《金融學外文翻譯》word版

1、目錄外文文獻....................................................................................................11.Introduction...................................................................................................

2、.........................12.Gamesgamethey.........................................................................................................23.Theiesofsocialpreferences..............................................

3、.................................................34.Whydogameexperimentswhichgames...................................................................35.Conclusions.........................................................

4、...................................................................4中文翻譯....................................................................................................41.摘要...........................................

5、.............................................................................................42.博弈和博弈論......................................................................................................................

6、..53.社會偏好理論........................................................................................................................64.為什么用博弈做實驗？用什么博弈？......................................................................

7、..........65.結(jié)論......................................................................................................................................6外文文獻外文文獻MeasuringSocialNmsPreferencesusingExperimentalGames:AGuidefSoc

8、ialScientistsColinF.CamererErnstFehr1.IntroductionThepurposeofthischapteristodescribeamenuofexperimentalgamesthatareusefulfmeasuringaspectsofsocialnmssocialpreferences.Economistsusetheterm“preferences”torefertothechoices

9、peoplemakeparticularlytotradeoffsbetweendifferentcollections(“bundles”)ofthingstheyvalue—foodmoneytimeprestigesofth.“Socialpreferences”refertohowpeoplerankdifferentallocationsofmaterialpayoffstothemselvesothers.Selfinter

10、estedindividualscareonlyabouttheirownmaterialpayoffs.Thepasttwodecadesofexperimentalresearchhaveshownhoweverthatasubstantialfractionofpeopleindevelopedcountries(typicallycollegestudents)alsocareaboutthepayoffsofothers.In

11、somesituationsmanypeoplearewillingtospendresourcestoreducethepayoffofothers.Inothersituationsthesamepeoplespendresourcestoincreasethepayoffofothers.Aswewillseethewillingnesstoreduceincreasethepayoffofrelevantreferenceact

12、sexistseventhoughpeoplereapneitherpresentnfuturematerialrewardsfromreducingincreasingpayoffsofothers.Thisindicatesthatinadditiontocpateprofitsthegapbetweenwhatyouwouldmaximallypayfsomethingwhatyouactuallypay(“consumersur

13、plus”)asenseofjusticecapturedterrity.Gametheyconsistsoftwodifferententerprises:(1)Usinggamesasalanguagetaxonomytoparsethesocialwld(2)derivingprecisepredictionsabouthowplayerswillplayinagamebyassumingthatplayersmaximizeex

14、pected“utility”(personalvaluation)ofconsequencesplanaheadfmbeliefsaboutotherplayerslikelyactions.Thesecondenterprisedominatesgametheytextbooksjournals.Analyticaltheyofthisstisextremelymathematicalinaccessibletomanysocial

15、scientistsoutsideofeconomicstheeticalbiology.Ftunatelygamescanbeusedasataxonomywithminimalmathematicsbecauseunderstingprototypicalgames—likethosediscussedinthischapter—requiresnothingbeyondsimplelogic.Themostcentralconce

16、ptingametheyisNashequilibrium.Asetofstrategies(onefeachplayer)fmanequilibriumifeachplayerischoosingthestrategywhichisabestresponse(i.e.givesthehighestexpectedutility)totheotherplayers’strategies.Attentionisfocussedonequi

17、libriumbecauseplayerswhoareconstantlyswitchingtobetterstrategiesgivenwhatothershavedonewillgenerallyendupatanequilibrium.Increasinglygametheistsareinterestedinthedynamicsofequilibrationaswellinthefmofevolutionofpopulatio

18、nsofplayerstrategies(Weibull1995)learningbyindividualsfromexperience(e.g.FudenbergLevine1998CamererHo1999).3.TheiesofsocialpreferencesWithineconomicstheleadingexplanationfthepatternsofresultsdescribedaboveisthatagentshav

19、esocialpreferences(“socialutility”)whichtakeintoaccountthepayoffsperhapsintentionsofothers.Roughlyspeakingsocialpreferencetheiesassumethatpeoplehavestablepreferencesfhowmoneyisallocated(whichmaydependonwhotheotherplayeri

20、showtheallocationcameabout)muchastheyareassumedineconomicstohavepreferencesffoodthepresentversusthefuturehowclosetheirhouseistowksofth.10Culturalanthropologistsevolutionarypsychologistshavesoughttoexplaintheiginofthesepr

21、eferences.Oneideaisthatintheenvironmentofevolutionaryadaptation(EEA)ancestralpastpeoplemostlyengagedinrepeatedgameswithpeopletheyknew.Evolutioncreatedspecializedcognitiveheuristicsfplayingrepeatedgamesefficiently.Itiswel

22、lknowningametheythatbehaviwhichisoptimalfaselfinterestedactinaoneperiodgamewithastrangersuchasdefectingfreeridingacceptingallultimatumoffersisnotalwaysoptimalinrepeatedgameswithpartners.Inarepeatedultimatumgamefexampleit

23、paystorejectofferstobuildupareputationfbeinghardtopusharoundwhichleadstomegenerousoffersinthefuture.Intheunnaturalhabitatviewsubjectscannot“turnoff”thehabitualbehavishapedbyrepeatedgamelifeintheEEAwhentheyplaysinglegames

24、withstrangersinthelab.Animptantmodificationofthisviewisthatevolutiondidnotequipallpeoplewithidenticalhardwiredinstinctsfplayinggamesbutinsteadcreatedthecapacityflearningsocialnms.Thelatterviewcanexplainwhydifferentcultur