[雙語(yǔ)翻譯]外文翻譯--中國(guó)企業(yè)債務(wù)的選擇國(guó)有制的作用（英文）

1、Choice of corporate debt in China: The role of state ownershipPierre PESSAROSSI a, Laurent WEILL b,?a University of Strasbourg, 47 Avenue de la Forêt Noire, 67000 Strasbourg, France b EM Strasbourg Business School,

2、University of Strasbourg, 47 Avenue de la Forêt Noire, 67000 Strasbourg, Francea r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c tArticle history:Received 7 November 2011Received in revised form 15 January 2013Accepted 19 March 2

3、013Available online 9 April 2013We analyze the factors affecting the decisions of Chinese firms to take on debt in the form ofeither bonds or syndicated loans over the period of 2006–2010. The study reveals the extent to

4、which corporate debt choices are politically or economically driven. We test if centralgovernment ownership, flotation costs, asymmetries of information, and renegotiation andliquidation costs influence the choice of deb

5、t. We find evidence in favor of the influence ofcentral government ownership on the financing choices of firms because Central State ownedfirms are more likely to issue bonds and to borrow uniquely on the bond market, ra

6、ther thantapping both debt markets. Overall, our findings show that financial factors play a much moreminor role in corporate debt choices compared to other countries, whereas centralgovernment ownership is a key determi

7、nant of preference for the bond market.© 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.JEL classification:G21P34Keywords:Corporate bondsSyndicated loansDebt choiceChinaState ownership1. IntroductionThe Chinese financial sy

8、stem is characterized by a weak, albeit fast-growing, corporate bond market and an over-dominantbanking industry.1 As Chinese banks have proven to be poorly efficient (Berger, Hasan, & Zhou, 2009) – mainly because of

9、 a lack ofexperience in risk management and severe political influence in lending decisions (Yeung, 2009) – capital allocation remainsbiased towards inefficient state-owned companies in China. In the long run, this misal

10、location of capital threatens thedevelopment of the country.A competitive corporate bond market should alleviate such concerns by providing benchmarks in risk pricing and puttingpressure on banks to attract other types o

11、f borrowers, such as small and medium enterprises, which are currently rationed on thecredit market (Herring & Chatusripitak, 2006).To determine whether this capital allocation problem can be solved through the corpo

12、rate bond market development, oneneeds to understand whether the banking system and the corporate bond market truly compete in China. This paper providesevidence on this issue by analyzing the determinants affecting firm

13、s' choice of debt market. Thus, our aim is to investigate thedeterminants of the choice for a Chinese firm to issue a bond, rather than borrowing from banks.The Chinese Communist Party has recognized the usefulness o

14、f capital markets and the importance of developing the corporatebond market in its Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of Capital Markets in 2004. TheChina Economic Review 26

15、(2013) 1–16? Corresponding author. Tel.: +33 368858138.E-mail address: laurent.weill@unistra.fr (L. Weill). 1 In 2006, the corporate bond market provided only 1.4% of the financing needs of Chinese firms (Hale, 2007). It

16、s growth reached 24.13% on average during theperiod 1990–2006 (People's Bank of China and China Statistical Yearbooks, cited by Allen, Qian, Qian, & Zhao, 2009). In 2010, bank loans accounted for 75% ofnon-financ

17、ial sector's external funding sources (People's Bank of China, China Monetary Policy Report, 2010).1043-951X/$ – see front matter © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2

18、013.03.005Contents lists available at ScienceDirectChina Economic Reviewof other emerging countries, but the corporate segment accounts only for one tenth of the total. The lack of currentdevelopment of the corporate bon

19、d market is a direct consequence of the tight regulation over issuance approvals. During the1980s and 1990s, a large number of bond issuances ended up in default. The central government had to intervene to bail outcompan

20、ies. This episode mostly explains why the government has remained cautious in pushing bond market development:according to the National Development Reform Commission (NDRC) officials, a repetition of the financial instab

21、ility created bythe bond market in the 1990s would have caused political grief for the NDRC (Reuters News, 2006). In 1998, the NDRC4 tightlymodified the approval process for corporate bond issuance, de facto allowing alm

22、ost exclusively large Central State ownedfirms to enter the market. Issuances were subject to an annual quota system, which required a one-hundred-percent guaranteefrom a bank and were at the discretion of the regulatory

23、 body. Consequently, the market nearly collapsed. In the early 1990s,issuances amounted to RMB 68 billion, whereas in the early 2000s, issuances had fallen to only RMB 8.3 billion (The Banker,2004).Informal evidence sugg

24、ests that the state agency played a key role in favoring the access of state enterprises to the bondmarket. The Financial Times wrote in 2007 that “[c]orporate bonds are virtually non-existent in China, mostly because th

25、ey areregulated by the state's conservative central planning agency, the National Development and Reform Commission. Thecommission allows only a handful of giant state-owned enterprises to issue bonds through an extr

26、emely opaque quota system.”(Financial Times, 2007). Apart from the fear of a new episode of corporate debt defaults, favoritism was also a consequence of thegovernment objective to employ the corporate bond market as a t

27、ool to finance pillar SOEs and infrastructure projects, such as the“Three Gorges Dam” (Business Weekly, 2002).As a consequence, even the rare, approved privately owned firms had difficulties in issuing bonds because of t

28、he necessity tofind a bank as guarantor.5 Even though the proportion of state-owned companies among corporate bond issuers has declined inrecent years – from 70% in 2007 to 48% in 2009 (Chen, Mazumdar, & Surana, 2011

29、) – it remains unclear whether favoritism inaccessing the bond market has stopped.The official recognition of the necessity to develop the corporate bond market came in 2004 in the Opinions of the State Councilon Promoti

30、ng the Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of Capital Markets. The corporate bond amount issued in 2005 was204.65 RMB billion, which was up from 32.70 in 2004. However, the major regulatory change in the market came in 200

31、7 withthe decision to share the approval decision between the NDRC and the CSRC. The reform was presented as a major step in themarket development. Since the reform, the CSRC has been responsible for the approval of issu

32、ances to all companies with acorporate structure and has not applied a quota system over yearly issuances. The regulatory body issued new rules of issuancewith immediate effect in mid-August 2007. Under the CSRC rules, c

33、orporations are no longer supposed to receive a bankguarantee. Bonds can amount to 40% of the company's net assets in the end of the last accounting year, and interest rates have tobe less than the annual net profit

34、during the three previous years. Every issuance has to be rated by a CSRC-approved creditagency. Moreover, the PBOC no longer controls the coupon rate of the corporate bond. Finally, corporations can issue bonds notonly

35、for fixed asset investment purposes, as was previously the case under the NDRC, but for all purposes.2.2. The syndicated loans marketThe syndicated loans market grew markedly in China over the last decade, with the outst

36、anding amount of syndicated loansbeing multiplied by four between 2005 and 2008 (CSRC). The market accounted for 7.11% of the total corporate loans in 2009(China Banking Association).A syndicated loan involves a group of

37、 lenders that jointly grant a loan to a single borrower. The process of syndication starts with alead bank mandated by the borrower to design the main characteristics of the financial contract. The lead bank (or arranger

38、) of theloan promotes the loan to other banks or financial institutions, which may participate in the deal. Every participant funds and isresponsible for a part of the loan. The monitoring role of the borrower usually fa

39、lls to the arranger of the loan.The syndicated loan market is an international debt market in which foreign bank participation can be notably high,especially in emerging markets. In China, half of the participants were d

40、omestic banks during the period of 1999–2002(McCauley, Fung, & Gadanecz, 2002). Further evidence suggests that foreign banks tends to be either the only participants ortotally absent in Chinese syndicated loans (Pess

41、arossi, Godlewski, & Weill, 2012). However, foreign presence in the syndicatedloan market seems to have significantly decreased since the financial crisis. Firstly, the domination of foreign banks in playingthe role

42、of arranger has ceased: the number of domestic banks as lead managers in loan issuances has increased markedly since2007 and now largely dominates the number of syndicates with foreign lead manager. Secondly, the increas

43、ed importance ofdomestic banks in the Chinese syndicated loan market has also been reflected in the currency used. In 2006, almost 80% ofsyndicated loans were issued in foreign currency (mainly USD). In 2009, foreign cur

44、rency loans accounted for less than 5% of themarket (Chui, Domanski, Kugler, & Shek, 2010). Thirdly, despite the withdrawal of foreign banks usually involved in the market,4 In 1998, the NDRC was named State Developm

45、ent Planning Commission. Among its official assignment, the NDRC is supposed to maintain the balance ofeconomic development and to guide restructuring of China's economic system (NDRC website). 5 Hongdou Group was th

46、e first private company to receive quota from the NDRC in end 2005, but it never sold bonds because it could not find a bank asguarantor (South China Morning Post, 2007).3 P. Pessarossi, L. Weill / China Economic Review