2009年--消防相關(guān)外文翻譯-- 高層里的消防和生命安全

1、<p>　　中文4690字,2895單詞，15100英文字符</p><p><b>　　一、英文原文</b></p><p>　　Fire and life safety in a high-rise</p><p>　　Arnold, Jim. Consulting - Specifying Engineer45.3&#

2、160;(Mar 2009): 35-38.</p><p><b>　　abstrat</b></p><p>　　A typical building fire begins slowly, as combustible materials are gradually warmed by a heat source to their ignit

3、ion temperature. The level of fire protection installed within a building and the response of the local fire department will determine whether a fire is controlled or grows into an inferno. This

4、article will describe the extremely different outcomes of two similar fires in two similar high-rise buildings and will explain why one event became a catastrophe while the other garnered m</p>

5、<p>　　This tale of two high-rise fires teaches one thing: Specifications, standards, and building and fire codes can make a difference between life and death.</p><p>　　A typical bui

6、lding fire begins slowly, as combustible materials are gradually warmed by a heat source to their ignition temperature. The level of fire protection installed within a building and the response of the

7、 local firedepartment will determine whether a fire is controlled or grows into an inferno.</p><p>　　This article will describe the extremely different outcomes of two similar fires 

8、in two similar high-rise buildings and will explain why one event became a catastrophe while the other garnered merely a brief mention on the nightly news.</p><p>　　Recipe for disaster</p>&

9、lt;p>　　The first fire is the disastrous Feb. 1, 1974, high-rise fire at the 25-story Joelma Building in Sao Paulo, Brazil. This reinforced concrete skyscraper was built from 1969 to 1972. Banco occ

10、upied most of the building, and the bank offices held a considerable fire load of desks, papers, curtains, carpets, plastic insulation and wall coverings, and wooden walls. The bottom eight stories were occupie

11、d by a parking garage. Emergency egress was limited to a single stairwell that was not built as a fi</p><p>　　The fire began at 8:50 a.m. An air conditioner on the 12th floor overheated and started

12、 the fire. The air conditioner circuit required a special circuit breaker that had been omitted because it was not available at the time of installation. The circuit was installed to bypass the electrical control pa

13、nel on the 12th floor. The lack of this simple protective device allowed the air conditioner motor to overheat and set fire to adjacent materials. Due to combustible products used throughout the bui</p>

14、<p>　　The fire was discovered soon after it started but was initially reported to the Sao Paulo Fire Dept. by a resident of an adjacent building nearly 15 minutes later. The first responding unit

15、s arrived 5 minutes later and immediately called for backup. The fire crews entering the single stairway were unable to proceed up the stairway beyond the 11th floor, which was the first business office level.

16、The single open stairway burned to the 15th floor and filled the remaining building height with smoke</p><p>　　Evacuation</p><p>　　Nearly 300 people were evacuated using the four elevators. The

17、elevator operators were only able to make a few trips before the elevator shafts filled with heat and smoke, making further rescue by elevator impossible.</p><p>　　Lacking a feasible escape path, approximate

18、ly 170 people sought refuge on the roof. Some reports claim as many as 100 people may have been rescued by helicopters from the top of the burning building.</p><p>　　One extremely brave police officer hastil

19、y rigged horizontal ropes to an adjacent building and led 18 occupants to safety on this thin lifeline. Approximately 80 people found shelter under the building roof tiles and were later found to be the lone survivors on

20、 the rooftop.</p><p>　　Some fortunate office workers survived by climbing onto ledges or balconies that had sufficient protection from the flames and smoke, primarily in the corners of the building. A few br

21、ave occupants lowered themselves from floor to floor using the balconies, past the ascending flames to a level where they could be reached by aerial ladders or were hidden from the rising fire.</p><p>　

22、　Few aerial ladder rescues were made during the fire because the lower building levels accessible to the ladder trucks consisted mainly of a parking structure occupied by vehicles, not people. The fire

23、0;truck aerial ladders were able to extend only to the lowest occupied floors.</p><p>　　The fire's intense flames heated the concrete walls to very high temperatures. This high h

24、eat expanded the air and water vapor inside microscopic bubbles in the concrete, resulting in an explosive spalling of the concrete, sufficient to expose reinforcing steel previously buried a few inches deep. The severe

25、spalling affected significant sections of the exterior walls, joists, and columns.</p><p>　　The building suffered extensive structural damage, yet did not collapse, primarily because the combustible building

26、 materials burned quickly and prevented prolonged exposure of the concrete-framed building's support structure to high temperatures. That type of prolonged exposure to extreme heat caused the collapse of th

27、e steel-framed Twin Towers of the World Trade Center on Sept. 11, 2001.</p><p>　　The Joelma Building fire began to subside by 10:30 a.m. after having consumed all available combustible material, an

28、d was extinguished at 1:30 p.m. After the fire was extinguished, fire crews, police units, and medical teams searched for dazed survivors who finally were able to climb down from the site of their har

29、rowing ordeal. A search initially revealed that 179 people were killed.</p><p>　　Taking a toll</p><p>　　Of the 756 people who were in the building, the death toll is generally reported at 188 to

30、 227 people, and the injury total is reported as high as 345. A number of the survivors later died from extensive injuries after enduring months of extremely painful treatment for burns and ensuing infection.&l

31、t;/p><p>　　Although the Joelma Building did not collapse during or after the fire, some structural components were damaged severely and required substantial repair prior to the building's reopening. Th

32、e building was closed for four years for reconstruction and repair. It is now open and occupied, and has been renamed the Praca da Bandeira (Flag Square).</p><p>　　Brazil has a national fire code,

33、which is a general document. Specific fire safety regulations vary by region and city. Sao Paulo has the most advanced fire code within Brazil. Additional fire safety laws were passed in 197

34、5, 1976, 1978, 1983, 1986, 1994, and 2001 as a result of the Joelma Building fire and other high-rise buildingfires in Brazil.</p><p>　　Annually, more than 17,000 fires hav

35、e occurred in high-rise structures greater than six stories in the United States alone, so a high-rise structure fire is hardly the unusual event that most people believe it to be. Ahigh-ris

36、e building fire can cause many fatalities, even without a structural collapse such as occurred on Sept. 11, 2001. The 1911 Triangle Shirt Waist Factory fire in New York City (146 killed), the 194

37、6 Winecoff Hotel firein Atlanta (120 killed), and the 1980 MGM Grand Hotel fire</p><p>　　Viva Las Vegas</p><p>　　A recent high-rise hotel fire in Las Vegas has many

38、 eerie similarities to the Joelma Building fire. The fireoccurred at 5 p.m. on July 14, 2008, in the Bally's Las Vegas Hotel & Casino, which is a 26-story reinforced concrete structure. The hotel w

39、as built in 1972 to 1973 and has 2,000 guestrooms. The building has three wings built in a T-shape with one interior and one exterior stairwell at each wing.</p><p>　　The Bally's building is the sam

40、e structure that was originally involved in the 1980 MGM Grand Hotel fire. In that fire, an electrical fire in the first-floor delicatessen spread quickly to the nearby casino and released dense cloud

41、s of toxic smoke that traveled upward into the hotel, killing 61 people on floors 16 to 26. The building was closed for nine months for reconstruction and repair and was retrofitted to the 1981 Las Vegas Retrofit Ordinan

42、ce, which required major revisions to the previou</p><p>　　The smoky 2008 fire began in an overheated air conditioner unit on the 20th floor. The fire was confined to the air conditioner,

43、 and the smoke produced was confined to an employee break area. The fire was reported to the Clark County Fire Dept. at 5:01 p.m. The first responding unit arrived at Bally's three minutes la

44、ter. A total of 21 fire department units responded to the fire. The firefighters used the elevator to access the 18th floor and evacuated floors 18 through 21. Heavy smoke was repor</p><p>　　A

45、 marked difference</p><p>　　Both buildings were concrete-reinforced high-rise structures of nearly identical height. Both buildings were built at approximately the same time period, the early 1970s

46、. The fires in both buildings started in air conditioning units. Both buildings have withstood a major fire without structural collapse.</p><p>　　How could two similar fires in

47、similar buildings have such dissimilar results? Why does one event end in a shocking tragedy while a similar event results only in a business interruption? Is it mere fortune that blesses some building occupants, while c

48、ondemning others to a horrible death or, at best, a lifetime of loss or pain?</p><p>　　Specifications, standards, and building and fire codes determine the response of a building during a fire

49、, and the survivability of its inhabitants. While the buildings were similar, one building received a major renovation that rendered it far less susceptible to fire damage than the original building.</p>

50、<p>　　The foremost building safety improvement of the 1981 Las Vegas Retrofit Ordinance was the requirement forfire sprinklers in high-rise structures of six stories or more. Installation of a retrof

51、it fire sprinkler system atBally's ensured that the area surrounding the air conditioning motor would not support continuing combustion of a large fire. The August 2008 fire never reached the

52、 temperature required to activate the sprinkler system in the break room.</p><p>　　Limits on flame spread of interior finish materials ensured that the overheated motor at Bally's did not setfire

53、60;to ceiling, wall, or floor furnishings. The Joelma Building was not sprinklered, and neither was the 1980 MGM Grand Hotel's casino area, through which a tremendous flame front roared at an estimated speed of 19 ft

54、/sec.</p><p>　　The building structural steel in the immediate vicinity of the air conditioning unit at Bally's was fireproofed and was, therefore, unaffected by the 2008 fire.</p><p&

55、gt;　　An area smoke detector mounted within 10 ft of the air conditioning unit alarmed soon after onset of the fireand activated audible alarms and visual strobes on the 19th, 20th, and 21st floors (the floor of inci

56、dent and the floors above and below the floor of incident). This allowed hotel guests in the rooms closest to the break room to quickly evacuate the area of greatest danger. This area detector also activated the alarm at

57、 the FireCommand Center and recalled the service elevator for use by t</p><p>　　A local power disconnect, required by Section 440 (VII) of the National Electrical Code, allowed a responding maintenance

58、staff member to remove the electrical power flowing to the air conditioner motor and prevent further overheating of the motor. A circuit breaker provided overcurrent protection, although it did not open due to use of the

59、 local power disconnect.</p><p>　　Construction of the employee break room as a passive smoke zone, with fire-resistant walls, ceiling, floor, and door-and smoke seals on doors and smoke zone boundary pe

60、netrations-confined the smoke to the break area. The smoke control system in the hotel corridor outside the break area was never activated by a corridor area smoke detector. Elevator shafts were built smoke-tight, which

61、allowed the firefighters to use the elevators to quickly access the location of the fire. Automatic doors closed</p><p>　　The fire code in effect at the time of the Joelma Building fire&#

62、160;in 1974 did not place these requirements on the building owner. The building and fire codes in effect at the time of the MGM Grand fire in 1980 also did not place these requirements on the buildin

63、g owner. The result for each building was a catastrophic fire less than seven years after opening. The single unprotected stairway in the Joelma Building further compromised emergency egress and resulted in man

64、y more deaths.</p><p>　　Requirements that protect building occupants from injury or death and also protect the building from significant damage can be found on the design drawings; on the specifications; in

65、applicable building, fire, mechanical, welding, plumbing, and electrical codes; as well as in the building life safety system's O&M and emergency manuals and procedures. In undeveloped countries that do not

66、have or do not enforce these restrictive requirements, a significant loss of life may result from a high-rise </p><p><b>　　Sidebar</b></p><p>　　No gambling on fire ord

67、inances</p><p>　　Jim Arnold</p><p>　　The 19 major features of the 1981 Las Vegas Retrofit Ordinance were:</p><p>　　Sprinklers were required for public entertainment assembly areas l

68、arger than 5,000 sq ft. Sprinklers were required for rooms and exit corridors in hotel towers more than 55 ft above ground level. Twenty-five percent coverage was required within 15 months of ordinance adoption, 50% cove

69、rage was required within 27 months, 75% coverage was required within 40 months, and 100% coverage was required within 48 months.</p><p>　　Smoke control was required for high-rise occupancies above

70、55 ft, including pressurized exit corridors and enclosed, pressurized stairways.</p><p>　　Emergency lighting to 1 foot candle was required for exit corridors and stairways.</p><p>　　Exit corrido

71、rs were required to be built from 1-hour fire-resistive materials, and exit stairways were required to be built from fire-resistive materials.</p><p>　　Exit doors were required to be either self-cl

72、osing or automatic closing in response to a signal from a smoke detector.</p><p>　　Elevator or utility shafts extending higher than two stories were required to be built from fire-resistive ma

73、terials.</p><p>　　Basement areas larger than 1,500 sq ft or located more than 75 ft from openings were required to be sprinklered.</p><p>　　Illuminated exit signs were required.</p><p

74、>　　Office buildings taller than two stories, hotels and motels taller than two stories with more than 19 guest rooms, and apartments and condominiums taller than two stories with more than 14 dwelling units were requi

75、red to install a fire alarm system that did not contain a manual delay.</p><p>　　Every hotel/motel guest room and every apartment dwelling unit was required to install a smoke detector.</p>

76、<p>　　Hotel/motel guest rooms and apartment dwelling units were required to install an air supply that was not connected to the exit corridor.</p><p>　　Smoke detectors were required to be installed in t

77、he ventilating ducts for hotel/motel guest rooms. The detectors were required to shut down the normal ventilation system, sound a voice alarm, and start the smoke control system.</p><p>　　Smoke detectors wer

78、e required to be installed in elevator lobbies. The detectors were required to prevent the elevator doors from opening on the alarmed floor, automatically return the elevator to the main floor or an alternate floor for f

79、urther operation under manual control, and close the elevator lobby doors on the alarmed floor.</p><p>　　Signs directing guests to use the exit stairs and not the elevator in an emergency were required to be

80、 posted on each elevator and the elevator call station on each floor. Signs indicating floor level and direction of emergency exits were required to be posted on each floor.</p><p>　　Signs that indicate the

81、stairway number were required to be posted in each stairway.</p><p>　　Hotel, office, and residential buildings more than 55 ft above ground level were required to install a public address system.</p>

82、<p>　　Interior finish materials were required to be limited in combustibility.</p><p>　　A central reporting location called the fire command center was required to be installed in all hotel/ca

83、sinos and malls.</p><p>　　Exterior wall openings were required to have flame barriers extending horizontally 30 in. or vertically 36 in. from the floor.</p><p>　　AuthorAffiliation</p><

84、;p>　　Arnold is associate engineer with Clark County (Nevada) Dept. of Development Services. He has extensive megaproject experience and has inspected smoke control systems on the Las Vegas Strip for 13 years.</p>

85、;<p><b>　　字?jǐn)?shù): 2711</b></p><p>　　Copyright Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier, Inc. Mar 2009</p><p><b>　　索引 (詳情)</b></p><p>&l

86、t;b>　　引用</b></p><p><b>　　主題</b></p><p>　　Fire protection;Safety management;Facilities planning;Engineering;High rise buildings</p><p><b>　　地

87、點</b></p><p>　　United States--US</p><p><b>　　分類</b></p><p>　　5340: Safety management5100: Facilities management8370: Construction & engineering industry9190

88、: United States</p><p><b>　　標(biāo)題</b></p><p>　　Fire and life safety in a high-rise</p><p><b>　　作者</b></p><p>　　Arnold, Jim</p><

89、;p><b>　　出版物名稱</b></p><p>　　Consulting - Specifying Engineer</p><p><b>　　卷45</b></p><p><b>　　期3</b></p><p><b>　　頁35-38</b

90、></p><p><b>　　頁數(shù)1</b></p><p><b>　　出版年份2009</b></p><p>　　出版日期Mar 2009</p><p>　　章節(jié)Features</p><p>　　出版商CFE Media</p><p&

91、gt;　　出版物地點Denver</p><p>　　出版物國家/地區(qū)United States</p><p>　　出版物主題Engineering, Building And Construction ISSN 08925046 CODEN CSENE9</p><p>　　來源類型Trade Journals</p><p>

92、　　出版物語言English</p><p>　　文檔類型Feature</p><p>　　ProQuest 文檔 ID220598963</p><p>　　文檔 URLhttp://search.proquest.com/docview/220598963?accountid=13818</p><p>　　版權(quán)Copyright Re

93、ed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier, Inc. Mar 2009</p><p><b>　　二、譯文</b></p><p>　　高層里的消防和生命安全</p><p>　　吉姆·阿諾德 咨詢工程師</p><p><b>　　

94、摘要 </b></p><p>　　由于易燃材料會由熱源逐步加熱直到達(dá)到其自燃點，典型的建筑消防發(fā)展得很緩慢。在建筑物里消防措施安裝的程度和當(dāng)?shù)叵啦块T的回應(yīng)共同決定著一場大火是會被控制還是會演變成一場災(zāi)難。本文以發(fā)生在兩棟類似的高層建筑里卻有不同的結(jié)果的兩起類似火災(zāi)為案例來解釋為什么一個會變成災(zāi)難而另一個卻只在晚間新聞里提了一下。在設(shè)計圖紙上會發(fā)現(xiàn)讓居民免受傷害和死亡以及讓建筑物免受損害的要求；這些

95、要求也體現(xiàn)在說明書上、可用建筑物上、消防設(shè)備、機器、焊接處、管子上以及電工規(guī)程里，此外也體現(xiàn)在建筑物生命安全系統(tǒng)的運營和維護(hù)、應(yīng)急手冊和操作過程中。不發(fā)達(dá)國家并不要求也不強制實行這些嚴(yán)格的要求，因此會在高層會很容易引起巨大的生命損失。要求里的任意一條都意味著在緊急情況下生命和死亡會有很大的差異。只要所有有關(guān)部分嚴(yán)格遵守可用建筑物安全要求，就會避免火災(zāi)悲劇的發(fā)生。</p><p><b>　　全文文獻(xiàn)&l

96、t;/b></p><p>　　兩棟高層火災(zāi)的事情說明一件事：規(guī)格、標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、建筑物和消防規(guī)范在生死之間有很大差異。由于易燃材料會由熱源逐步加熱直到達(dá)到其自燃點，典型的建筑消防發(fā)展得很緩慢。在建筑物里消防措施安裝的程度和當(dāng)?shù)叵啦块T的回應(yīng)共同決定著一場大火是會被控制還是會演變成一場災(zāi)難。</p><p>　　本文以發(fā)生在兩棟類似的高層建筑里卻有不同的結(jié)果的兩起類似火災(zāi)為案例來解釋為什么一

97、個會變成災(zāi)難而另一個卻只在晚間新聞里提了一下。</p><p><b>　　災(zāi)難造成因素</b></p><p>　　1991年2月1日，第一場具有災(zāi)難性的火災(zāi)發(fā)生在巴西圣保羅一棟高達(dá)25層的Joelma建筑物里。這棟加固的摩天大樓始建于1669年，完工于1972年。銀行占有大部分樓層，銀行辦公室超過了消防對桌子、紙張、窗簾、地毯、塑料絕緣物、墻紙和木制墻的最大負(fù)荷。

98、底部的八層又是室內(nèi)停車場。應(yīng)急出口只是單向的樓梯井，卻還不是帶有防火的外殼。這棟樓沒有防火墻、應(yīng)急照明燈、消防預(yù)警、消防噴水系統(tǒng)、消防應(yīng)急出口、張貼的疏散計劃、緊急信號指示和煙控系統(tǒng)。</p><p>　　火災(zāi)從上午八點五十分開始。由于十二層的空調(diào)過度加熱導(dǎo)致了火災(zāi)的發(fā)生?？照{(diào)電路所需的特殊電路斷路器被忽略了因為其在安裝時不可利用。電路要求通過十二層的電路控制板。對這一簡單的保護(hù)設(shè)備的忽略使空調(diào)發(fā)動機過度加熱將火

99、花濺到了相鄰的材料上。由于易燃產(chǎn)品在整棟樓里使用，火災(zāi)迅速發(fā)生，整棟樓在20分內(nèi)被大火吞沒。</p><p>　　火災(zāi)一開始就被發(fā)現(xiàn)了卻在十五分鐘之后由對面建筑物的居民首先將其報告給了圣保羅消防部。第一接警車輛五分鐘到達(dá)后立馬要求支援。進(jìn)入單向樓梯井的消防人員到達(dá)十一樓時前進(jìn)不了了,因為這是一個商務(wù)辦公級樓梯。單向打開的樓梯井燃燒至十五層，煙霧和熱量彌漫在其他樓層里，這阻礙了原本計劃的消防逃離方式。</p&

100、gt;<p><b>　　撤離</b></p><p>　　幾乎三百多人乘坐四部電梯來疏散。電梯操作員只能在電梯井充滿熱量和煙霧之前做些事，想做進(jìn)一步援救幾乎不可能。</p><p>　　大約170人由于沒有可行的逃離路徑，只能在屋頂上避難。一些報道稱有一百多人可能由直升機從燃燒的建筑物頂部救出。</p><p>　　一個非常勇敢

101、的警官勇敢地將繩子水平地拉到旁邊的建筑旁，讓18人在這條單薄的生命線上獲救。大約有80多人在屋頂瓦片下找到庇護(hù)，之后他們成為屋頂下孤獨的幸存者。</p><p>　　有些幸運的人員爬到窗口或陽臺上，他們主要是在建筑物的角落里，這可以免遭火焰和濃煙的傷害。一些勇敢的人利用陽臺讓自己層層下降，穿過上竄的火苗或躲過上竄的火苗再通過云梯到達(dá)地面。</p><p>　　在消防期間云梯援救沒有進(jìn)行因為

102、較低的樓層水平可很容易到達(dá)云梯消防車，這些車主要由車輛而非人占據(jù)的停車結(jié)構(gòu)組成。消防車云梯僅僅能夠延伸到最低占據(jù)的地板。</p><p>　　大火的高溫使混凝土墻也達(dá)到了很高的溫度。這種高溫使混凝土中微小氣泡內(nèi)的空氣和水蒸氣碰撞，造成混凝土的爆裂，這足以使之前掩埋幾英寸深的鋼筋暴露出來。嚴(yán)重的爆裂影響了外墻、托梁和柱子。</p><p>　　建筑物遭受了巨大的結(jié)構(gòu)性破壞但沒有坍塌，主要是因

103、為易燃建材迅速燒毀沒有使混凝土結(jié)構(gòu)建筑的支撐結(jié)構(gòu)長時間暴露在高溫下。長時間暴露于極熱的環(huán)境下會導(dǎo)致2001年9月11日世貿(mào)中心帶有鋼筋結(jié)構(gòu)的雙塔的坍塌。</p><p>　　該Joelma建筑火災(zāi)在燃燒掉所有易燃材料之后，大概在上午十點三十分開始消退，在下午一點半大火被撲滅。大火撲滅后，消防人員、警察部門和醫(yī)療隊搜尋幸存者，這些幸存者最終從悲慘的折磨中爬了出來。搜索首先發(fā)現(xiàn)179人遇難。</p>&

104、lt;p><b>　　造成的損失</b></p><p>　　住在建筑物里756人中，死亡人數(shù)一般報道在188到277人，總共受傷人數(shù)高達(dá)345人。許多幸存者為燒傷和之后的感染忍受了幾個月極度痛苦的治療之后，死于嚴(yán)重的傷害。</p><p>　　雖然Joelma建筑在火災(zāi)過程中或火災(zāi)之后并未坍塌，但一些結(jié)構(gòu)性部件嚴(yán)重受損，在建筑重新開放之前要進(jìn)行重大的修理工作。

105、該建筑花費了四年來進(jìn)行重建和修復(fù)?，F(xiàn)在該建筑開放了也有人居住了，并且改名為紅旗廣場。</p><p>　　巴西有國家消防規(guī)范，這是一個普通文件。具體的消防安全條例在城市和各地區(qū)之間不同。在巴西，圣保羅有最先進(jìn)的消防規(guī)范。由于在巴西像Joelma建筑和其他高層發(fā)生的一些火災(zāi)的原因，其他的消防安全法律分別在1975、1976、1978、1983、1986、1994和2001年通過。</p><p&

106、gt;　　每年有一萬七千多場火災(zāi)發(fā)生在高層建筑里，這發(fā)生火災(zāi)比在美國的六層樓上發(fā)生的火災(zāi)概率大得多，因此大多數(shù)認(rèn)為進(jìn)行高層建筑消防是不尋常的事件。即使沒有像2001年9月11日那場火災(zāi)引起的結(jié)構(gòu)性坍塌，高層建筑火災(zāi)會導(dǎo)致多人喪生。例如1911年發(fā)生在紐約的三角襯衫廠火災(zāi)（146人喪生）、1946年發(fā)生在亞特蘭大的Winecoff酒店火災(zāi)（120人喪生）和1980年發(fā)生在拉斯維加斯的米高梅大酒店火災(zāi)(87人喪生)，它們都發(fā)生在高層建筑里，