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1、<p> 外文題目:Student loans repayment and recover: international comparisons </p><p> 出 處:Higher Education
2、 </p><p> 作 者:Adrian Ziderman , Hua Shen </p><p><b> 原 文:</b></p><p> Student loans repayment and re
3、covery: international comparisons</p><p> Government-sponsored student loans schemes are in place in some 70 countries and regions round the world. Student loans schemes, usually concerned with tertiary edu
4、cation, are of particular interest to governments because these schemes are able to contribute to the solution of a range of pressing policy problems that governments face.</p><p> Student loans are able to
5、 relieve pressures on national budgets by facilitating greater cost sharing though the raising of tuition and other university fees. They both enable students to avoid the burden of the up-front payment of increased tuit
6、ion fees, as well as enabling them to delay loan repayment until they are in receipt of the higher salaries that generally accrue to university graduates. Liberated resources can be used in areas of greater priority for
7、society, both outside and within th</p><p> Considerable differences are evident in loans schemes across countries. Schemes differ not only in the underlying objectives pursued, but also in such parameters
8、as organizational structure, sources of initial funding, student coverage, loans allocation procedures and collection methods. However there is one element that is common to almost all government-sponsored loans schemes:
9、 they are highly subsidized by governments. This means that, unlike commercial loans, a sizeable proportion of the tot</p><p> A sizeable and sustained gap between disbursements and recovery implies continu
10、ing governmental ?nancial support. This is the case also where loans scheme capital is provided, not by government, but by such non-governmental sources as the banking system; here there is a need for ongoing government
11、guarantees against default, in addition to interest rate subsidies.</p><p> How large are these gaps across countries, in practice? A central objective of the present paper is to measure the size, and contr
12、ibuting factors, of this gap in 44 loans schemes worldwide. Has the gap changed in size over time? Many student loans schemes have undergone drastic reform in recent years. Some programs have moved from a traditional mor
13、tgage-type repayment model to income-contingency based repayment; some schemes have adjusted loan repayment conditions, such as interest rates, grace </p><p> The paper is structured as follows. The followi
14、ng, de?nitional section introduces the key concepts that are measured in this study: the loan repayment ratio, hidden grants and the loans recovery ratio. Previous measurement studies are discussed brie?y in section ‘‘Pa
15、st studies’’, while a brief account of data sources is provided in section ‘‘Data sources and methods’’. Our main ?ndings on repayment and recovery ratios are presented in Sections ‘‘Results: repayment’’ and ‘‘Results: e
16、f?ciency of l</p><p> Past studies</p><p> A number of studies have examined loans repayment and loans recovery in various country loans schemes. These studies take two forms: individual count
17、ry studies and comparative studies. Examples of country level studies are to be found in Wandiga (1997), which examines the Kenyan loans scheme, and in Chung and Hung (2003) which reports on student loans in Hong Kong. B
18、ut because these individual studies use somewhat different methodologies, it is dif?cult to draw any comparative conclusions from a</p><p> The comparative study by Ziderman and Albrecht (1995) is more gene
19、ral and far-ranging than the other studies noted above. Computing repayment and recovery ratios for student loans schemes in 19 countries, the study covered a larger number of countries, included both developing and indu
20、strialized and was not restricted to a regional coverage. However, the ?ndings relate to loans scheme conditions as they stood ?fteen to twenty years ago. The aim of the research reported in the present paper is to</p
21、><p> Given less-than-full loans recovery in almost all loans schemes and, in many cases, very heavy losses, government subsidy will remain a continuing feature of student loan schemes as they are presently op
22、erated. The widely held view that student loans scheme can act as revolving funds—which, once capitalized, can ?nance themselves subsequently through repayments from earlier loans—is seen to be a myth. Governments will n
23、eed to inject funds annually to cover the costs of the built-in loans repayme</p><p> However, the ?nancial viability of loans schemes can be improved. Improvement may be achieved either by reducing the lev
24、els of built-in subsidies (hidden grants) or by improving the ef?ciency of loans schemes through containing administration costs and particularly, in reducing repayment leakages due to default. We have noted that the mai
25、n factor in accounting for the failure to recoup loans disbursements in most schemes is the level of built-in subsidies (hidden grants), rather than default or </p><p> Confronting built-in over-subsidizati
26、on</p><p> Repayment ratios are quite low in a number of loans schemes. While there is room for some element of subsidy in most schemes, heavy government built-in subsidies provided through large hidden gra
27、nts—the major source of recovery losses—cannot always be justi?ed. Whether or not a loans scheme should be subsidized and, given that a subsidy is in place, whether or not the size of the government built-in subsidy is e
28、xcessive, will depend on the main objectives that the loans scheme is intended to ser</p><p> Cost-sharing is the central, albeit indirect, objective of many loans schemes. Student loans facilitate greater
29、cost-recovery through the raising of tuition fees and other university costs, in so far as they counter deleterious effects on enrollment, and especially on the access of disadvantaged groups. Social Targeting is explici
30、tly and directly concerned with accessibility of the poor. Where targeted speci?cally at disadvantaged groups, loans schemes (particularly where substantially subsidize</p><p> In loans schemes where either
31、 cost recovery or student independence constitutes the central objective, the case for heavy built-in student loan subsidies is not strong. In both of these cases, the intended effect of student loans is to reduce the ?n
32、ancial burden on students during study and to delay fee payment (through borrowing) until after graduation, when payment is more readily made from the expected enhancement of earnings that the additional education makes
33、possible. In these cases, the l</p><p> The traditional, and most effective, method of enhancing the educational access of the poor has been through the provision of means-tested grants to cover tuition fee
34、s and usually living expenses as well; however, a widespread grants scheme is likely to be expensive. The use of loans, rather than grants, proactively targeted on the poor, offers a method that may both increase access
35、for the poor and reduce, or at least contain, public expenditure on student support over the longer term, as loan </p><p> In the recent comparative study of loans schemes in South East Asia (Ziderman 2004)
36、, most schemes were shown to conform to the social targeting model. Yet the evidence did not indicate any high degree of success in increasing the university access of the poor. A number of essential conditions for succe
37、ss were lacking. These include a suf?ciently high level of individual support to cover necessary expenses; a broad coverage of poor students to achieve national impact; and careful and deliberate l</p><p>
38、The upshot of this discussion is that the levels of built-in subsidies, resulting in low repayment ratios, are often excessive. High subsidies may be either unnecessary (cost sharing and student independence models) or l
39、ess than effective in practice in achieving objectives (social targeting). Since the level of built-in subsidy is ?xed by government, these subsidies may be reduced, as appropriate, by government decision. However, veste
40、d interests are likely to militate against these desirable c</p><p> Reducing loans repayment default</p><p> The problem of high repayment default may be less tractable. A wide range of measu
41、res to reduce repayment default are available for use in various loans schemes. These include the use of loans guarantors, moral suasion (publication of defaulter lists), baring access to further credit if in default and
42、 legal action against recalcitrant defaulters. However, it is frequently the case that these measures are not employed in practice. In a number of cases, notably in developing countries, a general a</p><p>
43、 A subject of recent controversy is whether the type of repayments collection mechanism in place can affect the level of repayment default. Speci?cally, it has been argued strongly that income contingent repayments schem
44、es are likely to ease the problem of repayment default, since an excessive repayment burden is avoided during periods of unemployment and low earnings. However, whatever the other relative merits of income contingent rep
45、ayment and traditional mortgage loans schemes, there is no ev</p><p> Loans schemes are expensive for governments and, we have noted, very often highly subsidized. Given the tightness of public budgets in m
46、any countries, governments have a strong interest in containing overall loans scheme costs and, particularly, subsidy levels within appropriate and realistic limits. This will require a careful justi?cation for the curre
47、nt levels of loans subsidies, the development of ef?cient loans repayment collection procedures and the continuous monitoring of the outcomes of</p><p> 外文題目:Student loans repayment and recover: internation
48、al comparisons </p><p> 出 處:Higher Education </p><p> 作 者:Adrian Ziderman , Hua Shen
49、 </p><p> 學(xué)生貸款還款和回收:國(guó)際比較 </p><p> 世界上大約有70多個(gè)國(guó)家和地區(qū)實(shí)行由政府資助的學(xué)生貸款方案。學(xué)生貸款方案通常是有關(guān)高等教育的。政府對(duì)它特別感興趣是因?yàn)檫@些方案能夠解決各國(guó)所面臨的一系列緊迫的政策問題。</p><p> 學(xué)生貸款能夠減輕
50、由于學(xué)費(fèi)和其他大學(xué)費(fèi)用的增長(zhǎng)給國(guó)家預(yù)算帶來的壓力。它們可以使得大部分大學(xué)生減少前期學(xué)費(fèi)的負(fù)擔(dān),讓他們能夠延遲償還貸款,直到能夠取得較高的薪酬。流動(dòng)中的資源可以優(yōu)先運(yùn)用于有需要的領(lǐng)域中,尤其是社會(huì)上的基礎(chǔ)教育。更多教育成本的回收,能夠提供更多的資金來擴(kuò)大教育規(guī)模,來容納增加的高等教育需求。針對(duì)弱勢(shì)群體進(jìn)行貸款補(bǔ)貼,能夠使得更多的窮人和少數(shù)民族接受高等教育,從而促進(jìn)社會(huì)的公平。并在一定的條件下對(duì)特定領(lǐng)域的研究提供貸款,將會(huì)使技術(shù)發(fā)展的瓶頸得
51、到突破,抑制社會(huì),經(jīng)濟(jì)和工業(yè)發(fā)展的松動(dòng)。</p><p> 不同國(guó)家的貸款方案明顯是不同的。方案的不同不只是追求的基本目標(biāo)不同,還在與這種組織結(jié)構(gòu)的各種參數(shù),初始資金、學(xué)生覆蓋、貸款分配程序和收集方法等。但是幾乎所有政府資助的貸款方案都有一個(gè)共同的因素:都是由政府高度資助的。這意味著,不像商業(yè)貸款,總貸款的貸款機(jī)構(gòu)支出費(fèi)用占相當(dāng)大的部分,無論是政府部門,機(jī)關(guān)還是實(shí)施商業(yè)貸款方案的銀行,都有可能收不回貸款。總貸款
52、中的這種支出和貸款回收總金額之間產(chǎn)生差距的原因有兩個(gè)。首先,貸款方案中設(shè)置了內(nèi)置利率補(bǔ)貼。其次,在運(yùn)行中存在大量拖欠貸款和高管理成本方面的方案,效率低下。</p><p> 貸款支出和回收之間持續(xù)龐大的差距意味著助學(xué)貸款將一直受到政府的財(cái)政支持。這種情況意味著貸款方案中的資金提供者,不是政府機(jī)構(gòu),而是來源于這類非政府機(jī)構(gòu),如銀行體系。這里需要知道的是,除了利率補(bǔ)貼外,還有政府擔(dān)保。</p><
53、;p> 各個(gè)國(guó)家在貸款實(shí)行中到底存在多大差距?本文的一個(gè)中心目標(biāo)就是探查世界各地的44項(xiàng)貸款方案之間的差距以及產(chǎn)生的原因。差距是否隨著時(shí)間的流逝而改變?在最近幾年,許多貸款方案都經(jīng)過了重大修改。有些方案已經(jīng)從傳統(tǒng)的抵押貸款還款模式轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槭杖霊?yīng)急型的還款模式;有些方案修改了貸款的還款條件,如利率,寬限期和還款期;也有少數(shù)國(guó)家重新設(shè)計(jì),甚至完全代替了以前的貸款方案。本研究結(jié)果與90年代初(齊德曼和阿爾布雷克特1995)比較,分析在過
54、渡期間資助和貸款方案的整體效益水平改變到了什么程度。</p><p> 本文的結(jié)構(gòu),如下所示。在以下定義部分介紹這項(xiàng)研究的主要概念:貸款還款比率、隱藏的助學(xué)金以及貸款回收率。在“過去的研究”這一章中討論了以前的測(cè)量研究,在“資料的來源和方法”這一章中簡(jiǎn)單的介紹了資料的來源和方法。在“結(jié)果:還款”這一章中提到關(guān)于貸款還款率和回收率的研究結(jié)果。最后一章“結(jié)果:貸款方案效率”是對(duì)政策的總結(jié)。</p>&
55、lt;p><b> 一、過去的研究</b></p><p> 很多研究都在各個(gè)國(guó)家貸款方案中探討過貸款還款和貸款回收。這些研究有兩種形式:個(gè)別國(guó)家的研究和比較研究。個(gè)別國(guó)家研究的例子是,萬迪亞(1997)分析肯尼亞貸款方案以及孫洪(2003)關(guān)于香港助學(xué)貸款的報(bào)告。但由于這些個(gè)別研究使用的方法不同,很難從各個(gè)不同的檢測(cè)結(jié)果中得出結(jié)論。然而可以進(jìn)行多個(gè)國(guó)家的貸款方案比較研究。每個(gè)比較
56、研究都是在監(jiān)視狀態(tài)下檢查審核貸款方案。約翰斯頓(1986)發(fā)表了著名的研究,提出了隱藏補(bǔ)助金的概念,測(cè)量了在德國(guó),美國(guó)和瑞典的貸款方案中的隱藏補(bǔ)助金。卡爾森(1992)比較了拉丁美洲和加勒比地區(qū)之間的貸款方案,齊德曼(2004)得出了五個(gè)東南亞貸款方案比較研究的結(jié)果。但是這些研究的范圍都是有限的。約翰斯頓的研究只涉及到發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家,而卡爾森和齊德曼研究的都是重點(diǎn)地區(qū)。</p><p> 齊德曼和阿爾布雷克特 (19
57、95 ) 進(jìn)行了更廣泛的比較研究。計(jì)算了19個(gè)國(guó)家的學(xué)生貸款方案的還款和回收比率,這個(gè)研究涵蓋了更多的國(guó)家,包括發(fā)展中國(guó)家和發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家,且不限于一個(gè)區(qū)域。不過,因?yàn)樗麄兪钦驹谑逯炼昵?,所以研究結(jié)果所涉及貸款方案的條件都是以前的。本研究報(bào)告的目的是再次討論這個(gè)早期的研究,以更新調(diào)查結(jié)果,并以39個(gè)國(guó)家為樣本。我們可以了解同個(gè)資助模式在不同國(guó)家的發(fā)展水平?隨著時(shí)間的推移貸款補(bǔ)貼變得越來越普遍?他們運(yùn)行更有效?</p>&l
58、t;p> 目前運(yùn)作學(xué)生貸款方案的特點(diǎn)是政府在貸款損失很大的情況下給予比較全面的貸款補(bǔ)貼?,F(xiàn)在普遍認(rèn)為,學(xué)生貸款可作為周轉(zhuǎn)資金,一旦證券化,就可以通過融資來提供資金。在很多國(guó)家,政府每年都需要提供資金來支付的貸款方案內(nèi)置的費(fèi)用補(bǔ)貼和償還貸款,以彌補(bǔ)貸款違約所帶來的損失。</p><p> 然而,通過減少內(nèi)置補(bǔ)貼(隱藏補(bǔ)助金)水平或者通過改善管理成本和減少違約貸款能夠提高貸款使用效率。我們注意到,在大多數(shù)方
59、案中對(duì)違約貸款進(jìn)行的支出核算的主要是內(nèi)置的補(bǔ)貼(隱藏補(bǔ)助金),而不是較高的行政費(fèi)用。下面我們討論大多數(shù)方案中的內(nèi)置貸款資助水平高的理由。</p><p><b> 1.過度的內(nèi)置補(bǔ)貼</b></p><p> 大部分貸款方案中的貸款償還率都是較低的。在大多數(shù)情況下,政府通過內(nèi)置大量的隱藏補(bǔ)貼,使得損失得到恢復(fù),但是不能一直依靠政府補(bǔ)貼。貸款方案是不是應(yīng)該得到適當(dāng)?shù)?/p>
60、補(bǔ)貼,政府內(nèi)置的補(bǔ)貼是不是過度,主要取決于提供貸款服務(wù)的主要目標(biāo)。在最近的一篇文章中,作者之一齊德曼(2002)確定世界上的貸款方案至少有11個(gè)不同目標(biāo)。現(xiàn)在我們討論的是貸款方案的3個(gè)不同的目的,包括:成本共擔(dān)(收入同時(shí)發(fā)生),社會(huì)目標(biāo)(為貧窮的人提供公平)和減輕學(xué)生經(jīng)濟(jì)壓力。在實(shí)際中,任何方案都包括一種或者多種的目標(biāo)。</p><p> 很多貸款方案的中心目標(biāo)都是成本共擔(dān),學(xué)生貸款所產(chǎn)生的成本通過提高大學(xué)學(xué)費(fèi)
61、和其他費(fèi)用的來分擔(dān)。社會(huì)目標(biāo)是專門針對(duì)弱勢(shì)群體的,貸款方案(尤其是大幅補(bǔ)貼),能夠使得更多的窮人接受大學(xué)教育,從而促進(jìn)社會(huì)公平。第三,學(xué)生獨(dú)立模型,通常出現(xiàn)在西歐的貸款方案里。在這種情況下提供貸款的目的(通常只涉及生活費(fèi)用,因?yàn)閷W(xué)費(fèi)是最少的)是減輕學(xué)生在學(xué)習(xí)上的經(jīng)濟(jì)負(fù)擔(dān),這些負(fù)擔(dān)甚至可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)的較富裕的學(xué)生中。例如,在北歐國(guó)家的學(xué)生在經(jīng)濟(jì)上是與他們的父母獨(dú)立分開的,它們不會(huì)依靠父母的經(jīng)濟(jì)支持。</p><p>
62、 在以貸款的回收或?qū)W生獨(dú)立之間任何一個(gè)目標(biāo)為中心目標(biāo)的貸款方案,其內(nèi)置學(xué)生貸款補(bǔ)貼的數(shù)量是不多的。在這兩種目標(biāo)下,學(xué)生貸款的預(yù)期效果是減少學(xué)生在學(xué)習(xí)期間的經(jīng)濟(jì)負(fù)擔(dān),并將付款推遲到畢業(yè)后,提高貸款的預(yù)期付款率。在貸款目標(biāo)是幾乎收回全部貸款的情況下,貸款的內(nèi)置補(bǔ)貼往往是過高的。只有當(dāng)貸款方案的目的是直接以社會(huì)定位的時(shí)候,可以得到相當(dāng)大的內(nèi)置補(bǔ)貼。在許多國(guó)家,貧困和弱勢(shì)青年(在非義務(wù)教育階段中)高等教育入學(xué)率比較低。提高他們的入學(xué)率已成為教育
63、和社會(huì)政策的一項(xiàng)重要內(nèi)容。雖然入學(xué)率較低的原因是多方面的,不僅有學(xué)費(fèi)和生活費(fèi)用的負(fù)擔(dān),同時(shí)還有家長(zhǎng)對(duì)家庭收入的減少的擔(dān)心,然而最主要的原因是經(jīng)濟(jì)的負(fù)擔(dān)。因此提供經(jīng)濟(jì)援助,被認(rèn)為是實(shí)現(xiàn)更多的窮人接受高等教育的必要不充分條件。</p><p> 增加窮人的接受高等教育的機(jī)會(huì),傳統(tǒng)最有效的方法是通過提供免息的補(bǔ)助金,來支付學(xué)費(fèi)和生活所需的費(fèi)用。但是,一個(gè)普遍的補(bǔ)助金的方案是昂貴的。貸款不是主動(dòng)地有針對(duì)性的對(duì)窮人進(jìn)行補(bǔ)
64、貼。貸款償還機(jī)制的建立,提供了一個(gè)減少或降低貧困程度的方法,至少能夠在較長(zhǎng)時(shí)期內(nèi)對(duì)學(xué)生的公共開支進(jìn)行資助。要使貸款能夠有效增加貧困人接受教育機(jī)會(huì),還需要在軟貸款的條件下提供貸款。由于助學(xué)補(bǔ)助金提供了比助學(xué)貸款更有力,更直接的激勵(lì)措施,使得貸款的優(yōu)勢(shì)不夠明顯。貸款政策的核心難題是:內(nèi)置貸款補(bǔ)貼在什么水平下才能夠使得在對(duì)窮人進(jìn)行補(bǔ)貼時(shí),補(bǔ)助金比內(nèi)置貸款補(bǔ)貼更加有成本效益。</p><p> 在最近的東南亞貸款方案(
65、齊德曼2004年)的比較研究中,大部分方案都是以社會(huì)為目標(biāo)的。然而,沒有跡象表明貧困生大學(xué)入學(xué)率有較大的提高。以讓更多窮人參加高等教育為目的的貸款失敗往往都是因?yàn)槿鄙僖恍┍匾某晒l件,這些條件包括對(duì)個(gè)人提供的貸款足夠用來支付必要的開支費(fèi)用;貸款提供的范圍是對(duì)全部貧困生;仔細(xì)慎重的發(fā)放以貧困生和其他弱勢(shì)群體為目標(biāo)的貸款。</p><p> 這次討論的結(jié)果是低回收率的貸款內(nèi)置補(bǔ)貼水平往往過高。高補(bǔ)貼可能是不必要的
66、(費(fèi)用分擔(dān)和學(xué)生獨(dú)立模式)或有效目標(biāo)缺少補(bǔ)貼(社會(huì)定位)。由于內(nèi)置的補(bǔ)貼是由政府制定的,當(dāng)政府酌情決定時(shí),可能會(huì)減少補(bǔ)貼,然而會(huì)受到既得利益者的妨礙。</p><p> 2.減少貸款償還違約</p><p> 高還款拖欠問題是不容易處理的。在各項(xiàng)貸款方案中,采用了一系列的措施來解決還款拖欠問題。包括使用貸款保證、道德勸說(發(fā)布的違紀(jì)者列表)、能夠獲得進(jìn)一步信貸的機(jī)會(huì)、如果違約,將會(huì)對(duì)頑
67、固的欠款人采取法律行動(dòng)。但是,通常情況下,這些措施不能在社會(huì)中得到有效的效果。在一些國(guó)家特別是發(fā)展中國(guó)家,不償還貸款已經(jīng)被社會(huì)上所接受。</p><p> 最近的一些有爭(zhēng)議的問題是,貸款償還收集機(jī)制是否可以影響還款違約率。具體而言,具有強(qiáng)烈爭(zhēng)議的話題是,收入償還方案是否有可能減輕貸款違約率。因?yàn)榇蟛糠值倪€款方案避開了失業(yè)和低薪水這兩個(gè)時(shí)間段。然而,雖然收入償還貸款方案比傳統(tǒng)的按揭貸款方案相對(duì)有優(yōu)點(diǎn),但是目前的研
68、究證據(jù)難以表明,收入型償還貸款方案比按揭抵押型貸款方案的違約率更低。</p><p> 我們也注意到,很多時(shí)候,各國(guó)的貸款方案都是昂貴的,都是高補(bǔ)貼的。因?yàn)榇蠖鄶?shù)國(guó)家的公共財(cái)政預(yù)算都是緊張的,所以各國(guó)政府都專注于遏制和限制貸款方案中的補(bǔ)貼,特別是在高補(bǔ)貼水平的貸款方案中。要確保貸款目標(biāo)的實(shí)現(xiàn),這需要對(duì)當(dāng)前的貸款補(bǔ)貼水平進(jìn)行仔細(xì)調(diào)整,開發(fā)有效的貸款償還機(jī)制以及對(duì)貸款方案的效果進(jìn)行持續(xù)的監(jiān)測(cè)。</p>
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