外文翻譯---中小企業(yè)融資在歐洲介紹和概述

1、<p>　　附錄C引用的外文文獻(xiàn)及其譯文</p><p>　　SME Financing in Europe: Introduction and Overview</p><p>　　Introducing the topic of SME finance and summarising the main findings of the contributions to this

2、 edition of the EIB Papers, this overview stresses the importance of relationship banking for the supply of SME credit; points out the differences and similarities in the capital structure of firms across size classe

3、s and across Europe; observes that while there is little evidence of widespread SME credit rationing, financial market imperfections may nevertheless curb SME growth; and highlights</p><p>　　Introduction<

4、/p><p>　　Some of the changes in Europe’s financial landscape should work in favour of SME finance. Firstly, new information and communication technologies contribute, at a lower cost, to reducing information

5、asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, thereby making SME lending more attractive (see, among others, Frame et al. 2001). Secondly, partly due to progress in information technology, new banking methods are being deve

6、loped and implemented. For instance, banks adopt new portfolio credit risk mode</p><p>　　Other features of Europe’s financial landscape have raised concerns about a possible deterioration of conditions for S

7、ME finance. Firstly, consolidation in national banking markets has reduced the number of banks and has in many EU countries, especially in the smaller ones, increased the market share of the top-five largest institutions

8、 . This may be detrimental to SME lending since there is evidence that large banks devote a lesser proportion of their assets to small business loans in compariso</p><p>　　why financing of SMEs tends to be m

9、ore challenging than financing of large firms. Reflecting these challenges, small businesses often have no other choice than to rely on bank relationships for their external financing while large firms may turn to bank

10、s as well as capital markets.</p><p>　　We will also elaborate on the benefits and costs of relationship banking and briefly consider the impact of bank competition on relationship banking. In Section 3, we d

11、iscuss the capital structure of the average European firm across different size classes and review similar results for Italy, Germany, and France. In Section 4, we evaluate whether SMEs in Europe suffer from credit const

12、raints and whether financial market imperfections hamper the growth of companies. Section 5 begins with a brie</p><p>　　2. Capital structure of the average firm across size classes</p><p>　　In

13、 analysing the capital structure of firms, Wagenvoort distinguishes five different size</p><p>　　classes: very small, small, medium-sized, large, and very large firms. To motivate this analysis, one needs t

14、o bear in mind that a possible lack of external financing for small businesses could show up on the liability side of their balance sheet. Looking over a long period and at Europe as a whole, the ratio of equity to total

15、 liabilities is broadly similar across size classes and, therefore, leverage is more or less the same for a typical SME and a typical large firm. The ratio of financial d</p><p>　　However, Wagenvoort also sh

16、ows that there are striking differences in the capital structure of the average SME across EU countries. The three country studies confirm this result. Guiso shows that the financial debt of small Italian firms in propor

17、tion to their total assets is substantially lower than for large Italian firms. Guiso carefully explains that this difference is because many small firms do not have any loans outstanding at financial institutions. In

18、deed, conditional on having finan</p><p>　　3. Finance constraints</p><p>　　Is this lack of flexibility due to credit rationing? The three country case studies draw a firm conclusion: SME credit

19、rationing is not a widespread phenomenon in Italy, France, and Germany. Guiso builds a model that can explain why some small firms carry financial debt whereas others do not. The empirical results show that those firms w

20、ithout bank loans are often the ones that finance a relatively high proportion of their assets with equity. Guiso argues that a negative relationship between the</p><p>　　A few qualifying remarks are worth m

21、aking. One needs to bear in mind that the Stiglitz and Weiss definition of credit constraints implies that a firm is only considered to be rationed if lenders reject the demand for loans although the borrower is willing

22、to pay the going interest rate (and to meet other conditions) on equivalent loans made to others borrowers of the same quality. In other words, according to this definition a firm is not considered credit rationed if it

23、does not want to borrow</p><p>　　In sum, the higher interest rates observed on SME loans seem difficult to justify on credit risk grounds only. It could be that SMEs pay high interest rates for wrong reason

24、s. Banks may succeed in over-charging SMEs due to limited competition in (local) banking markets and the lock-in effect mentioned above. Therefore, due to finance constraints, under-investment by SMEs may happen on a lar

25、ge scale while credit rationing in the strict sense of Stiglitz and Weiss 1981 does not widely occur.</p><p>　　Wagenvoort moves beyond credit rationing and tests for financial market imperfections that may l

26、ead to finance constraints, which include credit rationing but also constraints resulting from excessive loan pricing and difficulties in raising outside equity. The empirical test of finance constraints here boils down

27、to testing whether financial variables, such as the amount of available internal funds, have a significant impact on the firm’s investment and, thus, its growth. More precisely, Wagenv</p><p>　　Secondly, whi

28、le finance constraints seem to be less binding for medium-sized enterprises, their growth, in comparison to the growth of large firms, nevertheless depends more on theavailability of internal funds. Thirdly, highly leve

29、raged firms have greater difficulties in tapping external finance and, hence, exploiting their growth potential.</p><p>　　How could one possibly improve the supply of finance to SMEs? It is useful to disting

30、uish between public policy measures and fforts that lenders and borrowers can make to alleviate finance constraints. Wagenvoort briefly reviews the literature on the effectiveness of public lending programmes and guaran

31、tee schemes.The main conclusion is that while direct lending and guarantee programmes usually benefit the recipients and help ease finance constraints, it has been questioned whether they improve</p><p>　　4.

32、 Relationship banking and bank consolidation</p><p>　　Is there empirical evidence to support the view that relationship banking can mitigate finance constraints? Ongena and Smith (2000) report substantial va

33、riation in the average number of bank-firm relationships across European countries. The three country studies reviewed here confirm this result and they show that firms make considerable use of multiple banking.</p&g

34、t;<p>　　Guiso’s analysis reveals that in Italy small firms keep on average more than four bank relationships whereas large Italian firms diversify their credit needs over more than 10 credit institutions. As shown

35、 by Hommel and Schneider, the Mittelstand in Germany relies on a smaller number of bank ties but even the small German firms on average borrow from more than one lender. Very small German firms borrow on average from two

36、 banks whereas large</p><p>　　Why is it then that SMEs keep fewer and shorter bank relationships than large firms? As credit availability improves when relationships become longer,one would expect informatio

37、n- opaque SMEs to stay with the same creditor(s). To begin with the number of relationships, as Dietsch notes, an obvious reason is that SMEs have to spread out fixed costs of lending over a smaller loan amount. Adding m

38、ore creditors to the list of the firm’s financial intermediaries will trigger additional costs. Theref</p><p>　　One remark is called for. Hommel and Schneider point out that the number of initial credit off

39、ers a firm enquires about before finalising a loan contract may be more informative than the number of its relationships. This is especially the case if firms seek offers from banks they had no prior relationship with. A

40、nother important element is whether firms seek offers from banks that are not located in the area where the firms have their headquarters. Overall, the authors conclude that Mittelstand </p><p>　　Companies a

41、pproaching several banks obtain an average of approximately three loan offers.</p><p>　　What is more, a substantial amount of offers originates from banks that had no prior relationship with the firm and/or

42、from banks situated outside the immediate geographical vicinity of the firm seeking finance. This is quite surprising because it is often argued that a local bank is best informed about firms in its region, essentially t

43、ying small firms to local banks.</p><p>　　Having established that both relationship banking and multiple banking enhance credit availability for SMEs, Dietsch continues his analysis by investigating whether

44、bank consolidation in France has altered those two important features of European banking. He emphasises that bank consolidation in France went hand in hand with a lower concentration level in the business loan market. T

45、he wave of mergers and acquisitions thus seems to have stimulated competition between credit institutions.Theauthor</p><p>　　5. Concluding remarks</p><p>　　Bank consolidation and Basel II have w

46、idely raised the fear that banks may reduce their participation in the SME loan market segment. So far, these expectations cannot be borne by empirical findings. On the contrary, there are indications that recent and f

47、uture developments in the European banking industry will actually foster SME lending.</p><p>　　That said, especially for firms with less than 50 employees (or an annual turnover less than EUR 2 million) fina

48、nce constraints still seem to hamper their development. It is worthwhile noting that a lack of financing does not necessarily imply a lack of debt. Indeed, credit rationing in the strict sense is rarely observed in Franc

49、e, Italy, and Germany. However, this does not rule out that banks overcharge SME loans and, as a consequence, that financial market imperfections have a negative impac</p><p>　　Public policy in support of S

50、MEs needs to be designed in such a way that relief is offered where finance constraints are most binding. In this respect, equity financing deserves more attention. According to a recent OECD report (OECD 2002), small b

51、usinesses experience considerable difficulty in obtaining risk capital. In Europe, small firms are relatively unimportant on the equity market in comparison to the United States.</p><p>　　Therefore, the pr

52、omotion of secondary capital markets and venture capital funds need to rank high on the political agenda.</p><p>　　中小企業(yè)融資在歐洲：介紹和概述</p><p>　　本文介紹了中小企業(yè)融資問(wèn)題以及總結(jié)歐洲投資銀行的貢獻(xiàn)，本概述強(qiáng)調(diào)民營(yíng)企業(yè)的信貸供給關(guān)系的重要性；指出了在整個(gè)

53、歐洲的分歧和企業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)的異同；注意到，盡管有廣泛的民營(yíng)企業(yè)信貸配給的現(xiàn)象，金融市場(chǎng)的不完善仍在抑制民營(yíng)企業(yè)的成長(zhǎng)和亮點(diǎn)。在歐洲金融環(huán)境變化的大背景下，包括銀行合并和新巴塞爾協(xié)議簽署的承諾，將會(huì)促進(jìn)民營(yíng)企業(yè)發(fā)展。</p><p><b>　　1.介紹</b></p><p>　　在歐洲的金融環(huán)境中一些政策是給予民營(yíng)企業(yè)融資的支持。首先，新的信息和通信技術(shù)作出貢獻(xiàn)，以較低的

54、成本，減少貸款人與借款人之間的信息不對(duì)稱問(wèn)題，從而使民營(yíng)企業(yè)貸款更具吸引力。其次，部分原因是由于信息技術(shù)的進(jìn)步，新的銀行管理辦法正在制定和實(shí)施。例如，銀行信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)采取新的組合模式，讓他們自己的資源配置和價(jià)格更有效。此外，信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移機(jī)制正在蔓延，使銀行能夠?qū)Ｗ⒂诒容^優(yōu)勢(shì)的活動(dòng)，特別是信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估，貸款發(fā)放，信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)監(jiān)控，所有活動(dòng)的提供都是為民營(yíng)企業(yè)融資。第三，股權(quán)資本提供給民營(yíng)型企業(yè)越來(lái)越通過(guò)二級(jí)資本市場(chǎng)和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本融資的發(fā)展。第四，歐盟

55、第二銀行指令旨在促進(jìn)銀行之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，從而提高銀行融資的條款及條件，包括提供給那些民營(yíng)企業(yè)。</p><p>　　歐洲金融環(huán)境的其他功能提出了關(guān)于民營(yíng)企業(yè)融資條件可能惡化的關(guān)切。首先，在國(guó)家銀行市場(chǎng)的整合，減少了對(duì)銀行的數(shù)目，并已在許多歐盟國(guó)家，特別是在較小的，增加了五家最大機(jī)構(gòu)市場(chǎng)份額。這可能不利于民營(yíng)企業(yè)的貸款，因?yàn)橛凶C據(jù)表明，與大銀行相比，小區(qū)域銀行投資小。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者與銀行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)時(shí)收集了經(jīng)濟(jì)積蓄，但他們往往對(duì)民

56、營(yíng)企業(yè)貸款比較少。第三，新資本充足架構(gòu)銀行正在形成。巴塞爾協(xié)議的主旨是為了更好地調(diào)整資本費(fèi)用，并通過(guò)延伸，抵御潛在的信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，貸款利率。由于民營(yíng)企業(yè)貸款通常被認(rèn)為是正確或錯(cuò)誤，因?yàn)樘貏e危險(xiǎn)，許多觀察家，尤其是民營(yíng)企業(yè)本身，已針對(duì)融資進(jìn)一步惡化發(fā)出警告聲。</p><p>　　為什么民營(yíng)企業(yè)融資往往會(huì)比大型企業(yè)的融資困難。反映這些挑戰(zhàn)，民營(yíng)小企業(yè)往往比較依賴外部資金來(lái)源，沒(méi)有其他選擇，而大型企業(yè)可能轉(zhuǎn)向銀行以及資本

57、市場(chǎng)。還有即將闡述的利益關(guān)系，銀行費(fèi)用，并簡(jiǎn)要考慮銀行的關(guān)系和銀行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的影響。我們?cè)跉W洲的民營(yíng)企業(yè)評(píng)估是否受到信貸限制，以及是否金融市場(chǎng)不完善阻礙公司成長(zhǎng)。</p><p>　　2.橫跨一般公司結(jié)構(gòu)類的資本規(guī)模</p><p>　　Wagenvoort區(qū)分五個(gè)不同的大小級(jí)：非常小，小，中型，大型和超大型企業(yè)。為了激勵(lì)這樣的分析，人們需要記住，小型企業(yè)缺乏外部融資可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)在其資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的負(fù)

58、債方。回顧過(guò)去一段長(zhǎng)時(shí)間作為一個(gè)整體的歐洲，總負(fù)債權(quán)益比率是全國(guó)規(guī)模大致相同的類，因此，杠桿是或多或少的一個(gè)典型的民營(yíng)企業(yè)與大企業(yè)相同的一個(gè)典型。金融債務(wù)比率，以總負(fù)債，其中主要包括民營(yíng)企業(yè)的銀行貸款案中，也是全國(guó)規(guī)模大致相同的類別。</p><p>　　然而，Wagenvoort也表明，正在跨越歐盟國(guó)家的平均民營(yíng)企業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)顯著的差異。這三個(gè)國(guó)家的研究證實(shí)這一結(jié)果。其表明，在其總資產(chǎn)的比例中的小企業(yè)金融債務(wù)，

59、大大超過(guò)其大型企業(yè)。他仔細(xì)解釋說(shuō)，這種差異是因?yàn)樵S多小公司沒(méi)有在金融機(jī)構(gòu)的貸款未償還。事實(shí)上，有條件的，有金融債務(wù)，金融債務(wù)比率和金融債務(wù)的期限結(jié)構(gòu)之間存在廣泛的大小類相似。對(duì)于意大利而言，Hommel和施奈德形成鮮明對(duì)比發(fā)現(xiàn)，德國(guó)民營(yíng)企業(yè)負(fù)債更是比德國(guó)大型企業(yè)高。三分之二的德國(guó)企業(yè)中大約三分之二的經(jīng)營(yíng)與資產(chǎn)比率低于百分之二十，而百分之41的德國(guó)公司報(bào)告百分之十以下股權(quán)比例。與此相比，歐洲約為三分之一的平均資產(chǎn)比率（見(jiàn)Wagenvoor

60、t）。迪特希找到一個(gè)法國(guó)公司的同類資產(chǎn)的比例，不論其大小?？偟膩?lái)說(shuō)，平均歐洲，法國(guó)和意大利的民營(yíng)企業(yè)似乎并非是資本不足，德國(guó)民營(yíng)企業(yè)。 Wagenvoort還分析了企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)如何隨時(shí)間的變化。他認(rèn)為，金融債務(wù)比率是非常不同的動(dòng)力相比。更具體而言，民營(yíng)企業(yè)則似乎不那么靈活調(diào)整其資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的結(jié)構(gòu)比大企業(yè)不斷變化的發(fā)展機(jī)會(huì)。尤其是金融債務(wù)比率上升（下降在不斷增長(zhǎng)的速度較慢）（收縮）比增長(zhǎng)（收縮）大公司</p><p>

61、;<b>　　3.金融約束</b></p><p>　　這是配給的財(cái)務(wù)約束缺乏彈性這三個(gè)國(guó)家的案例研究得出一個(gè)明確結(jié)論：民營(yíng)企業(yè)信貸配給是不是在意大利，法國(guó)和德國(guó)普遍現(xiàn)象。圭索建立一個(gè)模型，可以解釋為什么有些小公司帶來(lái)金融債務(wù)，而有的則沒(méi)有。實(shí)證結(jié)果表明，這些企業(yè)沒(méi)有銀行貸款，往往是那些與股權(quán)融資，其資產(chǎn)的比例相對(duì)較高。圭索認(rèn)為，股權(quán)比例之間的繼承和金融債務(wù)的概率呈負(fù)相關(guān)假說(shuō)與配給以來(lái)的尖銳

62、沖突立場(chǎng)堅(jiān)定信貸配給是不可能代替金融債務(wù)的股權(quán)。金融債務(wù)對(duì)許多意大利公司的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的情況下是這樣，主要是因?yàn)樗麄儾幌虢桢X，不是因?yàn)橘J款人不想貸款的情況。不過(guò)，圭索認(rèn)為，當(dāng)信貸約束約束力，缺乏規(guī)模和股權(quán)似乎發(fā)揮了關(guān)鍵作用。因此，信貸配給情況多與大公司比小公司。迪奇指出，除了很小的法國(guó)企業(yè)與1比歐元的年?duì)I業(yè)額不足200萬(wàn)，法國(guó)民營(yíng)型企業(yè)不增加銀行借款時(shí)，他們的信用狀況有所改善。在與小型和中型公司的對(duì)比，具有堅(jiān)實(shí)的信譽(yù)非常小公司做比同等規(guī)模

63、提高他們的同齡人更多的貸款，但較低的信譽(yù)。有鑒于此，迪特希得出結(jié)論認(rèn)為，信貸配給僅適用于非常不利的小企業(yè)信用評(píng)級(jí)有關(guān)，他表明，在法國(guó)相對(duì)少數(shù)公司有這些特點(diǎn)。 Hommel和施奈德認(rèn)為，信貸增長(zhǎng)在2002年在德國(guó)幾乎癱瘓主要</p><p>　　總之，高利率對(duì)民營(yíng)企業(yè)貸款的觀察，似乎很難對(duì)信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的唯一理由辯解。這可能是因?yàn)殄e(cuò)誤的理由民營(yíng)企業(yè)支付高利率。銀行可能會(huì)成功過(guò)度充電民營(yíng)企業(yè)由于（本地）銀行市場(chǎng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和有限

64、鎖定在上述效果。因此，由于資金的限制，根據(jù)民營(yíng)企業(yè)的投資有可能大規(guī)模發(fā)生時(shí)，在嚴(yán)格意義上的信貸配給斯蒂格利茨和魏斯1981年不會(huì)廣泛出現(xiàn)。</p><p>　　超出信貸配給和金融市場(chǎng)不完善，可能導(dǎo)致資金的限制，其中包括信貸配給，但也限制過(guò)度貸款定價(jià)和提高股票以外的困難造成測(cè)試Wagenvoort舉措。在財(cái)政困難的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)測(cè)試這里歸結(jié)為金融變數(shù)是否可用，如內(nèi)部資金量，已經(jīng)對(duì)公司的投資產(chǎn)生重大影響，因此，它的增長(zhǎng)。更

65、確切地說(shuō)，Wagenvoort估計(jì)之間的關(guān)系上，一方面，企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)和另一方面，現(xiàn)金流和資本結(jié)構(gòu)。一個(gè)高增長(zhǎng)的現(xiàn)金流敏感性是一個(gè)跡象，金融具有約束力。下面的結(jié)果是值得強(qiáng)調(diào)。首先，金融限制往往阻礙少于50名員工的小型和極小型企業(yè)（即公司的增長(zhǎng)），對(duì)平均而言，這些公司的增長(zhǎng)是一對(duì)一的有關(guān)保留溢利。第二，盡管財(cái)政困難似乎是相對(duì)于大型企業(yè)增長(zhǎng)減去民營(yíng)企業(yè)，他們的成長(zhǎng)，具有約束力，但更多地取決于對(duì)內(nèi)部資金theavailability。第三，高杠桿企

66、業(yè)有更大的困難，開(kāi)拓外部資金，因此，利用他們的增長(zhǎng)潛力。怎么可能改善對(duì)民營(yíng)企業(yè)的金融供給？它是有用的區(qū)分公共政策措施和努力，貸款人和借款人可以緩解資金制約。 Wagenvoort簡(jiǎn)要回顧了對(duì)公共貸款方案和保障計(jì)劃的有效性文獻(xiàn)。主要結(jié)論是，雖然直接貸款和擔(dān)保計(jì)劃的受助人通常受益，并幫助緩解資金的限制，它已</p><p>　　不過(guò)積極的公共干預(yù)的凈回報(bào)可以預(yù)期，如果干預(yù)減少借貸雙方的信息，從而有助于解決問(wèn)題的信息不

67、對(duì)稱。例如，公共當(dāng)局可刺激貸款人之間的信息共享。最近的一項(xiàng)研究（哈佩利和帕加諾2002）顯示，在貸款銀行的貸款信息交流的增加，減少信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。借款人和貸款人本身也有助于減少信息不對(duì)稱解決民營(yíng)企業(yè)直接融資問(wèn)題。如上所述，在長(zhǎng)期關(guān)系的建立有可能實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo)。</p><p>　　4.銀行和銀行合并的關(guān)系</p><p>　　銀行和銀行合并的關(guān)系是否有經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)支持這樣的觀點(diǎn)的關(guān)系可以緩解銀行資金的

68、限制？ Ongena和史密斯（2000）報(bào)告說(shuō)，在整個(gè)歐洲國(guó)家的銀行企業(yè)關(guān)系的平均人數(shù)大幅變化。這三個(gè)國(guó)家在這里證實(shí)這一審查的結(jié)果，這些都顯示出公司作出相當(dāng)多的銀行使用研究。圭索的分析顯示，在意大利的小企業(yè)保持平均超過(guò)4個(gè)，而意大利的大型企業(yè)銀行信用關(guān)系多樣化超過(guò)10多個(gè)信貸機(jī)構(gòu)的需要。正如Hommel和施耐德，德國(guó)民營(yíng)企業(yè)表現(xiàn)出的依賴，但就在德國(guó)的銀行聯(lián)系較少，甚至小的平均借貸從多個(gè)貸款人的德國(guó)公司。非常小的德國(guó)公司四家銀行的平均貸款

69、兩間銀行，而德國(guó)大約corporates有較大的關(guān)系。迪奇在法國(guó)發(fā)現(xiàn)類似情況，除了極少數(shù)的法國(guó)公司，只從一個(gè)單一的機(jī)構(gòu)借貸。從而使小企業(yè)比大企業(yè)較少的銀行企業(yè)關(guān)系。這三個(gè)案例研究文件，民營(yíng)企業(yè)也比大企業(yè)保持較短的關(guān)系。計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究的迪特希之間建立了一個(gè)明確的信貸供應(yīng)，一方面積極聯(lián)系，數(shù)量和另一方面對(duì)銀行企業(yè)關(guān)系的持續(xù)時(shí)間。此外，較小的公司，較大的影響。例如，小企業(yè)更敏感，比大公司的銀行關(guān)系的長(zhǎng)度。從迪特希的工作，我們認(rèn)為雙方關(guān)系的銀行

70、和多家銀行，可以刺激民營(yíng)企業(yè)融資。為什么那么，民</p><p>　　添加更多的債權(quán)人對(duì)公司的金融中介機(jī)構(gòu)名單將觸發(fā)額外的費(fèi)用。因此，小公司可能不太愿意從銀行借貸數(shù)在同一時(shí)間。但是，只依靠一家銀行的缺點(diǎn)是，這家銀行可能變成一個(gè)長(zhǎng)期的壟斷。迪特希解釋說(shuō)，雖然它是由較小的公司通過(guò)維護(hù)費(fèi)用昂貴，挑起多重關(guān)系的貸款競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為，打破小企業(yè)仍可能通過(guò)切換時(shí)間的流逝時(shí)，銀行的壟斷。這可能解釋了小企業(yè)銀行企業(yè)關(guān)系的持續(xù)時(shí)間相對(duì)較短

71、。</p><p>　　在確定雙方關(guān)系后，多家銀行加強(qiáng)為民營(yíng)企業(yè)提供信貸，以調(diào)查是否迪特希繼續(xù)在法國(guó)銀行合并改變了這兩個(gè)重要特征的歐洲銀行他的分析。他強(qiáng)調(diào)，在法國(guó)銀行的同時(shí)，鞏固了在商業(yè)貸款市場(chǎng)的低濃度的手。兼并和收購(gòu)浪潮從而似乎刺激了信貸機(jī)構(gòu)之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。筆者還表明，數(shù)量關(guān)系，銀行企業(yè)大大增加了鞏固期。在數(shù)量相對(duì)變化的關(guān)系是最小型和中型公司的重要。在債權(quán)人的人數(shù)增加信貸供應(yīng)趨于改善，而事實(shí)上，民營(yíng)企業(yè)在法國(guó)商業(yè)貸

72、款市場(chǎng)份額已大大增加，在20世紀(jì)90年代。這個(gè)鏡像是一個(gè)貸款相對(duì)下降，以大公司，這失去了其最初的65%的市場(chǎng)份額，而在1993年是8%。</p><p><b>　　5.結(jié)束語(yǔ)</b></p><p>　　銀行合并和新巴塞爾協(xié)議中提出普遍擔(dān)心銀行可能會(huì)減少參與民營(yíng)企業(yè)貸款市場(chǎng)。到目前為止，還未證明如此。相反，有跡象表明，歐洲銀行業(yè)在最近和未來(lái)的發(fā)展將實(shí)際促進(jìn)民營(yíng)企業(yè)貸

73、款。</p><p>　　盡管如此，不足50名雇員（或年?duì)I業(yè)額低于200萬(wàn)歐元）的限制似乎仍然妨礙它們的發(fā)展，特別是對(duì)企業(yè)。這是值得指出的是，缺乏資金，并不一定意味著對(duì)債務(wù)缺乏。事實(shí)上，在嚴(yán)格意義上的信貸配給很少出現(xiàn)在法國(guó)，意大利和德國(guó)。但是，這并不排除民營(yíng)企業(yè)貸款，銀行濫收費(fèi)用，并造成后果的，這種金融市場(chǎng)的不完善有一個(gè)對(duì)民營(yíng)企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)的負(fù)面影響，在經(jīng)濟(jì)大國(guó)，股權(quán)融資這方面，值得更多的關(guān)注。據(jù)經(jīng)合組織最近的一份報(bào)告

74、，民營(yíng)企業(yè)在獲得風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本的機(jī)會(huì)相當(dāng)難得。和美國(guó)一樣，在歐洲，小企業(yè)與市場(chǎng)上的股票相比是相對(duì)不重要的。因此，資本市場(chǎng)促進(jìn)二次創(chuàng)業(yè)資金的需求應(yīng)當(dāng)成為排名高的政治議程。</p><p>　　附錄D 主要參考文獻(xiàn)的題錄及摘要</p><p>　　1【篇名】我國(guó)民營(yíng)企業(yè)發(fā)展問(wèn)題研究</p><p><b>　　【作者】丁玉國(guó)</b></p>

75、<p>　　【刊名】經(jīng)濟(jì)經(jīng)緯，2004，（03）：17-18.</p><p>　　【摘要】近年來(lái) ,我國(guó)的民營(yíng)企業(yè)呈現(xiàn)出了良好的發(fā)展勢(shì)頭 ,但也存在著宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策環(huán)境不夠配套、企業(yè)內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)不夠合理等諸多問(wèn)題 ,影響著民營(yíng)企業(yè)的發(fā)展。因此 ,應(yīng)從宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境和企業(yè)內(nèi)部管理兩個(gè)方面提出一些具有針對(duì)性的措施和對(duì)策。</p><p>　　2【篇名】解析我國(guó)民營(yíng)企業(yè)融資難的現(xiàn)狀及對(duì)

76、策</p><p><b>　　【作者】原曉娉</b></p><p>　　【刊名】經(jīng)濟(jì)師，2009,（01）：60-61.</p><p>　　【摘要】近年來(lái)我國(guó)民營(yíng)企業(yè)有著較大的發(fā)展，同時(shí)也由于國(guó)家政策和市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)以及民營(yíng)企業(yè)自身等因素致使民營(yíng)企業(yè)面臨融資難的問(wèn)題。文章在分析民營(yíng)企業(yè)融資難的現(xiàn)狀的基礎(chǔ)上提出了相關(guān)的解決對(duì)策，以利于為民營(yíng)企業(yè)的

77、發(fā)展?fàn)I造良好的環(huán)境。</p><p>　　3【篇名】關(guān)于優(yōu)化中小企業(yè)籌資環(huán)境問(wèn)題的思考</p><p><b>　　【作者】俞小明</b></p><p>　　【刊名】企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)，2003,（11）：13-14.</p><p>　　【摘要】中小企業(yè)是一國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的重要支持力量,它在保證國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)穩(wěn)定增長(zhǎng),推動(dòng)民間投資,

78、帶動(dòng)地區(qū)發(fā)展,增長(zhǎng)就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì),實(shí)現(xiàn)科技創(chuàng)新與成果轉(zhuǎn)化等方面均發(fā)揮著不可替代的作用。然而,目前我國(guó)由于籌資渠道單一、銀行體系不合理及中小企業(yè)自身的問(wèn)題,籌資難,仍然是制約中小企業(yè)發(fā)展的一大瓶頸。</p><p>　　4【篇名】我國(guó)中小企業(yè)籌資難成因及對(duì)策</p><p><b>　　【作者】劉立麗</b></p><p>　　【刊名】合作經(jīng)濟(jì)與科技

79、，2009,（03）：25-26.</p><p>　　【摘要】長(zhǎng)期以來(lái),中小企業(yè)在我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)換和經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革的背景下,面臨著有利的發(fā)展機(jī)遇,但從目前中小企業(yè)的狀況來(lái)看,它們的發(fā)展卻不是一帆風(fēng)順的,其中籌資問(wèn)題越來(lái)越成為困擾中小企業(yè)進(jìn)一步發(fā)展的制約因素。</p><p>　　5【篇名】中小企業(yè)融資的難點(diǎn)及解決的措施</p><p><b>　　【作者】

80、程濤</b></p><p>　　【刊名】現(xiàn)代企業(yè)，2005,（07）：7-8.</p><p>　　【摘要】近年來(lái),中央銀行和各金融機(jī)構(gòu)出臺(tái)了一系列扶持中小企業(yè)加快發(fā)展的政策措施,有效地促進(jìn)了中小企業(yè)的發(fā)展。進(jìn)入2005年,央行再次強(qiáng)調(diào)加強(qiáng)中小企業(yè)的信貸服務(wù),中小企業(yè)和“三農(nóng)”、非公有制經(jīng)濟(jì)一起,再次被列為今年信貸投放的重點(diǎn)。支持中小企業(yè)發(fā)展,是金融業(yè)義不容辭的義務(wù)。<

81、/p><p>　　6【篇名】借鑒國(guó)外經(jīng)驗(yàn)構(gòu)筑我國(guó)中小企業(yè)支持系統(tǒng)</p><p><b>　　【作者】郭朝先</b></p><p>　　【刊名】經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題，1999，(3)：6-7.</p><p>　　【摘要】制定法律法規(guī)對(duì)中小企業(yè)予以支持，設(shè)立專門扶持中小企業(yè)發(fā)展的金融機(jī)構(gòu)，成立中小企業(yè)基金，對(duì)中小企業(yè)實(shí)行特殊的金融政策

82、，以及建立中小企業(yè)金融支持社會(huì)輔助體系，是國(guó)外在金融方面支持中小企業(yè)發(fā)展的基本做法。我國(guó)應(yīng)借鑒國(guó)外經(jīng)驗(yàn)，構(gòu)筑具有中國(guó)特色的中小企業(yè)金融支持體系，主要內(nèi)容為：完善中小企業(yè)金融支持法律法規(guī)，設(shè)立中小企業(yè)銀行，建立中小企業(yè)基金，對(duì)中小企業(yè)實(shí)行特殊金融優(yōu)惠政策，形成中小企業(yè)金融支持社會(huì)輔助體系。</p><p>　　7【篇名】中小企業(yè)融資問(wèn)題及對(duì)策</p><p><b>　　【作者】賀

83、云龍</b></p><p>　　【刊名】經(jīng)濟(jì)師，2003,（02）：16-17.</p><p>　　【摘要】文章論述了融資法律環(huán)境不健全是導(dǎo)致中小企業(yè)融資渠道不暢和融資方式單一的主要原因 ;金融支持體系不健全是導(dǎo)致中小企業(yè)融資難的根本原因 ;銀行借款理論資金成本較低是導(dǎo)致中小企業(yè)融資過(guò)程中過(guò)分依賴銀行借款籌集資金的主要原因 ;銀行貸款的限制性規(guī)定是導(dǎo)致中小企業(yè)銀行借款實(shí)際資

84、金成本較高、融資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)增大的根本原因。并針對(duì)中小企業(yè)融資問(wèn)題產(chǎn)生的原因 ,提出了相應(yīng)的對(duì)策。</p><p>　　8【篇名】發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家支持中小企業(yè)融資的比較及借鑒</p><p><b>　　【作者】蘇志鑫</b></p><p>　　【刊名】現(xiàn)代商業(yè),2006,（01）：3-4.</p><p>　　【摘要】中小企業(yè)是社會(huì)

85、經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的一支重要力量。但其融資難也是一個(gè)普通存在的問(wèn)題。美、英、日、德等國(guó)在解決中小企業(yè)融資難方面采取了許多富有成效的支持政策。本文在比較四國(guó)主要做法的基礎(chǔ)上，提出解決我國(guó)中小企業(yè)融資難問(wèn)題的對(duì)策建議。</p><p>　　9【篇名】中小企業(yè)融資與信用體系的建設(shè)</p><p>　　【作者】貝洪俊 鄭長(zhǎng)娟</p><p>　　【刊名】生產(chǎn)力研究，2003，（06

86、）：24-25.</p><p>　　【摘要】中小企業(yè)融資是一種信用關(guān)系和信用行為 ,其融資能力有賴于信用制度的建立和完善。按照市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體制的要求 ,建立科學(xué)完善的信用體系 ,實(shí)施信用工程 ,是解決中小企業(yè)融資難的有效措施。</p><p>　　10【篇名】中小企業(yè)融資的特殊性和亟待解決的問(wèn)題</p><p><b>　　【作者】秦艷梅</b>

87、</p><p>　　【刊名】北京工商大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)（社會(huì)科學(xué)版），2005，（04）：2-3.</p><p>　　【摘要】改革開(kāi)放以來(lái),中小企業(yè)對(duì)國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)的貢獻(xiàn)率不斷提高,特別是在滿足人們多樣化和個(gè)性化需求、進(jìn)行科技創(chuàng)新和增加社會(huì)就業(yè)總量等方面發(fā)揮著重要的作用。由于中小企業(yè)自身的因素和外部環(huán)境的影響,使得其在發(fā)展中形成了融資難等一系列問(wèn)題。本文通過(guò)分析中小企業(yè)融資規(guī)律和融資特點(diǎn),以及中小企業(yè)