falls behind in the level of technological knowledge necessary to efficiently in its indust

16、ry, and it is unable or unwilling to obtain the required technology through research and development, then it may attempt to acquire a foreign firm which is technologically more advanced. In their study, Cebenoyan et al.

17、(1992) support this point, showing that the expansion into new market through acquisitions allows firms to gain competitive advantage from the possession of special resources.</p><p>　　Unfavorable acquisitio

18、n factors</p><p>　　The factors discussed thus far generally tend to encourage firms to make cross-border acquisitions. In contrast there are other variables that often appear to restrain cross-border combina

19、tion. These include information asymmetry, monopolistic power, as well as government restrictions and regulations.</p><p>　　Information asymmetry</p><p>　　Roll (1986) contends that information a

20、bout a prospective target firm (e.g. market share, sales, and cash flow forecasts) is crucial in the decision-making process of acquiring firm. If the necessary information is not available, Roll (1986) argues that the p

21、rospective acquiring firm may be forced to delay or discontinue its plants, even though the foreign firm appears to be an attractive target. In contrast, Stoughton (1988) argues that information effects are not always ha

22、rmful. He points out </p><p>　　Monopolistic power</p><p>　　If a firm enjoys monopolistic power (a difficult prospect in the US, due to antitrust laws), then entry into the industry become more d

23、ifficult for potential competitors, domestic or foreign. Moreover, a monopolist is much more likely to resist a takeover attempt. Other barriers to entry that make cross-border acquisition especially difficult within a m

24、onopolistic environment include extensive outlays for research and development, capital expenditures necessary to establish greenfield productio</p><p>　　Government reconstructions and regulations </p>

25、;<p>　　Most governments have some form of takeover regulations in place. In many instances, government approval is mandatory before an acquisition by a foreign firm can occur. In addition, there may exist governme

26、nt restrictions on capital repatriations, dividend payouts, intercompany interest payments, and other remittances. Scholes and Wolfsan (1990) for example, discuss periods in the US where regulatory events discouraged acq

27、uisition activity; they cite the William’s Amendments</p><p>　　And the Tax Reform Act of 1969 as significant legal and regulatory changes that contributed to a significant showdown in merger activity in the

28、1960s. In addition, Scholes and Wolf son (1990) argue that there was a similar impact resulting from changes in US tax laws in the 1980s, because those changes increased transaction costs in acquisitions involving US sel

29、lers and foreign buyers. On the other hand, Dewenter (1995) contends that her empirical findings in the chemical and retail industry con</p><p><b>　　中文譯文之一</b></p><p><b>　　跨境合并

30、和收購：</b></p><p><b>　　歐洲、美國的經(jīng)驗</b></p><p>　　作者：R.J.Kish。</p><p><b>　　國籍：美國</b></p><p>　　出處：《跨國公司財務(wù)管理》，第八卷，第四期，1998年11月，434-437</p>&

31、lt;p><b>　　1.跨境收購的因素</b></p><p>　　McDonough Bergson(1990)，在關(guān)于合并和收購的廣泛討論中提出以下因素促使許多公司去收購國外公司：一是不同的領(lǐng)域傳播產(chǎn)品和分散風險；二是獲得備用產(chǎn)品；三是充分發(fā)揮并購的協(xié)同作用；四是達到規(guī)模經(jīng)濟。然而，她注意到，勞動力問題、落后的生產(chǎn)設(shè)施，以及社會形式和技術(shù)水平上的差異可能導(dǎo)致并購企業(yè)遭遇新的風險。

32、其他關(guān)于企業(yè)跨國并購的研究中把跨境并購形式產(chǎn)生的原因歸因于以下幾個競爭因素，包括有利的和不利的。我們的討論是建立在對這些因素的抽樣調(diào)查的基礎(chǔ)上的。在研究中，我們首先對收購的有利變量進行檢驗。(即變量出現(xiàn)會影響公司的關(guān)注跨境交易)，然后再對不力變量進行檢驗。同時，我們也會特別關(guān)注那些對研究范圍中的國家有直接聯(lián)系的因素。</p><p>　　1.1有利的收購因素</p><p>　　雖然很多因

33、素都有利于收購活動，但是目前我們更專注于那些影響歐美大陸之間并購活動的因素。這些因素包括各國之間的匯率、多元化發(fā)展的趨勢、本國的經(jīng)濟狀況發(fā)展狀況，以及科技發(fā)展水平和人力資源。</p><p><b>　　1.1.1匯率</b></p><p>　　現(xiàn)在和可以預(yù)見的未來匯率影響著以本國貨幣計算的收購價格，被收購公司未來現(xiàn)金流量的現(xiàn)值； </p><p

34、>　　因此，在任何情況下最重要的影響最終都將是是一個實證問題。從現(xiàn)有的研究中可以看出，研究者們對于匯率的作用各執(zhí)己見，尚未達成共識。例如，foot and Stein (1991)提出,雖然匯率變動與收購活動之間存在著一定的關(guān)系，但到目前為止還沒有任何確切的證據(jù)表明，匯率變動使外國收購者獲得比他們的美國同行更多的收益。他們認為，當美元貶值美時，任何一家公司無論展開何種業(yè)務(wù)，包括外國或國內(nèi)，美國都將是一個有利可圖的地方。此外，他們低

35、估了匯率變動對跨國并購活動的影響。相反，他們認為這對國際投資環(huán)境是十分有利的，在提高資本流動性和均衡性的同時也降低了投資的風險。Goldberg (1993)卻持截然相反的觀點。她發(fā)現(xiàn)美元的貶值會直接導(dǎo)致外商在美國投資業(yè)務(wù)的收縮。根據(jù)她的觀點，如果美元持續(xù)走強，那么我們會發(fā)現(xiàn)被收購的美國公司會增多而美國對外的收購活動會減少。然而，Harris and Ravens craft(1991)所得出的實驗結(jié)論與戈德堡的觀點又是相悖的。特別是，

36、他們認為美元貶值增加一些外國收購美國公司。</p><p><b>　　1.1.2多元化</b></p><p>　　這個論點是基于對不同經(jīng)濟的協(xié)方差的回歸直線的觀測中得出的。由此可見，當將來要收購某家公司時，首先需要考慮的因素是自身所期望報酬率和所能承受的與之相對應(yīng)的風險水平。與收購相關(guān)的其他需要考慮的問題都被放在這之后。通過權(quán)衡風險與報酬水平可以降低非系統(tǒng)風險，從

37、而企業(yè)也能規(guī)避關(guān)稅壁壘和非關(guān)稅壁壘的問題。</p><p>　　1.1.3本國經(jīng)濟條件</p><p>　　一方面，收購企業(yè)本國的經(jīng)濟條件應(yīng)當能夠促進跨國并購交易，并且能滿足日益增長的對多元化的需求。另一方面。例如經(jīng)濟下滑、衰退、尚未完全開放的資本市場經(jīng)濟很可能會導(dǎo)致將來企業(yè)在收購時只關(guān)注國內(nèi)的業(yè)務(wù)而忽視了國際戰(zhàn)略措施。</p><p>　　1.1.4技術(shù)與人才的培

38、養(yǎng)</p><p>　　如果一家公司對于其所處的產(chǎn)業(yè)所必需的技術(shù)水平相當匱乏，并且又不能或者不愿意通過技術(shù)開發(fā)和研究獲取這些必備的技術(shù)，那么它可以通過收購在這方面擁有先進技術(shù)的公司來彌補自身的缺陷以獲得發(fā)展。一個公司落后的技術(shù)知識水平必須有效地在它的產(chǎn)業(yè),它是不能或不愿意獲取所需的技術(shù)研究和開發(fā),然后通過它可能試圖收購?fù)鈬驹诩夹g(shù)上更先進。Cebenoyan (1992)，支持上述觀點，他的研究表明通過企業(yè)并購

39、獲得的擴張使得企業(yè)具有了特殊資源，并獲得了競爭優(yōu)勢。</p><p>　　1.2不利的收購因素</p><p>　　到目前為止我們所討論的因都是鼓勵企業(yè)間進行跨國并購活動的。然而，其他的可變因素也會抵制跨境并購活動的展開。這些不利因素包括信息的不對稱性，壟斷權(quán)力，以及政府出臺的抵制并購的法律法規(guī)。</p><p>　　1.2.1信息不對稱性</p>&

40、lt;p>　　Roll(1986)認為在制定并購決策的過程中，潛在的目標公司的信息是十分關(guān)鍵的(例如市場份額、銷量、現(xiàn)金流)。如果這些必要的信息無從獲得的話，Roll (1986)認為盡管這家外國公司看起來十分具有誘惑力，潛在收購方可能還是會被迫推遲或終止這項收購計劃。相反，Stoughton (1988)認為，信息的不對稱性帶來的影響并不總是有害的。他指出潛在收購者可以獲得與其他市場參與者相同的關(guān)于目標公司的信息。</p&

41、gt;<p><b>　　1.2.2壟斷力量</b></p><p>　　如果一個公司在市場上擁有壟斷權(quán)力(由于反托拉斯法存在，這種情況在美國的存在性是很小的)，那么無論是國內(nèi)還是國外的潛在競爭對手都很難進入這個行業(yè)對其造成威脅。并且，壟斷者會更容抵制這類收購的企圖。壟斷環(huán)境中其他成為跨國并購進入的主要障礙包括廣泛研究和開發(fā)支出，建立綠地生產(chǎn)設(shè)施，過大規(guī)模的廣告宣傳活動達到產(chǎn)品

42、差異化等必要的資本性支出。</p><p>　　1.2.3政府的約束</p><p>　　大多數(shù)政府都會執(zhí)行某種形式的收購法規(guī)。在許多情況下，在展開一個收購活動之前必須得到當?shù)卣恼J可和批準。此外，也可能存在政府限制資本返還，派發(fā)福利，公司內(nèi)部的利息支付和其他匯款的情況。以Scholes and Wolfsan (1990)為例，他們認為在美國監(jiān)管活動期間阻礙了收購活動的展開；為此他們列

43、舉了威廉的修正案。</p><p>　　1969年的稅收改革法案作為最重要的法律和法規(guī)的變化，促成了20世紀60年代企業(yè)并購活動的形成。此外，Scholes and Wolfsan (1990)認為，20世紀80年代稅收法案的變革也產(chǎn)生了一些類似的影響。這些改變增加了美國內(nèi)外企業(yè)并購交易者的成本。另一方面，Dewenter(1995)聲稱，她在化學(xué)和零售行業(yè)的實證結(jié)果卻恰恰與Scholes and Wolfsan

44、 (1990)相反。她總結(jié)了她的發(fā)現(xiàn)，20世紀80年代美國稅收制度的變化并不能為跨國并購活動水平提高任何解釋說明。然而，值得注意的是Dewenter(1995)只對1978年至1989年約占據(jù)了海外收購活動16%的兩個行業(yè)做了調(diào)查。Scholes and Wolfsan (1990)的研究卻包括了1968年到1987年大部分的行業(yè)。對從積極和消極兩個方面影響跨國并購的變量討論顯示，在涉及不同國家間的并購活動存在著一個附加的復(fù)雜性，而最基

45、本的合并分析方面保持不變。也就是說，合并或收購、國內(nèi)或國外，如果要估計的主要因素是未來現(xiàn)金流量，收購價格，融資成本，那么這些都可以在一個資本預(yù)算框架內(nèi)處理。因此，按理說，在宏觀層面上，</p><p><b>　　外文原稿之二</b></p><p>　　Acquirer Systematic Risk：</p><p>　　Evidence

46、on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions</p><p>　　Author： Sidney W. Yeomans</p><p>　　Nationality：America</p><p>　　Source： The degree of business administration with finance concentra

47、tion, Nova Southeastern University ,2004</p><p>　　Original text：</p><p>　　Managerial Risk Taking Following Acquisition </p><p>　　Researchers can think of the required performance im

48、provements as target reference points for managers with respect to preserving the value of the firm. Simulations clearly illustrated as the premium increases beyond certain levels, the likelihood of realizing the require

49、d improvements declines dramatically .It is the knowledge of the synergy trap and the results of the simulation analysis that allows upfront predictions about when managers are likely to miss their performance requiremen

50、ts and b</p><p>　　This discussion has largely focused on generating predictions about the systematic risk of targets and acquirers based on the value consequences and the interaction of those consequences in

51、 paying an acquisition premium. Future changes in the nature of resource commitments might take the form of changed in risk taking. </p><p>　　In the post-acquisition phase, the changes in managerial risk tak

52、ing could take two forms:(1)increasing the size of the bet on the current competitive game (such as a major advertising campaign),or(2) committing resources to new, higher-risk competitive games(such as a major distribut

53、ion system change or R&D venture),or both.</p><p>　　Why would the level of risk taking increase following an acquisition? Initially managers may have built increased risk into post-merger integration pla

54、ns to obtain a greater chance of positive returns from their resource allocation decision. But given the likelihood that as the acquisition premium increase, managers will predictably miss their performance targets the i

55、ssue is whether the level of risk taking will change over time.</p><p>　　A manager acting in an economically rational manner should, at any given point in time, evaluate the net present value of future decis

56、ions and not be affected by past decision. Simply put, is it better to divest or to continue ownership?</p><p>　　A substantial amount of evidence has shown that the assumption of economic rationality is rout

57、inely violated by managers. It is well documented managers may exhibit an escalation of commitment to a failing course of action. There are at least two approaches to risk taking that would motivate predications within t

58、his context.</p><p>　　One approach to the escalation of commitment phenomenon has been the self-justification hypothesis. Brockner, et.al(1986) has written escalation is determined, at least in part, “by dec

59、ision makers’ unwillingness to admit that their prior allocation of resources to the chosen course of action was in vain (the self-justification hypothesis).”O(jiān)ften managers do not want to admit defeat and will go to grea

60、t lengths to show their decisions were ultimately justified. This explanation is comparable to </p><p>　　The concept of escalating commitment has also been approached from the prospect theory perspective. Pr

61、ospect theory predicts that individuals will generally be risk seeking when they are losing but risk averse when they are winning-classic gambling behavior. Winning or losing is in relation to an arbitrary reference poin

62、t. The acquisition premium provides a clear target reference point for managers to use.</p><p>　　Then, as managers miss what may actually be unachievable performance targets and fall below their target refer

63、ence point into the domain of losses, they may increase their level of risk taking to attempt to upset these targets in the future. The analogy to this is a gambler sitting at a blackjack table who increases his bets as

64、he loses. These higher-risk strategies may simply be perceived as necessary by managers given the distance they must cover to preserve value. For example, recall when syn</p><p>　　Since higher levels of the

65、acquisition systematic risk will be associated with a greater likelihood of not achieving performance targets, it follows high levels of the premium will also be associated with increases in risk taking.</p><p

66、>　　Very little research has been done in the area of the effect of acquisitions on risk taking. Lubatkin and O’Nelii (1987) and Chatterjee and Lubatkin (1990) find larger decreases in systematic risk “than an investor

67、 can do his own” for relate mergers than unrelated merges. Unrelated mergers, however, are found to have larger absolute levels of systematic risk according to Chatterjee and Lubatkin (1990).As with the majority of the m

68、anagement literature on acquisitions; these results are not withou</p><p>　　The concept of changes in risk-taking behavior has not been considered in the post-acquisition environment. In other words, now mig

69、ht a given manager in two different post-acquisition performance environments react differently to a similar post-acquisition problem? Managerial actions do not lie in isolation of the performance environment, and so it

70、is important to consider how the risk-taking posture of executive teams may emerge post-acquisition.</p><p><b>　　中文譯文之二</b></p><p><b>　　收購后的風險</b></p><p>　　作

71、者：Sidney W. Yeomans </p><p><b>　　國籍：美國</b></p><p>　　出處：諾瓦東南大學(xué)博士論文，2004</p><p><b>　　中文譯文：</b></p><p>　　研究人員為管理者希望公司保值的愿望提供依稀必要措施作為目標參考值。模型清楚地說明，當

72、溢價超過某種程度時，意識到采取有效防范措施的可能性也就越小。這是協(xié)同效應(yīng)的陷阱，模型的分析結(jié)果，可以事前預(yù)測管理者在什么時候以及多達程度上達不到他們要求的目標。</p><p>　　本次討論主要關(guān)注對收購產(chǎn)生的系統(tǒng)性風險的預(yù)測，以及溢價收購所產(chǎn)生的后果。未來資源承諾的性質(zhì)的變化可能會采取不同的風險表現(xiàn)形式。</p><p>　　從并購之后的角度來看，管理風險的變化來自于兩個方面：(1) 在

73、當前激烈的競爭游戲中，所下的賭注的范圍越來越大(如一個重大的廣告活動)；(2)資源投入到風險更高新的競技游戲或兩者兼而有之。</p><p>　　為什么收購后的風險會增加？最初管理者為了增加從資源分配的決策中獲取高回報的機會采取高風險的并購整合計劃。但是要考慮到隨著收購溢價的增加，管理者很可能會忽視他們的業(yè)績，風險承擔水平是否隨時間而改變。</p><p>　　在任何情況下，一個理性的管理

74、者應(yīng)該評估一項決定未來現(xiàn)金流量的凈現(xiàn)值，而不是過去決策的影響。僅僅需要考慮是需要剝離資產(chǎn)呢還是繼續(xù)持有。</p><p>　　大量的證據(jù)表明，管理者經(jīng)常會違反經(jīng)濟合理性假說。這是有據(jù)可查的，在失敗的行動中，管理者可能會給出一個升級的承諾。在此情況下，至少有兩種承擔風險的突進可以起到激勵作用。</p><p>　　自我辯解假說是實現(xiàn)承諾升級現(xiàn)象的途徑之一。Brockner(1986)等人認為

75、承諾現(xiàn)象至少在一定程度上是肯定的，“決策者通常不愿意承認他們?yōu)榱诉x擇行動策略而進行事先分配資源的舉動是徒勞的(自我辯解假說)” 管理者通常是不愿承認失敗的，并會通過延長時間來證明他們的決定最終是合理的。這個解釋與金融界上的管理傲慢理論很相似。該理論認為管理者認為他們是一定可以達到所要的報酬。還有一些研究認為管理者在失敗的收購中提升承諾會使得撤資的決定被嚴重推遲。</p><p>　　承諾升級理論也是從前景理論的觀

76、點演變而來前景理論認為當人們失敗時會采取帶有風險的行動，反而在成功時采取風險規(guī)避的態(tài)度，這就是經(jīng)典的賭徒心理。</p><p>　　收購溢價為管理者提供了一個明確的目標參考點。那么，當管理者誤解了可能那些實際上不可能實現(xiàn)的戰(zhàn)略目標，并低于之前設(shè)定的目標參考點產(chǎn)生損失時，他們可能采取更高的風險企圖破壞未來的這些目標。就好像一個在賭場上賭輸?shù)馁€徒坐在酒桌旁，這無疑是會增加他的堵住的。考慮到保值的因素，管理者僅僅會認為

77、采取高風險的戰(zhàn)略是必需的。例如，在AT&T收購NCR的案例中，并未實現(xiàn)并購效應(yīng)，損失卻因此產(chǎn)生AT＆T在從未涉及的且沒有經(jīng)驗的全新市場和領(lǐng)域中在銷售團隊上花費了數(shù)百萬。</p><p>　　由于收購的系統(tǒng)性風險越高，無法事項戰(zhàn)略目標的可能性也就越大，同時，高溢價也會使承擔的風險增加。</p><p>　　至今為止，關(guān)于并購對于風險的影響的研究相當匱乏。Lubatkin、O’Neli

78、i (1987)，Chatterjee、Lubatkin (1990)發(fā)現(xiàn)，亦非相關(guān)合并相比，相關(guān)合并在降低單個投資者無法通過投資組合降低的系統(tǒng)風險上更有用。然而，Chatterjee和Lubatkin認為非相關(guān)合并有更高的絕對性水平的系統(tǒng)風險。和大多數(shù)有關(guān)并購管理的文獻的觀點一樣，這一結(jié)果是不容置疑的。Seth (1990)發(fā)現(xiàn)任何一種類型的并購都沒有顯著地降低系統(tǒng)風險，并得出結(jié)論減少測試并不是價值創(chuàng)造的來源。</p>