2012年金融外文翻譯--轉(zhuǎn)變經(jīng)濟增長方式和發(fā)展的再思考（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　3500英文單詞，19500英文字符，中文6100字</p><p>　　出處：Justin Yifu Lin, David Rosenblatt. Shifting patterns of economic growth and rethinking development[J]. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 2012, 15(3):171-194

2、.</p><p>　　畢 業(yè) 設(shè) 計（論 文）</p><p><b>　　外文文獻翻譯</b></p><p>　　學(xué) 院： 經(jīng)濟與管理學(xué)院 </p><p>　　專 業(yè)： 國際經(jīng)濟與貿(mào)易 </p>&

3、lt;p>　　班 級： 國貿(mào)XX班 </p><p>　　學(xué)生姓名： XXX </p><p>　　導(dǎo)師姓名： XXX 職稱： XX </p><p>　　起止時間：2016年03 月 07 日

4、 至 2016 年 03月 10日 </p><p><b>　　英文原文</b></p><p>　　Shifting patterns of economic growth and rethinking development</p><p>　　Justin Yifu Lin ， David Rosenblatt</p>

5、;<p><b>　　Abstract</b></p><p>　　This paper provides an historical overview of both the evolution of the economic performance of the developing world and the evolution of economic thought o

6、n development policy. The twentieth century was broadly characterized by divergence between high-income countries and the developing world, with only a limited number (less than 10% of the economies in the world) managin

7、g to progress out of lower or middle-income status to high-income status. The last decade witnessed a sharp reversal from a </p><p><b>　　Keywords</b></p><p>　　Economic growth ,develo

8、pment,convergence,structural transformation</p><p>　　1. Introduction</p><p>　　The industrial revolution marked a dramatic turning point in the economic progress of nations. Technological innova

9、tion created new tools that created the potential for a dramatic increase in productivity and living standards. During the nineteenth century, a number of technological leaders and early adapters leapt ahead of the rest

10、of the world, while others lagged behind.</p><p>　　One might have expected that the twentieth century would have been a period in which technology spread across the world – allowing countries to catch up wit

11、h advanced economies. This might have been achieved through trade and capital flows based upon continued progress in transportation and communication technology. In fact, the predominant neo-classical paradigm in economi

12、c thinking suggested that this would be the case.</p><p>　　Instead, the twentieth century was an unfortunate period of continued and accelerated divergence in living standards. In part, this may have been du

13、e to an interruption in trade and capital flows during the World Wars and the inter-war Great Depression that marked the first half of the twentieth century. Protectionism also persisted in many countries following the S

14、econd World War. It was only with the Uruguay Round of negotiations in the 1980s, leading to the eventual establishment of the WTO i</p><p>　　On the other hand, there was a small group of exceptional cases o

15、f ‘catch-up.’ In addition, since the turn of the century, there has been reinvigorated growth in the developing world, especially in a number of large developing countries, such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and th

16、e Russian Federation. There are numerous other countries that are taking advantage of growing trade and financial links – both with developed and developing countries – to accelerate economic growth. In brief, the g</

17、p><p>　　The next section provides a history of twentieth century divergence. We then provide an anatomy of the rise of the multi-polar growth world. This is followed by a critique of the history of development

18、thinking and the need for a democratic approach to economic enquiry for development.</p><p>　　2. The challenge of economic development: historical antecedents and twentieth century divergence</p><

19、p>　　Before the industrial revolution, there was little growth in the world economy and the income gap between countries was extremely small. For example, even in 1820, the between-country income differences represente

20、d less than 15% of income equality across people in the world, whereas the between-country share rose to well over half of global inequality by 1950,and the richest country’s per capita income was only just less than fou

21、r times higher than the poorest, and the richest countries’ per cap</p><p>　　Maddison (1982) divides the last 1500 years into four economic epochs: agrarianism, advancing agrarianism, merchant capitalism, an

22、d capitalism. The capitalism period started at the time of the industrial revolution. The new technology created the potential for new techniques of production that required organizational structures based on capitalist

23、economic relations. It also represented the start of a period of unprecedented growth for the world economy .</p><p>　　2.1 The industrial revolution and the great divergence</p><p>　　All of this

24、 changed with the industrial revolution. Scientific progress began to be applied to the means of production as machines were developed that both increased productivity in firms, but also dramatically reduced transportati

25、on costs. This created the possibility for the countries that developed those technologies, or those that adapted the technologies first, to grow much faster than less technologically advanced countries.</p><p

26、>　　The result of this process was that (at least prior to the year 2000) the global economy was dominated by the few industrialized economies that existed in the world, and most of these few economies had become indus

27、trialized either as leaders or earlier followers of the nineteenth century industrial revolution. Lin (1995) argues that the transition from innovation based on the experiences of artisan/farmers in the pre-industrial re

28、volution period to innovation based on controlled experiments guid</p><p>　　One can see the significance of these few large economies both in terms of their shares of global economic output and in terms of t

29、heir contribution to economic growth. During the twentieth century, the G7 maintained a large and fairly stable share of world gross domestic product that started and ended the century at about 45%. There was a slight ri

30、se to 51% during the first half the century that was reversed during the second half of the century.</p><p>　　2.2 Low and middle income country growth ‘traps’</p><p>　　In principle, one would ex

31、pect, and certainly hope, that the poorer countries in the world can catch up with the richer countries in the world. Unfortunately, few countries have experienced ‘convergence’ on a sustained basis. In fact, one famous

32、paper that discusses the performance during the twentieth century is entitled: ‘Divergence, big time’ .</p><p>　　One approach to measuring relative progress is to look at per capita GDP relative to the Unite

33、d States, which has been the symbol of advanced industrialized countries after the Second World War. Figure 4 shows that the shares of countries in each ratio range have been fairly stable, with some growth in the percen

34、tage of countries in the upper MIC range (say, roughly 0.3–0.7), but really not much expansion of the share of countries that are at 0.7 of the US level of per capita GDP. At the bottom </p><p>　　There is al

35、so some ‘churning’ where countries not only converge up the ladder, but also diverge down the ladder. This is the case of some former colonies in Africa: many have gone from being lower MICs at independence to LICs in 19

36、80. Since then, some have climbed back up to MIC status. There are also countries at the HIC end of the distribution that have fallen back to MIC status, by this measure.</p><p>　　The net result is that, dur

37、ing the twentieth century, very few countries managed to progress from low income status to middle income status and then to high income status. Part of this history was explained in the previous sections, and hopefully,

38、 the recent rise of a number of large MICs marks the beginning of a better century for developing country convergence. That said, Table 2 summarizes how only a handful of developing countries have succeeded in reaching h

39、igh levels of prosperity, and man</p><p>　　3. The rapid growth of a few large economies and the rise of the new growth poles </p><p>　　While there was progress in development during the twentiet

40、h century, the G7 countries still dominated the global economy in terms of size, contribution to economic growth and living standards. This dominance began to decline dramatically during the first decade of the twenty-fi

41、rst century – in particular, due to the fast growth of large dynamic emerging economies – the so-called ‘BRICs’ (Brazil, Russia, India and China). As a result, the G7 share of global GDP declined rapidly from 45 to 37% i

42、n</p><p>　　To understand the patterns of south-south globalization, one can start by examining the evolution of the large fast-growing BRICs. In the trade dimension, after decades of stagnation in the develo

43、ping country share of world exports, this share began to increase sharply at the turn of the century, and it now stands at about 30%. We see, however, that much of this recent evolution was driven by the increasing share

44、 from BRIC countries. The BRIC share more than doubled from 2000 to 2009. A large pa</p><p>　　Capital flows have been an important factor in the changing multi-polar landscape. Developing countries were rece

45、iving record levels of FDI and other capital flows prior to the global financial crisis. Naturally, there was a decline in these flows following the boom; however, flows have continued to be in line with the average of t

46、he 3 to 4 years preceding the crisis. In addition, starting since the mid-1990s there has been a general shift up in annual FDI flows as a share of developing countrie</p><p>　　Technology is also part of the

47、 story. From both theory and practice, we expect developing countries to lag the high income countries in technology, since the latter are at the technological frontier in most products that they produce. That said, one

48、would expect the more dynamic middle-income countries to begin to move up the technological ladder as they move up the per capita income ladder. In addition, there are sectors in middle income countries that are reaching

49、 (or have already reached) the</p><p>　　The rise of the new emerging market growth poles is extremely welcome; however, it would be a mistake to fall into complacent triumphalism. The remaining challenges fa

50、cing the new growth poles, specifically, and the developing countries, generally, are substantial. As noted in the previous section, very few countries have succeeded in progressing from low-income status to middle-incom

51、e status and on to high-income status.This discussion leads to the new challenges facing the new middle-income gr</p><p>　　4. Rethinking economic development</p><p>　　The stylized facts elaborat

52、ed in the preceding section require a response from the economics community to provide policy guidance. Why was there so little convergence in the twentieth century? What was special about the few countries that ‘escaped

53、’ middle income status? What is behind the rise of the multi-polar growth and the BRICS? Can it be sustained? Can their success be replicated in the laggard countries?</p><p>　　The challenges faced by countr

54、ies vary substantially across levels of development. Unfortunately, development economics has not always provided useful policy guidance in the past, and may be unable to do so in the future as well. As we will see below

55、, often broad policy prescriptions were formulated to cure the problems of developing countries as a group, and often these prescriptions used the rich countries as a reference point.Waves of economic thought either focu

56、sed on isolating developing co</p><p>　　4.1 The need to democratize development economics</p><p>　　Why is now the time to democratize development economics? Continuous technological innovation a

57、nd structural change is inherent in modern economic growth in both developed and developing countries; however, the policy challenges for achieving growth differ between developed and developing countries. The difference

58、 is derived from the fact that industries in the developed countries are generally on the global technological frontier, while industries in developing countries are within the global f</p><p>　　The economic

59、 theories that originate in developed countries attempt to explain and promote the growth in the developed countries; as such, they may not be relevant to developing countries because of the differences in the challenges

60、 and opportunities discussed above. Meanwhile, successful developing countries have generated many useful lessons for how to achieve dynamic growth. Their experiences will be more relevant for other developing countries

61、than the experiences of the developed countries </p><p>　　Most developing countries that followed the dominant development theories to design development policies failed to achieve the goal of narrowing the

62、income gap with developed countries. Most of those that achieved the catching up did not follow the dominant development theories. These basic stylized facts, in and of themselves, should be ample rationale for rethinkin

63、g economic development on a more democratic basis – one that builds on developing countries’ own ideas and experience. China, with </p><p>　　The increase in the trade, financial flow, and the research capaci

64、ty in developing countries will contribute to the exchange of ‘south-south’ experiences. With the rising of the multi-polar world, the research capacity in the developing world has improved. It can be expected that more

65、research and theories will be produced by economists in developing countries with the intention to explain the phenomena in developing countries. This research will enrich development economics and make development</p

66、><p>　　5. Concluding remarks </p><p>　　As documented above, the global economy has evolved from a period of dramatic divergence in income per capita to an incipient convergence. Not only are develo

67、ping countries playing a larger role in global economic growth, the economic relations between developing countries have increased dramatically. The developing countries are contributing more to development knowledge – b

68、oth through home-grown academic research and through the practical experience gained from successful policies and programs</p><p>　　The views presented here are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent

69、the views of the World Bank.</p><p><b>　　中文譯文</b></p><p>　　轉(zhuǎn)變經(jīng)濟增長方式和發(fā)展的再思考</p><p><b>　　摘要</b></p><p>　　本文概述了歷史發(fā)展中世界經(jīng)濟業(yè)績的演變和經(jīng)濟思想的演變發(fā)展政策。二十世紀大體上是高

70、收入國家和發(fā)展中國家之間的分歧，而只有數(shù)量有限 (少于 10%的世界經(jīng)濟體) 管理較低或中等收入狀態(tài)到高收入狀態(tài)的進展。過去十年目睹了經(jīng)濟發(fā)展急劇的逆轉(zhuǎn)，從一種發(fā)散模式— — 特別是對一組大型的中等收入國家。后面這種現(xiàn)象也被迫通過增加發(fā)展中國家間和智力上的經(jīng)濟聯(lián)系，增加知識的創(chuàng)造和分享。重新思考發(fā)展政策意味著面對這些現(xiàn)實：二十世紀經(jīng)濟分歧的，為數(shù)不多的成功的故事和世界最近崛起的多極增長經(jīng)驗。本文提供描述性數(shù)據(jù)和文獻調(diào)查，以記錄這些趨勢。

71、</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵字：經(jīng)濟增長，發(fā)展，整合，結(jié)構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)變</p><p><b>　　簡介</b></p><p>　　在國家的經(jīng)濟進步中，工業(yè)革命是一個戲劇性的轉(zhuǎn)折點，。技術(shù)創(chuàng)新創(chuàng)造出了提高生產(chǎn)力和生活質(zhì)量的新工具。在十九世紀，雖然在其他方面還較為落后，但許多技術(shù)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者和早期的適應(yīng)者已經(jīng)領(lǐng)先于世界。</p><p>

72、;　　人們原本期待二十世紀技術(shù)傳遍世界 — — 使各國能夠趕上先進經(jīng)濟體一段時期。這可能已經(jīng)在貿(mào)易和資本流動的基礎(chǔ)上以及在運輸和通信技術(shù)繼續(xù)取得進展。事實上，在經(jīng)濟思維主導(dǎo)的新古典范式建議此案例。</p><p>　　相反，二十世紀是一個段不幸時期的繼續(xù)，加速了在生活質(zhì)量方面的分歧。部分原因可能是由于在兩次世界大戰(zhàn)中貿(mào)易和資本的流動以及大蕭條期間的中斷。在第二次世界大戰(zhàn)中有許多國家保持著貿(mào)易保護主義。隨著20世紀

73、80年代的烏拉圭回合談判，最終在1995年建立了世貿(mào)組織，從而使貿(mào)易開放成為制度化。同時，在20世紀后期通訊和交通技術(shù)的進步－－尤其是通訊技術(shù)的便捷加速促進了全球貿(mào)易和資本流動。</p><p>　　一方面，這兒有一小組趕超的特例。另一方面，在世紀之交中，在發(fā)展中世界里重新恢復(fù)增長，尤其是在一些大的發(fā)展中國家里，如巴西、 中國、 印度、 印度尼西亞和俄羅斯聯(lián)邦。有許多其他國家正在利用越來越多的貿(mào)易和金融聯(lián)系－－發(fā)

74、達國家和發(fā)展中國家－－為了加快經(jīng)濟增長。簡而言之，隨著發(fā)展中國家的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)方式和新的增長動力的出現(xiàn)，全球經(jīng)濟已進入多極增長。</p><p>　　下一個部分將展示20世紀的歷史分歧。我們接著將剖析多極增長的世界。這將通過歷史對經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的研究做出相應(yīng)的評論。</p><p>　　經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的挑戰(zhàn) ︰ 歷史上的先例和在二十世紀的分歧</p><p>　　工業(yè)革命前,世界經(jīng)濟幾

75、乎沒有增長，并且國家之間的收入差距是極其小的。例如，即使在 1820 年，國家間收入差異小于 15%的世界中等收入水平，然而在1950年，國家間的收入份額不斷激增，超過了全球的平等水平，最富有的國家的人均收入僅略高于最貧窮國家的四倍，而現(xiàn)在最富有的國家的人均收入則達到最驚人的 127 倍。工業(yè)革命導(dǎo)致大分流 ︰ 在第二次大戰(zhàn)前和第二次大戰(zhàn)后（除了日本，它是由于加入先進的工業(yè)化國家），世界經(jīng)濟增長是由幾個西方工業(yè)化國家所引起的。</

76、p><p>　　麥迪森 （1982 年) 最近的1500 年可分為四個經(jīng)濟時代理論︰ 平均地權(quán)論、推進平均地權(quán)論、商業(yè)資本主義和資本主義。資本主義時期開始于工業(yè)革命。新技術(shù)創(chuàng)造出了資本主義經(jīng)濟關(guān)系的基礎(chǔ)以及所需的生產(chǎn)新技術(shù)的潛力。它也是一段前所未有的世界經(jīng)濟增長的開始。</p><p>　　2.1工業(yè)革命以及所造成的巨大分歧</p><p>　　所有的改變都源于工業(yè)革命

77、?？茖W(xué)的進步開始應(yīng)用于工廠生產(chǎn)中的機器，從而提高生產(chǎn)率，也極大地降低了運輸成本。這創(chuàng)造的可能性為開發(fā)這些技術(shù)的國家或那些快速適應(yīng)新技術(shù)的國家?guī)砹烁嗟暮锰帯?lt;/p><p>　　這一過程的結(jié)果 （至少到 2000 年之前）是全球經(jīng)濟的主導(dǎo)力量存在于工業(yè)化經(jīng)濟體中，和大多數(shù)的這些經(jīng)濟體已成為十九世紀工業(yè)革命的工業(yè)化產(chǎn)物，他們要么作為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，要么作為早期的追隨者。林 （1995 年) 認為從工業(yè)革命之前基于工匠/農(nóng)

78、民的經(jīng)驗的創(chuàng)新過渡到基于受控實驗后以科學(xué)為指導(dǎo)的創(chuàng)新是工業(yè)革命的關(guān)鍵因素。在前現(xiàn)代中國社會獎勵制度不利于創(chuàng)新系統(tǒng)所需的人力資本積累。歷史數(shù)據(jù)大大揭示了國家集團不同增長模式之間的差異。在十九世紀后期，西方的歐洲國家和他們的殖民地開始經(jīng)歷著人均收入的歷史性騰飛。這與后來20世紀中期的日本十分匹配。世界經(jīng)濟是受幾個大型西方的歐洲國家 （德國、 法國、 意大利、 英國） 和以英語為母語的國家（澳大利亞、 新西蘭、 美國和加拿大），再加上日本。許

79、多其他國家，包括前蘇聯(lián)得以上升到中等收入水平的地位，并且享有較好的經(jīng)濟福利，遠遠超出了先前的幾個世紀;然而，這些生活標準仍然落后于一些發(fā)達的領(lǐng)先國家。簡而言之，所謂的“G7”主導(dǎo)著全球的經(jīng)濟。</p><p>　　人們可以看到這些大型經(jīng)濟體在全球經(jīng)濟產(chǎn)出的份額和他們對經(jīng)濟增長的貢獻方面的意義。在20世紀，“G7”在世界的生產(chǎn)總值中保持了相當(dāng)穩(wěn)定的份額，在開始和結(jié)束中大約占了45%，在被推翻后半世紀中是上升至 51

80、%。</p><p>　　2.2中低收入國家的增長陷阱</p><p>　　原則上，據(jù)估計，當(dāng)然也希望，世界的貧窮國家可以趕上世界較富裕國家。不幸的是，沒有幾個國家在持續(xù)的基礎(chǔ)上可以達到整合。事實上，在20世紀有一篇著名論文的題目是: “分歧，大時代”。</p><p>　　檢驗取得進步的一種方法是看看自己國家的人均 GDP 相對于美國，在第二次世界大戰(zhàn)后這一直是先

81、進工業(yè)化國家的特征。圖 4 顯示了國家在每個比例范圍內(nèi)所占的穩(wěn)定份額，與一些國家在上部的 MIC 的百分比的增長范圍 （比如，大約 0.3-0.7），但是，真的沒有太多擴展，都在 0.7 人均 GDP 水平。在結(jié)束時期，所占份額在 0.1 或更少的美國各級仍然被困在 40%的水平?？偟膩碚f，超過 80%的國家在世界 GDP中有一半或不足一半的水平。</p><p>　　這兒也有一些“摻雜”成分在里面，有些國家不僅

82、收斂于上界限，而且沿著下界限也有分歧出現(xiàn)。這是在非洲的一些前殖民地的情況：在1980年，許多人已經(jīng)從低中等收入水平的殖民地獨立起來。自那時以來，一些已經(jīng)達到MIC狀態(tài),也有一些國家通過這種措施回落至MIC狀態(tài)。</p><p>　　結(jié)果是，在 20 世紀，極少數(shù)國家設(shè)法從低收入水平發(fā)展到中等收入狀水平，然后達到高收入水平。如在前面所解釋的那樣，最近，多數(shù)中等收入國家的崛起標志著發(fā)展中國家在新世紀的發(fā)展前途。也就是

83、說，表2總結(jié)了如何使發(fā)展中國家成功地達到與西歐一樣的高水平的繁榮時期。少數(shù)發(fā)展中國家經(jīng)濟成功的故事 — — 除了少數(shù)幾個小的石油富國 — — 通常位于東亞和通過快速工業(yè)化后的國家利用比較優(yōu)勢來帶動出口，從而促進國家經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展。</p><p>　　3.一些大型經(jīng)濟體的快速成長和新生體的崛起</p><p>　　在20世紀的發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟取得了進展，但G7 國家仍然主導(dǎo)全球經(jīng)濟規(guī)模、 經(jīng)濟增長和

84、生活水平。在21世紀的第一個十年，這種優(yōu)勢開始急劇下降——尤其是，由于大型動態(tài)的新興經(jīng)濟體 — — 所謂金磚四國 （巴西、 俄羅斯、印度和中國） 的快速增長。結(jié)果，“G7”占全球GDP的比重迅速下降從 45% 下降至37%，僅僅用了8 年的時間 。這是前所未有的具有歷史意義的轉(zhuǎn)變。之后整個世紀 G7 顯著的優(yōu)勢，造成了經(jīng)濟主體的戲劇性轉(zhuǎn)變。金磚四國和其他新興經(jīng)濟體也增加了其貿(mào)易份額、 資本流動與創(chuàng)新。通過 “南南合作”全球化趨勢日益增長

85、，在這些新興市場經(jīng)濟相互作用下高收入國家和發(fā)展中國家之間的合作增多。</p><p>　　要了解南南全球化模式，可以通過金磚四國的演變史來了解。在貿(mào)易方面，在世紀之交中，由于停滯在占世界人口多數(shù)的發(fā)展中國家的貿(mào)易份額開始大幅增加，它現(xiàn)在大約占到30%左右。然而，我們看到，很多的最新進展，推動了越來越多的份額加入到金磚四國 。金磚四國股份從 2000年到2009年逐漸增多。很大一部分的故事是要隨著貿(mào)易國家之間的發(fā)展

86、而產(chǎn)生的——實際上這個趨勢可以追溯到幾十年前－－在整個世界經(jīng)濟發(fā)展中起關(guān)鍵作用的南-南雙邊協(xié)議和區(qū)域貿(mào)易協(xié)定以及供應(yīng)鏈集成。來自其他發(fā)展中國家的進口份額現(xiàn)在是 1960 年代的近兩倍之多。隨著南南貿(mào)易的開展，以前全球化分工中發(fā)展中國家（南）向高收入國家（北）通過生產(chǎn)制造初級產(chǎn)品進行出口的特點已經(jīng)變得更加復(fù)雜。一些主要的發(fā)展中國家經(jīng)濟體現(xiàn)在專門從事出口制造 （亞伯拉罕和范霍夫，2011年）。所有的這些事情都是相互關(guān)聯(lián)的：中國制成品主要體現(xiàn)

87、在與發(fā)展中國家的進口結(jié)合方面，以及從亞洲新興經(jīng)濟體中，另外投入到日本、 臺灣、 中國和韓國。這是世界中發(fā)展中國家、發(fā)達國家以及高收入國家間貿(mào)易一體化的結(jié)果。</p><p>　　資本流動已經(jīng)成為多極化格局的一個重要因素。在全球金融危機爆發(fā)前，發(fā)展中國家得到了創(chuàng)記錄的外國直接投資以及其他資本的大量流入。當(dāng)然，還有后繁榮時期，雖然資本流動下降，但其流動有繼續(xù)按照平均水平的3到4年內(nèi)水平流動。此外，從九十年代中期開始出

88、現(xiàn)了向上發(fā)展的總體轉(zhuǎn)變，外國直接投資數(shù)量占發(fā)展中國家的國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值不斷增加。盡管投資在高收入國家之間的流動仍然是最大的，但也可能促進南南投資流動的升幅。最近，從國際貨幣基金組織公布的數(shù)據(jù)來看，由于其有很多缺失的數(shù)據(jù)點，因而很難系統(tǒng)地分析。然而，有具體案例的數(shù)據(jù)披露了南南流動的巨大影響。例如，香港特行政區(qū)是中國對外直接投資頭寸的第十個最大來源，并在中國（內(nèi)地）南非的直接投資地位略大于傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟強國法國。雖然大型新興市場呈現(xiàn)多極化趨勢增長，但

89、較小和較貧窮的經(jīng)濟體在全球經(jīng)濟中的地位也有了很大的變化。例如，撒哈拉以南非洲地區(qū)也參與了最近的多極化增長以及擴大貿(mào)易和資本流動。作為一個整體的國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值在該地區(qū)已經(jīng)急增長。該地區(qū)共有 11 個國家——在世界大約有29 個國家——它的平均經(jīng)濟增速為6.5%或更多于全球金融危機之前的經(jīng)濟增長?？傮w而言，該區(qū)域國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的</p><p>　　技術(shù)也是一個很重要的部分。從理論和實踐上來講，我們知道發(fā)展中國家在技術(shù)方

90、面落后于發(fā)達國家，因為發(fā)達國家在很多產(chǎn)品方面的技術(shù)都比發(fā)展中國家要先進。這就是說，一些中等收入的國家開始借助發(fā)達國家的先進技術(shù)來使自己本國的經(jīng)濟得到發(fā)展并獲得更多的收入，現(xiàn)在他們的人均收入已經(jīng)有所提高。此外，在中等收入國家中，正在（或已經(jīng)）有技術(shù)前沿部門的設(shè)置了。因此，我們就期望這些國家能夠從現(xiàn)在開始投入更多的資金在研究和開發(fā)方面，并希望他們產(chǎn)生更多的本土技術(shù)創(chuàng)新。雖然所展示的數(shù)據(jù)可能不是最可靠的，但從中可以了解到金磚四國經(jīng)濟增長中研發(fā)

91、支出總額和專利申請數(shù)目的的一些可喜成就。特別值得一提的是中國的總研發(fā)支出占國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的比重已經(jīng)較以前超過一倍之多。雖然專利申請數(shù)量落后于高收入國家，但其比率所占的份額也在不斷地呈現(xiàn)多樣化的變化，金磚四國的應(yīng)用程序申請數(shù)量也從40HIC不斷地進行調(diào)整。</p><p>　　新興市場增長極的崛起是非常受歡迎的。然而，它將陷入自滿的必然錯誤之中。具體來說，在新的增長極面臨的諸多挑戰(zhàn)中，一般來說，發(fā)展中國家需要的是持續(xù)

92、的堅守。如前面所提到的那樣，很少有國家能夠成功地從低收入狀態(tài)進入到中等收入，甚至到達高收入的狀態(tài)。這個話題將新的中等收入增長極引向新的挑戰(zhàn)。在某些情況下——例如，中國——收入不平等日益擴大，政策制定者將面臨更大的挑戰(zhàn)，調(diào)整經(jīng)濟結(jié)構(gòu)使其擴大好處，給人們帶來更多的益處——特別是要關(guān)注落后的農(nóng)村地區(qū)的收入。此外，新的經(jīng)濟增長速度極快也對環(huán)境造成了一定的影響，不利于經(jīng)濟增長的可持續(xù)性。環(huán)境問題在所有金磚四國的增影響不斷增加。另外，隨著收入水平的

93、提高，一般來說工資也在不斷地提高。在全球化經(jīng)濟中，這意味著新的增長極需要不斷改善其工業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)，尋找新的產(chǎn)品或提高現(xiàn)有產(chǎn)品線的生產(chǎn)效率。所有這些挑戰(zhàn)需要改進國家發(fā)展政策，從而克服這些挑戰(zhàn)，確保持續(xù)發(fā)展進步。</p><p>　　4.經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的重新再思考</p><p>　　在前面部分已經(jīng)闡述了政策對于經(jīng)濟學(xué)的導(dǎo)向作用。為什么在20世紀整合的效果？關(guān)于逃離中等收入狀況的國家特別應(yīng)該做什么？多極增

94、長和金磚四國的崛起背后是什么？能持續(xù)嗎？他們的成功可以被后來的落后國家復(fù)制嗎？</p><p>　　各個國家的發(fā)展所面臨的挑戰(zhàn)發(fā)生極大地變化。不幸的是，在過去發(fā)展經(jīng)濟學(xué)不總是能夠提供有用的政策來指導(dǎo)經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展，可能將來也無法做到。正如我們將在下面看到，經(jīng)常有發(fā)展中國家會把自己作為一個群制定相應(yīng)的政策去應(yīng)對，以此來解決發(fā)展中國家所面對的問題，這些處事方法常常也會被發(fā)達國家最為一定的參考。大多數(shù)的經(jīng)濟思想要么集中在不

95、平等的觀念中要求經(jīng)濟發(fā)展要隔離發(fā)展中國家，要么就是在全球經(jīng)濟體系中盲目模仿發(fā)達世界經(jīng)濟，過早地開放一些領(lǐng)域。這些一刀切政策和處理方式未能充分顯示經(jīng)濟結(jié)構(gòu)的有效調(diào)整，以及個體私營經(jīng)濟的優(yōu)勢，目前的現(xiàn)狀不利于經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展。發(fā)展需要提供如何在不同的經(jīng)濟需求下采取合適措施去應(yīng)對，不同階段需要不同的策略，我們將在下面進行詳細解說。因此，一些錯誤的政策則不利于經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展。</p><p>　　4.1民主發(fā)展經(jīng)濟學(xué)的需要<

96、/p><p>　　為什么現(xiàn)在是民主發(fā)展經(jīng)濟學(xué)的時代？發(fā)達國家和發(fā)展中國家經(jīng)濟增長都需要不斷的技術(shù)創(chuàng)新和經(jīng)濟結(jié)構(gòu)的調(diào)整。 但是，為實現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟增長發(fā)達國家和發(fā)展中國家所面臨的政策制定是不同的。差別在于發(fā)達國家工業(yè)通常在全球的技術(shù)前沿，而發(fā)展中國家產(chǎn)業(yè)則在全球范圍內(nèi)。前者需要自主創(chuàng)新技術(shù)使其保持領(lǐng)先地位。對于發(fā)展中國家來說，所面臨的挑戰(zhàn)是根據(jù)各自的優(yōu)勢（如前一節(jié)中討論）發(fā)展本國經(jīng)濟，并進而采用現(xiàn)有技術(shù)的后發(fā)優(yōu)勢。自主創(chuàng)新與有

97、效采用不同的政策所面臨的挑戰(zhàn)——其結(jié)果是，政策框架應(yīng)是不相同得。中等收入國家一般都有具有代表性的前沿技術(shù)和較少的先進技術(shù)混合在一起的產(chǎn)業(yè)。</p><p>　　經(jīng)濟學(xué)理論起源于發(fā)達國家試圖解釋和促進增長的發(fā)達國家。因此，他們可能無法與發(fā)展中國家的有關(guān)經(jīng)濟現(xiàn)象存在差異性，因為兩者所面臨的經(jīng)濟機遇和挑戰(zhàn)不同。同時，成功的發(fā)展中國家獲得了許多有益的經(jīng)驗，來實現(xiàn)他們經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的新動力。他們的經(jīng)驗將為其他發(fā)展中國家提供更多的

98、經(jīng)驗，它比發(fā)達國家的經(jīng)驗更加具有借鑒作用，因為他們之間的經(jīng)濟機遇和挑戰(zhàn)更加相似。</p><p>　　大多數(shù)發(fā)展中國家沿用發(fā)達國家的經(jīng)濟政策并沒有實現(xiàn)縮小與發(fā)達國家之間的收入差距。大部分國家沒有領(lǐng)會經(jīng)濟理論的重要部分。這些基本事實說明我們應(yīng)該反思經(jīng)濟發(fā)展上更加民主和大眾化的基礎(chǔ)—— 建立一個有利于發(fā)展中國家自己發(fā)展的經(jīng)驗和理論。近幾十年來中國就是一個典型的例子，取得了經(jīng)濟上的卓越成績。林(2012)認為，中國的經(jīng)

99、濟學(xué)家有其不可取代的優(yōu)勢，他們更多地關(guān)注于中國經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的本身經(jīng)驗，適合中國自己的發(fā)展道路。</p><p>　　隨著發(fā)展中國家在貿(mào)易、資金流動和科研究能力的不斷增加將有助于南南合作之間的經(jīng)驗交流。隨著世界多極化的興起，發(fā)展中國家的科研究能力得到改善?？梢灶A(yù)期的是更多的研究和理論將由發(fā)展中國家的經(jīng)濟學(xué)家和研究者來探究，從而得到更多適合發(fā)展中國家的理論和經(jīng)濟政策。這項研究將豐富發(fā)展經(jīng)濟學(xué)并使發(fā)展經(jīng)濟學(xué)更好地適應(yīng)發(fā)展中