財(cái)務(wù)管理外文翻譯-- 擁有少量董事的公司擁有更高的市場(chǎng)評(píng)價(jià)（節(jié)選）

1、<p><b>　　中文1835字</b></p><p>　　Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors(節(jié)選)</p><p>　　Author：David Yermack</p><p>　　Nationality：The U.S.&l

2、t;/p><p>　　Derivation: Journal of Financial Economics 40(1996)185-211</p><p>　　（P185-187）Introduction</p><p>　　A growing body of empirical research examines the structure and effective

3、ness of corporate governance systems. An important insight from this literature is that top managers’ decisions appear to be influenced by executive compensation, take over threats, monitoring by boards of directors, and

4、 other control mechanisms. I contribute to this literature by evaluating a proposal for limiting the size of boards of directors in order to improve their effectiveness. My evidence supports this proposal, a</p>&

5、lt;p>　　Lipton and Lorsch (1992) state that‘...the norms of behavior in most boardrooms are dysfunctional’, because directors rarely criticize the policies of top managers or hold candid discussions about corporate per

6、formance. Believing that these problems increase with the number of directors, Lipton and Lorsch recommend limiting the membership of boards to ten people, with a preferred size of eight or nine. The proposal amounts to

7、a conjecture that even if boards’ capacities for monitoring increase w</p><p>　　Some evidence shows that reducing board size has become a priority for institutional investors, dissident directors, and corpor

8、ate raiders seeking to improve troubled companies. Kini et al. (1995) present evidence that board size shrinks after successful tender offers for under-performing firms. At American Express, the outside director who in 1

9、993 organized the removal of the company’s CEO cited the‘unwieldy’19-person board as an obstacle to change, stating that the ‘size of the board does make</p><p>　　In a sample of 452 large U.S. public corpora

10、tions observed over the period 1984 to 1991, I find an inverse relation between firm market value, as represented by Tobin’s Q, and the size of the board of directors. The association appears in both cross-sectional anal

11、yses of the variation among firms and in time-series analyses of the variation within individual companies. The negative relation between board size and firm value attenuates as boards become large, implying that the gre

12、atest incrementa</p><p>　　A range of additional evidence is consistent with the finding that companies achieve the highest market value when boards are small. Several measures of operating efficiency and pro

13、fitability are negatively related over time to board size within firms. Smaller boards are more likely to dismiss CEOs following periods of poor performance. Similarly, evidence shows that CEO compensation exhibits great

14、er sensitivity to performance in companies with small boards. Stock returns for a sample of compani</p><p>　　The inverse association between board size and firm value proves robust to a variety of tests for

15、alternative explanations. I introduce variables to control for firm size, industry, board composition, inside stock ownership, the presence of growth opportunities, diversification, company age, and different corporate g

16、overnance structures. None of these modifications changes the conclusion that companies with small boards are valued more highly in the capital markets.</p><p>　　An alternative interpretation of the results

17、is that board size arises from prior company performance, with troubled firms adding directors to increase monitoring capacity. I conduct a range of tests to obtain insight into the direction of causation between board s

18、ize and firm value. The tests show that while the rate of director turnover increases following poor performance, board size remains quite stable over time with little sensitivity to performance.</p><p>　　（P

19、209-210） Summary and conclusions</p><p>　　This paper evaluates a recent proposal in the legal and finance literature for reducing the size of corporate boards of directors. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jense

20、n(1993)have criticized the performance of large boards, stating that problems of poor communication and decision-making overwhelm the effectiveness of such groups. I find evidence consistent with this theory. Using a var

21、iety of regression models with data from 1984-91 for 452 large public corporations, I find an inverse association b</p><p>　　The basic result proves robust to a variety of controls for company size, the pres

22、ence of growth opportunities, and alternative corporate governance and ownership structures. No evidence is consistent with conjectures that companies change board size as a result of past performance.</p><p&g

23、t;　　A range of supporting evidence is consistent with the main finding of an inverse association between board size and firm value. Financial ratios related to profitability and operating efficiency appear to decline as

24、board size grows. CEO performance incentives provided by the board through compensation and the threat of dismissal operate less strongly as board size increases. A small group of sample companies that announce significa

25、nt reductions in board size realize substantial excess stock ret</p><p>　　擁有少量董事的公司擁有更高的市場(chǎng)評(píng)價(jià)（節(jié)選）</p><p>　　作者：David Yermack</p><p>　　國(guó)籍：The U.S.</p><p>　　原文出處: Journal o

26、f Financial Economics 40(1996)185-211</p><p>　?。≒185-187）介紹</p><p>　　越來(lái)越多的實(shí)證研究探討公司治理體系的結(jié)構(gòu)和效益。本文的觀點(diǎn)是:高層管理者的決策看起來(lái)是受高管薪酬、收購(gòu)?fù){、董事會(huì)監(jiān)督和其他控制機(jī)制的影響。本文通過(guò)提議限制董事會(huì)規(guī)模進(jìn)行評(píng)估以提高效率，另外，本文的證據(jù)也支持這一觀點(diǎn)，因?yàn)楣P者發(fā)現(xiàn)美國(guó)的大部分公司的公

27、司價(jià)值與董事會(huì)規(guī)模呈負(fù)相關(guān)。</p><p>　　Lipton和 Lorsch（1992年）認(rèn)為：“從行為準(zhǔn)則來(lái)說(shuō)，大多數(shù)的董事會(huì)是不合理的”，因?yàn)槎潞苌倥u(píng)高層管理人員的績(jī)效或?qū)ζ髽I(yè)績(jī)效進(jìn)行坦率的討論。Lipton和Lorsch認(rèn)為董事成員越多存在的問(wèn)題就越大，因此他們建議限制董事會(huì)成員人數(shù)在十人之內(nèi)，最合理的人數(shù)是八或九人。該提案相當(dāng)于作了這樣一個(gè)猜想：盡管董事的監(jiān)督作用隨著董事會(huì)規(guī)模的增加而增強(qiáng)，但是好處

28、卻被更慢的決策，更不坦率的管理績(jī)效的討論以及對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的偏見(jiàn)這些成本夸大了。Jensen（1993）也注意到了這個(gè)問(wèn)題，他指出“在會(huì)議室里不惜以真實(shí)和坦率為代價(jià)極力強(qiáng)調(diào)文明和禮貌”，并指出，“當(dāng)董事成員超過(guò)七、八人，他們是不太可能有效地發(fā)揮監(jiān)督作用，從而更容易被CEO所控制”。</p><p>　　一些證據(jù)表明，減少董事會(huì)規(guī)模已成為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者，持不同政見(jiàn)的董事以及尋求改善陷入困境的公司介入者的首要事項(xiàng)。Kinic

29、tal（1995年）的研究表明，業(yè)績(jī)不佳的公司成功中標(biāo)后，其董事會(huì)規(guī)模將縮小。根據(jù)Monks 和 Minow（1995年）所言，在美國(guó)運(yùn)通，那些在1993年組織過(guò)取消公司的CEO的外部董事，他們把19個(gè)人的董事會(huì)看成是改革的阻礙，聲稱(chēng)“董事會(huì)規(guī)模的大小的確有很大的影響”。 最近，在通用汽車(chē)，IBM公司，西方石油公司，斯科特紙業(yè)，格雷斯，時(shí)代華納和西屋電氣這些著名公司進(jìn)行公司治理大修整的期間，產(chǎn)生了較小的董事會(huì)規(guī)模。據(jù)報(bào)道,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的壓

30、力導(dǎo)致了這樣的變化,比如1995年在瑞典，董事會(huì)成員自22個(gè)減少到到12個(gè)。</p><p>　　觀察1984年至1991年的452家大型的美國(guó)上市公司，筆者發(fā)現(xiàn)托賓Q衡量的公司的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值與董事會(huì)規(guī)模呈顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)。這種聯(lián)系出現(xiàn)在企業(yè)間的縱向變量的分析比較和個(gè)別獨(dú)立的公司的內(nèi)部時(shí)間序列分析。董事會(huì)規(guī)模與公司價(jià)值的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系隨著董事會(huì)規(guī)模的增大而增強(qiáng)，這意味著董事會(huì)規(guī)模從小型到中等將產(chǎn)生最大的增量成本。舉例來(lái)說(shuō)，當(dāng)

31、董事會(huì)成員從6個(gè)增加到12個(gè)時(shí)，公司價(jià)值的損失按照預(yù)計(jì)將等同于董事會(huì)規(guī)模從12個(gè)增加到24個(gè)的價(jià)值損失，而很少有董事會(huì)規(guī)模會(huì)少于6個(gè)或多于24個(gè)的董事。</p><p>　　一系列額外的證據(jù)表明同企業(yè)的董事會(huì)規(guī)模很小時(shí)，公司能取得最高市場(chǎng)價(jià)值的這一發(fā)現(xiàn)是相一致的。一些針對(duì)營(yíng)運(yùn)效率和營(yíng)運(yùn)盈利的措施與企業(yè)的董事會(huì)規(guī)模負(fù)相關(guān)。規(guī)模較小的董事會(huì)更容易解雇表現(xiàn)欠佳時(shí)期的CEO，同樣地，也有證據(jù)表明，在董事會(huì)規(guī)模較小的公司，

32、CEO薪酬表現(xiàn)出更大的與經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效的相關(guān)性。一家以股票收益來(lái)衡量的樣本公司在董事會(huì)規(guī)模表現(xiàn)顯著的變化，當(dāng)董事會(huì)規(guī)模變小時(shí)投資者反映積極，董事會(huì)規(guī)模變大時(shí)投資者表現(xiàn)的消極。</p><p>　　董事會(huì)規(guī)模與公司價(jià)值的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系鮮明地證明了一些可選擇解釋的測(cè)試，筆者通過(guò)引進(jìn)變量從公司規(guī)模，行業(yè)，董事會(huì)的組成，內(nèi)部股權(quán)，成長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)的出現(xiàn)，多元化，公司存在年齡，不同的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)來(lái)進(jìn)行控制。所有這些修改都沒(méi)有改變董事會(huì)規(guī)模小

33、的公司在資本市場(chǎng)價(jià)值更高的結(jié)論。</p><p>　　對(duì)結(jié)果的另一種解釋是，董事會(huì)規(guī)模產(chǎn)生于先前的公司績(jī)效，同時(shí)困境企業(yè)通過(guò)增加董事來(lái)增加監(jiān)控的力度。筆者進(jìn)行一定范圍的測(cè)試，以獲得董事會(huì)規(guī)模與公司價(jià)值因果關(guān)系方向的見(jiàn)解。試驗(yàn)表明，雖然董事變換率隨著差的業(yè)績(jī)?cè)鲩L(zhǎng)，但董事會(huì)規(guī)模依然在相當(dāng)時(shí)間內(nèi)與業(yè)績(jī)保持穩(wěn)定，并且表現(xiàn)為較差的敏感性。</p><p>　?。≒209-210）摘要和結(jié)論</

34、p><p>　　本文為對(duì)最近在法律和財(cái)務(wù)文獻(xiàn)中關(guān)于減少公司董事會(huì)規(guī)模的提議進(jìn)行了評(píng)論。 Lipton，Lorsch（1992）和Jensen（1993）批評(píng)了那些較大規(guī)模董事的績(jī)效，并指出溝通不暢和決策妨礙了這些機(jī)構(gòu)的效率。筆者找到了與這理論相符合的證據(jù)。通過(guò)對(duì)1984至1991年間452家大型上市公司做回歸模型分析，筆者發(fā)現(xiàn)董事會(huì)規(guī)模與公司價(jià)值呈現(xiàn)著負(fù)相關(guān)的關(guān)系。這種關(guān)系看起來(lái)很明顯，表明當(dāng)董事會(huì)規(guī)模從小型發(fā)展到中

35、等規(guī)模時(shí)，公司價(jià)值損失部分也最大。</p><p>　　那個(gè)基本的結(jié)論證實(shí)了對(duì)公司規(guī)模、成長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)的出現(xiàn)以及可選擇的公司監(jiān)管進(jìn)行大量的控制是那么的有必要。沒(méi)有證據(jù)表明董事會(huì)規(guī)模的變化與以前的公司業(yè)績(jī)有關(guān)。</p><p>　　一系列支持的證據(jù)都表明與董事會(huì)規(guī)模與公司價(jià)值的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系這一發(fā)現(xiàn)的一致。與經(jīng)營(yíng)效率和盈利效率相關(guān)的財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)表現(xiàn)出隨著董事會(huì)規(guī)模的增長(zhǎng)而下降。通過(guò)董事會(huì)薪酬支付和解雇威脅