外文翻譯--港口集群治理

1、<p>　　Governance In Seaport Clusters</p><p>　　Peter W. de Erlangen </p><p>　　1. Introduction</p><p>　　Apart from well-known physical factors such as the location, maritime a

2、ccessibility and hinterland infrastructure, the governance of seaports is an important determinant of their performance.</p><p>　　An analysis of the governance of seaports has mostly been limited to the role

3、 of the port authority. Notwithstanding the central role of port authorities in ports, we argue that an analysis of governance in seaports requires attention for the role of (private) firms. Institutional economic litera

4、ture offers a useful framework for ana lysing advantages and disadvantages of alternative governance mechanisms and provides a basis for ana lysing the roles of port authorities. </p><p>　　In this paper we d

5、eal with the issue of cluster governance in seaports and illustrate our approach with an analysis of the port of Rotterdam..</p><p>　　First, we briefly discuss the theoretical foundations of the cluster gove

6、rnance concept. Second, we discuss the role of port authorities in the governance of seaports. Third, we present empirical results of a survey among 43 cluster experts in Rotterdam on the governance of Rotterdam’s port c

7、luster. We feminality the paper with conclusions.</p><p>　　2.The Quality Of Cluster Governance </p><p>　　We define cluster governance as ‘the mix of and relations between various mechanisms of c

8、oordination used in a cluster’. The quality of the governance differs between clusters. The quality depends on the level of coordination costs and the ‘scope’ of ‘coordination beyond price’. Low coordination costs and mu

9、ch coordination beyond price improve the quality of governance.</p><p>　　When the benefits of coordination are distributed unequally, when (the threat of) opportunistic behaviour prevents coordination or whe

10、n benefits of coordination are uncertain, coordination beyond price does not arise spontaneously or instantaneously, even when benefits of coordination exceed costs. Therefore there is in general a shortage of coordinati

11、on beyond price. More coordination beyond price improves the quality of the governance of clusters.</p><p><b>　　2.1Trust </b></p><p>　　In clusters where the level of trust is high, (

12、average) transaction costs are relatively low, because of low costs to specify contracts and low monitoring costs. Furthermore, costs of coordination beyond price are lower and as a consequence, more coordination beyond

13、price will arise. The level of trust in a cluster is influenced by the importance of reputation effects in a cluster. If reputation effects are strong, abusing trust has negative effects and therefore a culture of trust

14、is sustained.</p><p>　　2.2 Intermediaries</p><p>　　The presence of intermediaries lowers coordination costs and expands the scope of coordination beyond price, for three related reasons. First,

15、they provide a ‘bridging tie’ (Weevily and Zachery, 1999) between two or more otherwise not connected exchange partners. Second, intermediaries reduce coordination costs because they ‘connect cognitions’. Intermediaries

16、can bridge cognitive differences between firms that operate in different market environments. This role of connecting cognitions is espec</p><p>　　2.3Leader firms</p><p>　　Leader firms are ‘stra

17、tegic Centre with superior coordination skills and the ability to steer change’ (Lorenz and Baden fuller, 1995). The behaviour of leader firms influences the performance of the cluster as a whole, because leader firms ha

18、ve both the ability and incentive to invest in the competitiveness of a whole network of firms. We identify three investments of leader firms with positive effects (these can be termed ‘leader firm externalities’) on oth

19、er firms in the cluster:</p><p>　　Internationalism;</p><p>　　innovation;</p><p>　　contributing to solving collective action problems (Olson, 1971)</p><p>　　Thus, leader

20、 firms can enable or even enforce cooperation and for that reason add to the performance of clusters. </p><p>　　2.4Collective action in clusters</p><p>　　The ‘problem’ of collective action (Olso

21、n, 1971) is relevant in clusters. Even when collective benefits of co-operation to achieve collective goals exceed (collective) costs, such co-operation does not (always) develop spontaneously. Different CAP’s (Collectiv

22、e Action Problems), such as education and training and innovation are relevant in clusters. For each CAP a governance regime arises. In this context, a regime can be defined as a ‘relatively stable collaborative agreemen

23、t that provides acto</p><p>　　3.Port authorities as ‘cluster managers’</p><p>　　Even though a variety of actors play a role in the governance of a seaport cluster, the port authority is the most

24、 central actor. The term ‘cluster manager’ can be used to describe the role of the port authority. We discuss the role of a cluster manager in general, the institutional position of port authorities and sources of revenu

25、e and investment decisions of port authorities. </p><p>　　3.1 The role of a ‘cluster manager’</p><p>　　A ‘perfect’ cluster manager would be an galvanization with the following four characteristi

26、cs.</p><p>　　1. A cluster manager has incentives to invest in the cluster, because its revenues are related to the performance of the cluster. The ‘perfect’ cluster manager would receive a share of the value

27、 added generated in the cluster as revenue, for instance through a ‘cluster tax’.</p><p>　　2. A cluster manager invests in activities with cluster benefits (instead of firm specific benefits). Furthermore, t

28、he cluster manager aims to invest when ‘cluster benefits’ exceed costs.</p><p>　　3. A cluster manager aims to distribute investment costs for investments to those firms that benefit. This involves co-finance

29、 arrangements with a specific group of beneficiary firms.</p><p>　　4. A cluster manager operates self-sustaining: over time investments equal revenues.</p><p>　　The port authority matches all fo

30、ur criteria: they have incentives and resources to invest in the cluster. The port dues and lease revenues are resources to invest in the port cluster. Furthermore, they generally are self-sustaining and invest in the pe

31、rformance of the cluster as a whole. Port authorities invest in activities with general benefits, such as port expansion, safety and dredging. Given their institutional position, most port authorities are not profit driv

32、en</p><p>　　The port authority owns and exploits the port area and benefits when the port cluster is an attractive location because they can lease more land and charge higher prices. Furthermore, port author

33、ities collect ‘port dues’. Thus, the more ships call a port the higher the port dues. For these two reasons, port authorities have a clear incentive to invest in the performance of the port cluster.Thus, port authorities

34、 can be regarded as cluster managers.</p><p>　　3.2 Revenues of port authorities </p><p>　　The port authority has various sources of revenue. The existence and relative importance of various char

35、ges differs between ports (Asar, 2001). In general, port authorities generate revenue from three sources:</p><p>　　charges to shipowners/ ship operators;</p><p>　　charges to tenants in the port,

36、 including terminal operators;</p><p>　　charges to cargo-owners.</p><p>　　Charges for shipowners/ship operators are termed ‘port dues’ and in most cases related to the size of vessels. These por

37、t dues are justified by investments in dredging, safety systems, and investments in port basins. Charges for tenants are lease charges to firms such as terminal operators and warehousing and production firms. Charges for

38、 cargo owners are termed wharfage and are mostly related to cargo volume or to the value of goods. Some port authorities do not have wharfage charges, because c</p><p>　　This implies that the port charges do

39、 not have to be fully justified on the basis of investments with benefits for either tenants or shipowners. Investments for the benefit of cargo owners, such as investments in hinterland infrastructure, hinterland access

40、 or warehousing facilities, can be justified because the cargo owners as users of the port pay the port charges ‘in the end’. Therefore, investments with benefits for these cargo owners are justified, even if port charge

41、s are paid only by tena</p><p>　　3.3 Investment decisions of port authorities</p><p>　　The port charges have to be justified by investments of the port authority. ‘Investment appraisal’ –on the

42、basis of which criteria do port authorities decide to invest- is therefore a central issue for port authorities. We claim that the following simple rule is a guideline for investment appraisal of port cluster managers:

43、benefits for the cluster of an investment should exceed costs for the cluster. Cluster benefits are the sum of all benefits of firms in the cluster, cluster costs are the co</p><p>　　4. Cluster governance in

44、 the port of Rotterdam</p><p>　　In this section we present an empirical case study of the port of Rotterdam. We interviewed 43 port experts in the port of Rotterdam. First, we deal with the importance of clu

45、ster governance for the performance of the cluster. In the next four paragraphs, we discuss the empirical results for the four variables that influence the quality of the cluster governance. Sixth, we briefly discuss the

46、 role of the port authority in Rotterdam and end with conclusions.</p><p>　　4.1 The importance of cluster governance in Rotterdam’s seaport cluster</p><p>　　These results show that cluster gover

47、nance is less important than the structure of the cluster and the economic development in general, but more important than national and international policies. The experts were also asked to indicate the relative importa

48、nce of the four variables of cluster governance, also by ranking them.</p><p>　　4.2 Trust in Rotterdam’s port cluster</p><p>　　Virtually all cluster experts agree with the proposition that trust

49、 is important for the quality of the cluster governance, and as discussed above, argue that trust is the most important ‘governance variable’. The cluster experts evaluated the port of Rotterdam and its main competitors,

50、 Antwerp and Hamburg, with regard to the presence of trust.</p><p>　　4.3 Leader firms in Rotterdam’s port cluster</p><p>　　Virtually all cluster experts also agree that the presence of leader fi

51、rms is an important determinant of the quality of cluster governance. The experts evaluate the three competing ports as follows:</p><p>　　b significantly better than in worst port</p><p>　　Antwe

52、rp is evaluated the most positive, Hamburg has the lowest score. In general the experts indicate that all three ports do score relatively good with regard to leader firms.</p><p>　　4.4 Intermediaries in Rott

53、erdam’s port cluster</p><p>　　With regard to intermediaries, a significant majority of the experts agree with the presumed positive effect of intermediaries on cluster governance, but nine out of the 43 disa

54、gree.</p><p>　　4.5 Solutions for CAP’s in Rotterdam’s port cluster</p><p>　　Finally, we discuss the quality of solutions for collective action problems. Out of the five proposed CAP’s in seaport

55、s, the cluster experts judged four relevant：</p><p>　　a significant majority</p><p>　　4.6 The role of the port authority in Rotterdam</p><p>　　The Rotterdam municipal port authority

56、 (RMPM) is a public landlord port. The galvanization formally is a part of the municipality Rotterdam but operates to a large extent autonomous. Currently, a modification of the institutional structure, to grant the port

57、 authority more autonomy, and to change the monitoring and control function from the city council to an independent board of directors is discussed. However, even when the suggested new structure is approved, the municip

58、ality will remain the </p><p>　　5. Conclusions</p><p>　　In this paper we argue that an analysis of the governance in port clusters adds to our understanding port competition, port development an

59、d port performance. We have presented an analytic framework for ana lysing (port) cluster governance. The quality of the governance of a cluster depends on the level of transaction costs in a cluster and the ‘scope of co

60、ordination beyond price’. Four variables influence both: the presence of leader firms, the presence of intermediaries, the level of trust and </p><p><b>　　港口集群治理</b></p><p>　　Peter

61、W. de Erlangen </p><p>　　1、Introduction引言</p><p>　　除了眾所周知的地理因素，如位置、海上交通方便程度和腹地的基礎設施，港口治理是其功能發(fā)揮的決定性因素。</p><p>　　作者分析了港口治理大多被限定為港口當局的職能。盡管港口當局在港口中起著核心作用, 但我們認為分析港口治理對港口的作用同時需要關注（私營）

62、企業(yè)。制度經(jīng)濟文獻分析提供了一個有益的框架，分析優(yōu)點和缺點替代治理機制提供基礎分析港口當局的作用。</p><p>　　在本文中,我們處理港口集群治理的問題，闡明我們的方法并分析了鹿特丹港。</p><p>　　首先,我們簡要的討論了集群治理概念的理論基礎。其次,我們討論港口當局在港口治理中的作用。第三,我們分析了來自于43位專家對鹿特丹市鹿特丹港口集群治理的一項調(diào)查的研究結果。最后完成文

63、章的結論。</p><p><b>　　2、集群治理的質量</b></p><p>　　我們定義集群治理為“混合之間的關系，以及各種機制的協(xié)調(diào)用于集聚。”集群之間的治理質量不同。質量取決于協(xié)調(diào)成本水平和“范圍”的“協(xié)調(diào)無價”。 低協(xié)調(diào)成本和多協(xié)調(diào)成本無價能提高治理質量。</p><p>　　當協(xié)調(diào)的利益分配不均，當（威脅）防止投機行為協(xié)調(diào)或協(xié)調(diào)

64、利益不確定時，協(xié)調(diào)無價不會自發(fā)或立即產(chǎn)生，即使協(xié)調(diào)收益超過成本。因此一般缺少協(xié)調(diào)無價。更多的無價協(xié)調(diào)能改善集群治理的質量。</p><p><b>　　2.1信任</b></p><p>　　在集群中信任水平高，（平均)交易成本則相對較低, 因為低成本指定合同和監(jiān)督成本低。此外,協(xié)調(diào)成本無價越低，更多的協(xié)調(diào)無價會因此出現(xiàn)。在一個集群中的信任水平受到聲譽效應的影響。如果

65、聲譽效應強, 濫用信任會產(chǎn)生負面影響，因此信任文化是持續(xù)的。</p><p><b>　　2.2中介機構</b></p><p>　　中介機構存在降低協(xié)調(diào)成本和擴大協(xié)調(diào)無價的范圍有三個相關的原因。首先, 他們提供了一個“橋梁紐帶” 在兩個或多個之間否則不能連接交換伙伴(Weevily and Zachery, 1999)。其次，中介機構降低協(xié)調(diào)成本，因為它們“連接認知

66、”。 企業(yè)之間的橋梁中介機構可以認知不同市場環(huán)境中運作的差異。而連接認知有特別重要的作用在集群中考慮集群實際的特征是“認知分工” (Belus and Tardigrada, 2000)。</p><p><b>　　2.3領導公司</b></p><p>　　領導公司是“具有卓越協(xié)調(diào)能力和駕馭能力，改變戰(zhàn)略中心” (Lorenz and Baden fuller,

67、1995)。領導公司的行為影響整個集群的功能，因為領導企業(yè)有能力和動力投資于一個有競爭力的整體公司網(wǎng)絡。我們確定了三個投資于領導公司的其他公司的積極作用（這些可以被稱為“領導公司外部性”）在集群中:國際化、創(chuàng)新、有助于解決集體行動問題(Olson, 1971)。</p><p>　　因此, 領導公司能加強合作,甚至可以增加企業(yè)的業(yè)績。</p><p>　　2.4集群中的集體行動</p

68、><p>　　集體行動的“問題”在集群中是相關的 (Olson, 1971)。即使在合作的集體利益中實現(xiàn)集體（目標）超過集體成本，這種合作不（總是）自發(fā)發(fā)展的。不同的集體行動問題如教育、培訓和創(chuàng)新是相互聯(lián)系的在集群中。對每個集體行動問題會產(chǎn)生相應的管理體制。在這種情形下, 一個管理體制可以被定義為一種“相對穩(wěn)定的合作協(xié)議處理克服集體行動問題的能力?！?lt;/p><p>　　3、港口當局作為集群管

69、理者</p><p>　　雖然有各種行為者參與集群治理，但港務局起著最核心的作用。可以把“集群管理者”描述為港口當局的作用。我們討論集群管理者的一般作用，港務當局所處的位置、收入來源和投資決策。</p><p>　　3.1集群管理者的作用</p><p>　　一個“完美”的集群管理者將是一個具有以下四個特點的組織：</p><p>　　1、集

70、群管理者激勵來投資在產(chǎn)業(yè)集群中，因為它的收入與集群績效有關。一個“完美”的集群管理者將收到一份增值產(chǎn)生的收入在集群中，比如通過“集群稅”。</p><p>　　2、集群管理者進行投資活動獲得集群收益（替代公司特殊收益）。此外, 集群管理者的目標是當投資的“集群收益”超過成本。</p><p>　　3、集群管理者的目的是把投資成本分配給那些投資獲益的公司。這涉及到一起籌措資金安排于一組特定的

71、受益人公司。</p><p>　　4、集群管理者經(jīng)營達到自給自足：經(jīng)過一段時間投資等于收入。</p><p>　　港務局匹配所有四項標準：它們有動機和資金投資于集群。在港口集群中港口費和租賃向投資提供資金。此外,它們通常自給自足及投資于整個集群的績效。港口當局投資于一般福利活動，例如港口拓展、安全、疏浚?？紤]到制度的關系 ,大多數(shù)港口當局沒有利潤的驅動。</p><p&

72、gt;　　港務局擁有并開發(fā)港區(qū)而獲得收益，港口集群是一個具有吸引力的位置，因為它們可以出租更多的土地，并且收取更高的價格。此外,港口當局還征收“港口費”。 因此,船只越多的港口會產(chǎn)生較高的港口費。基于上述兩個原因，港口當局有明確鼓勵投資于港口集群的性能。</p><p>　　3.2港口當局的收入</p><p>　　港口當局有各種來源的收入。對存在的各項費用和相對重要性收取不同的費用在不同

73、的港口之間(Asar, 2001)。一般來說,增加港口當局的收入來源有三個: 船東/船舶經(jīng)營人費用；在港口租借費,包括碼頭營運人；費用為船方。費用為船東/船舶經(jīng)營人的被稱為“港口費”，大多數(shù)情況下與船只大小有關。這些港口費是合理的從事疏浚，安全系統(tǒng),以及在港內(nèi)的投資。租賃費用是公司按租約收取的，如碼頭營運人倉儲和生產(chǎn)企業(yè)。貨主碼頭費大多數(shù)與貨物大小或者商品價值有關。一些港口當局沒有碼頭費，因為貨主間接也支付其他費用。在這樣的情況下, 部

74、分其他費用都可以被看作是“偽碼頭費”。</p><p>　　這意味著港口費用不需要完全正當在基礎投資上獲益對承租人或船東。投資為貨主的利益，如投資于腹地基礎設施，接近腹地或倉儲設施是合理的，因為貨主作為港口使用者支付“最終”的港口費。因此,這些貨主的投資收益是正當?shù)模词垢劭谫M用只能由居住者和運輸公司支付。</p><p>　　3.3港口當局的投資決策</p><p&g

75、t;　　港口費用是合理的由港口當局投資?！巴顿Y評估”—是根據(jù)港口當局投資的一些準則作出的投資。我們主張以下簡單的規(guī)則為港口集群管理者投資評價的標準：集群的投資效益應該超過集群成本。集群的好處是集聚企業(yè)利益的總和，集群的成本是集聚企業(yè)的投資成本。在大多數(shù)情況下,成本會損失，因為港口費用需要集群投資。因為成本等于收入，高投資水平需要高的港口費用。</p><p>　　4、鹿特丹港的集群治理</p>&l

76、t;p>　　在本節(jié)中，我們提出一個對鹿特丹港的實證案例研究。我們采訪了43個港口專家在鹿特丹市的港口。首先,我們處理集群治理的重要性為了集聚的績效。在接下來的四個段落里，我們討論了四個變量影響集群治理質量的實證結果。第六，我們也簡要的討論港口當局在鹿特丹市的作用并最后得出結論。</p><p>　　4.1集群治理的重要性在鹿特丹港口群</p><p>　　這些研究結果表明一般來說集群

77、治理是同樣的重要與集群結構和經(jīng)濟發(fā)展，但更重要的是國際和國內(nèi)政策。專家們也要求它們的排名表明集群治理四個變量的相對重要性。</p><p>　　4.2信任在鹿特丹港口群</p><p>　　幾乎所有集群專家們都同意信任是很重要的對集群治理質量這一觀點，如上所述，認為信任是最重要的治理變量。集群專家評估關于信任的存在在鹿特丹港和它的主要競爭對手安特衛(wèi)普和漢堡。</p><

78、p>　　4.3領導公司在鹿特丹的港口群</p><p>　　幾乎所有集群專家也同意領導公司的存在是集群治理質量的重要因素。專家評估三個競爭港口如下：</p><p><b>　　b明顯優(yōu)于最壞港口</b></p><p>　　安特衛(wèi)普被評為最積極的、漢堡得分最低?？偟膩碚f,專家表明這三個港口是評分方面相對較好的領導企業(yè)。</p>

79、;<p>　　4.4中介機構在鹿特丹的港口群</p><p>　　關于中介機構,有相當多數(shù)專家同意假定中介機構對集群治理有積極作用，但43個專家中有9個不同意。</p><p>　　4.5解決集體行動問題在鹿特丹港口群</p><p>　　最后我們討論了集體行動問題解決方案的質量。提出了五個集體行動問題建議在港口中，集群專家判斷四個相關：</p&

80、gt;<p><b>　　a相當多數(shù)</b></p><p>　　4.6港口當局的作用在鹿特丹市</p><p>　　鹿特丹市港口當局(RMPM)是一個公共的地主港。該組織是一個正式的為鹿特丹港市的一部分，但是很大一部分有經(jīng)營自主權。目前, 修改體制結構，港口當局授予更多的自主權，改變監(jiān)測和控制功能，從市議會到獨立董事會的討論。然而,即使當建議新構架被批

81、準后，市政當局仍然是主要的主導者。</p><p><b>　　5、結論</b></p><p>　　在本文中,我們認為港口集群治理分析增加了我們了解港口競爭, 港口發(fā)展和港口的功能。我們已經(jīng)提供了一份分析框架用于分析(港口)集群治理。集群治理的質量取決于在一個集群中的交易費用和“協(xié)調(diào)無價的范圍”。而四個變量同時影響治理質量：領導公司的存在，中介機構的存在，信任水平和