外文翻譯---國家公共財務管理機構和宏觀經(jīng)濟的思考

1、<p><b>　　外文文獻翻譯譯文</b></p><p><b>　　一、外文原文</b></p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Subnational Public Financial Management: Institutions and Macroec

2、onomic Considerations</p><p>　　Transparent public financial management at the subnational level requires institutions and processes that mirror those needed at the central government level, in order to gener

3、ate better accountability and competition among different subnational governments, critical elements in ensuring good governance and efficiency of decentralized administrations. Further subnational debt also has implicat

4、ions for overall macroeconomic stability that concerns the central government. The key components are id</p><p>　　Practical issues relating to effective public financial management ultimately govern whether

5、or not there is good governance at the subnational level-hence the success or failure of different policy options. Although there is a growing literature on "fiscal rules" and subnational debt management, there

6、 has been less attention to the critical governance aspects of public financial management (although see Potter 1997, Momoniat,2001).Part of this neglect may be due to the presumption that decentra</p><p>　　

7、Indeed, the emphasis on community participation was a feature of development strategy in the 1950s, largely driven by the Ford Foundation and U.S. foreign assistance programs. Despite a lack of significant success at the

8、 time, there has been a resurgence of the policy in recent years due to the efforts of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).The emphasis on community-driven development was adopted as one of the cornerstones of the World

9、 Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework (World Bank, 200</p><p>　　The underpinnings of public financial management relate to the basic institutional and procedural elements that might be enshrined in

10、 a constitution, or higher level laws on the budget, or laws or agreements governing subnational operations or levels of indebtedness. In some countries, such as South Africa, where the process has been nicely sequenced,

11、 there is a set of consistent and well designed legislation covering all the areas mentioned above.</p><p>　　In order for any level of government to take responsibility for its actions, there must be clarity

12、 in its functions, its mechanisms for appropriating funds and prioritizing and authorizing spending, and ensuring that the spending is actually carried out and accounted for. Another critical aspect relates to timely and

13、 accurate reporting to the respective legislature and any higher levels of administration. In short, questions would need to be posed concerning the transparency and accountability o</p><p>　　The case for co

14、mmunity-based governance depends on the possibilities of local information generation together with the networks of inter-community interactions or social capital. The combination of these factors could, in principle, ge

15、nerate spending tailored to local needs, with substantive local interactions in order to ensure that funds are not diverted from expressed objectives. And as stated above, international and donor agencies have raised the

16、se possibilities in the design of assistance </p><p>　　Bradman and Mothered (2005) discuss theoretical tradeoffs between centralized and decentralized delivery of infrastructure services. Under conditions of

17、 considerable inequality, poorer and vulnerable sections of society might be disadvantaged by community based development, as existing social and economic relations might be used by more influential groups to the disadva

18、ntage of the usual target groups (Plateau, 2004). Plateau also emphasizes the risks of the outright embezzlement of funds, in ad</p><p>　　These tendencies are likely to be reinforced when as described above

19、the PFM infrastructure, especially information flows and independent audit, are weak.</p><p>　　The evidence on community-based development is mixed, at best (see the survey by Mansur and Rae, 2004).An assess

20、ment of Social Investment Funds suggests that these have been less than successful in generation ownership” the local communities (Tender, 2000), it a mismatch between the preferences of the donors and recipients, a “fac

21、ade” of consultation between communities and donors through the PPA process (Francis and James, 2003).</p><p>　　A strong conclusion by Plateau (2004) is that electorates may not be willing or able to discipl

22、ine corrupt local leaders, specially if there is some trickle-down and improvement regardless of the magnitude of funds diverted. And competition among donors may make matters worse. Is proposals include a sequential dis

23、bursement of assistance, and on accurate information on the spending, together with an improved technology of fraud detection. Equally important are the effective mechanisms put in plac</p><p>　　In order to

24、meet the requirement of providing accurate and timely information to policy makers, the legislature and the broader public, there is increasing emphasis in organic budget laws around the world that the budget should comp

25、ly with the principles of comprehensiveness, unity, and internal consistency. Without the associated budgeting, reporting and audit infrastructure, it is unlikely that the good governance aspects of decentralized operati

26、ons would be realized.</p><p>　　The principle of comprehensiveness requires that the budget cover all government institutions undertaking government operations, so that the budget presents a consolidated and

27、 complete view of these operations and is voted on, as a whole, by the body vested with national legislative authority. Unfortunately, in many cases, donors' demands to maintain donor funds in extra budgetary or off-

28、budget accounts have undermined the transparency and financial discipline of government operations (Premhang,</p><p>　　The principle of unity requires that the budget includes all revenues and expenditures o

29、f all government agencies undertaking government operations. This principle is important to ensure that the budget is an effective instrument to impose a constraint on total and government expenditure, and promote higher

30、 efficiency in the allocation of resources.</p><p>　　The principle of internal consistency between different components of the budget requires, in particular, hat current expenditure needed for the maintenan

31、ce and operation of past investments be fully reflected in the budget. Moreover, this principle implies that there should be no dual budget systems involving a split between current and capital (or development) spending.

32、 </p><p>　　The principles above translate in different ways in terms of information requirements for appropriations, accounting, controls and reporting, depending on the budgeting framework in use-and we dis

33、tinguish here between a continuum-based on traditional budgeting frameworks to those on the basis of "performance or outcomes." These are discussed sequentially below.</p><p>　　Government Accountab

34、ility</p><p>　　Government accountability is an essential principle of democracy through which elected and unelected public officials are obligated to explain their decisions and actions to the legislature an

35、d the broader public to ensure an appropriate use of public resources. The framework for government accountability usually includes a combination of political and administrative mechanisms designed to hold public officia

36、ls responsible for their Performance.</p><p>　　Fixed terms of office and fair elections are key political mechanisms to hold policy makers accountable. It these mechanisms, he electorate could remove elected

37、 government officials if their performance is not in line with public expectations. Legal mechanisms of accountability for both elected and unelected officials include all legislation proscribing actions that public offi

38、cials can and cannot take and well as sanctions against officials with unsatisfactory conduct. Precondition legal accoun</p><p>　　A community-based scheme for government accountability combining political, a

39、nd administrative mechanisms has received increasing attention by international agencies. Particularly important under this scheme are the legal instruments that require input from the communities on certain government d

40、ecisions or provide access to the press or the broader public to information on government activities.</p><p>　　B. Traditional Budgeting Models</p><p>　　The traditional cycle of budget appropr

41、iations, counting, control and reporting are described for both unitary and federal states. he recent experiences of developing countries in meeting the expenditure accountability requirements of the Heavily Indebted Poo

42、r Country (HIPC) initiative are summarized in sky and Floyd (2004).</p><p>　　The typical stages of budgeting include decisions by the administration and authorized by the elative legislature on what to spend

43、—this is the appropriation stage. This would increasingly place in a medium-term framework to fully capture the effects of decisions that last for multiple periods. In a unitary state with subnational governments, the bu

44、dget decisions would be made by the central government and approved by the national legislature. Such an arrangement would be perfectly compatible wit</p><p>　　In a federal system, he center would appropriat

45、e transfers for each level, which in turn would prepare their own budgets. There would then be a premium on ensuring that promised transfers-it special purpose or general, “equalization” transfers—are made in a timely ma

46、nner.</p><p>　　Under either system, a fundamental rule for preventing rent seeking and ensuring accountability, throughout the entire budget process, is that there should be no spending without adequate appr

47、opriations and financing arrangements. In countries with the old Francophone PFM systems, funding could be provided to public entities without appropriations during the budget execution process, and “l(fā)egalized” as an ex

48、post appropriation in the budget of the subsequent year. This practice clearly weakens t</p><p>　　A typology of classification of borrowing controls described by Ter-Minassian (1997), refers to four broad &q

49、uot;stylized" categories: (1) market discipline; (2) rules-based controls; (3) administrative controls; and (4) cooperation between different levels of Government.</p><p>　　Market discipline </p>

50、<p>　　Some countries rely exclusively on capital markets to restrain subnational borrowing. In this case, the central government would not set any limits on subnational borrowing and local governments are free to

51、decide amounts, sources and uses of borrowing. Provinces in Canada as well as U. S. states have the right to borrow with no central review or control. Similarly, in Argentina, all levels of government are permitted to bo

52、rrow both domestically and abroad.</p><p>　　Markets have been myopic, as in the case of Argentina, and in many parts of the world, inadequate capital markets at the local level are inadequately developed to

53、conceive of extensive reliance on market-based borrowing, or the ability of markets to discipline subnational government. Moreover, it is increasingly becoming clear that the ratings agencies, where they operate at the s

54、ubnational level, evaluate all the public financial management criteria described above, as well as the overall desig</p><p>　　Subnational governments may however decide on their own to adopt a fiscal rule i

55、n an attempt to enhance their credit standing in the market. Such self-imposed rules are found for example in Canada, Switzerland, and the United States. In these countries, sensational governments have generally direct

56、access to financial markets to meet their borrowing requirements, and there are few precedents of bailouts of insolvent subnational governments by the central government; hence their desire to maintai</p><p>

57、;　　Rules-based approach </p><p>　　In some cases, his central government might try to contain subnational borrowing by imposing a fiscal rule. Both federal and unitary states have relied on various standing r

58、ules specified in the constitution or in laws to control subnational borrowing, in an effort to confer credibility for the conduct of macroeconomic policies. Such rules introduce a constraint on fiscal policy to guarante

59、e that fundamentals will remain predictable and robust regardless of the government in charge.</p><p>　　Enforcing borrowing controls </p><p>　　Three basic mechanisms are used by countries to enf

60、orce borrowing controls at the subnational level: (1) market discipline (2) intergovernmental entities operating with in a cooperative arrangement (3) administrative procedures carried out by an entity of the public sect

61、or.</p><p>　　This paper focuses on the institutional and procedural backbone of decentralized governance. It illustrates that decentralization relying solely on community safeguards will generally be insuffi

62、cient to ensure pro-poor spending, and that there needs to be concomitant emphasis on the generation of accurate and timely information on the actual spending, if not on the outcomes. This needs to be supplemented by eff

63、ective mechanisms to detect, prevent, and punish misuse of resources or diversion of f</p><p>　　Even with adequate monitoring of subnational spending, there has to be an emphasis on the effects of such spend

64、ing, particularly the incurring of debt and other contingent liabilities, on overall macroeconomic aggregates. Again, the implementation of orderly macroeconomic adjustments will rely on the nature of the public financia

65、l management infrastructure at all levels of government.</p><p>　　Source: Ehtisham Ahmad, Maria Albino-War, and Raju Singh. Subnational Public Financial Management: Institutions and Macroeconomic Considerati

66、ons. IMF Working paper,2005（108）,pp.1-26.</p><p><b>　　二、翻譯文章</b></p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　國家公共財務管理：機構和宏觀經(jīng)濟的思考</p><p>　　中央政府在透明的公共財政管理過程中，需要地

67、方一級機構的配合，這反映了其職能的需要，同時為了能和地方政府創(chuàng)造更好的下放管理效率，確保良好的問責制和競爭機制是關鍵因素。此外國家債務這樣一因素對整個宏觀經(jīng)濟穩(wěn)定有著影響，中央政府要特別關注國內(nèi)債務的監(jiān)測和管理。</p><p>　　在實際問題上，地方一級有是否有良好的最終有效的公共財務管理治理取決于成功或失敗的不同政策選擇。雖然有一系列有關地方財務和“財務規(guī)則”的文獻表明已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)不太重視公共財務管理的重要治理方

68、面的情況（見波特1997年，月夜，2001）。這一疏忽部分原因可能是由于權力下放，以及以社區(qū)為基礎的產(chǎn)生有效和公平的支出決策所導致的。</p><p>　　事實上，在以社區(qū)參與為發(fā)展重點的戰(zhàn)略是在20世紀50年代，主要特征是由福特基金會和外國緩助方案所驅動。但在當時并未取得重大成就，即使由于近幾年來經(jīng)過非政府組織的一系列政策努力。以社區(qū)推動為發(fā)展重點采用的是世行的綜合發(fā)展框架（世界銀行，2001）基石之一。但是，

69、越來越多的證據(jù)表明，弱或缺乏公共財務管理職能和機構很可能會導致接近地方社區(qū)所固有的公共服務沒有任何優(yōu)勢。</p><p>　　有關涉及到基礎公共財務管理的基本制度和程序因素可能已經(jīng)在憲法，或在預算，或法律或協(xié)議管轄下的國家經(jīng)營或負債較高層次中的法律中規(guī)定。在一些國家，比如南非，就已經(jīng)有一個涵蓋上述領域的精心設計的法例法規(guī)。</p><p>　　在任何一級政府采取的負責秩序的行動中，必須明確

70、其功能，優(yōu)先考慮和授權支出對挪用其資金，確保合理的實際支出。另一重要方面則涉及到需要及時準確地報告給各自的立法機關和更高層次的機構。但問題是需要政府提出相關的透明度和問責制，以及是否符合最起碼國際標準的制度。常常國家大量的支出可能會轉移到上級政府，但如果政府沒有在初級水平進行硬預算約束的情況下有可能超過預算（利特瓦克和強持隆德，2003）。弱或不存在的借款超過控制時可能通常需要轉換，例如，通過債務或發(fā)放貸款承包，或間接地拖欠應付賬款建設

71、。在不同的政制安排下，來自各不相同的國家對實施的借貸自愿協(xié)議（一般指州）或規(guī)則（聯(lián)合會，以及超國家的團塊的國家，如歐盟）有不同的政策反應。</p><p>　　以社區(qū)為基礎的治理情況取決于當?shù)匦畔a(chǎn)生的可能性以及社區(qū)間的相互作用或者是社會網(wǎng)絡的資本。在原則上，這些因素的結合可以針對當?shù)禺a(chǎn)生的消費需求與當?shù)氐膶嶋H情況進行相互作用以達到資金不被挪用的目標。而針對這些情況，國際社會和捐助機構有可能提出緩助方案設計。但是

72、，在實踐中有倆個實質性的困難：一個問題涉及到是否有可能被集團壟斷；另一個涉及到的問題是這以方案是否有助于加強信息類型的生成。最后要分析當?shù)胤盏挠行院褪欠裼袕姶蟮牡胤嚼嫒后w能夠爭取到一個大比例的分配到地方的資金。</p><p>　　布拉德曼和戴安娜 (2005)討論了集中和分散之間的基礎設施服務的提供理論權衡。在不平等的條件下，貧困或弱勢社會條件可能對以社區(qū)為基礎的發(fā)展不利，因為現(xiàn)有的社會經(jīng)濟關系通?？赡苁?/p>

73、到目標群體缺點的影響。同時，高原還強調了直接挪用資金的風險，除了受消費或誤導消費因素影響。這些傾向有可能會加強基礎設施，特別是使信息的流動性和審計的獨立性薄弱。</p><p>　　證據(jù)顯示，以社區(qū)為基礎的發(fā)展現(xiàn)象是復雜的（參見由曼蘇里，2004年的的調查）。一個社會投資基金的評估表明，這些已經(jīng)有一代所有權的社區(qū)，由于捐助者和受助者的喜好的不匹配，即使是通過社區(qū)之間的磋商，也同樣產(chǎn)生了各種矛盾（佛郎西斯和詹姆斯，

74、2003）。</p><p>　　高原的理論（2004）指出，選民未必愿意選舉腐敗的地方領導人，特別是受捐助者之間由于資金規(guī)模的競爭導致形成的不善言論的影響。建議包括連續(xù)性的緩助支出，利用準確到位的信息來防止和懲罰濫用公共支出的情況，并轉化為對基礎設施的有效公共開支的控制和預算審計機制。</p><p>　　為了滿足提供準確及時的信息，政策制定者、立法機關、廣大公眾以及越來越多的有機預算法

75、強調世界各地的預算應符合全面性，團結的原則和內(nèi)部一致性的要求。沒有相關的預算編制、報告和審計的基礎設施，是不可能實現(xiàn)使分散經(jīng)營的狀況得到良好的治理。</p><p>　　全面性原則要求，預算涵蓋政府機構所有的經(jīng)營運作，使預算得到鞏固和完成，它是由一個具有國家立法權力的整體投票通過決定的。不幸的是，在許多情況下，捐助者的捐助資金需求維持在預算外資金或預算外賬戶，這削弱了政府運作的透明度和財務紀律（佩錢佳，1996）

76、，而且往往產(chǎn)生平行和不協(xié)調的預算制度。</p><p>　　內(nèi)部一致性原則要求不同組成部分之間的預算應遵循這一原則，特別是目前的開支維持在過去的投資和經(jīng)營運作所需的預算中。此外，這一原則并沒有涉及復式預算制度之間的經(jīng)常項目和資本支出（或開發(fā)）的分裂。</p><p>　　以上這些原則，以不同的方式轉化為撥款、會計、控制和報告要求方面的信息，這取決于使用的預算框架和連續(xù)為基礎的傳統(tǒng)的預算編制

77、框架所形成的性能的基礎或結果。這些討論順序如下：</p><p><b>　　政府問責制</b></p><p>　　政府問責制是由民主選擇產(chǎn)生，通過這些非民選公職人員有有義務解釋其決定和行動向立法機關和更廣泛的公眾，以確保公共資源的合理利用。通常情況下，政府問責制框架旨在公共官員于他們所負責的政治與管理機制的相結合。結合辦公條件和子固定時間舉行公平選舉的政治機制的是

78、決策者的責任，這些機制可以讓選民取消那些不符合公眾期望的政府官員的選舉資格。為選民及非選民選舉產(chǎn)生的官員問責制的法律機制，限制制裁不合格的官員，但實現(xiàn)的法律前提是一個獨立的司法系統(tǒng)。行政問責制涉及到獨立審計和監(jiān)察員，同時要求其公職人員不得違背任務或者是濫用公共資金。</p><p>　　以社區(qū)為基礎的政府問責制這個計劃現(xiàn)在越來越受到國際機構的關注。根據(jù)這項計劃，尤其重要的是需要從某些政府決策的社區(qū)輸入或提供有關政

79、府活動的機會向新聞界或向更廣泛的公眾信息的法律文書。</p><p><b>　　傳統(tǒng)預算編制模式</b></p><p>　　預算經(jīng)費、執(zhí)行、核算、控制和報告在傳統(tǒng)上是統(tǒng)一的，在最近的一次會議上，發(fā)展中國家介紹有關重債窮國開支問責制的要求。</p><p>　　有泰爾所述的借款控制（1997）類型分類是指四大“風格化”類：（1）市場紀律；（2

80、）以規(guī)則為基礎的控制；（3）行政控制措施；（4）不同層次政府之間的合作。</p><p>　　一些國家完全依賴于資本市場，在這個情況下，中央政府將不設置關于國內(nèi)借款，地方政府借口自由決定其數(shù)額、來源和用途的任何限制。加拿大各省以及美國各州有權借用沒有經(jīng)過中央審查的款項，而在阿根廷，各級政府則不得隨意借用國內(nèi)和國外的款項。</p><p>　　市場已經(jīng)近視，比如在阿根廷這種情況下的世界許多地

81、方，地方資金市場沒有得到充分的開發(fā)，而廣泛依賴以市場為基礎的借款或向各級地方政府紀律市場的能力不足。此外，評級機構明確表示，他們在地方一級的運動，評估所運用的是公共財務管理的準則，以及政府間系統(tǒng)的整體設計原則。</p><p>　　地方政府可自行提高他們在市場上自我加強的信譽財務規(guī)則，加拿大、瑞士和美國就是這樣做的。在這些國家中，各級政府一般都直接進入金融市場，以滿足借款需求，也有由中央地方政府破產(chǎn)救助，但這種例

82、子很少，因此他們希望保持對市場有利的信貸評級。同時最近，阿根廷按照這個要求與財務責任相結合引進一個聯(lián)邦委員會財務責任的改革探索。</p><p><b>　　以規(guī)則為基礎的方法</b></p><p>　　在某些情況下，中央政府很可能會試圖控制國家的財務借款規(guī)則。聯(lián)邦和各州都依賴站在不同的憲法或法律規(guī)定上，以控制國家借貸規(guī)則，努力賦予宏觀經(jīng)濟的行為規(guī)則的可信度。這個規(guī)

83、則介紹了在財務政策上的限制，可以使府主管對可預測和基本面的強勁保證。</p><p><b>　　執(zhí)行借款控制</b></p><p>　　國家在地方一級執(zhí)行借款控制時所使用的三種基本機制：（1）市場紀律；（2）政府間機構的合作和安排；（3）行政程序由實體公共部門執(zhí)行。</p><p>　　本文對分散體制和程序的重點說明，權力下放僅僅依靠社會保

84、障不足以確保扶貧支出，除非伴隨著信息能夠在需要的時候準確及時的進行實際支出。這需要通過有效的機制來檢測、預防和懲處資源濫用或挪用資金的情補充。即使能夠對省市級支出進行準確的監(jiān)測，也要重視此類支出所造成的影響，特別是對債務和其他或負債承擔整體宏觀經(jīng)濟總量的影響。</p><p>　　出處：艾哈邁德，瑪利亞，辛格. 《國家公共財務管理：機構和宏觀經(jīng)濟的思考》. 《國際貨幣基金組織工作文件》，2005(108),P1-