金融市場不完善的后果【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p>　　Consequences of imperfect financial markets</p><p>　　MaterialSource:Yale univerity economic growth center discussion </p><p>　　Author:Jon

2、athan Conning</p><p>　　Even if a small tight-knit group could accomplish the feat of efficient risk pooling, individuals would still very likely remain exposed to substantial risks because the very physical

3、proximity and closeness that is required of agents to be able to enforce state-contingent risk-sharing arrangements will typically expose these individuals to correlated risks. For example, a shortfall of rain is likely

4、to affect most of the agricultural households in the same small dry land farming community. Loca</p><p>　　Since realistically it would quickly become prohibitively costly and complicated for each individual

5、to separately contract directly with each of many hundreds of other individuals spread out over large distances, it is natural to expect this to create demand for the entry of specialized financial intermediaries to help

6、 lower the transaction costs of pooling risks and in this way help society to further complete the market and reap the gains to financial trade.</p><p>　　The entry of efficiency-enhancing financial intermedi

7、ation may however be delayed or complicated for several reasons. The first problem is that outside financial institutions (FIS) are just that: outsiders that may not have the kind of local information and enforcement mec

8、hanisms necessary to verify and enforce detailed state-contingent contracts within the　village. As reviewed in more detail below, this may end up severely limiting the set of feasible contracts a FI may be willing to off

9、er. </p><p>　　Hence, either because the members of their trading networks face correlated risks and/or because financial contracting is incomplete within villages, households and individuals in rural areas a

10、re likely to be left facing considerable residual risk. This leads households to search for and adopt other, possibly quite costly, strategies to smooth income or consumption. It also creates significant latent demand fo

11、r financial trade with outsiders. Income smoothing strategies include scattering plots </p><p>　　Research pointing to evidence of such costly strategies is vast, and we will mention only a few prominent exam

12、ples. Kochar (1999) showed that over three-quarters of the correlation that Townsend (1994) found between household and village aggregate consumption could be accounted for by the households’ increased supply of labor to

13、 the agricultural wage market following a shock to their farm production. In other words, when hit by an idiosyncratic production shock, households appear to have smoothe</p><p>　　To complement the literatur

14、e that documents the extreme degree of fragmentation in rural financial markets (section 2.1 above), there is some research that attempts to measure the extent of credit rationing in these imperfect rural financial marke

15、ts. Many surveys have found that farmers claim that they would borrow more if additional credit were available at a given interest rate (Diagne and Zeller 2001; Zeller, Diagne, and Mataya 1998). However, it is sometimes

16、difficult to interpret these coun</p><p>　　Amartya Sen (1982) points to the importance of land as an asset for smoothing income when he wrote “a small peasant and a landless laborer may both be poor, but the

17、ir fortunes are not tied together.” He has argued that wage labor markets often collapse rapidly at the outset of a famine and whereas households with land can often fall-back upon this or other assets for subsistence pu

18、rposes to buffer the shock, wage laborers have few other assets to work with. Land may also ‘entitle’ the owner to a</p><p>　　Households may also try to smooth consumption by accumulating or decumulating phy

19、sical buffer stocks of assets such as animals, grain, land, or jewelry. When the assets are used directly in production and there are incomplete or missing rental markets, consumption-smoothing can again come at the cost

20、 of productive efficiency. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) document this cost when partial consumption smoothing is achieved by households in the ICRISAT India villages through the sale and purchase of </p><p>

21、　　There is a broad consensus of the large empirical literature on risk and household responses to risk in rural areas of LDCS that most households succeed in protecting their consumption from the full consequences of the

22、ir risky environment. However, they do not do so to the full degree implied by either Pareto efficient risk pooling within specified communities or by strict versions of the permanent income hypothesis. </p><p

23、>　　Imperfect financial markets also shape production organization more generally. It has been clear since the development of the standard agricultural household model (e.g.,Singh et al. (1986); de Janvry et al. (1991)

24、) that the organization of production on the household farm depends upon the nature of the financial markets available to the household. The same literature shows that household labor supply response to price changes, fo

25、r example, depends upon the household’s access to financial market</p><p>　　More generally, the structure of rural economic relations itself depends upon the nature of available financial contracts, which in

26、 turn of course depend upon the structure of rural economic activity. This joint causation opens up the possibility of a wide range of potential equilibria, and an important research agenda.</p><p>　　A serie

27、s of important papers have examined the role of financial market imperfections in generating a persistent non-degenerate income distribution (Loury (1981) is an early paper that raises this issue). Galor and Zeira (1993)

28、 and Banerjee and Newman (1993) show in an economy characterized by non-convexities in investment, capital-market imperfections can cause initial disparities in wealth to persist across generations. Moreover, the distrib

29、ution of wealth affects aggregate patterns of economi</p><p>　　There has been a flowering of related theoretical work on linkages between distribution and growth when financial markets are imperfect. Mookher

30、jee and Ray (2003) and Matsuyama (2002) are also good points of entry into this literature. </p><p>　　More recently, there have been some attempts to link these theoretical insights to data. Banerjee and Du

31、flo (2004) examines an array of reduced-form implications of these theories, with special emphasis on data from India. There is a rapidly growing literature that examines the empirical implications of models of the endog

32、enous growth of financial intermediation in the context of dynamic general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents. The most recent important papers include Jeong and Tow</p><p>　　金融市場不完善的后果</p>

33、<p>　　資料來源：耶魯大學經濟增長中心討論文件 　　　作者：喬納森康寧</p><p>　　因為實際上即使一個再小的緊密團體可以完成高效率的風險分擔，個人仍然很可能繼續(xù)面臨相當大的實質性風險，因為那能執(zhí)行州偶然的事情分享風險的安排的代理所要求的這非常物質的接近和緊密通常將這些個人暴露給相互關系的風險。例如，雨的不足很可能在相同小干旱地區(qū)影響大部分農業(yè)家庭。當地人會想把風險轉移到外地。 </p

34、><p>　　它會很快成為令人望而卻步的復雜昂貴的，而且每一個體分別直接與每個合同成百上千的其他個人分布在長距離下的情況，你會很自然地預期這將進入創(chuàng)造需求的專業(yè)金融中間人幫助降低風險和共享的交易費用這樣有利于社會進一步完善市場,所收的是獲得金融貿易。</p><p>　　在提高效率的金融中介的項目可能會延遲或復雜化的原因有以下幾個。首先的問題是金融機構外(FIS)的就是那樣：外人可能不會有這樣

35、的當地信息和執(zhí)法機制,以驗證和執(zhí)行當地的合約形式。正如下面將詳細審查，這可能會嚴重限制金融中間人提供一套可行的合約。</p><p>　　因此，要么因為成員與交易網絡面臨的風險或由于金融收縮是不完整的家庭和個人在農村地區(qū)很可能面臨著相當大的殘余風險。這將導致家庭，尋找和采取其他可能相當昂貴，戰(zhàn)略順利收入和消費。這也創(chuàng)造了與外界的金融貿易產生重大的潛在需求。收益平滑策略包括散射圖（麥克洛斯基1976；湯森1993年

36、）選擇一個較低的回報，但更多的混合作物和非農業(yè)生產活動，遷移和婚姻模式（羅森茨維格和斯坦格1998年），調整勞動供給和多元化結構（卡持 1999年），勞動凝結和勞務償債（斯里尼瓦桑1989；熱尼科2002年），以及許多其他的選擇。雖然這些策略可能與金融貿易一起在一個完整的市場里運用，當金融市場是不完整的家庭生產和消費之間的選擇，整潔的分離將被打破，使昂貴的先進個人和低效調整生產和投資計劃具有明顯的成效。</p><p

37、>　　研究指著這些昂貴的戰(zhàn)略所需的依據是巨大的，我們將會提幾個突出的例子。卡持（1999年）顯示，超過四分之三與該策略有關系，湯森（1994）發(fā)現家庭和村莊之間可占消費總量的增加以及對勞動力的增加使農業(yè)生產受到沖擊。換句話說,當一場特殊的生產休克、家庭消費，似乎有平滑收入，而不是通過金融交易作為湯森的工作。對勞動供給的計劃會調整當然會高度破壞，尤其是如果他們會損害人類的資本形成的項目。雅各比和斯卡法（1997）只是一個研究，發(fā)現了

38、許多證據表明，在貧困家庭的兒童上學和工作隊收入有特別的沖擊（比格爾和加蒂2003年減少；詹森2000年杜里埃林和萊維森2003年）。</p><p>　　為配合文獻（見2.1節(jié))，以及了解金融市場的極端程度，有一些研究試圖測量在這些不完美的農村金融市場下的信貸配給程度。很多調查都發(fā)現，例如迪亞涅和澤勒（2001）；澤勒和迪亞涅（1998）農民聲稱，如果更多的信貸都是在給定利率下你那么他們將借更多。不過，有時很難解

39、釋這些反事實的反應。一些研究已經試圖利用計量經濟學的方法來衡量在農村信貸市場的管制（貝爾，斯里尼瓦桑，安竹（1997）；卡持（1997）配給的程度，但是這些估計數的確定，必須以試探性的假設為基礎。我們的焦點超越農村金融班納吉和迪弗洛觀察(2004)顯示一個可以說是外源增加(減少)了信用的可用性的一套公司也借從某一特定的印度銀行是聯系在一起的緊隨其后的是增加(減少)公司提供的產量信用約束的證據。</p><p>　

40、　阿馬蒂亞森（1982）指出，土地作為平滑收益資產的重要性時，他寫道：“小農民和無地勞動者可能都很窮，但他們的財富并沒有聯系在一起的?！彼暦Q勞工市場通常瓦解的速度非?？?然而家庭土地經?？梢栽谶@或其他資產下能維持基本的沖擊,工資勞工很少有其他資產與之共事的人。土地可能還“賦予”主人給該社區(qū)的資源越來越少，失地份額變大。例如家庭土地可以在危機時刻借用,而無地或社會地位低的則不能。</p><p>　　家庭同樣可以

41、順利通過積累和消費緩沖股票資產如動物、糧食、土地、珠寶等。當資產被直接應用于生產和有不完整或失蹤的租賃市場,收益平滑可以再來以生產效率為代價。羅森茨魏希和沃林分（1993）時，此文件是由局部平滑消費的印度通過在銷售和購買的公牛在生產中使用的村戶取得成本。 卡茲納格和安竹（2004）提供一個在布基納法索作物研究所調查的村莊住戶類似的成本的證據。</p><p>　　有廣泛共識的實證文獻風險和家庭反應發(fā)展的農村地區(qū)的

42、風險,大多數家庭成功充分保護他們的消費后果的危險的環(huán)境。然而，他們不這樣做的充分程度或者帕累托效率或在指定的社區(qū)的永久收入假說嚴格的版本匯集風險暗示。</p><p>　　不完美的金融市場通常也塑造生產組織。森哈 (1986)；詹文 (1991)從標準農業(yè)家庭模型生產的組織在家庭農場取決于金融市場的本質以及是否可利用對家庭。伊文和卡特瓦(1986)，例如展示對資本的通入，反過來與土地的最初的發(fā)行有關，怎樣塑造生產

43、組織的平衡樣式，包括土地是否工作在薪水民工或房客旁邊和生產效率?？ㄌ睾妥搪?2000)分析這個模型的一個動態(tài)版本。</p><p>　　通常，農村經濟聯系結構取決于可利用的財政合同的本質，當然反之取決于農村經濟活動結構。這種聯合因果打開了可能廣泛的潛在的平衡，而且是一個重要的研究議題。</p><p>　　一系列的重要審查了金融市場缺點的角色在引起堅持非退化的收入分布(拉瑞 (1981)是

44、提出這個問題)的一份早報。在投資描繪的經濟的格拉和子瑞(1993)和本杰和紐曼(1993)展示，資本市場缺點在財富可能造成最初的差距橫跨世代下堅持。而且，財富的發(fā)行影響，果斷地劃分在“效率”和“產權之間的”經濟活動和成長的聚集樣式所有潛在的分離在對經濟政策的分析。</p><p>　　有了開花的相關理論著作分布和發(fā)展之間的聯系金融市場是不完善的。馬克黑吉和雷(2003)和馬特斯瑞(2002)也是以這個為很好切入點

45、。</p><p>　　最近，有些試圖把這數據相關理論。班納吉和迪弗洛觀察(2004)審查以一個數組的形式返回這些理論，特別強調數據來自印度。有審查財政調解內在成長模型經驗主義的涵義在與異種代理的動態(tài)一般均衡模型中的迅速地增長。最近的重要文件包括村和湯森(2003)，察看人成長模型的微觀經濟基礎資本市場不對稱與反復使用數據的基礎上，以泰國經濟提供縱切面調查。菲克和湯森(2004)進行運動與類似的目標，而是使用重復