外文翻譯--英國保險行業(yè)的組織結構和內部控制（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　中文4200字,2500單詞，14000英文字符</p><p>　　出處：Hilary Ingham. Organisational Structure and Internal Control in the UK Insurance Industry[J]. Service Industries Journal, 1991, 11(4):425-438.</p><p

2、>　　Organisational Structure and Internal Control in the UK Insurance Industry</p><p>　　HILARY INGHAM</p><p>　　A significant body of literature supports the superiority of the multidivisional

3、organisational structure for the management of a diversified enterprise. However recent research has cast doubt on the widespread existence of optimally organised multidivisional firms and has suggested that, in practice

4、, what is observed is a hybrid type of administrative structure. This paper focuses on the extent and nature of divisionalisation within UK insurance companies. Such companies are of particular inter</p><p>

5、　　Regulatory changes have radically altered the nature of financial service provision in the UK. In the wake of liberalisation many financial service companies have diversified into new areas which have tended, for the m

6、ost part, to be related to their primary line of business. Recourse to the work of Channon [1973] suggests that a policy of diversification may weU render companies' administrative structures obselete thus necessitat

7、ing organisational change. Although much research has been conduct</p><p>　　Hilary Ingham: Manchester School of Management, UMIST, Manchester M601QD, UK.</p><p>　　The Service Industries Journal,

8、 Vol. 11, No.4 (October 1991), pp.425-438 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON</p><p>　　Later the focus turns to the insurance industry. Thus, whilst many firms in the economy can be viewed as divisionalised, onl

9、y a sub-set of these operate within an optimal multi-divisional structure. This section highlights the stringent conditions for optimal divisionalisation and questions whether or not these are likely to be fulfilled with

10、in the insurance industry. Since the information required to ascertaiQ this is not available in published sources, the fourth section presents the results o</p><p>　　STRATEGY AND ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE<

11、/p><p>　　The seminal work on the linkage between a company's diversification strategy and the subseqent need for organisational change is that of Chandler [1962]. Subsequent work for UK manufacturing compan

12、ies is contained in Channon [1973].1 Using case histories of major US corporations, for example, Du Pont and General Motors, Chandler noted how technology driven diversification had caused radical changes in the nature a

13、nd scope of the companies* operations.2 Within a single product enterprise the unit</p><p>　　However, as companies diversified, the weaknesses of the U-form structure for the management of multi-product firm

14、s became apparent. Primarily, if a company is operating in more than one market, the diversity of information that the head office must absorb increases significantly. Within a U-form structure all decision making is ves

15、ted in top level management but bounded rationality will severely limit their effectiveness within a diversified company.3 Thus the inability of top management to han</p><p>　　A proposed solution to the prob

16、lem was the organisational innovation of the multi-divisional structure (M-form). This involves the decom- positioo of the company into a number of quasi-firms which are divisions of the organisation. Each division is or

17、ganised into functional areas; thus a M-form firm comprises a number of divisions each of which resembles a U-form firm. The efficiency advantages of such a structure are as follows. First, it facilitates the decentraUsa

18、tion of decision making; this</p><p>　　Of course the establishment of a two-tiered management structure creates an agency problem within the firm akin to that caused by the divorce of ownership from control

19、[Jensen and Meckling, 1976]. Control mechanisms are therefore necessary to minimise opportunistic Sehaviour on the part of divisional managers. Two such measures exist both of which link a divisional manager's perfor

20、mance to a remuneration system. First, an internal capital market can be created. Head office assumes the role of ca</p><p>　　Although Chandler's work was written over two decades ago its resurgence in t

21、he economics literature can be attributed to Williamson [1975,1979, and 1985]. Although his writings explore the many facets of market failure, one of his most researched contributions is his M-form hypothesis. This stat

22、es that:</p><p>　　The organization and operation of the large enterprise along the lines of the M-form favors goal pursuit and least cost behavior more nearly associated with the neoclassical profit maximisa

23、tion than does the U-form alternative.</p><p>　　Williamson, 1975, p. 150</p><p>　　Early empirical studies (see, for example, Armour and Teece, 1978 and Steer and Cable, 1978) were supportive of

24、the superior performance achieved by M-form firms. More latterly however, certain studies [Cable and Dirrheimer, 1983 and Cable and Yasuki, 1985] have failed to find positive performance effects.4 Furthermore Hill [1985]

25、 and Hill and</p><p>　　Pickering [1986] provide eiddence which suggests that the existence of optimaliy organised M-form firms is rare. In particular tfcey note the unwillingness of top management to decentr

26、alise decision making and their failure to implement the necessary control systems.5 Thus it would appear that the optimal M-form company is rare. If a suboptimal hybrid is, in actuality, the dominant organisational form

27、 then it can no longer be assumed that this divisionalised form of enterprise enjoys the efficie</p><p>　　OPTIMAL DIVISIONALISATION AND THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY</p><p>　　Insurance business in the

28、UK is conducted within a wide spsctmm of business organisations. For the UK registered companies whose major line of business is the provision of insurance two legal forms exist. Proprietary companies distribute profits

29、to their shareholders whilst in the mutual companies profits are distributed amongst the (wEtla profits* policy holders. However insurance business is also conducted within a variety of other business organisations. Many

30、 other financial service companies</p><p>　　Although the strategy structure link has been subject to much examination in the case of manufacturing, far less research has been conducted on the service industr

31、ies despite their increasing prevalence in the UK economy.7 For the insurance companies the only major existing work is that of Channon [1978] which was conducted over a decade ago. For the twenty-three insurance compani

32、es which he studied, Channon noted the slow development of product and geographic diversification. He identified the </p><p>　　Since deregulation diversification has increased though most companies have tend

33、ed to enter other financial service markets; either via related products or via geographical expansion. Such a diversification strategy is consistent with the work of Luffman and Reed [1984] who note that firms tended to

34、 move through the single-dominant-related- unrelated product spectrum rather than making a quantum change. Given that at the time of Channon's study the majority of companies had only diversified to t</p><

35、p>　　the identification of separable economic activities within the firm;</p><p>　　according quasi autonomous standing (usually of a profit centre nature) to each;</p><p>　　monitoring the effi

36、ciency performance of each division;</p><p>　　awarding incentives;</p><p>　　allocating cash flows to high yield uses;</p><p>　　performing strategic planning (diversification, acquis

37、ition, and related activities) in other respects.</p><p>　　Thus the observable pattern of diversification which has occurred within the insurance industry suggests that these organisations may differ markedl

38、y from the textbook conglomerate to which Williamson's work refers. In this respect insurance is not unique, the degree of diversification of many of the UK manufacturing companies is limited. It is, therefore, appos

39、ite to question how applicable a M-form organisational structure is for such companies since, if such divisionalisation is only feasible</p><p>　　One problematic area is the relatedness of the companies* act

40、ivities which will tend to cause the volume of inter-divisional transfers to be high [Umapathy, 1979]. The linkage between endowment mortgages and estate agency provides one such example. However, once interdivisional tr

41、ansfers take place, the related issue of transfer pricing moves to the fore since the final price decided will be a revenue to the supplying division and a cost to the receiving division. Referring to the first two cond&

42、lt;/p><p>　　Of course such a problem extends beyond inter-divisiosna! transfers since internal charging systems are also necessary when certain services are subject to central provision [Radner, 1986]. The cost

43、 allocated to the divisions for these services also affects the divisional managers1 ability to maximise their individual local profit. Divisional autonomy is also reduced if the purchase of a good or service is mandated

44、 to be internal. If a divisional manager can obtain a better price by purchasing e</p><p>　　Thus the crucial question that must be addressed is whether internally determined prices are likely to be consisten

45、t with profit maximisation for the individual divisions concerned. Note that in order for the system to be viewed as equitable by all the divisional managers party to any transaction the achievement of joint profit maxim

46、isation will not suffice since the normal expectation is that these managers will be evaluated on the basis of individual peformance.</p><p>　　There are differing possible solutions to this problem [Eccles,

47、1985]. First, if an external market exists for the good or service, the problem is lessened since shadow prices cao be imputed to the divisions. However, for many internal transactions, no external market exists and such

48、 information is, thus, unavailable. If this is the case one possiblity is that the final price cam be determined via bargaining between the divisions concerned. Clearly the final outcome depends on the bargaining str<

49、/p><p>　　Alternatively head office could mandate that all internal traesactions be priced at full cost. Io this instance the selling division must be designated as a cost centre hence violating another conditio

50、n for optimal divisionalisation. Finally a dual pricing system could be adopted such that the selling division receives a market price whilst the receiving division pays ftill cost; the revenue discrepancy is then borne

51、at head office level. Of course this medianism still requires that a shadow pri</p><p>　　Thus the choice of any internal charging system radically affects whether or not a company can be broken down into a n

52、umber of autonomous profit centres. If the decomposibility requirement cannot be met because of inter-divisional transfers the resulting organisational structure is not pure M-fonn. Even if this requirement is satisfied,

53、 further problems can be present which also prevent a firm from achieving true M-form status. These concern the internal control systems. Thus if divisional manag</p><p>　　SURVEY RESULTS</p><p>

54、　　This section presents the results of a questionnaire which was designed to investigate the existence and nature of divisionalisation amongst companies operating in the insurance industry. All companies registered for c

55、onducting insurance business were included in the survey. At the time of mailing, June 1989, one hundred and seventy companies were so registered. The choice of this broad sample base was twofold.</p><p>　　英

56、國保險行業(yè)的組織結構和內部控制</p><p>　　HILARY INGHAM</p><p>　　大量文獻支持多元化企業(yè)的管理應優(yōu)先采用多部門組織結構的觀點。然而，最近的研究對經過最優(yōu)化組織的多部門公司的廣泛存在性表示懷疑，并認為實際中所觀察到的其實是一種混合型行政管理結構。本文主要研究的是英國保險行業(yè)中分部管理體制的內涵和外延。對此類企業(yè)特別感興趣的原因有二。首先，組織結構的變化是最近

57、發(fā)生的，其次，該行業(yè)公司傾向于在眾多相關商業(yè)領域經營。本文結論支持了混合型結構是最為普遍的觀點，因為已有證據顯示分部管理體制企業(yè)往往是次佳的。</p><p>　　英國政策法規(guī)的變化徹底改變了金融服務條款的性質。自由化后，許多金融服務公司向諸多籌謀已久的新領域開展多元化投資，這些行業(yè)大多與他們原有的主營產業(yè)相關。根據Channon [1973]的研究，多元化經營政策可能會淘汰企業(yè)原有的行政管理結構，從而迫使部門組

58、織發(fā)生變革。盡管對制造業(yè)中的企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略與結構聯(lián)動性已經做了許多研究，但就服務業(yè)中的這種情況仍缺乏證據。本文將討論金融服務業(yè)的一個細分市場——保險業(yè)中的企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略與組織結構的關系。下文章節(jié)將討論多元化經營與組織結構間的理論關系。現有的關于多部門結構假定優(yōu)越性的實證研究也將在討論范圍之內。</p><p>　　接下來重點將轉向保險行業(yè)。由此，盡管有時許多公司在經濟意義上可以視為是多元化經營的，但只有其中一部分是在一個最優(yōu)

59、的多部門結構中運營。這一部分強調了最優(yōu)多元化的嚴格條件和其在保險業(yè)中是否廣泛存在的問題。由于難以在公開出版資源中獲取證實這一問題所需的信息，因此本文第四部分提供了一份問卷的調查結果。該調查不僅包括了關于多元化經營和組織結構的基本問題，而且闡明了樣本公司的內部管理和運行的控制系統(tǒng)。因此這一調查結果反映的關于多元化企業(yè)管理的情況比迄今為止所有相關研究都要精確得多。從而我們有可能弄清最優(yōu)多元化經營的條件是否可以達成的問題。</p>

60、<p><b>　　戰(zhàn)略和組織結構</b></p><p>　　Chandler [1962]對企業(yè)多元化戰(zhàn)略和伴生的組織變革需求間的關系做了重要研究。Channon [1973]進一步對英國制造企業(yè)的情況進行了研究?；趯χ饕绹髽I(yè)的案例分析，例如杜邦和通用汽車，Chandler認為技術驅動的多元化戰(zhàn)略將徹底改變企業(yè)的經營性質和范圍。在單一產品企業(yè)中，單一的組織結構（U型結

61、構）在實際經營中是較為普遍的行政管理體系。因此，這類公司的結構是根據一些關鍵功能部門來確定的：如市場，人事，金融等。這種結構的優(yōu)點在于可以獲得專業(yè)化分工優(yōu)勢[Smith, 1937]。</p><p>　　然而， 隨著公司經營的多元化，多產品企業(yè)管理中所采用的U型結構逐漸開始顯露出不足。首先，如果企業(yè)在不止一個市場領域經營，信息的多樣性將顯著增加，而這些眾多的信息公司總部必須吸收。在U型結構下，所有決策都由管理高

62、層做出，然而多元化企業(yè)高層的有限理性又會極大限制他們的效率。因此，管理高層在處理信息流上的不足可能會導致因優(yōu)先考慮決策而忽視企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略的問題。</p><p>　　針對該問題的一個解決方案是進行多部門（M型）組織結構革新。這涉及到將原有企業(yè)分解為若干準公司的問題，這些準公司成為新組織的部門。每個部門負責相應的功能領域。因此，一家M型企業(yè)包括諸多分部門，每個分部門都類似于一個U型公司。該結構的效率優(yōu)勢如下。首先，這有

63、利于分散決策，可以緩解有效理性的負面影響。日常經營決策交給部門經理使得管理高層可以專注于全球或是企業(yè)整體范疇上的事務。此外，企業(yè)分部能使得高層更為便利地獲取各類信息。各類部門的成立也讓企業(yè)各組成部分的績效一目了然。</p><p>　　當然雙重管理結構的構建也帶來了一個公司內代理問題，類似于分割對所有權的控制所造成的影響[Jensen and Meckling, 1976]?？刂茩C制是有必要的，它能減少部門經理的

64、機會主義行為。就此有兩套應對措施，兩者都將部門經理的表現與薪酬體系掛鉤。首先，可以建立一個內部資本市場?？偛繐钨Y本分配者的角色，對不遵循公司政策的部門經理少分配資金。內部資本市場取代外部資本市場來提供資金。由于公司內外部的信息部隊稱，內部市場可能會更有效率，也就是說企業(yè)內部資金配置比通過外部市場配置將更有信息優(yōu)勢。此外，將部門經理的工資直接與他們部門的表現掛鉤可以約束其機會主義。Baiman and Demski [1980]列舉了該

65、方案的具體例子。</p><p>　　盡管Chandler的研究是在二十多年前做的，但其在經濟學文獻中復興得歸功于Williamson[1975,1979, and 1985]。盡管他的著作研究了市場失靈的諸多層面，但其貢獻最大的研究之一卻是他的M型結構假說。援引如下：</p><p>　　相比采用U型結構的企業(yè)，采用M型結構的大型企業(yè)其組織和經營方式更有利于實現其目標，能使其成本性態(tài)更符

66、合新古典主義利潤最大化的觀點?！猈illiamson, 1975, 第150頁。</p><p>　　早期的實證研究（例如Armour和Teece, 1978 及Steer和Cable, 1978）支持了M型結構企業(yè)能取得更優(yōu)表現的觀點。然而，更新的某些研究[Cable和Dirrheimer, 1983及Cable和Yasuki, 1985]卻未能發(fā)現正績效現象。此外，Hill [1985]及Hill和Pick

67、ering [1986]的研究證明經過最優(yōu)組織的M型公司是極少的。他們特別指出管理高層并不愿意分散決策權，也難以落實必要的控制系統(tǒng)。因此，就會出現最優(yōu)M型公司十分稀少的現象。如果次優(yōu)的混合型結構是主流的組織形式，事實上的確如此，那么就不能再假定多部門形式所獲得的效率優(yōu)勢來自于純M型結構了。因此接下來的部分將討論最優(yōu)事業(yè)部制的必要條件和關于保險行業(yè)公司能達成多少此類條件的調查。</p><p>　　最優(yōu)事業(yè)部制和保

68、險業(yè)</p><p>　　英國的保險業(yè)務由一系列商業(yè)機構開展。在英國注冊的主營保險業(yè)務的公司主要有兩種法律形式。股份保險公司將利潤分配給股東，而互相保險公司則將利潤分配給保單持有者。然而，各種各樣的其他商業(yè)機構也開展著保險業(yè)務。許多其他金融服務企業(yè)擁有自己的保險公司；例如，艾比人壽由勞埃德集團持有。一些非英國籍保險公司則在英國設有子公司- Equity and Law由Compagnie du Midi持有。最后

69、，一些集團的資產組合中包括有保險公司的股份；Eagle Star是BAT的全資子公司。</p><p>　　雖然戰(zhàn)略與結構的關聯(lián)性就制造業(yè)中的情況獲得過很多驗證，但就服務業(yè)中的情況卻少有研究，盡管服務業(yè)在英國經濟中的比重日漸提高。而就保險公司中該問題目前已有的主要研究只有Channon [1978]的，而且已經是十年前的。從23家他研究的保險公司，Channon注意到了緩慢的產品發(fā)展和地域多元化。他認為大型股份制

70、公司是最早的分散經營者，盡管有些仍將主要業(yè)務維持某一特定細分市場。鑒于這種多樣化，一些保險公司開始意識到他們原有的組織結構已不再適宜。從歷史觀點說，綜合保險公司已經將其業(yè)務分為壽險和非壽險部門，兩者在兩半式組織結構下管理。重組涉及建立自主產品和地域劃分，盡管自主性多少有些膚淺，因為集團盈利能力部分取決于投資表現；因此投資管理是一個關鍵功能。</p><p>　　因為放松管制，多元化經營有所增加，盡管大多數的企業(yè)之

71、前就已試圖進入其他金融服務市場；要么通過關聯(lián)產品，要么通過地域擴張。這種多元化戰(zhàn)略與Luffman和Reed [1984]的研究結果吻合，他們注意到公司變革沿著單一的——主導——關聯(lián)——無關產品的路徑，而非進行一次量子聚變。鑒于在Channon所做研究的時期，絕大多數企業(yè)只將多元化進行到主導產品的階段，進入關聯(lián)產品領域的變革符合預期。然而這給構建多部門結構帶來了一些問題。援引Williamson [1975, 第149頁]，實現最優(yōu)多元

72、化的要求十分苛刻，因為它需要：</p><p>　　1.識別公司內可分離的經濟活動。</p><p>　　2.給與各部門準自治地位（通常是利潤中心的性質）。</p><p>　　3.監(jiān)視每個部門的工作效率。</p><p><b>　　4.鼓勵創(chuàng)新。</b></p><p>　　5.分配現金流到高

73、收益項目</p><p>　　6.在其他方面實施戰(zhàn)略計劃（多元化經營，收購及相關活動）。</p><p>　　因此保險行業(yè)內可觀察到的多元化模式表明，這些機構可能與Williamson在其研究中所提及的教科書般的綜合企業(yè)大為不同。從這個層面講，保險業(yè)并不特別，許多英國制造業(yè)企業(yè)的多元化程度也有限。因此，M型組織結構對這類企業(yè)的適用性就值得懷疑，因為如果這種多元化只適合單純的綜合性企業(yè)，那么

74、許多公司可能認為他們的行政結構對其組織而言是最優(yōu)的，但事實上并非如此。</p><p>　　一個存疑的地方是企業(yè)活動的關聯(lián)性，這些活動可能造成部門間資源的大量轉移[Umapathy, 1979]。壽險抵押貸款和房產中介間的關聯(lián)就提供了一個這樣的例子。然而，一旦部門間的轉移發(fā)生，轉移價格的問題便首當其沖，因為確定的最終價格會給供給部門帶來收益，而給接受部門帶來成本。上文列舉的實現最優(yōu)多元化所需要求中的前兩個條件是公

75、司可以分解為許多有一定自主權的利潤中心。但是任何部門間的轉移都會對一個以上其他部門的利潤造成影響。如果想讓部門經理們覺得公平，轉移價格則必須符合部門利潤最大化的要求。</p><p>　　當然這個問題超越了部門間轉移的范疇，因為當某些服務受中央規(guī)定約束時，內部定價系統(tǒng)是必要的[Radner, 1986]。這些服務給一些部門帶來的成本也會影響到部門經理自己個人收益的最大化。如果商品或服務的購買是強行內部化的，那部門

76、的自主權也會受到削弱。如果部門經理從外部購買可以得到一個更好的價格，但卻遭到公司總部的禁止，因為交易內部化可使公司收益最大化，那部門經理的自主權也便被削弱了。</p><p>　　因此，必須解決的關鍵問題是內部定價是否與單個部門利潤最大化相一致。既然想讓各部門經理都認為內部定價機制對任何一筆交易都是公平的，那么整體利潤最大化便難以實現。因為正常情況下對這些經理的考評將以各自部門表現為基礎。</p>

77、<p>　　就該問題有多種可能的解決方案[Eccles, 1985]。首先，如果存在外部商品或服務市場，那問題就沒那么麻煩，因為影子價格可以轉移給各部門。然而，對于許多內部交易而言，并沒有那樣的外部市場，因此這類信息也是難以獲取的。如果是這種情況，一個可行的辦法是通過部門間議價確定最終價格。很明顯最終結果取決于各部門的議價能力，而鑒于內部市場按買賣者數量來看可能很小，最終價格不太可能接近完全競爭條件下的價格。</p>

78、;<p>　　或者總部可以下令讓所有內部交易都采用完全成本價。在此情況下，銷售部門必須被任命為一個成本中心，而這又違反最優(yōu)多元化的其他條件。最后雙重定價機制有可能被采用，這樣當接受部門支付全部成本時，銷售部門能得到一個市場價；之后利差由總部承擔。當然該機制仍要求估算反映外部市場價格的影子價格。</p><p>　　因此任何內部定價系統(tǒng)的選擇都會從根本上影響一家公司是否能分解為若干自主利潤中心。如果由

79、于部門間轉移使得可分解性要求難以滿足，那么組織結構也就不會是純M型。即使這一要求被滿足，也會出現更深一步的問題阻礙公司達到真正的M型結構狀態(tài)。這些關系到內部控制系統(tǒng)。因此如果部門經理沒有被監(jiān)管，也沒有收取報酬——在個人方面通過他們的薪水，在部門方面通過資本配置——因此將該公司視為M型的認識不正確的。然而，相對上文所討論的問題，這是一個不同的問題。部門間的相互依賴意味著M型結構無法建立，但是有效控制系統(tǒng)的缺失意味著公司已經無法有效運行M型