（節(jié)選自書籍）外文翻譯--在城市化進(jìn)程中國(guó)式的鄰避沖突（原文）

1、85 Z. Cheng et al. (eds.), Urban China in the New Era: Market Reforms, Current State, and the Road Forward, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-54227-5_5, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014Abstract Concomitant with the grow

2、th of conflicts over land use, China has wit- nessed an increasing ‘Not-In-My-Backyard’ (NIMBY) syndrome throughout the country. The legal foundation for environmental action, public environmental aware- ness and latent

3、 NIMBY participants have shown the potential for a forthcoming neighbourhood environmental protest in urban China, and also implied some special resistance tactics. This chapter explores two NIMBY protests in Beijing a

4、nd suggests that NIMBY action in China is similar to that in the West in some protest tactics and internal rhythms but distinctive in the single supportive network. Rather than relying on a diversified external social

5、 network, like non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or media, the most effective supporter for China’s NIMBY action is government. Therefore, Chinese NIMBY action struggles for support from government by using China’

6、s administrative system ethos. Furthermore, with NIMBY practices, the resi- dents strengthen their awareness of property rights, as well as establish their identity, as the citizens pursue public participation and envir

7、onmental justice. 5.1 Introduction Since the opening-up reform in 1978, China’s economy has grown rapidly, with an average annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of nearly 10 %. Concomitant with this swift e

8、conomic development, China has experienced rapid urbanization. Since the late 1990s, China’s rate of urbanization has increased by Chapter 5 China’s Not-in-My-Backyard Protest in the Process of Urbanization Ying Wu a

9、nd Xuezhen Dai Y. Wu (*) National Institute of Social Development , The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences , Beijing , China e-mail: w-ying@cass.org.cn X. Dai School of Management Science and Engineering,

10、Central University of Finance and Economics , Beijing , China 87NIMBY action become increasingly common. Some Asian societies, such as Japan, India and Taiwan, also faced the NIMBY phenomenon in their urbanizatio

11、n processes (Kawashima 2000 ; Hsu 2006 ; De Groot 2008 ). According to empirical research, three elements facilitate NIMBY action. These elements are geographic conflict, risk perception and action ability. Fir

12、st, geographic proximity is the universal rule of all NIMBYs: the closer residents are to an unwanted facility, the more likely they are to oppose it (Dear 1992 ). Second, public perception is also integral to NIMBY

13、behaviour. If the locals distrust the government or the project sponsors and they perceive the facilities to be risky and threatening, they undertake some oppositional behaviour. The greater the negative impact (or pe

14、rceived risk), the less acceptable to the site, and more likely to evoke a NIMBY response (Kraft and Clary 1991 ). The last element of NIMBY action ability has not been noticed much. The action ability contains two e

15、lements: willingness and capability. On one hand, individuals in the community should be willing to engage in oppositional behaviour. To do so, they have to overcome psychological reactance, deem the opposition as the

16、ir need, and believe their effort could change the situation (Thornton and Knox 2002 ). On the other hand, the community must know how to use appropriate tactics to promote their NIMBY campaign, such as unifying loc

17、al or non-local social networks (Shemtov 2003 ). Willing individuals and an able community make NIMBY action possible. To ‘protect their turf’, residents take varied tactics during the NIMBY action, such as neighbourh

18、ood petitions, letter-writing campaigns to the relevant stake- holders, lobbying of local officials, appealing to the media and demonstrations (Dear 1992 ). For example, De Groot (De Groot 2008 ) found that some co

19、mmunities in India depend on the local NGOs to raise awareness and build social capital. Cable et al. (Cable et al. 1988 ) noticed that activists also rely on state and national antinuclear organisations to gain more

20、 global support against nuclear power facilities in their neighbourhood. Or, sometimes, the protestors extend local civil rights issues to a broader rhetoric with maximum value, like ‘social justice’ or ‘human right’

21、(Bullard 1993 ). No matter what kind of actions they take, the basic principal is to foment and channel community opposition. Furthermore, the opposition evolves with the understanding and involvement of the local pop

22、ulation. Dear ( 1976 ) summarised the evolution of opposition as a three- stage cycle. In the youth stage, the opposition starts with a small group resid-ing very near to the proposed development. NIMBY actions are us

23、ually raw and blunt responses by individual opponents and then moves to the maturity stage. In order to institutionalize the resources of the community and unify the voice addressing the problem, the debate moves into

24、 a public and organisational forum through which the opposition tactics are improved. Consequently, the aim and actions of this stage become clearer and more rational. Because conflict resolution is often time- consum

25、ing, the process could last a long time. At the old stage, some kind of arbitration process may be adopted and one of the stakeholders may gain a victory, or, sometimes, the outcome is just inconclusive. The above-menti