[雙語(yǔ)翻譯]管理層收購(gòu)?fù)馕姆g--管理層收購(gòu)中的私募股權(quán)和企業(yè)家管理（節(jié)選）

1、3700 英文單詞， 英文單詞，21500 英文字符，中文 英文字符，中文 6500 字文獻(xiàn)出處： 文獻(xiàn)出處：Bruining H , Verwaal E , Wright M . Private equity and entrepreneurial management in management buy-outs[J]. Small Business Economics, 2013, 40(3):591-605.Private eq

2、uity and entrepreneurial management in management buy-outsHans Bruining , Ernst Verwaal , Mike WrightAbstract Critics claim that short-term profit orientation and high deal price strategies of private equity (PE) firms c

3、an negatively affect the ability of management buyouts to initiate and sustain entrepreneurial management. This study investigates this claim by comparing effects of majority PE backed and other buy-outs at different lev

4、els of financial leverage on post buy-out increases in entrepreneurial management. We propose that PE can be used as an organizational refocusing device that simultaneously increases entrepreneurial and administrative ma

5、nagement. We find that majority PE-backed buy-outs significantly increase entrepreneurial management practices. Furthermore, the increased financial leverage positively affects administrative management in management

6、buy-outs. However, the effect of high financial leverage is larger for majority PE-backed buy-outs. These results support the notion that PE firms help buy- out companies develop ambidextrous organizational change: i.e

7、. simultaneously develop entrepreneurial and administrative management practices. The findings have important implications for practitioners and policy makers.Keywords : Private equity, Entrepreneurship, Buyout1. Int

8、roductionThe international surge of private equity (PE) markets during the first decade of this century has been accompanied by a public debate about their effects, both positive and negative (Financial Services Authorit

9、y 2006; PSE-Group in European Parliament 2007). PE firms have been presented, variously, as drivers of more efficient use of organizational resources, but also as asset strippers with adverse consequences for employees a

10、nd other stakeholders that diminish chances for entrepreneurial growth of the firm. These concerns give rise to the need to evaluate the impact of PE governance on organizations, relevant stakeholders, and society as a w

11、hole.A management buy-out (MBO) usually involves the acquisition of a divested division or subsidiary or of a private family owned firm by a new company in which the existing management takes a substantial proportion of

12、the equity with substantial funding provided by banks. PE firms involved in MBOs seek to achieve returns on their investment through significant equity ownership, financial leverage, and strategic and operational monitor

13、ing and control of the companies in their investment portfolio (Wright and Bruining 2008). PE firms can be active investors through taking board seats and specifying contractual restrictions on the behavior of management

14、 which include detailed reporting requirements. Although recent attention has focused upon PE-backed buyouts, not all MBOs are PE-backed. Further, in some deals PE firms hold majority positions, giving them scope for ex-

15、post contracting influence on the strategic policies of portfolio companies (Cotter and Peck 2001), while in others, especially former divisions and family- owned firms, they may have a less active role and take minor

16、ity equity positions.Despite the rhetoric of recent public debate, we can distinguish between two distinct PE Entrepreneurial management is a set of opportunity- based management practices covering a continuum of firm be

17、havior that can help organizations remain vital and contribute to firm and societal level value creation and competitiveness (Stevenson and Gumpert 1985). At one end of the continuum, entrepreneurial management is an out

18、ward opportunity-seeking approach to management without regard to resources currently controlled. At the other end, administrative management is a more inward-oriented management approach toward resources and competcompe

19、tenciesare currently controlled (Table 1). The six dimensions of this model are: strategic orientation, resource orientation, management structure, reward philosophy, growth orientation, and entrepreneurial culture (Brow

20、n et al. 2001). Changes in entrepreneurial management are a result of changes in one or more dimensions of this model.Table 1.Stevenson’s conceptualization of entrepreneurial management (Brown et al. 2001)Entrepreneurial

21、 focus Conceptual dimensions Administrative focusDriven by perception of opportunity Many stages with minimum exposure at each stageStrategic orientationDriven by controlled resources A single stage with complete commitm

22、ent out of decisionEpisodic use or rent of required resources Resource orientation Ownership or employment of required resourcesFlat, with multiple informal networks Management structure HierarchyBased on value creation

23、 Reward philosophy Based on responsibility and seniorityRapid growth is top priority; risk accepted to achieve growthGrowth orientation Safe, slow, steadyPromoting broad search for opportunities Entrepreneurial culture

24、Opportunity search restricted by resources controlled; failure punishedAn organization can lean toward either administrative or entrepreneurial management. We choose the entrepreneurial management model because we believ

25、e that the six dimensions of the model are appropriate to cover conceptually the expected changes following a buyout.The renewed ownership structure and the increased leverage of the buy-out firm can lead to changes in

26、the way the company is led by management (Robbie and Wright 1996), or to changes in its strategic and growth orientation (Phan and Hill 1995), its organizational culture (Green 1992), and the allocation of resources and

27、choice of incentives (Reid 1996). Especially in divisional buyouts, the strategic orientations of managers are initially motivated by the market opportunities they see in the business setting that they were unable to pur

28、sue as former directors of a subsidiary (Wright et al. 2001a). After the buyout, the directors are spurred to allocate resources to operations with the strongest cash flow and to eliminate unprofitable operations (Jensen

29、 1993; Wright et al. 1994). Management structures after buyout tend to become more decentralized, with fewer management layers, thus enhancing the speed of decision-making and leaving room for managers and workers to ada

30、pt freely to changing circumstances (Phan and Hill 1995). Monitoring and rewarding by the PE firm will stimulate a post-MBO philosophy based on creating value for the firm in terms of improving efficiency (Harris et al.

31、2005) and/or innovative growth (Bruining and Wright 2002; Meuleman et al. 2009). Pre-MBO, divisional buyout managers may find growth-oriented strategies are limited by headquarters; after the buyout, these barriers may b