環(huán)境規(guī)制與國際貿(mào)易外文翻譯

1、<p>　　1914單詞，11000英文字符,3600漢字</p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目：Environmental regulation and international trade </p><p>　　出 處：Journal of Regulatory Economics Volume 8,

2、 Number 1,61-72,DOI:10.1007/BF01066600 </p><p>　　作 者：Eftichios Sophocles Sartzetakis and Christos Constantatos </p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Environme

3、ntal regulation and international trade </p><p>　　Abstract ：In this paper, we investigate how a country's choice of environmental policy instrument affects the international competitiveness of its firms

4、. We show that in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the total marke share of firms regulated through tradeable emission permits increases relative to that of the firms operating under command and control due to better alloca

5、tion of total abatement among the firms in the country. Our work suggests that free trade situations should not only result in</p><p>　　1. Introduction</p><p>　　In recent years, increased aware

6、ness of environmental issues has made pollution control, notably the control of emissions, an important topic in public policy discussions. A commonly raised objection against emissions control is that this may impair t

7、he competitiveness of the domestic industry in international markets. In particular, it has been argued that firms operating in countries with low environmental standards will acquire substantial cost advantages over int

8、ernational competitors opera</p><p>　　Substantial literature has been devoted to the impact of environmental policy on trade patterns. The link between trade and the environment is rooted in policy rigiditie

9、s that prevent authorities from achieving first best optimality. In the absence of any restrictions on the use of environmental and trade policies, any impact the former might have on a country's terms of trade coul

10、d easily be offset by the appropriate choice of tariffs. International agreements as well as the action of domesti</p><p>　　Kennedy (1994) also considers environmental policy as the only instrument in the p

11、resence of transboundary pollution within an imperfectly competitive global environment. Rather than looking at the optimal tax level, he determines the Nash equilibrium pollution taxes and shows that strategic interacti

12、on between countries results to equilibrium taxes that are lower than what is globally efficient. Finally, Copeland (1994) recognizes the possibility of restrictions on the use of both environmental</p><p>　

13、　In this paper, we deal with the impact of environmental policy on trade patterns. Our work differs from the aforementioned papers in that, instead of focusing on the level of environmental standards, we concentrate on

14、the impact of the type of regulatory regime on a country's international competitiveness. This particular focus is motivated by the following observations. First, the fact that some countries have already adopted &qu

15、ot;incentive based" regulatory policy instruments--namely taxes and tr</p><p>　　Even in a context of differing environmental standards, the impact of differing regimes on international competitiveness s

16、hould not be neglected. As we show, for large differences in abatement technology, a more efficient regulatory regime may yield an advantage substantial enough to outweigh any trade disadvantage stemming from a more stri

17、ngent environmental regulation. Thus, the country with the more efficient regulatory regime can either increase its international market share or afford a be</p><p>　　Among the various regulatory instrument

18、s, Pigouvian taxes, tradeable emission permits (TEP), and command and control (CAC) are the most commonly used. The equivalence of emission taxes and permits, when there are no transaction costs or imperfections in the p

19、ermit market and the regulator has full information, is well established in the literature. While Pigouvian taxes are used mainly in Europe, there is an increasing interest in North America in the use of tradeable permit

20、s as an alternative t</p><p>　　In this paper, we consider two countries imposing the same environmental standards through different regulatory regimes and examine the potential effects of this asymmetry on t

21、rade patterns. More specifically, we are interested in finding whether the adoption of any specific regime might help a country's industry to increase its share in international markets. </p><p>　　The p

22、aper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the main model in the absence of regulation; sections 3 and 4 derive the reaction functions of the firms under a CAC and a TEP regulation, respectively; and section 5 ana

23、lyses the free-trade equilibrium under the simultaneous presence of both regulatory regimes. Section 6 contains the concluding remarks. Most proofs have been abbreviated with more details provided in the corresponding a

24、ppendices.</p><p>　　6. Conclusions</p><p>　　We investigate how a country's choice of environmental policy instrument affects the international competitiveness of firms in that country. We s

25、how that in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the total market share of firms regulated through a TEP system increases relative to that of the firms operating under a CAC system. This is due to the fact that a TEP system bette

26、r allocates total abatement among the firms in the country. The advantage of a TEP system becomes more pronounced as the diversity of</p><p>　　The advantage of TEP regulations must be qualified for the comp

27、etitive emission permit market assumption. Hanh (1984) has shown that in autarky, when the industry is competitive, a non-competitive permit market result in efficiency losses, but remains more efficien than a CAC system

28、. Further, Sartzetakis (1993) fias shown that a CAC regulation may be welfare superior to a non-competitive permits market when the industry is also non-competitive. These results indicate that the advantage of a TEP <

29、;/p><p>　　Background：State Environmentalism</p><p>　　Among other things the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and related national environmental legislation were born out of the concern that the

30、patchwork of diverse state environmental standards evolving in the early 1970s would wreak havoc on interstate commerce and create competitive disadvantages for states striving to improve environmental quality. National

31、environmental legislation was expected to level the playing field.</p><p>　　Although national environmental policies have certainly raised the minimum level of environmental standards, three decades later ve

32、ry important differences in state environmental policies remain, as anyone who works in business or industry can attest. Federal laws notwithstanding, state regulations governing hazardous waste disposal, wetlands fillin

33、g, air and water pollution, and wildlife protection vary considerably between Louisiana and Massachusetts, Mississippi and New Jersey, and Idaho and </p><p>　　Some of these differences can be explained in te

34、rms of “need.” The more heavily industrialized and urbanized states have more serious environmental problems and hence require more stringent controls. Other differences can be attributed to variations in state politic

35、al cultures. Sagebrush states, for example, tend to reflect the “l(fā)eave people be” attitude of their residents.</p><p>　　Regardless of what may explain these differences tabulating and comparing the characte

36、ristics of environmental policies among the states produces an interesting snapshot of the relative degree of “environmentalism” among the states. TABLE 1 lists the states in order, starting with those with the weakest e

37、nvironmental policies and moving down to the strongest, for 1982 and 1990. A detailed description of the precise method for deriving the scores underlying these listings is not important for our</p><p>　　Wha

38、t is important is that the listings are intuitive: the states that most of us would guess as having the most stringent environmental regulations appear near the bottom of the list. Those that we would imagine to have le

39、ss rigorous standards are found near the top. This is essential for the analysis to be credible. Environmentalists, politicians, business and industry must "feel" comfortable that the correct comparisons are b

40、eing made. If, for example, New Jersey were scored as have weak en</p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p><b>　　環(huán)境規(guī)制與國際貿(mào)易</b></p><p>　　摘要：從本文中，我們得知一個國家的環(huán)境政策工具會影響該國公司的

41、國際競爭力。我們使用古諾—納什均衡分析表明，在市場調(diào)節(jié)下公司通過分享排放許可能夠減少溫室氣體排放總量，這歸功于公司的優(yōu)秀的經(jīng)營和指導。我們的研究還表明在自由貿(mào)易狀況下，不僅會產(chǎn)生相類似的環(huán)境標準，而且還會有類似的監(jiān)督管理體制變化。而在加拿大的環(huán)保部門正在考慮緊跟美國的腳步而提起一項貿(mào)易排放許可機制的行為就不足為奇了。</p><p><b>　　一、說明</b></p><

42、;p>　　近年來，隨著民眾環(huán)境保護意識的加強，污染控制問題，特別是控制排放的問題，已成為一個公共政策討論的重要課題。一個大家普遍對排放控制這一有好處的政策提出的不同看法就是不得損害國內(nèi)產(chǎn)業(yè)在國際市場上的競爭力。特別是對，在國家環(huán)保標準較低的國家運行與利用巨大的成本優(yōu)勢在國家環(huán)保標準更高的國家的運行的公司而言。甚至已經(jīng)有些學者表示，有些國家可能成為“污染天堂”以犧牲環(huán)境為代價來吸引那些低環(huán)境標準的企業(yè)，比如，Markusen 等（1

43、993）。但是早在Leonard(1988)和Tobey(1989,1990)的實證研究就認為環(huán)境標準上的差異其實并沒有顯著的影響貿(mào)易的格局；而最近Lucas等(1992)的研究表明，本文所提出的環(huán)境規(guī)制對于國際貿(mào)易的影響可能是起關鍵作用的。 </p><p>　　一些實際應用型的文獻一直致力于尋找環(huán)境政策影響貿(mào)易模式之間的關系，貿(mào)易和環(huán)境關系主要取決于政策，這也是當局的最優(yōu)預防污染方法。在缺乏相關的限制而使用環(huán)

44、境和貿(mào)易的政策，任何的一個影響都有可能使某個國家的貿(mào)易條件有選擇性的抵消稅收。國際協(xié)議以及國內(nèi)游說組織的作用，也在事實上成為了限制貿(mào)易/環(huán)保政策關系的工具。Baumol 和Oates(1988)還有Markusen(1975)考慮在行使環(huán)境政策或者是檢查必要關稅后所產(chǎn)生的環(huán)境問題。Krutilla（1991）和Markusen(1975)則認為在國際貿(mào)易協(xié)議中限制使用關稅以進行環(huán)境監(jiān)管的條例中，唯一可行的措施就是來自外國。在考慮這些所有

45、情況的條件下，發(fā)現(xiàn)這些關稅或者是綠色稅收可能會高于或比最高的水平略低。</p><p>　　Kennedy(1994)也認為環(huán)境政策在一個在不完全競爭的全球環(huán)境下比調(diào)查跨國界污染更能夠評測也更適合政府的支出水平，它決定于納什均衡曲線，調(diào)查表明了，污染稅在國與國之間的相互作用，平衡稅款對于全球環(huán)境多是有效的。最后，Copelan(1994)承認使用限制于環(huán)境和貿(mào)易政策這些條件工具對于政策的逐漸改革是一種實質(zhì)上的進步

46、。他的作用強調(diào)的是協(xié)調(diào)貿(mào)易與污染政策，以避免進一步打破政策改革可能更加容易分配污染排放配額，但明顯不是稅收制度起的作用。他也發(fā)現(xiàn)，國際因素的流動性其實主要得益于污染政策的改革。</p><p>　　在本文中，我們主要處理的是環(huán)境規(guī)制對于各國貿(mào)易政策模式的影響。我們的工作與上述文件是不盡相同的，我們并不專注于環(huán)保的水平而是重點在環(huán)保的要求上，以及對一個國家的國際競爭力還有對其監(jiān)管體制的類型影響。這些特別關注主要來源

47、于以下的觀察。首先，這一事實，有些國家已經(jīng)批準了“以激勵為基礎的”政策監(jiān)管工具——也就是說稅收與排放許可應具有可交易性——顯然別人也是在這個方向上進行相關工作的，以期能指揮與控制收益水平大小。第二，環(huán)保標準發(fā)展中國家往往與發(fā)達國家并不是明顯不同的，看Cropper和Oates(1992)，由于類似的環(huán)境偏好保護或國際協(xié)議就形成了標準的相似性。關于后者，有人說是因為環(huán)境保護意識的增強與國家更加嚴格的規(guī)定，自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定將不再是可以做到忽視環(huán)

48、境問題的程度了，需要對寬松的環(huán)境標準加強管制以代替國際協(xié)議中合同仲裁法規(guī)。因此，在當前趨勢下，有些國家在面對嚴格的污染標準時有可能出現(xiàn)貿(mào)易自由化的副作用。不過，沒有明顯的理由去評價國際協(xié)議為什么應當加強參與國的任何特定監(jiān)管制度。</p><p>　　甚至在同一個國家也有不同的環(huán)保要求，對不同的政權影響國際競爭力是不可忽視的影響。如上面所說，因為減少溫室氣體排放技術的國與國，地區(qū)與地區(qū)之間的巨大差異，更有效的監(jiān)管體

49、制所帶來的優(yōu)勢會給貿(mào)易帶來更大的收益。因此，更加有效的國家監(jiān)管制度可以使你占有更多國家市場份額或者至少使沒有一家公司因為環(huán)保問題而在國際競爭中處于劣勢。</p><p>　　在眾多的監(jiān)督管理工具中，皮古稅收、可交易排放許可（TEP），監(jiān)管與控制系統(tǒng)（CAC）三者是最常用的。在沒有交易成本或者是不完善的許可證市場里，監(jiān)管機構有著的相似的允許排放稅率，這些都是建立在數(shù)據(jù)之上的。在皮古稅應用于歐洲時，人們卻越來越關注北

50、美使用許可證替代越來越廣泛的CAC規(guī)定。本文摘要政府鼓勵使用排放許可證作為具有代表性的基礎工具。許多研究試圖在一個封閉的經(jīng)濟中評估福利系統(tǒng)的優(yōu)缺點來進行比較靜力學研究，比如Malueg（1990），Copeland(1990),Sartzetakis(1993)都是這種想法。然而，沒有什么工具能夠完全檢測同時使用不同類型的國際貿(mào)易環(huán)境規(guī)制。</p><p>　　在本文中，我們通過不同的管理制度，相對兩國相同的管理

51、制度來考慮，還能檢查非對稱貿(mào)易模式下二者的潛在影響。更確切的說，我們對于一些具體采用這些措施的政權是否有助于一個國家的工業(yè)，增加其在國際市場的份額。</p><p>　　本文摘要組織如下：第二節(jié)描述了缺乏調(diào)節(jié)的主要模式；第三和第四節(jié)則反映了在模型狀態(tài)下的公司和TEP的規(guī)定，并進行分析；第五節(jié)是自由貿(mào)易平衡下兩種管理制度同時存在。第六部分作為結(jié)束語。大多數(shù)數(shù)據(jù)被縮寫以提供更多的細節(jié)都在附錄之中。</p>

52、<p><b>　　六、總結(jié)</b></p><p>　　我們研究一個國家環(huán)境政策工具對于該國的國際企業(yè)競爭力的影響。分析表明，在古諾—納什均衡中，占總的市場份額的公司通過TEP調(diào)節(jié)系統(tǒng)相對于增加公司的CAC系統(tǒng)的運行更有效。由于這些事實，分配系統(tǒng)應將具有良好基礎的TEP總減排企業(yè)放置在欠發(fā)達國家。但是由于國家內(nèi)部多種多樣的減少溫室氣體排放的技術TEP的系統(tǒng)優(yōu)勢會變得更加明顯，

53、這些實現(xiàn)了CAC規(guī)定的增長。對大型公司不同的差異減排成本，已經(jīng)確定了那些環(huán)境法規(guī)帶來增量的國家，當然這是為了實現(xiàn)一個相對于私人規(guī)制的TEP情況而言的。研究顯示，自由貿(mào)易情況不僅會產(chǎn)生相似的環(huán)保標準，還能出現(xiàn)相類似的監(jiān)督管理體制的變化。針對上述結(jié)果，導致加拿大環(huán)保部門認真考慮并隨著美國提出的環(huán)境規(guī)制的排污系統(tǒng)標準的這一現(xiàn)象是一致的。</p><p>　　市場假設TEP的規(guī)范優(yōu)勢必然能夠勝過排放許可證的競爭優(yōu)勢。Ha

54、nh(1984)已經(jīng)表明，在自給自足的市場中，這個行業(yè)的競爭力，允許非競爭性市場的效率損失，但仍然會比CAC系統(tǒng)更有效率。此外，Sartzetakis(1993)還大膽的表示CAC 法規(guī)的福利是因為在非競爭性市場允許中，工業(yè)也變得毫無競爭能力。這些結(jié)論表示，作為TEP系統(tǒng)是可以有效增加在更多政策存在不完善地方的市場上的優(yōu)勢的。</p><p><b>　　背景：國家環(huán)保主義</b></

55、p><p>　　除了上述原因之外，空氣清潔法案、潔凈水資源法案，以及其他相關國家環(huán)境立法的出現(xiàn)是由于擔心于二十世紀七十年代早期那個簡單將不同國家環(huán)境規(guī)制法案修改、拼湊在一起的環(huán)境法案會對各個州之間的商貿(mào)往來還有各州的環(huán)境質(zhì)量造成破壞。并且國家環(huán)境立法還是為了對各州競賽的水平進行合理評價。</p><p>　　盡管國家環(huán)境政策的確提高了環(huán)境標準的最低限度，就像那些在工商業(yè)或者制造業(yè)中的工作人員能

56、夠證明的一樣，三十年后作用最為明顯的區(qū)別主要原因還是在于對于國家環(huán)境政策是否能夠堅持。雖然在聯(lián)邦法律之中，國家對于危險物品的處置、濕地的利用、空氣污染與水體污染、野生動植物保護有嚴格規(guī)定，但是實際上這些法規(guī)在路易斯安那州、馬薩諸塞州、密西西比州還有新澤西州愛荷達州、加利福尼亞州執(zhí)行的力度相差比較大。</p><p>　　這些差異的有些事可以解釋為“所必須需要的”。州的工業(yè)化和城市化程度越高那么環(huán)境問題越嚴重，所以

57、這是需要嚴格控制的。差別其實主要可以歸結(jié)在國家政治文化上。比如在Sagebrush州，人們就對“遠離大都市”有著不同的態(tài)度。</p><p>　　任何東西都可以解釋這些比較指標還有各州環(huán)境政策之間的差異與特點，那樣的話，無論對“環(huán)保主義”與各州之間的關聯(lián)度都是個有趣的反映。下表1列出了以各州為基礎的數(shù)據(jù)，將從1982年到1990年之間的最嚴格的環(huán)境政策到執(zhí)行力度最差的環(huán)境政策的所有州做了一個排名。對于我們的目標而

58、言，詳盡準確描述的方法從而產(chǎn)生衍生分數(shù)的潛力排名是不重要的。從數(shù)據(jù)來源上來說，每個州的得分大約來自于二十項環(huán)境政策指標的收集，例如：濕地政策、危險品處理蒸菜，還有非點源性環(huán)境污染政策。我們是對每一個領域進行評分，然后最終總結(jié)得到最終成績。因為從1982年到1990年的排名是因為在每個制表者是利用各自不同的統(tǒng)計方法還有統(tǒng)計范圍進行評價的，所以我們減去了相關系列的均值并除以標準差，從而進行更有意義的分數(shù)比較。因此，在變化中的環(huán)境評分單位代表

59、了各州在前十名左右的近似排名（由弱到強的環(huán)境政策執(zhí)行力），是以“均值”狀態(tài)（即州排名到25為止）。另一個單元在環(huán)境評分中上升，將土地歸國家排名那將到約四十位。所以，對環(huán)境的差異分別是兩個單位的距離，并且是從排名前十的州中尋找到執(zhí)行力最強的環(huán)境政策的州還有最弱的州。</p><p>　　重要的是，這些表格上所列出的是符合事實情況的，我們當中的絕大多數(shù)人都想會有最嚴格的環(huán)境法規(guī)那樣就會使他們出現(xiàn)在列表的底部。那些我們