信息披露質(zhì)量和現(xiàn)金流外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　中文2194字</b></p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Disclosure Quality and Cash Flow</p><p>　　We study a relatively recen

2、t change in voluntary disclosure practices by management, namely the issuance of management cash flow forecasts. While we find some management cash flow forecasts in the early 1980s, the incidence of such disclosures is

3、low until recent years. However, since 2000, there has been a dramatic increase in the issuance of management cash flow forecasts and the number of such forecasts has more than tripled from pre-2000 levels.</p>&

4、lt;p>　　One potential explanation for this trend is Regulation FD, which went into effect in 2000. For example, if managers were disclosing cash flow forecasts privately to analysts prior to Regulation FD, they would

5、have to publicly disclose such forecasts to all parties after Regulation FD or curtail their management cash flow forecasts completely. Regulation FD potentially increases company disclosure of a wide array of financial

6、information, including cash flow information. Consistent with this, we</p><p>　　Another potential explanation for the recent trend of more management cash flow forecasts is investors and analysts paying more

7、 attention to cash flow information than before. Recent corporate scandals involving Enron, WorldCom and others, have heightened investor concern over potential accounting earnings manipulations. Such concerns were recen

8、tly noted in a Business Week article entitled “Fuzzy Numbers”. Consistent with an increase in the demand for cash flow information by investors, we also </p><p>　　We study voluntary management cash flow fore

9、casts and test hypotheses on managers’ incentives to issue these forecasts. Prior voluntary disclosure literature offers varying predictions for management’s incentives to provide disclosure as well as the nature of info

10、rmation conveyed in management disclosures. For example, theoretical models demonstrate that when there are proprietary costs of disclosure or when investors are uncertain about the information management has, firms will

11、 voluntarily dis</p><p>　　Earnings forecasts likely play a special role in reducing the risk of litigation, and a more important role than management cash flow forecasts. For firms with bad news and thus co

12、ncerned about potential litigation, earnings-related disclosures are likely to be more effective in conveying that bad news to investors than disclosures of other financial information such as cash flows because, in gene

13、ral, earnings is the most informative summary performance measure. Thus, earnings disclosure is mo</p><p>　　We predict that management issues cash flow forecasts to signal good news in cash flow, to meet in

14、vestor demand for cash flow information, and to pre-commit to a certain composition of earnings in terms of cash flow versus accruals, thus reducing the degree of freedom in earnings management. Our findings are consiste

15、nt with these predictions. We find that the likelihood of management cash flow forecasts increases in periods when there is a large increase in operating cash flow, when analysts are</p><p>　　We document tha

16、t firms issuing management cash flow forecasts tend to have better cash flow information than those without a forecast and that management cash flow forecasts tend to beat existing expectations. This applies to situation

17、s where there is very bad or very good news in earnings and when the firm is young, suggesting that management uses cash flow forecasts to mitigate the negative impact of bad news in earnings, to lend credibility to good

18、 news in earnings and to signal economic viab</p><p>　　We provide evidence on how management reports actual cash flow information in (subsequent) press releases. We document that managers use discretion in

19、reporting realized cash flows in earnings announcement-related press releases and adopt alternative definitions of cash flows (vis-à-vis GAAP definitions of cash flow per the statement of cash flows). Specifically,

20、 management-announced actual cash flows tend to exceed actual GAAP cash flows. As a result, management-announced actual cash flows me</p><p>　　Sloan (1996) provides evidence that investors overestimate the p

21、ersistence of accruals and underestimate the persistence of cash flow. This results in mispricing – labeled the accrual anomaly – where a trading strategy designed to exploit investors’ misunderstanding of the persistenc

22、e of earnings components earns significant abnormal returns. Literature extending Sloan (1996) primarily focuses on accrual overvaluation (e.g., Xie [2001]; Thomas & Zhang [2002]; Collins, Gong, & Hribar [2003]).

23、 Ho</p><p>　　Investigating the association between disclosure quality and the mispricing of accruals and cash flow is important because it highlights the role that disclosure quality plays in helping invest

24、ors to efficiently impound accounting information into prices, thus establishing a link between disclosure quality and market efficiency. As such, this study tests a conjecture in Thomas (2000) that the mispricing of ea

25、rnings information may result from low-quality disclosures. Our results contribute to t</p><p>　　Recent research provides evidence that temporary accounting distortions arising from accrual estimation errors

26、 plays a significant role in the lower earnings persistence of accruals relative to cash flow (Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, & Tuna [2006]). These accrual estimation errors could be a result of both unintentional error

27、s in forecasting the future economic benefits of accruals and intentional managerial manipulation (Xie [2001]; Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, & Tuna [2006]). Sloan (1996) argues</p><p>　　Theory suggests tha

28、t increased disclosure plays a role in equity markets by reducing information asymmetries, increasing liquidity, and reducing the cost of capital (Diamond & Verrecchia [1991]; Kim & Verrecchia [1994]). However, v

29、ery few papers investigate the role that disclosure plays in efficient pricing. Our focus on disclosure is based on the idea that more informative disclosures allow investors to more fully understand the information in

30、accruals and cash flow for future earnings. We co</p><p>　　Following Sloan (1996), we use the Mishkin (1983) rational expectations framework (hereafter referred to as the “Mishkin test”) to examine whether t

31、he earnings expectations embedded in stock prices accurately reflect the differential persistence of the components of earnings (i.e., accruals and cash flow). We first confirm that the mispricing phenomenon documented b

32、y Sloan (1996) occurs in our full sample of firms. That is, we find that investors behave as if they over-estimate the persistence o</p><p>　　Following prior literature (e.g., Collins, Gong, & Hribar [20

33、03]; Desai, Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam [2004]; Mashruwala, Rajgopal, & Shevlin [2006]; Barone & Magilke [2008]), we use a cross-sectional regression approach to investigate whether accruals and cash flow are a

34、ssociated with future returns after controlling for variables known to predict future returns (i.e., size, book-to-market). Consistent with recent research, in our full sample, we find no evidence that accruals are asso

35、ciated with</p><p>　　This study investigates the relationship between disclosure quality and the mispricing of the components of earnings (i.e., accruals and cash flow). Our results provide useful informatio

36、n to regulators, academics, and investors interested in the pricing of earnings components. Specifically, we illustrate a potential benefit of better quality disclosure by documenting a specific case in which higher-qual

37、ity disclosure is associated with more efficient prices. The results of this study are also r</p><p>　　Source:Michael S. Drake,James N. Myers and Linda A. Myers,2008“disclosure quality and cash flow”,August

38、.pp.2-4. </p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　信息披露質(zhì)量和現(xiàn)金流</p><p>　　本文研究自愿性信息披露管理實(shí)踐方面的最新變化，即現(xiàn)金流量預(yù)測(cè)管理的發(fā)布。早期的現(xiàn)金流量預(yù)測(cè)管理始于20世紀(jì)80年代，對(duì)其進(jìn)行披露是近幾年才興起的。然而，從2000年起對(duì)現(xiàn)金流量預(yù)測(cè)管理的發(fā)布有了顯著增長(zhǎng)，并

39、且預(yù)測(cè)數(shù)量是2000年以前水平的三倍多。</p><p>　　導(dǎo)致這種趨勢(shì)的一個(gè)可能的解釋是在2000年生效的公平信息披露規(guī)則（以下簡(jiǎn)稱“規(guī)則”）。例如 ，如果管理者在規(guī)則發(fā)布之前私下向分析師披露現(xiàn)金流量預(yù)測(cè)信息，則在規(guī)則發(fā)布之后，他們必須將這些預(yù)測(cè)信息向所有的利益相關(guān)者進(jìn)行公開，否則將完全剝奪其現(xiàn)金流量預(yù)測(cè)管理的權(quán)利。規(guī)則潛在地增加了公司里包括現(xiàn)金流量信息在內(nèi)的各種財(cái)務(wù)信息的披露。</p><

40、;p>　　近期現(xiàn)金流量預(yù)測(cè)管理趨勢(shì)的加強(qiáng)可能還和投資者及分析師較以前更加關(guān)注現(xiàn)金流信息有關(guān)。安然、世通等公司的丑聞加重了投資者對(duì)潛在的會(huì)計(jì)盈余操縱的擔(dān)憂。這些擔(dān)憂最近被商業(yè)周刊稱為“模糊數(shù)”。與投資者對(duì)現(xiàn)金流量信息的需求增加相一致，我們也發(fā)現(xiàn)分析師對(duì)現(xiàn)金流量的預(yù)測(cè)在2000-2003年間是2000年以前水平的兩倍多。</p><p>　　我們研究自愿性的現(xiàn)金流量預(yù)測(cè)管理，并且對(duì)管理者發(fā)布這些預(yù)測(cè)的誘因進(jìn)行假

41、設(shè)檢驗(yàn)。以前的自愿披露文獻(xiàn)對(duì)管理者提供披露的誘因作出了多種預(yù)測(cè)。例如，理論模型表明，在有了競(jìng)爭(zhēng)劣勢(shì)成本的披露或當(dāng)投資者們不了解信息管理的情況時(shí),企業(yè)會(huì)自愿披露好消息并保留較不利的消息。早期有關(guān)收益預(yù)測(cè)管理的實(shí)證研究為該預(yù)測(cè)提供了佐證。然而，近期的較多實(shí)證文獻(xiàn)指出訴訟風(fēng)險(xiǎn)對(duì)盈余預(yù)測(cè)管理有重要影響。斯金納（1994），卡斯尼克和列夫（1995）指出盈余預(yù)測(cè)管理更有可能傳達(dá)壞消息，符合管理者關(guān)心訴訟風(fēng)險(xiǎn)以及先發(fā)制人的發(fā)布盈余預(yù)測(cè)從而降低投資者

42、的期望。</p><p>　　盈余預(yù)測(cè)在降低訴訟風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中扮演著一個(gè)特殊角色，且比現(xiàn)金流量預(yù)測(cè)管理更為重要。有不利消息的公司通常關(guān)心潛在的訴訟，與盈余有關(guān)的披露在向投資者傳達(dá)不利信息時(shí)比其他財(cái)務(wù)信息例如現(xiàn)金流量更有效，因?yàn)橐话銇碚f,收入是最為有效的總結(jié)業(yè)績(jī)的尺度。盈利披露更有可能實(shí)現(xiàn)調(diào)整投資者期望的需要。從而，以前的一些偏好用盈余預(yù)測(cè)來反映不利信息的研究可能不適用于其他的預(yù)測(cè)管理類型，例如現(xiàn)金流量預(yù)測(cè)。與此一致，使用

43、20世紀(jì)80年代以來的數(shù)據(jù)，研究人員發(fā)現(xiàn)更好的業(yè)績(jī)伴隨著更高的整體信息披露水平。</p><p>　　我們預(yù)測(cè)管理層發(fā)布現(xiàn)金流量的利好信號(hào)，來滿足投資者對(duì)現(xiàn)金流量信息的要求，并根據(jù)現(xiàn)金流量與利潤(rùn)額之間的差額對(duì)盈余作部分調(diào)整，因而減少了盈余管理的自由度。我們的研究結(jié)果與這些預(yù)測(cè)是一致的。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金流量預(yù)測(cè)管理的加強(qiáng)時(shí)期伴隨著營(yíng)運(yùn)現(xiàn)金流量的增加，即當(dāng)分析師預(yù)測(cè)收入減少、當(dāng)管理層明確地在新聞報(bào)道中說明收入會(huì)低于或高于

44、預(yù)期以及公司處于起步階段時(shí)。除此之外，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金流量預(yù)測(cè)管理的減少時(shí)期伴隨著頻繁的的審計(jì)師變更。</p><p>　　研究表明，相比那些不對(duì)現(xiàn)金流量進(jìn)行預(yù)測(cè)以及傾向于超越現(xiàn)有預(yù)期的公司，發(fā)布現(xiàn)金流量預(yù)測(cè)管理的公司有著較佳的現(xiàn)金流量信息。這一點(diǎn)同樣適用于不論收入是利差還是利好以及處于起步階段的公司，意味著管理層使用現(xiàn)金流量預(yù)測(cè)來減輕收入利差消息的負(fù)面影響，并增加收入利好消息的可信度，對(duì)年輕的公司來說則給人以成長(zhǎng)性

45、較好的信號(hào)。</p><p>　　我們對(duì)管理層如何報(bào)道實(shí)際的現(xiàn)金流量信息進(jìn)行了說明，證實(shí)了管理層在與收入有關(guān)的公告中對(duì)已經(jīng)發(fā)生的現(xiàn)金流量使用自由裁量權(quán)進(jìn)行報(bào)道，并采用現(xiàn)金流量的替代定義（相對(duì)于公認(rèn)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則中現(xiàn)金流量表里現(xiàn)金流量的定義來說）。具體地說，管理層公布的實(shí)際現(xiàn)金流量往往超過按照公認(rèn)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則計(jì)算的現(xiàn)金流量。因此，從滿足或超過現(xiàn)金流量預(yù)測(cè)數(shù)的情況來看，管理層公布的實(shí)際現(xiàn)金流量多于按公認(rèn)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則計(jì)算的現(xiàn)金流量,

46、從而產(chǎn)生顯著的正現(xiàn)金流預(yù)測(cè)誤差。這個(gè)發(fā)現(xiàn)顯示，實(shí)踐中管理層在備考盈利與現(xiàn)金流量的公布方面有著相似之處。</p><p>　　斯隆（1996）指出投資者存在高估利潤(rùn)低估現(xiàn)金流的觀念，這就導(dǎo)致了錯(cuò)誤定價(jià)。繼斯隆之后的文獻(xiàn)主要研究利潤(rùn)的過高估計(jì)（例如，謝（2001）；托馬斯和張（2002））；柯林斯（2003）。然而，近期研究表明，僅關(guān)注對(duì)利潤(rùn)的錯(cuò)誤定價(jià)而忽視對(duì)現(xiàn)金流的錯(cuò)誤估價(jià)對(duì)研究而言是不全面的（德賽（2004）；余

47、（2007）；巴羅內(nèi)（2008））。因此，在本文中我們研究信息披露質(zhì)量在準(zhǔn)確評(píng)估利潤(rùn)和現(xiàn)金流時(shí)的重要作用，并特別檢驗(yàn)投資者從信息披露質(zhì)量高的企業(yè)對(duì)其未來收入從利潤(rùn)和現(xiàn)金流兩方面獲得更好理解的情況下，是如何對(duì)股票定價(jià)的。</p><p>　　研究信息披露質(zhì)量與利潤(rùn)和現(xiàn)金流被錯(cuò)誤估價(jià)之間的關(guān)系很重要，因?yàn)樗鼜?qiáng)調(diào)了信息披露質(zhì)量幫助投資者有效運(yùn)用會(huì)計(jì)信息進(jìn)行估價(jià)的作用，從而在信息披露質(zhì)量與市場(chǎng)效率之間建立了聯(lián)系。本文檢驗(yàn)

48、了托馬斯（2000）的一個(gè)推測(cè)，即對(duì)利潤(rùn)的錯(cuò)誤定價(jià)可能源于較低的信息披露質(zhì)量。通過提高信息披露質(zhì)量可以減少市場(chǎng)異常，我們的結(jié)果補(bǔ)充了這一領(lǐng)域的文獻(xiàn)研究。此外，我們的研究對(duì)政策制定者衡量提高信息披露質(zhì)量的成本和收益給予了建議。</p><p>　　近期研究表明暫時(shí)的會(huì)計(jì)失真主要源于利潤(rùn)的估計(jì)錯(cuò)誤（理查德森，斯隆，索里曼（2006）。這些利潤(rùn)估計(jì)錯(cuò)誤可能是對(duì)未來經(jīng)濟(jì)收益的無意識(shí)錯(cuò)誤及有意識(shí)管理操縱造成的（謝（2001

49、；理查德森，斯隆，索里曼（2006））。斯?。?996）認(rèn)為投資者并不完全理解利潤(rùn)，因?yàn)樗麄儾恢览麧?rùn)比現(xiàn)金流融入了更多的主觀成分。近期研究也表明投資者低估現(xiàn)金流，因而對(duì)現(xiàn)金流在未來經(jīng)濟(jì)中的收益也無法完全理解。（德賽（2004）；余（2007）；巴羅內(nèi)（2008））。</p><p>　　理論研究表明提高信息披露水平能夠降低股市中的信息不對(duì)稱，增強(qiáng)流動(dòng)性，降低資金成本（金姆（1994））。然而，很少有文獻(xiàn)研究信息

50、披露在有效定價(jià)方面的作用。我們對(duì)信息披露的研究圍繞信息披露能夠使投資者更全面地理解未來收益中的利潤(rùn)和現(xiàn)金流這一主題。我們推測(cè)信息披露質(zhì)量提高后，投資者能夠更好地理解管理層操縱利潤(rùn)的行為，并更好地預(yù)測(cè)未來經(jīng)濟(jì)收益以及評(píng)估利潤(rùn)的影響。更具體地說，相對(duì)于信息披露質(zhì)量低的企業(yè)，我們預(yù)計(jì)信息披露質(zhì)量高的企業(yè)其利潤(rùn)的收益持續(xù)性較低，現(xiàn)金流的收益持續(xù)性則較高。</p><p>　　繼斯隆（1996）的研究之后，我們使用米什金（

51、1983）理性預(yù)期框架來檢驗(yàn)股價(jià)中包含的收益期望是否準(zhǔn)確反映收益的組成部分（即利潤(rùn)和現(xiàn)金流）間的差異。我們用全面的樣本首次證實(shí)了斯?。?996）提出的錯(cuò)誤定價(jià)現(xiàn)象。即，投資者存在過高估計(jì)利潤(rùn)的持續(xù)性，過低估計(jì)現(xiàn)金流的持續(xù)性。我們用兩個(gè)子樣本即高質(zhì)量披露公司和低質(zhì)量披露公司重復(fù)了米什金的測(cè)試。結(jié)果顯示市場(chǎng)對(duì)利潤(rùn)和現(xiàn)金流的定價(jià)與所選樣本公司不同。我們特別發(fā)現(xiàn)利潤(rùn)的過高定價(jià)和現(xiàn)金流的過低估計(jì)更多地發(fā)生在信息披露質(zhì)量低的公司。相反，在信息披露質(zhì)

52、量高的企業(yè)不存在對(duì)利潤(rùn)和現(xiàn)金流的錯(cuò)誤估價(jià)。這個(gè)結(jié)果表明當(dāng)信息披露質(zhì)量高時(shí)，投資者對(duì)利潤(rùn)和現(xiàn)金流信息的理解會(huì)更好。</p><p>　　參考以前的研究，在對(duì)預(yù)計(jì)會(huì)影響未來收益的變量進(jìn)行控制后，我們使用橫截面回歸法來研究利潤(rùn)和現(xiàn)金流是否與未來收益有關(guān)。與近期研究相一致，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)當(dāng)現(xiàn)金流和控制變量包括在模型中時(shí)，未來收益與利潤(rùn)無關(guān)。然而，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)未來收益與現(xiàn)金流的錯(cuò)誤估價(jià)有關(guān)。</p><p>

53、　　本文研究信息披露質(zhì)量和收益的構(gòu)成部分（即利潤(rùn)和現(xiàn)金流）之間的關(guān)系，我們的研究結(jié)果為對(duì)這一領(lǐng)域感興趣的政策制定者、專業(yè)學(xué)者和投資者提供了有用信息。我們特別闡釋了較高的信息披露質(zhì)量帶來的有效定價(jià)方面的潛在收益。對(duì)利潤(rùn)和現(xiàn)金流的錯(cuò)誤定價(jià)的決定因素進(jìn)行研究，也符合當(dāng)前學(xué)術(shù)界的研究方向。</p><p>　　出處：邁克爾·S·德雷克，詹姆斯·N·梅耶斯和琳達(dá)·A