金融學(xué)外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　目 錄</b></p><p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)1</b></p><p>　　1. Introduction1</p><p>　　2. Games and game theory2</p><p>　　3. Theories of social prefe

2、rences3</p><p>　　4. Why do game experiments? And which games?3</p><p>　　5. Conclusions4</p><p><b>　　中文翻譯4</b></p><p><b>　　1.摘要4</b></p&g

3、t;<p>　　2.博弈和博弈論5</p><p>　　3.社會(huì)偏好理論6</p><p>　　4.為什么用博弈做實(shí)驗(yàn)？用什么博弈？6</p><p><b>　　5. 結(jié)論6</b></p><p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)</b></p><p>　　M

4、easuring Social Norms and Preferences using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists Colin F. Camerer and Ernst Fehr</p><p>　　1. Introduction </p><p>　　The purpose of this chapter is to

5、 describe a menu of experimental games that are useful for measuring aspects of social norms and social preferences. Economists use the term “preferences” to refer to the choices people make, and particularly to tradeoff

6、s between different collections (“bundles”) of things they value—food, money, time, prestige, and so forth. “Social preferences” refer to how people rank different allocations of material payoffs to themselves and others

7、. Self-interested individua</p><p>　　As we will see, the willingness to reduce or increase the payoff of relevant reference actors exists even though people reap neither present nor future material rewards f

8、rom reducing or increasing payoffs of others. This indicates that, in addition to self-interested behavior, people sometimes behave as if they have altruistic preferences, and preferences for equality and reciprocity.1 R

9、eciprocity, as we define it here, is different from the notion of reciprocal altruism in evolutionary biology.</p><p>　　Reciprocity, inequality aversion and altruism can have large effects on the regularitie

10、s of social life and, in particular, on the enforcement of social norms. This is why the examination of the nature of social preferences is so important for anthropology and for social sciences in general. There is, for

11、example, an ongoing debate in anthropology about the reasons for food-sharing in small-scale societies. The nature of social preferences will probably have a large effect on the social mechanis</p><p>　　In t

12、he following we first sketch game theory in broad terms. Then we describe some basic features of experimental design in economics. Then we introduce a menu of seven games that have proved useful in examining social prefe

13、rences. We define the games formally, show what aspects of social life they express, and describe behavioral regularities from experimental studies. The behavioral regularities are then interpreted in terms of preference

14、s for reciprocity, inequity aversion or altruism. The fi</p><p>　　2. Games and game theory </p><p>　　Game theory is a mathematical language for describing strategic interactions and their likely

15、 outcomes. A game is a set of strategies for each of several players, with precise rules for the order in which players choose strategies, the information they have when they choose, and how they rate the desirability (`

16、`utility") of resulting outcomes. Game theory is designed to be flexible enough to be used at many levels of detail in a broad range of sciences. Players may be genes, people, groups, fir</p><p>　　Game

17、theory consists of two different enterprises: (1) Using games as a language or taxonomy to parse the social world; and (2) deriving precise predictions about how players will play in a game by assuming that players maxim

18、ize expected “utility” (personal valuation) of consequences, plan ahead, and form beliefs about other players' likely actions. The second enterprise dominates game theory textbooks and journals. Analytical theory of

19、this sort is extremely mathematical, and inaccessible to ma</p><p>　　The most central concept in game theory is Nash equilibrium. A set of strategies (one for each player) form an equilibrium if each player

20、is choosing the strategy which is a best response (i.e., gives the highest expected utility) to the other players’ strategies. Attention is focussed on equilibrium because players who are constantly switching to better s

21、trategies, given what others have done, will generally end up at an equilibrium. Increasingly, game theorists are interested in the dynamics o</p><p>　　3. Theories of social preferences </p><p>

22、　　Within economics, the leading explanation for the patterns of results described above is that agents have social preferences (or “social utility”) which take into account the payoffs and perhaps intentions of others. R

23、oughly speaking, social preference theories assume that people have stable preferences for how money is allocated (which may depend on who the other player is, or how the allocation came about), much as they are assumed

24、in economics to have preferences for food, the present versus </p><p>　　Cultural anthropologists and evolutionary psychologists have sought to explain the origin of these preferences. One idea is that in the

25、 environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA) or ancestral past, people mostly engaged in repeated games with people they knew. Evolution created specialized cognitive heuristics for playing repeated games efficiently. I

26、t is well-known in game theory that behavior which is optimal for a selfinterested actor in a one-period game with a stranger - such as defecting</p><p>　　4. Why do game experiments? And which games? </p&

27、gt;<p>　　A central advantage of experimental games is comparability across subject pools (provided great care is taken in controlling for differences in language, purchasing power of outcomes, interactions with ex

28、perimenters, and so forth). While comparability is clearly not perfect, it is surely as good as most qualitative measures. A further advantage is replicability. The fact that experiments are replicable is a powerful tool

29、 for creating consensus about the fact and their interpretation in the scien</p><p>　　In fact, experiments conducted in the field by anthropologists may actually have two large advantages compared to lab exp

30、eriments in Western countries which usually (though not always) use college students as experimental subjects. First, since anthropologists are in the field for long periods of time, the cost of collecting data is rather

31、 low. (Most contributors to this volume often noted that the experiment was unusually fun for participants, probably more so than for college students raised i</p><p>　　5. Conclusions </p><p>　　

32、Game theory has proved useful in a wide range of social sciences in two ways: By providing a taxonomy of social situations which parse the social world; and by making precise predictions about how self-interested players

33、 will actually play. Behavior in experiments which carefully control players’ strategies, information, and possible payoffs shows that actual choices often deviate systematically from the game-theoretic prediction based

34、on self-interest. These deviations are naturally interpreted</p><p><b>　　中文翻譯</b></p><p>　　測(cè)量社會(huì)規(guī)范和偏好使用的博弈實(shí)驗(yàn)：對(duì)社會(huì)科學(xué)家的指導(dǎo)</p><p>　　Colin F. Camerer and Ernst Fehr</p>

35、<p><b>　　1.摘要</b></p><p>　　本章的目的是描述一個(gè)能有效測(cè)量社會(huì)規(guī)范和社會(huì)偏好的博弈。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家使用術(shù)語(yǔ)“偏好”來(lái)表達(dá)人們的選擇，特別是在不同的集合（“束”）例如食品，金錢，時(shí)間，聲譽(yù)的事情，等等中他們的權(quán)衡。“社會(huì)偏好”指的是人們?nèi)绾闻判蛭镔|(zhì)回報(bào)給自己和別人不同的分配。自私自利的人只關(guān)心自己的物質(zhì)回報(bào)。過(guò)去二十年的博弈實(shí)驗(yàn)研究表明，實(shí)際上，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的相

36、當(dāng)大的一部分人（通常是大學(xué)生）也關(guān)心他人的回報(bào)。在某些情況下，許多人愿意花費(fèi)資源減少別人的回報(bào)。在其他情況下，這些人花費(fèi)資源來(lái)增加別人的回報(bào)。</p><p>　　正如我們將看到的，即使減少或增加他人的報(bào)酬不影響自身現(xiàn)在或未來(lái)得到的報(bào)酬，減少或增加相關(guān)參與者報(bào)酬的意愿仍然存在。這表明，除了自我感興趣的行為，人們有時(shí)表現(xiàn)得好像他們有利他偏好，并追求平等和互惠。互惠，我們?cè)谶@里的定義，不同于在進(jìn)化生物學(xué)的互惠利他主義

37、的概念。互惠意味著人們?cè)敢猹?jiǎng)賞友好的行為和懲罰不利的行動(dòng)，即使獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)或懲罰導(dǎo)致實(shí)施獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)或懲罰的人的物質(zhì)報(bào)酬凈減少。同樣的，那些不喜歡不平等的人愿意采取代價(jià)高昂的行動(dòng)來(lái)減少不平等雖然這可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致他們的物質(zhì)回報(bào)凈減少。互惠利他主義通常假設(shè)往復(fù)運(yùn)動(dòng)產(chǎn)生的凈增長(zhǎng)使物質(zhì)回報(bào)增加（例如，因?yàn)橐粋€(gè)參與者的行動(dòng)贏得了聲譽(yù)使他們?cè)谖磥?lái)受益）。利他主義，在這里的定義，意味著一個(gè)參與者采取代價(jià)高昂的行動(dòng)來(lái)增加另一個(gè)參與者的回報(bào)而不管其他參與者的歷史行為。利他主

38、義是無(wú)私的奉獻(xiàn)，而互惠意味著以其他參與者的歷史行為為條件的非自利行為。</p><p>　　互惠，不平等厭惡和利他主義對(duì)社會(huì)生活的規(guī)律影響很大，特別是對(duì)社會(huì)規(guī)范的執(zhí)行。這就是為什么社會(huì)偏好的本質(zhì)的考察通常是非常重要的人類學(xué)和社會(huì)科學(xué)。例如有一個(gè)關(guān)于人類學(xué)中小規(guī)模社會(huì)分享食物的原因的正在進(jìn)行的辯論。社會(huì)偏好的性質(zhì)可能將對(duì)維持共享食物的社會(huì)機(jī)制產(chǎn)生很大影響。例如，如果許多人在一個(gè)社會(huì)中表現(xiàn)出不平等厭惡或互惠，他們將有

39、意愿去懲罰那些不愿意分享失誤的人，因此沒有正式的機(jī)制來(lái)管理食品共享。沒有這樣的偏好，就需要正式的機(jī)制來(lái)維持分享食物（或者共享根本不存在）。正如我們將看到的一些簡(jiǎn)單的實(shí)驗(yàn)，來(lái)讓研究人員找出是否有食品共享的規(guī)范，和對(duì)那些不分享的人懲罰。</p><p>　　接下來(lái)我們首先在廣泛的術(shù)語(yǔ)中草擬理論。然后我們描述經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)實(shí)驗(yàn)設(shè)計(jì)的一些基本特征。然后，我們介紹一系列在研究社會(huì)偏好中被證明是有用的的七個(gè)博弈。我們正式定義那些實(shí)驗(yàn)

40、，展示他們表示的社會(huì)生活的方方面面，描述從實(shí)驗(yàn)研究中得出的行為規(guī)律。行為規(guī)律在隨后的偏好互惠利他主義中被解釋為不公平厭惡或利他主義。最后的部分描述了一些其他的人類學(xué)家可能會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)有用并得出結(jié)論的博弈。</p><p><b>　　2.博弈和博弈論</b></p><p>　　博弈論是描述戰(zhàn)略的相互作用及其可能的結(jié)果的一種數(shù)學(xué)語(yǔ)言。博弈是每個(gè)參與者的決策的集，在參與者選擇

41、決策時(shí)有精確的規(guī)則，他們選擇時(shí)擁有的信息，和他們?nèi)绾喂烙?jì)由此產(chǎn)生的結(jié)果的期望（效用）。博弈論可以靈活的在許多細(xì)節(jié)層次的學(xué)科范圍廣泛使用。參與者可以是基因，人，團(tuán)體，企業(yè)或國(guó)家。策略可能是基因編碼的本能，在拍賣網(wǎng)站競(jìng)標(biāo)的啟發(fā)式算法，為新產(chǎn)品開發(fā)企業(yè)的例程，在復(fù)雜的大規(guī)模侵權(quán)案件的法律策略，或戰(zhàn)時(shí)作戰(zhàn)計(jì)劃。結(jié)果可以是任何參與者衡量的價(jià)值——信譽(yù)，食品，對(duì)國(guó)會(huì)的控制，性機(jī)會(huì)，返回一個(gè)網(wǎng)球發(fā)球，企業(yè)利潤(rùn)，你會(huì)最大限度地付出的東西和你實(shí)際支付之間

42、的差距，（消費(fèi)者剩余），正義感，或捕獲的領(lǐng)土。</p><p>　　博弈論由兩個(gè)不同理論組成：（1）使用博弈作為一種語(yǔ)言或分類來(lái)解析社會(huì)；（2）通過(guò)假設(shè)參與者最大化預(yù)期“效用”（自我價(jià)值）的重要性獲得關(guān)于參與者如何進(jìn)行一次博弈的精確預(yù)測(cè)，預(yù)先計(jì)劃，并形成對(duì)其他參與者類似行為的猜想。第二理論主導(dǎo)博弈論教科書和期刊。這種分析理論是完全的數(shù)學(xué)化，并且無(wú)法聯(lián)系許多經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和生物學(xué)理論之外的社會(huì)科學(xué)。幸運(yùn)的是，由于了解典型的

43、博弈——像那些在本章討論的——沒有超出簡(jiǎn)單的邏輯的要求，可以使博弈被用作一種最小的數(shù)學(xué)分類。</p><p>　　在博弈論中最核心的概念是納什均衡。如果每個(gè)參與者選擇對(duì)其他參與者決策的最佳回應(yīng)策略，一組策略（一個(gè)參與者一個(gè)）形成一個(gè)平衡（即提供最高的期望效用）。研究著注意力集中在平衡，因?yàn)閰⑴c者被給予其他參與者已經(jīng)做出的決策信息后會(huì)不斷切換做出更好的決策，通常會(huì)結(jié)束在一個(gè)平衡。漸漸地，博弈論者也對(duì)動(dòng)態(tài)平衡有興趣，

44、在對(duì)參與者的策略群進(jìn)化的形式（Weibull，1995）；或個(gè)人的學(xué)習(xí)經(jīng)驗(yàn)（例如，F(xiàn)udenberg和Levine，1998；Camerer和Ho，1999）。</p><p><b>　　3.社會(huì)偏好理論</b></p><p>　　在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中，對(duì)上述結(jié)論的方式的主導(dǎo)的解釋是，代理商有社會(huì)偏好（或“社會(huì)效用”），考慮到收益和別人可能的意圖在內(nèi)。大致說(shuō)來(lái)，社會(huì)偏好理論

45、假定人們對(duì)金錢如何分配有穩(wěn)定的偏好（這可能取決于其他的參與者是誰(shuí)，或者分配是如何而來(lái)的）就像他們被假定為對(duì)食物有偏好的經(jīng)濟(jì)人，現(xiàn)在與未來(lái)，如何更靠近家地工作等等。</p><p>　　文化人類學(xué)家和進(jìn)化心理學(xué)家試圖解釋這些偏好的起源。一種觀點(diǎn)是在適應(yīng)環(huán)境的進(jìn)化中（EEA）或者與祖先有關(guān)的過(guò)去，人們大多從事他們知道的重復(fù)博弈。進(jìn)化建立專門的有效地重復(fù)博弈的認(rèn)知啟發(fā)式演化。眾所周知，在博弈論中一個(gè)自利主義的參與者與陌

46、生人的單輪博弈取得最優(yōu)結(jié)果的行為——如公共物品博弈，接受所有的最后通牒報(bào)價(jià)——在與合作伙伴的重復(fù)博弈中并不總是最優(yōu)解。在一個(gè)重復(fù)博弈中，例如，參與者由于難以推廣而拒絕提供付出來(lái)建立良好的聲譽(yù)，這導(dǎo)致他在未來(lái)更多的付出。一種非自然的觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，當(dāng)參與者在實(shí)驗(yàn)室與陌生人進(jìn)行單輪博弈時(shí)，他們不能“關(guān)閉”在EEA的重復(fù)博弈生活中形成的行為習(xí)慣。這種觀點(diǎn)的一個(gè)重要的修改是，進(jìn)化沒有配備所有的人具有相同的硬連線的本能進(jìn)行博弈，而替以創(chuàng)造學(xué)習(xí)社會(huì)規(guī)范的

47、能力。后者的觀點(diǎn)可以解釋為什么不同的文化會(huì)有不同的規(guī)范。</p><p>　　4.為什么用博弈做實(shí)驗(yàn)？用什么博弈？</p><p>　　博弈實(shí)驗(yàn)的一個(gè)核心優(yōu)勢(shì)是學(xué)科交叉相似性（提供很大關(guān)注在控制語(yǔ)言差異，控制的結(jié)果，購(gòu)買力的相互作用與實(shí)驗(yàn)者，等等）。雖然在可比性顯然是不完美的，但這肯定是最好的定性措施。另一個(gè)優(yōu)點(diǎn)是可重復(fù)性。事實(shí)上，重復(fù)實(shí)驗(yàn)是建立在科學(xué)界對(duì)事實(shí)和解釋的共識(shí)上的一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的工具

48、。</p><p>　　事實(shí)上，人類學(xué)家在現(xiàn)場(chǎng)組織實(shí)驗(yàn)相比西方國(guó)家通常（但并不總是）使用的大學(xué)生作為實(shí)驗(yàn)對(duì)象做實(shí)驗(yàn)室研究可能實(shí)際上有兩個(gè)很大優(yōu)點(diǎn)。首先，由于人類學(xué)家在現(xiàn)場(chǎng)很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間，收集數(shù)據(jù)的成本是相當(dāng)?shù)偷?。（很多?duì)這種觀點(diǎn)有貢獻(xiàn)的觀點(diǎn)指出，此類實(shí)驗(yàn)多參與者來(lái)說(shuō)有不同尋常的樂(lè)趣，可能比大學(xué)生玩Nintendo世界，500頻道有線電視，和網(wǎng)上沖浪更有樂(lè)趣。）第二，支付給發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的研究支出資金總額預(yù)算通常在發(fā)展水平

49、低的社會(huì)中具有非凡的購(gòu)買力。因此，人類學(xué)家測(cè)試人們對(duì)非常大的收益，如一周或一個(gè)月的工資，與較低的收益相比是否有不同的表現(xiàn)是很容易的。這樣的比較對(duì)歸納高收益經(jīng)濟(jì)行為是很重要的，但往往在發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家是費(fèi)用昂貴的。</p><p><b>　　5. 結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　博弈論已經(jīng)以兩種途徑在廣泛的社會(huì)科學(xué)中被證明是有用的：通過(guò)提供對(duì)社會(huì)情況剖析的分類；和通過(guò)對(duì)自利

50、主義的參與者實(shí)際表現(xiàn)會(huì)如何做出精確預(yù)測(cè)。實(shí)驗(yàn)中的行為仔細(xì)控制了參與者的決策，信息和可能的回報(bào)，實(shí)際的選擇往往偏離系統(tǒng)的基于自利主義的博弈理論預(yù)測(cè)。這些偏差很自然地作為解釋社會(huì)規(guī)范（參與者期望和覺得有義務(wù)去做的事）和社會(huì)偏好（參與者在其他參與者獲得更多或更少錢時(shí)的感覺）的證據(jù)。這個(gè)證據(jù)現(xiàn)在被經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家積極使用來(lái)制造關(guān)于社會(huì)偏好的狹義理論，這個(gè)理論被用來(lái)以一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的方法解釋許多不同博弈中的數(shù)據(jù)，憑此做出最新的預(yù)測(cè)。因?yàn)槿祟悓W(xué)家往往對(duì)社會(huì)規(guī)范和