外文翻譯---內(nèi)部控制信息的弱點(diǎn)和不確定性

1、<p>　　2120單詞，12700英文字符，4040漢字</p><p>　　出處：M.D.Beneish, M.Billings, L.Hodder. Internal Control Weaknesses and Information, Uncertainty Kelley School of Business ,Indiana University,2005.</p><p

2、><b>　　原文一：</b></p><p>　　Internal Control Weaknesses and Information Uncertainty </p><p><b>　　Abstract </b></p><p>　　Using a sample of 336 firms making rep

3、orts required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we examine the effect of mandated internal control weaknesses disclosures on information uncertainty for disclosing firms and for size- and performance-matched non-disclosing firm

4、s. We find a significantly negative (weakly positive) price response for disclosing (non-disclosing) firms consistent with resolution of information uncertainty in both groups. For disclosing firms we find that the negat

5、ive market response to</p><p>　　Introduction </p><p>　　Recent accounting scandals have led to increased interest into the determinants and consequences of low financial reporting quality. A seri

6、es of congressional inquiries into the integrity of financial reporting systems in the United States culminated with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. Among other provisions, SOX requires firms to iden

7、tify and disclose material weaknesses in internal controls over financial reporting. One potential effect of these disclosures is a reduction</p><p>　　In this paper, we focus on the market response to mandat

8、ed disclosures that provide information about the credibility of firms’ financial reporting systems. First, we measure abnormal returns over the three-day window surrounding the disclosure event to determine whether the

9、 market response to disclosing (non-disclosing) firms is consistent with an increase (decrease) in perceived information uncertainty. Second, we examine factors expected to exacerbate or mitigate the market response to

10、the </p><p>　　restatements and previous signals of low earnings quality. Third, we perform two tests to determine whether the negative market response is consistent with higher perceived information risk. S

11、pecifically, we evaluate whether the market’s response to earnings announcements declines when weaknesses are disclosed, consistent with lower perceived informativeness of earnings. We also evaluate whether abnormal tra

12、ding volume increases with disclosure, consistent with greater information uncertainty </p><p>　　Our study contributes to three important streams of research. The first is how the quality of financial discl

13、osures affects the capital markets. Prior research has been subject to limited availability of meaningful proxies for financial reporting quality. For example, Botosan (1997) and Botosan and Plumlee (2002) provide some

14、 evidence that the quantity of disclosures is negatively associated with the cost of equity for firms with low analyst following. However, inferences are limited to the </p><p>　　documentation of disproport

15、ionately negative reactions to financial report restatements is consistent with the pricing of increased information uncertainty (Hribar and Jenkins, 2004, Palmrose et al., 2004). However, restatement announcements conf

16、ound information about future financial performance with information about the credibility of the firm’s financial reporting system. In </p><p>　　contrast, our setting allows us to evaluate the capital mark

17、et effects of disclosures directly targeted at the quality of individual firm’s financial reporting system separately from disclosures about financial performance. </p><p>　　Our study also contributes to res

18、earch that investigates how auditor attestation affects the perceived credibility of financial reporting systems. Teoh and Wong (1993) finds that firms engaging high quality auditors have higher earnings response coeffic

19、ients. Becker et al. (1998) finds that firms engaging high quality auditors have lower discretionary accruals. However, these results are consistent either with the selection of high quality auditors by high quality firm

20、s, or with the engagement o</p><p>　　setting allows us to examine the marginal effect of auditor type on the market reaction to an uncertainty-increasing event. Finding a positive effect of audit quality on

21、 information uncertainty in this setting is consistent with the engagement of high-quality auditors resulting in higher actual or perceived financial reporting quality. </p><p>　　Finally, our paper con

22、tributes to the stream of research assessing the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley provisions on the financial reporting environment, for which results have been mixed. Li et al. (2004) and Jain and Rezaee (2003) document a posi

23、tive market reaction to the regulatory proposals culminating with the passage of SOX, consistent with SOX having a net beneficial effect on the quality of financial reporting. Consistent with these results, Jain et al. (

24、2004) finds that information uncertain</p><p>　　Our paper contains the following results. First, we find a significantly negative (weakly positive) price response for disclosing (non-disclosing) firms consis

25、tent with resolution of information uncertainty in both groups. Second, for disclosing firms we find that the negative market response to disclosure is exacerbated by conditions associated with higher inherent reporting

26、 risk, including auditor turnover and high-risk industry membership. However, we find that the negative market response t</p><p>　　we find that the negative market reaction for disclosing firms is dampened w

27、hen the firm’s previously reported earnings have an abnormally high accruals component. This result is consistent with the disclosure having lower information content when poor earnings quality has already been conveyed

28、by high abnormal accruals. </p><p>　　The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide background on SOX and discuss previous literature examining information risk. In Section

29、3 we describe our hypotheses and research design. In section 4 we describe our sample and provide descriptive statistics. We present results in Section 5, and additional analyses in Section 6. Section 7 contains a summa

30、ry and our conclusions. </p><p>　　Background and prior research Background and prior research </p><p>　　2.1 Regulation of internal accounting controls </p><p>　　The Securities Ac

31、ts of 1933 and 1934 give the Securities and Exchange Commission little authority over firms’ operational matters or their internal accounting controls. Hence, regulatory oversight over firms’ internal controls results fr

32、om subsequent legislation enacted, generally in response to accounting scandals. The passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) in 1979 marks the first legislative effort to instill investor confidence in the

33、quality of financial reporting by providin</p><p>　　Regulatory authority over internal accounting controls is expanded by the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (“FDICIA”)

34、in 1991 in response to the large number of bank failures in the 1980s. In addition to requiring banks to establish and maintain a documented system of internal controls, pioneering provisions of FDICIA called for banks

35、to assess and report on the adequacy of their internal controls, and for these controls to be subjected to independent audit.</p><p>　　The consequence of well-publicized accounting scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxl

36、ey Act of 2002 (“SOX”) expands the scope of regulatory oversight over internal controls to all public companies (rather that simply financial institutions), and relative to FDICIA, introduces new provisions emphasizing t

37、he certification and testing of internal controls by management and independent auditors. In particular, SOX significantly changes the information environment by providing for the establishment, maintenance a</p>

38、<p>　　Significant new reporting requirements for public companies and their independent auditors are summarized in Figure 1. Among the new requirements are Sections 302 and 404, which focus on internal control over

39、 financial reporting. Section 302, Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports, requires CEOs and CFOs to certify in the company’s quarterly and annual reports that: </p><p>　　? they reviewed the report,

40、 </p><p>　　? the report contains no misrepresentations, </p><p>　　? the financial information is fairly presented, </p><p>　　? they have reported any internal control weaknesses (in

41、cluding fraud) to the audit committee, and, </p><p>　　? they have reported any material changes in internal controls. </p><p>　　Under Section 404, Enhanced Financial Disclosures, Management As

42、sessment of Internal Controls, both management and the company’s independent auditor have increased responsibility with respect to internal controls. Specifically, Section 404 requires management to issue an “internal c

43、ontrol report” in which they take responsibility for maintaining adequate internal controls and make assertions concerning their effectiveness. The company’s auditor then must issue a separate opinion on management’s<

44、/p><p>　　2.2 Prior research </p><p>　　Our analyses of the information conveyed by disclosures of material weaknesses are related to three streams of research. The first includes research that in

45、vestigates the market effects of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 to assess whether the Act and its financial statement certification provisions are effective in reducing uncertainty about the quality of fir

46、ms’ financial reporting. Li et al. (2004) and Jain and Rezaee (2003) document a positive market reaction to the regulatory</p><p>　　In contrast to these studies that evaluate the aggregate market effects of

47、 actual and perceived regulatory intervention associated with the passage of SOX, our setting enables us to examine the implications for individual firms of the implementation of a specific provision of the Act: the rece

48、ntly binding requirement to disclose material weaknesses.</p><p>　　A second body of research investigates how auditor characteristics and auditor actions affect the perceived credibility of financial reporti

49、ng systems.For example, Teoh and Wong (1993) finds that firms engaging “BIG” auditors (a proxy for high quality auditors) have higher earnings response coefficients, and Becker et al. (1998) finds that firms engaging su

50、ch auditors have lower discretionary accruals.The direction of causality is not clear from these studies. Firms with high quality financial </p><p>　　1)Examine the marginal effect of auditor type on the mark

51、et reaction to an uncertainty-increasing event. Finding a positive effect of audit quality on information uncertainty while controlling for market perception of firms’ earnings quality is consistent with the engagemen

52、t of high-quality auditors resulting in higher actual or perceived financial reporting quality. </p><p>　　Assess the information content of disclosures of internal control weaknesses both independently from

53、auditor resignations, and for a wider range of control weaknesses.</p><p>　　The final stream of research to which we contribute attempts to document a connection between earnings quality and the stock market

54、 response to earnings or cost of capital.Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) finds results consistent with the prediction that firms can reduce the cost of capital by increasing the precision of information, and Easley a

55、nd O’Hara, (2004) shows that uncertainty about valuation parameters can affect firms’ costs of capital. Development of this line of inquiry has bee</p><p><b>　　譯文一：</b></p><p>　　內(nèi)部

56、控制信息的弱點(diǎn)和不確定性</p><p>　　根據(jù)“薩班斯-奧克斯利法案”，我們研究調(diào)查了336家公司并做了一份報(bào)告，我們分析研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：內(nèi)部控制對(duì)信息公開性公司的披露具有信息不確定性，同時(shí)，它也不能披露信息非公開性公司的公司規(guī)模、公司的運(yùn)行狀況等更多的不確定信息。在我們調(diào)查研究的兩個(gè)小組中，當(dāng)公司的決議信息表現(xiàn)出不確定性時(shí)，會(huì)通過市場產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格波動(dòng)來反應(yīng)披露的信息。在披露的公司過程中，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)市場的消極的反應(yīng)會(huì)加

57、劇一些高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行業(yè)的行情，這其中包括審計(jì)師以及高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的行業(yè)會(huì)員。然而，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，當(dāng)公司聘用了高素質(zhì)的審計(jì)人才時(shí)，市場的消極反應(yīng)披露的影響是緩和的。除此之外，我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)當(dāng)公司前期報(bào)告的收益中有明顯的不正常增值部分時(shí)，市場的消極反應(yīng)披露也是減弱的。較差的盈余質(zhì)量帶來的不正常的高收益，這樣的結(jié)果與信息披露的內(nèi)容是一致的。</p><p><b>　　引言</b></p><p&g

58、t;　　最近的會(huì)計(jì)業(yè)丑聞，使人們?cè)絹碓疥P(guān)注導(dǎo)致較低的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告質(zhì)量的重要因素和結(jié)果。美國國會(huì)通過對(duì)一系列關(guān)于財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告制度的調(diào)查，最終在2002年通過了薩班斯-奧克斯利法案（SOX）。除了其他規(guī)定外，薩班斯-奧克斯利法案要求企業(yè)能夠甄別和披露對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的內(nèi)部控制方面出現(xiàn)的弱點(diǎn)。這些披露的潛在效果就是減少市場的信息的不確定性。Easley和O’Hara在2004年的研究報(bào)告中表明，信息的不確定性對(duì)于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資者來說可能是一個(gè)不可分散的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素。

59、因此，監(jiān)管作為一種降低系統(tǒng)信息風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的有效手段不僅可以減少平均成本而且可以促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長。</p><p>　　在本文中，我們把重點(diǎn)放在那些在市場信息變化時(shí)，能夠可靠真實(shí)地披露財(cái)報(bào)告信息的公司的披露。首先，我們通過對(duì)為期三天的調(diào)查研究披露信息得出的數(shù)據(jù)報(bào)告，以確定在市場信息變化時(shí)公司披露反應(yīng)的信息是否與我們感性預(yù)測的信息不確定性是否一致。第二，我們調(diào)查的原因包括審計(jì)質(zhì)量、行業(yè)成員資格、審計(jì)師的收入、僅限于先前的較低的

60、信息質(zhì)量收入，預(yù)期將加劇或緩解市場反應(yīng)披露。第三，我們將執(zhí)行兩個(gè)測試，以確定消極的市場反應(yīng)是否符合較高的信息風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。特別來說，當(dāng)有資料顯示缺陷的披露缺陷與較低的收入并存時(shí)時(shí)，我們?cè)u(píng)估市場的反應(yīng)對(duì)收入公告是否會(huì)下降。我們也評(píng)估隨著信息披露，異常交易量的增長是否與公司披露的信息的不確定性并存。</p><p>　　我們的研究促成了三個(gè)重要方面的理論。第一是財(cái)務(wù)狀況披露的質(zhì)量如何影響資本市場。以前的研究一直受到提供有意義

61、的代理財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告質(zhì)量的限制。例如， Botosan和Botosan、Plumlee分別在1997和2002年提供了一些證據(jù)表明消極地披露的數(shù)量是與股權(quán)融資成本低的公司相關(guān)的。然而，在某種程度上，披露數(shù)量而不是披露質(zhì)量的推論是有限的。同樣地，Hribar、Jenkins和Palmrose 等研究者在2004指出不均衡地消極的反應(yīng)對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告重述的文獻(xiàn)是否與定價(jià)增加信息的不確定性并存。然而，再聲明公告迷惑了關(guān)于未來財(cái)政業(yè)績的信息和公司的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告

62、系統(tǒng)的可信度的信息。相比之下，我們所做的研究使我們能夠準(zhǔn)確評(píng)估直接披露對(duì)資本市場和財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告制度的影響。</p><p>　　我們的課題同樣有助于研究調(diào)查審計(jì)師的證詞是如何對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告系統(tǒng)的可信度產(chǎn)生影響的。1993年，Teoh 和Wong 發(fā)現(xiàn)公司聘請(qǐng)高質(zhì)量的審計(jì)師時(shí)會(huì)帶來較高盈余響應(yīng)系數(shù)。1998年，Becker等研究者發(fā)現(xiàn)公司雇傭高品質(zhì)的審計(jì)師會(huì)引起較低的盈余管理。然而，這些結(jié)果既符合高端公司對(duì)高品質(zhì)的審計(jì)師的

63、選擇，也符合公司雇傭高品質(zhì)的審計(jì)師時(shí)會(huì)帶來較高的盈余質(zhì)量。相比之下，在我們研究的背景下，可以審查審計(jì)類型的邊際效應(yīng)在市場反應(yīng)上，對(duì)增加不確定性事件的影響。在信息的不確定性上尋找到一種積極的審計(jì)品質(zhì)，在這種狀態(tài)下與聘請(qǐng)高品質(zhì)審計(jì)師會(huì)帶來比預(yù)期更高的更真實(shí)的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告質(zhì)量是一致的。</p><p>　　最后，我們的這篇文章對(duì)評(píng)估薩班斯—奧克斯利法案給財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告環(huán)境造成了影響，但是這些成果被混淆了。在2003年和2004年

64、，Li和ain 、Rezaee 都證明了積極的市場發(fā)應(yīng)使薩班斯—奧克斯利法案中的監(jiān)管建議通過了，并且對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的質(zhì)量起到有利的影響。Jain等研究者在2004年發(fā)現(xiàn)信息的不確定性在買賣差價(jià)降低上體現(xiàn)出來，延伸降低了對(duì)薩班斯—奧克斯利法案的，這些結(jié)果與前面的是一致的。相比之下，Cohen 等研究者在2004年發(fā)現(xiàn)薩班斯—奧克斯利法案通過后，盈余信息質(zhì)量沒有發(fā)生任何變化，Bhattacharya在2002年并沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)重大的市場反應(yīng)對(duì)首席執(zhí)行

65、官和首席財(cái)務(wù)官的有資格認(rèn)證要求。每一項(xiàng)這些研究主要涉及平均信息環(huán)境的變化，但是在2002年，Bhattacharya 等研究者僅僅是對(duì)此進(jìn)行猜測而不是依據(jù)薩班斯—奧克斯利法案直接執(zhí)行。與之相比較，我們的研究是以薩班斯—奧克斯利法案為原理，側(cè)重于對(duì)公司的不確定信息進(jìn)行披露形成報(bào)告質(zhì)量。因此，我們的分析可以披露重大個(gè)人影響，以致達(dá)到總數(shù)上的平衡，而且具有強(qiáng)大的潛力。</p><p>　　本文的結(jié)論有以下幾個(gè)方面。首先

66、，在我們調(diào)查研究的兩個(gè)小組中，當(dāng)公司的決議信息表現(xiàn)出不確定性時(shí)，會(huì)通過市場產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格波動(dòng)來反應(yīng)披露的信息。其次，在披露的公司中，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)消極的市場反應(yīng)披露更是加劇了較高的固有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)報(bào)告，包括審計(jì)師收入及高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的行業(yè)會(huì)員。然而，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，當(dāng)公司有高質(zhì)量的審計(jì)師時(shí)，消極的市場反應(yīng)披露會(huì)減輕。最后，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)當(dāng)公司前期報(bào)告的收益中有明顯的不正常增值部分時(shí)消極的市場反應(yīng)披露會(huì)減弱。較差的盈余質(zhì)量帶來不正常的高收益，這樣的結(jié)果與信息披露的內(nèi)容相關(guān)。&

67、lt;/p><p>　　本文的其他組成部分如下：在薩班斯—奧克斯利法案的背景下我們將在下個(gè)部分對(duì)前人的文獻(xiàn)討論研究信息風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。在第三部分，探討我們的假設(shè)和研究設(shè)計(jì)。在第四節(jié)我們介紹樣片并提供統(tǒng)計(jì)說明。在第五部分提出結(jié)果，第六部分進(jìn)行分析，第七部分提出總結(jié)并作出結(jié)論。</p><p><b>　　研究背景</b></p><p>　　2.1內(nèi)部控制的監(jiān)

68、管</p><p>　　《1933年證券法》和1934年的《證券交易法》，具體規(guī)范了上市公司的業(yè)務(wù)事項(xiàng)和內(nèi)部控制。因此，為了監(jiān)管企業(yè)的內(nèi)部控制，針對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)丑聞隨后頒布了相應(yīng)的法律。1979年通過了《反海外賄賂法》（簡稱FCPA），這個(gè)法案最先的成果就是增進(jìn)了投資者在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告質(zhì)量上的信心，并提供內(nèi)部會(huì)計(jì)控制的管理標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。反海外賄賂法案要求發(fā)行人“在保持書籍、記錄和帳戶的合理詳細(xì)方面，能夠準(zhǔn)確、公正地反映發(fā)行人的財(cái)產(chǎn)

69、的交易和處置”。雖然這些規(guī)定是在建立和維護(hù)一個(gè)有效的內(nèi)部控制制度，F(xiàn)CPA提供了沒有任何實(shí)質(zhì)性的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，在缺少指控犯罪行為的證據(jù)的情況下，我們對(duì)其采取強(qiáng)制措施是沒有法律依據(jù)的。</p><p>　　20世紀(jì)80年代成千上萬的銀行破產(chǎn)，于是監(jiān)管當(dāng)局?jǐn)U大了會(huì)計(jì)內(nèi)部控制的，在1991年通過了《美國聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄保險(xiǎn)公司改進(jìn)法案》（簡稱“FDICIA”）。此外，還要求銀行建立并保持具有文件夾管理模式的內(nèi)部控制系統(tǒng)，具有開創(chuàng)性的聯(lián)

70、邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司改進(jìn)法案還要求銀行評(píng)估和報(bào)告其內(nèi)部控制是否足夠以及確定內(nèi)部控制是不是處于獨(dú)立審計(jì)的狀態(tài)。</p><p>　　眾所周知的會(huì)計(jì)丑聞使《2002薩班斯法案》（“SOX”）的監(jiān)督管理范圍擴(kuò)大到了所有上市公司的內(nèi)部控制（而不是簡單的金融機(jī)構(gòu)），相對(duì)與FDICIA而言，SOX提出了新的規(guī)定，通過管理者和獨(dú)立審計(jì)人員要進(jìn)行重點(diǎn)突出認(rèn)證和內(nèi)部控制測試。特別是SOX，其要求在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中提供環(huán)境信息的建立，維護(hù)和定期

71、認(rèn)證公開內(nèi)部控制這些顯著變化，并要求公司在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中公開披露內(nèi)部控制的本質(zhì)和缺陷。</p><p>　　上市公司及獨(dú)立審計(jì)師對(duì)最新的報(bào)告要求作了總結(jié)。在SOX302和SOX404這兩個(gè)新的條款中，其中重點(diǎn)都集中在財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的內(nèi)部控制上。</p><p>　　條款303中公司負(fù)責(zé)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告要求CEO和CFO在公司的季度和年度報(bào)告證明如下：他們要審查報(bào)告，報(bào)告內(nèi)容沒有虛假成分，財(cái)務(wù)信息是公開披露的

72、，他們對(duì)審計(jì)委員會(huì)報(bào)告內(nèi)部控制的任何缺陷（包括欺詐）和內(nèi)部控制的任何本質(zhì)變化。</p><p>　　條款404中，加強(qiáng)財(cái)務(wù)披露，內(nèi)部控制管理評(píng)估，管理者和公司的獨(dú)立審計(jì)師增加對(duì)內(nèi)部控制的責(zé)任。尤其是404條款中要求管理者發(fā)行“內(nèi)部控制報(bào)告”中關(guān)于他們負(fù)責(zé)維持適當(dāng)?shù)膬?nèi)部控制，明確主張他們的權(quán)力的說明。該公司的審計(jì)師必須發(fā)表關(guān)于管理和適當(dāng)?shù)膬?nèi)部控制的單獨(dú)的意見。我們依靠這些新報(bào)告的要求和信息評(píng)價(jià)，向投資者傳達(dá)內(nèi)部控制

73、披露的缺陷。</p><p><b>　　2.2以前的研究</b></p><p>　　我們對(duì)信息傳達(dá)披露信息本質(zhì)的弱點(diǎn)的分析有三個(gè)方面的研究。第一個(gè)研究包括：通過調(diào)查2002年薩班斯奧克斯利法案對(duì)市場反應(yīng)的影響，來評(píng)估這個(gè)行為及其財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表認(rèn)證規(guī)定是否能有效地減少公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告質(zhì)量的不確定性。Li、Jain和Rezaee 在2003年和2004年等研究者最終根據(jù)薩班斯奧

74、克斯利法案，證明了市場會(huì)對(duì)調(diào)整的監(jiān)管建議做出積極的回應(yīng)，這與薩班斯奧克斯利法案對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的質(zhì)量起到有利影響相一致。Jain在2004年發(fā)現(xiàn)根據(jù)薩班斯奧克斯利法案，信息的不確定性反映在買賣價(jià)差的下降。然而，Cohen 等研究者在2004年發(fā)現(xiàn)盈余信息并沒有隨著薩班斯奧克斯利法案的通過而發(fā)生改變，Bhattacharya 等研究者在2002年發(fā)現(xiàn)不重要的市場反應(yīng)對(duì)首席執(zhí)行官和首席財(cái)務(wù)官的資格沒有認(rèn)證要求。</p><p&

75、gt;　　與這些研究相比，評(píng)估市場集聚起來的實(shí)際影響，并意識(shí)到監(jiān)管干預(yù)與SOX法案有關(guān)，我們所處的環(huán)境使我們能夠?qū)彶閷?duì)個(gè)別企業(yè)的具體行為規(guī)定的實(shí)施：結(jié)合最近的信息披露的本質(zhì)缺陷。</p><p>　　第二個(gè)研究調(diào)查是：審計(jì)師的獨(dú)特性和審計(jì)師的行為如何影響公開財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告系統(tǒng)的可信度。例如，Teoh和Wong 在1993年發(fā)現(xiàn)公司聘請(qǐng)具有高素質(zhì)的審計(jì)師時(shí)，會(huì)有較高的盈余反應(yīng)系數(shù)，相反的，貝克爾等人在1998年研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，

76、如果企業(yè)雇傭較低素質(zhì)的審計(jì)人員時(shí)，它的利潤會(huì)有所降低。從這些研究中，我們可以看出因果關(guān)系的方向是不明確的。高效益的企業(yè)必然會(huì)吸引大批高素質(zhì)的人才。高素質(zhì)的審計(jì)師能夠更加熟練地去操作，因此會(huì)使企業(yè)的盈余質(zhì)量較高。</p><p>　　與之前的工作相比，我們接下來的工作安排大致如下：</p><p>　　(1)檢查審計(jì)員類型對(duì)市場對(duì)不確定性事件所產(chǎn)生的影響。發(fā)現(xiàn)積極的審計(jì)質(zhì)量會(huì)影響信息的不確定

77、性，當(dāng)控制市場對(duì)公司的盈余質(zhì)量與公司雇傭高質(zhì)量的審計(jì)員是否會(huì)帶來比預(yù)期更高的實(shí)際盈利。</p><p>　　(2)從審計(jì)師的辭職和各種各樣的控制缺陷來評(píng)估內(nèi)部控制信息缺陷所披露的內(nèi)容。</p><p>　　最后一個(gè)研究，我們?cè)噲D用文件形式來連接盈余質(zhì)量與股票市場對(duì)收益或資本成本的反應(yīng)。Easley, Hvidkjaer和O’Hara 在2002年，發(fā)現(xiàn)了一個(gè)結(jié)論：公司可以通過增加一些預(yù)測的

78、信息來減少資源的消耗，這個(gè)結(jié)論基本與預(yù)測的結(jié)果是一致的，與此同時(shí)，他們還在2004年表示評(píng)估參數(shù)對(duì)公司的支出的影響也是不確定的。如何準(zhǔn)確的衡量盈余的質(zhì)量阻礙了我們研究的進(jìn)程。由于缺少對(duì)盈余質(zhì)量進(jìn)行時(shí)報(bào)告的這么一些機(jī)構(gòu)，現(xiàn)存的會(huì)計(jì)研究機(jī)構(gòu)更多是趨向于對(duì)信息質(zhì)量的關(guān)注，而不是對(duì)盈余質(zhì)量本身的關(guān)注。</p><p>　　來源：巴尼什，比林斯，萊斯利.凱恩內(nèi)部控制信息的弱點(diǎn)和不確定性，印第安那大學(xué)凱萊商學(xué)院，2005年3