56中英文雙語外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯成品債券市場參與者對信息披露質(zhì)量的關(guān)注來自中國上市公司的證據(jù)

1、<p>　　外文標(biāo)題：Are Participants in Bond Market Concerned about the Quality of Information Disclosure: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies</p><p>　　外文作者：Huan Luo, Changhai Yu, Ran Su</p><p>

2、;　　文獻(xiàn)出處: Modern Economy,2014,5,1031-1045 </p><p>　　英文2089單詞， 11789字符，中文3608漢字。</p><p>　　此文檔是外文翻譯成品，無需調(diào)整復(fù)雜的格式哦！下載之后直接可用，方便快捷！只需二十多元。</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></

3、p><p>　　Are Participants in Bond Market Concerned about the Quality of Information Disclosure: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies</p><p>　　Huan Luo, Changhai Yu, Ran Su</p><p>　　

4、Introduction</p><p>　　Although the bond market develops rapidly in recent years, China’s bond market is still far behind the stock market (Bottelier, 2003) [1]. As a comprehensive measure of corporate credit

5、 risk, the quality of corporate disclosure should be important for corporate credit rating. However, due to the ineffectiveness of China’s bond market, credit ratings have always been questioned. There is no conclusion a

6、bout whether the information disclosure quality would affect the level of bond credit rating an</p><p>　　High quality of information disclosure can help to solve the problem of asymmetric information and red

7、uce the moral and speculation risk. This plays a very important role in protecting the investors’ interests and promoting the development of capital market. However, as China’s bond market development is relatively lagge

8、d, Chinese academics tend to study stock market rather than bond market. Whether improving the quality of in- formation disclosure could reduce the bond financing cost is inconcl</p><p>　　Literature Review&l

9、t;/p><p>　　The most two important theories studying information disclosure are the efficient market theory and signaling theory. Both of the two theories agree that the disclosure of information plays a very im

10、portant role in the capital market. About the relationship between the information disclosure quality and credit rating, there are some theories and empirical literature show that the high information disclosure quality

11、will bring a high credit rating. Currently there’s no direct literature in china </p><p>　　Information disclosure plays a very important role in corporate governance. For internal governance, the information

12、 disclosure quality may reflect the level of management control; for external governance, improving the disclosure quality helps to protect investors and maintain a healthy development of the market. High quality of info

13、rmation disclosure can solve the information asymmetry problem to a certain extent, which is very important to the effective operation of the capital market. Bond c</p><p>　　Improving the quality of informat

14、ion disclosure will help to reduce the capital cost. The first reason is high information disclosure quality will increase the corporate stock and bond liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia,1991) [6]. The Second reason is th

15、e high information disclosure quality is good for reducing the investors’ estimating risk of future earnings (Handa and Linn, 1993) [7]. Heflin et al. (2011) [5] did an empirical research on the relationship between the

16、information disclosure qual</p><p>　　Hypothesis</p><p>　　In recent years, as the China’s bond market continues to mature and develop, the bond market regulation is more stringent and the investo

17、rs become more rational, the China’s credit rating system is gradually improving. Several Chinese major rating agencies started to cooperate with foreign rating authorities, such as Moody’s acquisition of China Chengxin

18、Credit Rating Group with absolute control in 2006. Also in 2006, Xinhua Finance (con- trolled by U.S.) acquired Shanghai Far East. In 2007, Sta</p><p>　　Due to the information asymmetry, the quality of accou

19、nting information and disclosure is often seen as the signal of corporate condition and performance. Wiedman (2000) [9] studied the relationship between voluntary disclosures and issuing stock and found voluntary disclos

20、ure can reduce information asymmetry between investors and companies. Barry and Brown (1985) [2], Coles and Loewenstein (1988) [3] and Clarkson et al. (1996) [4] found high information disclosure quality can reduce mista

21、ke whe</p><p>　　Based on above analysis, we believe that credit rating agencies in the bond market are concerned about the information disclosure quality. Therefore, we come up with Hypotheses 1.</p>

22、<p>　　Hypotheses 1: The corporate information disclosure quality has a positive impact on the credit rating, the higher information disclosure quality, the higher credit rating.</p><p>　　Hypotheses 2: T

23、he corporate information disclosure quality has a negative impact on corporate bond financing cost, the higher information disclosure quality, the lower bond financing cost.</p><p>　　Research Design</p>

24、;<p>　　Models and Variables</p><p>　　Since rating agencies sequence the corporate credit ratings in order, we use sequencing logic model (Ordered Logit) in our empirical analysis. Based on previous re

25、search on credit rating (Elton et al., 2004; Perraudin and Taylor, 2004) [10] [11], our model to test Hypotheses 1 is as follows:</p><p>　　When credit rating agencies are rating a corporate’s credit, they a

26、lso give a rating of the bond issued by the corporate. But in the practice of credit rating in China, the rating standards of short-term financing bond are different from other types of bond, thus research often uses the

27、 corporate credit rating directly, namely the credit rating for issuing corporates. This article also directly uses the corporate credit rating, and in order to make the results more robust, we also use the bond r</p&

28、gt;<p>　　Empirical Results</p><p>　　Descriptive Statistics</p><p>　　Quality of information disclosure’s (DisSz, Shenzhen Stock Exchange score) mean is 3.0932, median is 3, the minimum val

29、ue is 2, indicating information disclosure quality of listed companies which issued bonds in the bond market is higher than the overall average. The interest rate spread’s (Spread) mean is ?0.3215, median is ?0.5, showin

30、g bond financing cost is lower than bank loan. The mean of bond issuing corporate credit rating (Credit) is 3.9492, and the median is 4, showing the average cred</p><p>　　AccQuality is characterized by three

31、 variables: Big 4, Conserv, VarRoe. We noticed only 11.30% companies in the sample choose Big 4 to do the financial report audit. Conserv has a mean with 0.0420 and median with ?0.0152, which means the reports are robust

32、 in general, but the 0.2601 deviation shows huge differences among companies. VarRoe, earnings volatility, is relatively small; its standard deviation also shows big differences. We can also see big difference among samp

33、les in Roe, Size, Lev, C</p><p>　　Regression Analysis</p><p>　　Credit Rating and Information Disclosure Quality</p><p>　　From Model 1’s result, we can see the coefficients of Roe an

34、d Size (7.206, 2.725) are significantly positive at 1% level, indicating high profitability and big size can lead to high credit rating. The coefficient of Lev (?8.192) is significantly negative at 1% level, showing high

35、 liability-asset ratio will bring low credit rating. All these prove that the signal effect does exist in the China’s bond market, corporate’s financial condition will affect its credit rating. The coefficient of GDPgrow

36、</p><p>　　Robustness Test</p><p>　　Selection of the Information Disclosure Quality Indicator</p><p>　　Considering the Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s data is simply divided into four leve

37、ls, it does not distinguish between voluntary disclosure and mandatory disclosure, and the evaluation index system is also not announced. More importantly, the data doesn’t cover companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Ex

38、change, so there might be some problem. In order to make the results more robust, we use the Chinese listed companies information disclosure index (Gao Minghua, Beijing Normal University, 2010, 2012) [</p><p&g

39、t;　　The regression results of CCDI partly supported the hypothesis of this paper, but there are some differences. The reason for this result might be that although investors are concerned about the quality of corporate i

40、nformation disclosure, usually they cannot assess the disclosure quality themselves, so they often use the authorities’ evaluation result. Clearly, Shenzhen Stock Exchange data has much more influence than CCDI.</p>

41、;<p>　　Conclusion</p><p>　　As a signal, information disclosure plays an important role in the capital market, although many studies sup- ported the signal theory from the theoretical and empirical lev

42、el, but researchers in China found only participants of the stock market are concerned about information disclosure quality. This article assumes signal theory also applied in China and participants of the bond market sh

43、ould be concerned about information disclosure quality. But our empirical results only support Hypothesis 2</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　債券市場參與者對信息披露質(zhì)量的關(guān)注：來自中國上市公司的證據(jù)</p><

44、p>　　Huan Luo, Changhai Yu, Ran Su</p><p><b>　　引言</b></p><p>　　盡管近幾年債券市場發(fā)展迅速，但中國債券市場仍遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)落后于股市（波特利爾，2003）[1]。作為企業(yè)信用風(fēng)險的綜合衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，企業(yè)信息披露的質(zhì)量對企業(yè)信用評級至關(guān)重要。但是，由于中國債券市場效率低下，信用評級一直受到質(zhì)疑。信息披露質(zhì)量是

45、否會影響債券信用評級水平以及信用評級機構(gòu)是否關(guān)注信息披露質(zhì)量尚無定論。此外，還沒有關(guān)于債券投資者是否關(guān)注信息披露質(zhì)量的研究。</p><p>　　高質(zhì)量的信息披露有助于解決信息不對稱問題、降低道德風(fēng)險和投機風(fēng)險。這在保護(hù)投資者利益和促進(jìn)資本市場發(fā)展方面起著非常重要的作用。然而，由于中國債券市場發(fā)展相對滯后，中國學(xué)者傾向于研究股票市場而不是債券市場。提高信息披露質(zhì)量能否降低債券融資成本尚無定論。本文探討了中國債券市

46、場參與者是否關(guān)注信息披露質(zhì)量，試圖彌補中國債券市場發(fā)展缺乏相關(guān)研究的缺陷并提出一些政策建議。</p><p><b>　　文獻(xiàn)綜述</b></p><p>　　研究信息披露最重要的兩個理論是有效市場理論和信號理論。兩種理論都認(rèn)為信息披露在資本市場中起著非常重要的作用。關(guān)于信息披露質(zhì)量與信用評級之間的關(guān)系，有一些理論和實證文獻(xiàn)研究表明，高信息披露質(zhì)量會帶來較高的信用評級

47、。目前我國尚無直接研究這種關(guān)系的文獻(xiàn)，相關(guān)研究主要集中在債券市場的信息披露狀況，信用評級是否能反映企業(yè)的財務(wù)狀況。也沒有直接的文獻(xiàn)研究信息披露質(zhì)量與債券融資成本之間的關(guān)系。相關(guān)研究主要集中在信息披露質(zhì)量與股權(quán)融資成本之間的關(guān)系，以及公司財務(wù)狀況與債券融資成本之間的關(guān)系。</p><p>　　信息披露在公司治理中起著非常重要的作用。對于內(nèi)部治理、信息披露質(zhì)量可能反映了管理控制水平;對于外部治理而言，提高披露質(zhì)量有助

48、于保護(hù)投資者利益和保持市場健康發(fā)展。高質(zhì)量的信息披露能夠在一定程度上解決信息不對稱問題，這對資本市場的有效運行是非常重要的。作為企業(yè)信用風(fēng)險的綜合衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，債券信用評級應(yīng)考慮債券發(fā)行公司的經(jīng)濟環(huán)境、行業(yè)特征、競爭態(tài)勢、管理能力和財務(wù)狀況等諸多因素。因此，公司披露的信息應(yīng)該是債券信用評級的重要來源。 巴里、布朗（1985）[2]，科爾斯和勞溫斯坦恩（1988）[3]以及克拉克森等人（1996）[4]發(fā)現(xiàn)當(dāng)投資者估計企業(yè)信用風(fēng)險時，高信息披

49、露質(zhì)量可以減少錯誤發(fā)生的幾率。 Heflin等人（2011）[5]用美國債券市場數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實證研究，檢驗信息披露質(zhì)量與信用評級之間的關(guān)系，他們發(fā)現(xiàn)信息披露質(zhì)量較高的年報信息披露較高，信用等級較高。</p><p>　　提高信息披露的質(zhì)量將有助于降低資本成本。第一個原因是信息披露質(zhì)量高會增加公司股票和債券的流動性（戴蒙德和韋爾奇，1991）[6]。 第二個原因是高信息披露質(zhì)量有利于降低投資者對未來收益的估計風(fēng)險（漢達(dá)

50、和林，1993）[7]。 Heflin等人 （2011）[5]對信息披露質(zhì)量與信用評級與美國債券市場數(shù)據(jù)之間的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了實證研究，發(fā)現(xiàn)年報披露的信息質(zhì)量越高，其債券融資成本較低。</p><p><b>　　假設(shè)</b></p><p>　　近年來，隨著中國債券市場的不斷成熟和發(fā)展，債券市場監(jiān)管越來越嚴(yán)格，投資者越來越理性，中國的信用評級體系逐步完善。多家中國主要評級

51、機構(gòu)開始與外國評級機構(gòu)合作，例如穆迪于2006年收購中國誠信信用評級集團，并于2006年完全控股。同樣在2006年，新華財經(jīng)（由美國控制）收購上海遠(yuǎn)東。 2007年，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾與上海新世紀(jì)合作，雙方也考慮合資。通過與國外評級機構(gòu)合作，中國的信用評級機構(gòu)提高了評級技術(shù)和信譽。 朱（2013）[8]發(fā)現(xiàn)2005年以后的信用評級反映了企業(yè)盈利能力、債務(wù)水平、規(guī)模因素和所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的差異。此外，信號理論也適用于中國債券市場。信息披露的質(zhì)量作為反映公

52、司治理和未來風(fēng)險的另一個信號應(yīng)該能夠得到投資者的認(rèn)可。</p><p>　　由于信息不對稱，會計信息和披露質(zhì)量往往被視為企業(yè)狀況和業(yè)績的信號。 懷德門（2000）[9]研究了自愿披露和發(fā)行股票之間的關(guān)系，發(fā)現(xiàn)自愿披露可以減少投資者和公司之間的信息不對稱。巴里和布朗（1985）[2]，科爾斯和勒溫斯坦（1988）[3]和克拉克森等人。 （1996）[4]發(fā)現(xiàn)當(dāng)投資者估計信用風(fēng)險時，高信息披露質(zhì)量可以減少錯誤。 He

53、flin等人（2011）[5]發(fā)現(xiàn)企業(yè)信息披露質(zhì)量越高，信用等級越高。</p><p>　　基于上述分析，我們認(rèn)為債券市場信用評級機構(gòu)對信息披露質(zhì)量的關(guān)注度較高。因此，我們提出了假設(shè)1。</p><p>　　假設(shè)1：企業(yè)信息披露質(zhì)量對信用評級有正面影響，信息披露質(zhì)量越高，信用等級越高。</p><p>　　假設(shè)2：企業(yè)信息披露質(zhì)量對企業(yè)債券融資成本有負(fù)面影響，信息披

54、露質(zhì)量越高，債券融資成本越低。</p><p><b>　　研究設(shè)計</b></p><p><b>　　模型和變量</b></p><p>　　由于評級機構(gòu)是按順序來排列企業(yè)信用評級，我們在實證分析中使用了排序邏輯模型（Ordered Logit）。根據(jù)之前關(guān)于信用評級的研究（埃爾頓等，2004; Perraudin和T

55、aylor，2004）[10] [11]，我們的假設(shè)1測試模型如下：</p><p>　　當(dāng)信用評級機構(gòu)對公司的信用評級時，他們也對該公司發(fā)行的債券也會進(jìn)行評級。但在中國信用評級實踐中，短期融資券的評級標(biāo)準(zhǔn)與其他類型的債券不同，因此研究往往直接使用企業(yè)信用評級，即發(fā)行企業(yè)的信用評級。本文還直接使用企業(yè)信用評級，為了使結(jié)果更加穩(wěn)健，我們還使用債券評級1作為穩(wěn)健性測試，取消了短期融資券的樣本。</p>

56、<p><b>　　實驗結(jié)果</b></p><p><b>　　描述性統(tǒng)計</b></p><p>　　信息披露質(zhì)量指數(shù)（DisSz，深圳證券交易所評分）平均為3.0932，中位數(shù)為3，最小值為2，說明債券市場發(fā)行債券的上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量高于整體平均水平。利差（利差）的平均值為-0.3215，中位數(shù)為-0.5，顯示債券融資成本低于銀

57、行貸款。債券發(fā)行企業(yè)信用評級（Credit）的平均值為3.9492，中位數(shù)為4，顯示樣本中的平均信用評級為AA。評級是債券評級（由于各種評級標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，此數(shù)據(jù)不包括短期債券），其平均值為3.4358，中位數(shù)為3，表明債券的平均評級為AA。</p><p>　　Acc質(zhì)量具有三個變量：Big 4，Conserv，VarRoe。我們注意到樣本中僅有11.30％的公司選擇Big 4來進(jìn)行財務(wù)報告審計。 Conserv的平均值

58、為0.0420，中位數(shù)為-0.0152，這意味著其報告總的來說是穩(wěn)健的，但是0.2601的偏差顯示出公司之間的巨大差異。 VarRoe收益波動相對較小;其標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差也顯示出很大的差異。我們還可以看到Roe，Size，Lev，CFO，CR，QR和LLR中的樣本有很大差異。關(guān)于公司類型，48.02％的樣本是國有的。從債券特征看，23.73％的樣本有擔(dān)保。平均債券期限為3.9442年，中位數(shù)為0.4932，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差為2.2444，表明債券期限差異巨

59、大。</p><p><b>　　回歸分析</b></p><p>　　信用評級和信息披露質(zhì)量</p><p>　　根據(jù)模型1的結(jié)果，我們可以看到Roe和規(guī)模（7.206,2.725）的系數(shù)在1％水平顯示為正，表明高盈利能力和公司規(guī)?？梢詭砀咝庞迷u級。列弗系數(shù)（-8.192）在1％水平顯示為負(fù)，顯示高負(fù)債資產(chǎn)比率會帶來低信用評級。所有這些都證

60、明信號效應(yīng)在中國債券市場確實存在，企業(yè)的財務(wù)狀況將影響其信用評級。 GDP增長系數(shù)（-0.455）在1％水平顯示為負(fù)值，表明信用評級機構(gòu)在宏觀經(jīng)濟衰退時傾向于給予較高的信用評級，這被稱為“反周期”現(xiàn)象，這與以前的研究一致。國家系數(shù)為0.935，顯示為正值，表明國有企業(yè)獲得較高的信用評級。會計信息質(zhì)量變量（Big4，Conserv和VarRoe）的系數(shù)不顯著，說明信用評級機構(gòu)并不關(guān)注會計信息質(zhì)量，這與以往的研究相沖突。 DisSz的系數(shù)不

61、顯著，表明信息披露質(zhì)量對公司信用評級沒有顯著影響，這并不支持假設(shè)1的觀點.可能有兩種解釋：一種是DisSz可能不是一個合適的指標(biāo);二是信用評級機構(gòu)往往通過各種渠道收集信息，對公司信息披露質(zhì)量不夠重視。我們會在魯棒性測試中發(fā)現(xiàn)。模型2的結(jié)果與模型1幾乎相同，只是它具有更多變量。但是，模型2也不支持假設(shè)1的觀點。</p><p><b>　　穩(wěn)健性測試</b></p><p&

62、gt;　　信息披露質(zhì)量指標(biāo)的選擇</p><p>　　考慮到深圳證券交易所的數(shù)據(jù)簡單地分為四個等級，它也不區(qū)分自愿披露和強制披露，評估指標(biāo)體系也未公布。更重要的是，這些數(shù)據(jù)并不包括在上海證券交易所上市的公司，所以可能存在一些問題。為了使結(jié)果更加健全，我們使用中國上市公司信息披露指數(shù)（北京師范大學(xué)高明華[2010]，2012年）[17] [18]作為進(jìn)行再次檢驗的指標(biāo)。 CCDI衡量信息披露的完整性（包括強制性和自

63、愿性），盡管它只有2年的數(shù)據(jù)，但涵蓋了更多的上市公司。</p><p>　　CCDI的回歸結(jié)果部分支持了本文的假設(shè)，但存在一些差異。造成這種結(jié)果的原因可能在于，雖然投資者關(guān)注公司信息披露的質(zhì)量，但通常他們不能自己評估披露質(zhì)量，因此他們經(jīng)常使用當(dāng)局的評估結(jié)果。顯然，深圳證券交易所的數(shù)據(jù)比CCDI有更大的影響力。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)論</b></p>

64、;<p>　　信息披露作為一種信號在資本市場中占有重要地位，盡管許多研究從理論和實證層面支持信號論，但中國研究者只發(fā)現(xiàn)股市參與者關(guān)注信息披露質(zhì)量。本文假設(shè)信號理論也應(yīng)用于中國，債券市場參與者應(yīng)關(guān)注信息披露質(zhì)量。但我們的實證結(jié)果僅支持假設(shè)2的觀點：發(fā)行債券的投資者和企業(yè)關(guān)注信息披露質(zhì)量，而信用評級機構(gòu)則沒有。造成這種結(jié)果的原因可能是信用評級機構(gòu)有很多渠道獲取信息，披露的信息沒有得到足夠的重視。本文的主要貢獻(xiàn)在于彌補了中國債券