外文翻譯---分析投標(biāo)商遠(yuǎn)期合同的投標(biāo)策略

1、Analysis of equilibrium about bidding strategy ofsupplierswith future contractsZhiqiang Yuan *, Dong Liu, Chuanwen JiangElectric Power School, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030, PR ChinaReceived 6 May 2005;

2、accepted 9 August 2006Available online 2 October 2006AbstractIn this paper, the supply function model is employed to simulate the bidding strategy of suppliers in the power pool, and models of the supply function with fu

3、ture contracts are presented. It is proved that only one of the parameters between slope and intercept of the bidding curve is an independent variable in order to achieve definite equilibrium. In the meantime, the equili

4、bria of the bidding strategy about suppliers are studied when different intercepts of the bidding curve are chosen. Some examples are employed to study the Nash equilibrium strategies of suppliers with different future c

5、ontracts in various bidding strategy models. The results show that the equilibria are different in different bidding strategy models, but the future contracts can effectively make spot prices decrease in all the models.1

6、. IntroductionThe electric power industry worldwide is experiencing unprecedented restructuring from the traditional integrated regulation monopoly to a competitive power market. The object of deregulation is to introduc

7、e a competition mechanism into the power market and provide incentives for efficient operation of the power industry, eventually reducing the market price. The ideal market is a perfect competitive market in which partic

8、ipants bid their marginal cost into the market. Consequently, the market price is low in this kind of market. However, the electricity market is different from other merchandise markets. In the power market, only a few s

9、uppliers can provide power services in some geographic region. This is due to the restriction of some factors, such as large investment scale, small demand elasticity, transmission constraints and no largely storable ele

10、ctricity. Consequently, the actual power market is more close to an oligopolistic market in which the suppliers can achieve maximum profit through strategic bidding. That means that the generation companies possess marke

11、t power, which is harmful to the operation of the power systemand will make electricity price far higher than the marginal cost of the power market. each player’s part is as good a response to what the others are meant t

12、o do as any other strategy available to that player [9]). Secondly, the equilibria of the market are studied when different intercepts of the bidding curve are chosen. Finally, the effect of different future contracts on

13、 the equilibrium strategies of suppliers in various bidding strategy models is analyzed. Besides, the bidding strategies are also studied while generation constraints are active.2. Supply function equilibrium model with

14、forward contractsIt is supposed that the inverse demand function is a linear function, that is（1）1p=r-sNiiq? ?where p is market price, r and s are the intercept and slope of the inverse demand function, respectively, is

15、the generation of the supplier i and N is the number of i qsuppliers. Eq. (1) can be transformed into the electricity demand function,（2） i i i q + i p ? ? ? max1Niiq q lp?? ? ?， maxr q s ? 1 l s ?The bidding curve of

16、the supplier is assumed as a linear function,（3） i i i q + i p ? ? ?where and are the intercept and slope of the bidding curve, respectively, both of i ? i ?which are larger than zero, and i = 1,. . . ,N.The electricity

17、 price is assumed to clear at the uniform price in the power pool, and then, the generations of the suppliers are calculated according to Eqs. (2) and (3).If the forward contracts is while the dealing price is , the equ

18、ilibrium state of the i f i ksuppliers can be obtained by maximizing an individual profit function of each supplier.? ? ? ? i i i i i i max =p q -f f -C q ? ? ?（i=1……N） （4） min max i i i q q q ? ?Wit