財(cái)務(wù)控制外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Financial Control </p><p>　　Effective corporate governance and financial control includes the use of monitoring and incentive mechanisms to align diver

2、gent interests between shareholders and managers and encourage the creation of shareholder value. Value-based management systems (VBM) provide an integrated management strategy and financial control system intended to in

3、crease shareholder value by mitigating agency conflicts. In concept, VBM reduces agency conflicts and helps create shareholder value since it reveals value-i</p><p>　　Our primary goal is to examine whether t

4、he adoption of a VBM system improves economic performance. We recognize that firm performance and the decision to tie compensation to a VBM metric can be endogenous, which creates a potential sample selection bias. For i

5、nstance, firms that are performing poorly face tougher challenges to creating economic value and could be more likely to tie compensation to VBM to provide managers the incentives to overcome these challenges. Alternativ

6、ely, managers who ex</p><p>　　With regard to our first research question, we find that firm performance increases following the adoption of value-based management systems. Compared to a matched firm based on

7、 industry, prior performance, and size, firms that adopt VBM systems increase residual income for the five years subsequent to the adoption of a VBM system relative to the year before adoption. The median firm in our sam

8、ple increases industry- and performance-adjusted residual income divided by invested capital by over 7 </p><p>　　With regard to our second research question, we find that firm size is the only firm specific

9、characteristic that relates to the effectiveness of VBM in all years. After controlling for possible sample selection bias, we find that large firms show less improvement than small firms. We note, however, that these re

10、gressions have low adjusted R2s. Possibly, this result suggests that larger firms face greater monitoring costs, which make it more difficult to implement programs in larger firms. In o</p><p>　　Overall, ou

11、r results provide support that value-based management systems are effective mechanisms for improving corporate performance. </p><p>　　The literature on property rights (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and a

12、gency theory (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976) maintains that different incentives lead to conflicts between shareholders and managers of the public firm that result in a loss in firm value. Ultimately, the shareholders

13、bear this loss. Value-based management provides an integrated management strategy and financial control system designed to mitigate these agency conflicts and increase shareholder value. VBM systems attempt </p>&

14、lt;p>　　Value-based management has captured the interest of the corporate and investment communities. Ryan and Trahan (1999) report that 87 percent of 86 CFOs surveyed indicate that they are familiar with value-based m

15、anagement. Most of these CFOs also indicate that their firm uses one or more VBM systems. This interest has also been demonstrated in the business press. Articles in Fortune (e.g., Stires, 2001; Colvin, 2000; Tully, 1999

16、) include a list of 1,000 companies ranked by how much market value th</p><p>　　We identify four variations of VBM metrics from these articles in the popular press. All of the metrics are similar in that the

17、y are single-period measures of performance that take into account return on invested capital and the relevant cost of capital. They are all consistent with discounted cash flow valuation. Although consulting firms have

18、popularized these metrics, many companies apply their own versions of the metrics. We do not take any given metric to represent the work of a consulting </p><p>　　(1) Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)—DCF methods,

19、for instance shareholder value added (SVA), express value as expected future cash flows discounted to the present time at the company’s cost of capital. See Rappaport (1998) for a more detailed discussion of DCF methods

20、as they relate to value-based management.</p><p>　　(2) Cash Flow Return on Investment (CFROI)—CFROI expresses an estimate of a company’s single-period cash flow as a percentage of total investment. Madden (1

21、999) provides a detailed discussion of CFROI.</p><p>　　(3) Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)—ROIC is defined as the ratio of net operating profits less adjusted taxes (NOPLAT) to invested capital. See Copela

22、nd, et al., (2000) for a more detailed discussion of ROIC.</p><p>　　(4) Residual Income (RI)—RI measures the excess earnings over a capital charge based on investment opportunities of similar risk. Stern Ste

23、wart & Co. popularized RI under the market name of EVA. See Wallace (1997) for a more detailed discussion of RI.</p><p>　　Despite the attention afforded value-based management techniques and their widesp

24、read application, we have scant evidence on their ability to improve firm performance. Much of the existing empirical research, often conducted by the consulting firms who market value-based management systems, focuses o

25、n the relations between the metrics (or value-drivers) and shareholder value. These studies by consultants (e.g., Stewart, 1994) document positive relations between performance metrics (e.g., Economi</p><p>

26、　　Our sample selection method distinguishes our study from previous studies. These relevant studies only have access to data on VBM compensation plans for top executives, and exclude firms that use VBM systems for evalua

27、tion and budgeting (see Ittner and Larcker, 1998, 2001). Our sample includes firms that tie VBM to compensation, and also firms that use VBM systems for evaluation, budgeting, and monitoring but not for compensation. Th

28、is feature allows us to explore the more extensive use of VBM,</p><p>　　Our method makes three additional contributions. First, we extend our analysis of post-adoption performance to five years beyond the ye

29、ar of adoption, allowing us to examine longer-term effects. Second, we use different tax rates based on the statutory tax rate in effect for a particular year as opposed to assuming a constant tax rate for all years. Thi

30、rd, we use a cost of equity based on the capital asset pricing model, a cost of debt based on Moody’s bond yields, and the firm’s capital structu</p><p>　　Effective corporate governance and financial control

31、 includes the use of monitoring and incentive mechanisms to encourage the creation of shareholder value. Value-based management systems attempt to accomplish this goal by providing managers with a set of decision-making

32、tools that identify which alternatives create or destroy value, and often link compensation and promotions to metrics associated with shareholder value. Although the use of VBM has increased significantly in past years,

33、we have </p><p>　　We find that the typical firm in our sample significantly improves residual income following the adoption of VBM. No one component of residual income (after-tax operating profit, invested c

34、apital, or cost of capital) drives the result, but rather all three components appear to work together. VBM does not appear to be more or less effective when used for compensation or when adopted by firms with high or lo

35、w levels of capital expenditures, growth opportunities, or investment in working capital. W</p><p>　　Firms are more likely to tie compensation to VBM when they perform better prior to adoption and when other

36、 firms in the industry have also tied VBM to compensation. Firms with higher growth opportunities are less likely to tie VBM to compensation, consistent with options being more efficient for these firms. Firms with highe

37、r levels of working capital are also less likely to tie VBM to compensation. Controlling for these characteristics, we find that performance subsequent to VBM adoption is neg</p><p>　　In sum, our analysis su

38、ggests that VBM produces improvements in economic performance. Overall, matched-firm-adjusted residual income is higher in all five post-adoption years relative to the year prior to adoption. The use of value-based manag

39、ement systems is associated with improved economic performance for a sustained period.</p><p>　　Source: Harley E.Ryan, Emery A.Trahan,2006.“Corporate Financial Control Mechanisms and Firm Performance: The Ca

40、se of Value-Based Management Systems”. Forthcoming in the Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,September,pp.2-33.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p><b>　　財(cái)務(wù)控制</b></p>

41、<p>　　有效的公司治理和財(cái)務(wù)控制，包括使用監(jiān)控和激勵(lì)機(jī)制來調(diào)整股東和管理者之間的不同利益關(guān)系，鼓勵(lì)股東價(jià)值的創(chuàng)造。基于價(jià)值的管理體系（VBM）提供了一個(gè)綜合管理戰(zhàn)略和財(cái)務(wù)控制體系，意圖通過減少代理沖突來增加股東價(jià)值。自揭示雇員價(jià)值逐漸增長(zhǎng)的決策以來，VBM在理念上減少了代理沖突且?guī)椭鷦?chuàng)造了股東價(jià)值，使管理決策的監(jiān)控變得簡(jiǎn)單，并且提供了一種將報(bào)酬與產(chǎn)出掛鉤的方法來創(chuàng)造股東價(jià)值。然而，何種程度上的VBM系統(tǒng)能實(shí)際提高上市公

42、司的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益是個(gè)尚未解決的問題。為了深入認(rèn)識(shí)這個(gè)問題，我們調(diào)查了從1984年到1997年采用VBM系統(tǒng)的84個(gè)公司，由此來說明VBM系統(tǒng)的作用和經(jīng)濟(jì)效益。我們調(diào)查了兩個(gè)相關(guān)問題：（1）VBM系統(tǒng)的采用是否提高了經(jīng)濟(jì)效益？（2）加強(qiáng)或者阻礙VBM系統(tǒng)效果的因素是什么？</p><p>　　我們的主要目的是探討采用VBM體系是否能提高經(jīng)濟(jì)效益。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)公司績(jī)效和將報(bào)酬與VBM聯(lián)系的決策間有著內(nèi)在的聯(lián)系，這產(chǎn)生了潛在樣

43、本選擇性偏差。例如，業(yè)績(jī)較差的公司在經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值創(chuàng)造上面臨著更艱巨的挑戰(zhàn)，其更傾向于將報(bào)酬與VBM聯(lián)系，從而給管理者激勵(lì)，來克服這些困難。另外，管理者可以通過簽訂一個(gè)基于VBM標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的報(bào)酬合同，讓公司績(jī)效達(dá)到一定的水平，從本質(zhì)上保證獎(jiǎng)金支付。我們研究的樣本包括以VBM標(biāo)準(zhǔn)計(jì)算報(bào)酬的公司，同時(shí)也包括僅僅利用VBM分析和評(píng)估的公司。因此，我們可以審查為何公司選擇將報(bào)酬與VBM聯(lián)系，這使我們能控制由酬金方案與公司績(jī)效間的內(nèi)在關(guān)系導(dǎo)致的潛在樣本選擇性

44、偏差。</p><p>　　關(guān)于我們的第一個(gè)研究問題，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在采用基于價(jià)值的管理體系之后，公司績(jī)效增加了。通過與在行業(yè)，以前的業(yè)績(jī)和規(guī)模方面相當(dāng)?shù)墓具M(jìn)行比較，發(fā)現(xiàn)公司采用VBM體系后的5年的剩余收益比采用之前有所增加。在我們的樣本中，在行業(yè)與業(yè)績(jī)處于平均水平的公司，自采用VBM體系后的5年中投資回報(bào)率上升了7個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。我們沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)任何證據(jù)表明在高增長(zhǎng)型公司中VBM鼓勵(lì)過低投資，建議剩余收益的改善不以犧牲長(zhǎng)期

45、價(jià)值為代價(jià)。</p><p>　　關(guān)于我們的第二個(gè)研究問題，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)在所有年份中公司規(guī)模是唯一與VBM效果有聯(lián)系的公司具體特點(diǎn)。在控制可能樣本的選擇性偏差后，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)大公司比小公司提高較少。我們注意到，這些線性回歸不管怎樣都具有較小的調(diào)整系數(shù)R2s。這結(jié)果表明大公司可能面臨較大的監(jiān)控成本，這使其在大公司落實(shí)程序較困難。在我們的多變量分析中，我們還會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)，(i)優(yōu)先執(zhí)行的企業(yè)更有可能將報(bào)酬與VBM相聯(lián)系，(ii)應(yīng)

46、用VBM后前兩年調(diào)整后的業(yè)績(jī)與使用VBM來決定報(bào)酬負(fù)相關(guān)。這影響在兩年后的統(tǒng)計(jì)中不是很顯著。已經(jīng)以價(jià)值創(chuàng)造為中心的公司更有可能將VBM與報(bào)酬聯(lián)系起來，而且這些公司僅有較少的改進(jìn)潛力。另外，當(dāng)公司實(shí)施計(jì)劃時(shí)超額獎(jiǎng)金支付可能太低，這降低了最初的效能。我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)公司采用VBM后減少了資本性支出。這些支出的減少?zèng)]有因企業(yè)發(fā)展機(jī)會(huì)的不同而不同。因此，這些業(yè)績(jī)上的改進(jìn)并不會(huì)以犧牲長(zhǎng)期價(jià)值為代價(jià)。</p><p>　　總的來說

47、，我們的研究結(jié)果支持以下這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)：基于價(jià)值的管理系統(tǒng)對(duì)于提高企業(yè)績(jī)效來說是一個(gè)有效的機(jī)制。</p><p>　　關(guān)于財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)（阿爾欽和德姆塞茨, 1972）與代理理論（詹森和邁克林, 1976）的文獻(xiàn)表明：不同的激勵(lì)機(jī)制導(dǎo)致了上市公司股東與管理者間的沖突，其結(jié)果會(huì)導(dǎo)致企業(yè)價(jià)值的損失。最終，股東將承受這一損失?；趦r(jià)值的管理提供了一個(gè)可以減輕這些機(jī)構(gòu)沖突和增加股東價(jià)值的綜合管理戰(zhàn)略和財(cái)務(wù)控制系統(tǒng)。VBM系統(tǒng)試圖通過向

48、管理者提供一套決策工具來實(shí)現(xiàn)這個(gè)目標(biāo)，至少在理論上，指出哪些選擇創(chuàng)造或損壞價(jià)值，同時(shí)經(jīng)常將報(bào)酬和升職與股東價(jià)值相聯(lián)系。公司可以用這些度量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來監(jiān)控和管理薪酬績(jī)效。它們提供了一個(gè)將管理者決策與創(chuàng)造股東價(jià)值的公司績(jī)效相聯(lián)系的機(jī)制，并且提供了一種進(jìn)一步協(xié)調(diào)股東權(quán)益和管理者利益的手段。</p><p>　　基于價(jià)值的管理已捕獲了企業(yè)利益和投資群體。賴安和特拉漢（1999）指出：在86位被調(diào)查的首席財(cái)務(wù)官中，有87%表示他

49、們熟悉基于價(jià)值管理的體系。這些首席財(cái)務(wù)官中的大部分也表明他們公司使用了一個(gè)或多個(gè)VBM系統(tǒng)。商業(yè)界也表現(xiàn)了這種利益關(guān)系。財(cái)富雜志中的文章（思特斯，2001； 科爾文，2000； 塔利，1999）包含一個(gè)基于斯特恩·斯圖爾特的市場(chǎng)增加值(MVA)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，根據(jù)在過去十年中增加多少市場(chǎng)價(jià)值來排名的1000家公司列表。這些文章剖析了采納多種管理系統(tǒng)的幾家企業(yè)，基于不同VBM標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，通過各種努力來增加它們的價(jià)值。</p>&l

50、t;p>　　我們從大量發(fā)表的文章中認(rèn)識(shí)到四種不同的VBM度量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。所有的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是相似的，因?yàn)樗鼈兌际菃沃芷谟?jì)量措施，考慮到了投資資本回報(bào)率和相關(guān)的資本成本。他們都與現(xiàn)金流貼現(xiàn)估值一致。雖然咨詢公司已推廣了這些度量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，但許多公司仍采用各自不同的指標(biāo)。我們不使用任何給定的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來代表可能已將該種方法推廣的咨詢公司的作用。我們提供了四個(gè)度量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，總結(jié)如下：</p><p>　　（1）現(xiàn)金流量貼現(xiàn)（DCF）——現(xiàn)金流

51、折現(xiàn)法，比如股東價(jià)值增加值（SVA），表示在公司資本成本的基礎(chǔ)上將預(yù)計(jì)未來現(xiàn)金流量折合到現(xiàn)在的價(jià)值。可以見拉巴波特（1998）對(duì)基于價(jià)值管理的DCF方法更為詳細(xì)的論述。</p><p>　　（2）現(xiàn)金流量的投資回報(bào)率（CFROI）——CFROI表示對(duì)一個(gè)公司單周期的現(xiàn)金流占總投資比例的估計(jì)。馬登（1999）對(duì)CFROI進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)的論述。</p><p>　?。?）投資資本回報(bào)率（ROIC）

52、——ROIC被定義為經(jīng)營(yíng)凈收益減去調(diào)整稅收（NOPLAT）與投入資本的比值。可以見科普蘭等人（2000）對(duì)ROIC更為詳細(xì)的論述。</p><p>　　（4）剩余收益（RI）——RI是度量基于相同風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)會(huì)的資本支出超額收益。斯特恩·斯圖爾特和有限公司對(duì)EVA市場(chǎng)名義下的RI進(jìn)行了推廣。見華萊士（1997）對(duì)于RI更為詳細(xì)的論述。</p><p>　　盡管所提供的基于價(jià)值管理的

53、技術(shù)和其廣泛的應(yīng)用受到關(guān)注，但我們沒有足夠的證據(jù)證明其有能力改善公司的績(jī)效。大多數(shù)現(xiàn)有的實(shí)證研究，經(jīng)常是由實(shí)行基于價(jià)值管理體系的咨詢公司所發(fā)起的，其注重指標(biāo)（或價(jià)值因素）與股東價(jià)值之間的聯(lián)系。這些咨詢公司的研究（例如，斯圖爾特，1994年）證明了業(yè)績(jī)指標(biāo)（例如，經(jīng)濟(jì)增加值（EVA））與股票價(jià)格的歷史表現(xiàn)之間成正相關(guān)。與此相反，比德爾等人的學(xué)術(shù)研究（1997）認(rèn)為EVA解釋為股東回報(bào)并不比收入要好。科普蘭（2002）認(rèn)為，一般的基于價(jià)值管

54、理標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的同時(shí)期措施對(duì)股票價(jià)格變化解釋得不是很好，而且這種預(yù)期中的變化需要被考慮其中?？破仗m的論點(diǎn)強(qiáng)調(diào)了對(duì)VBM系統(tǒng)的使用和改善股票價(jià)格間關(guān)系的測(cè)試難度。</p><p>　　我們的樣本選擇方法使我們的研究區(qū)別于以前的研究。這些相關(guān)研究?jī)H使用了為高層主管提供VBM薪酬計(jì)劃的數(shù)據(jù)，并且排除了使用VBM系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行評(píng)價(jià)和預(yù)算的公司（伊德納和拉克爾，1998，2001）。我們的樣本中，包括將VBM與報(bào)酬相聯(lián)系的公司，也包括使

55、用VBM系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行評(píng)估、預(yù)算和監(jiān)控但非報(bào)酬的公司。這些特征可以讓我們?nèi)ヌ剿鱒BM更為廣泛的運(yùn)用, 還能揭示內(nèi)源性決策過程。此外，我們的樣本還使我們能夠檢查VBM系統(tǒng)更為廣泛的群體，而不僅僅是以前研究中用基于EVA對(duì)剩余收益進(jìn)行計(jì)算的系統(tǒng)。</p><p>　　我們的方法有三個(gè)額外貢獻(xiàn)。首先，我們將分析由應(yīng)用后的業(yè)績(jī)擴(kuò)展到采納后五年的業(yè)績(jī)，使我們能夠檢查其長(zhǎng)期效果。其次，我們使用特定年份的基于法定稅率的不同稅率與所有

56、年度不變的稅率進(jìn)行比較。第三,我們使用基于資本資產(chǎn)定價(jià)模型的股權(quán)成本，基于穆迪債券收益率的借貸成本和公司的資本結(jié)構(gòu)，估計(jì)每個(gè)樣本公司的加權(quán)平均資本成本，為所有企業(yè)提供電子計(jì)算機(jī)會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)庫中可獲得的數(shù)據(jù)，與目的相匹配。這一貢獻(xiàn)使我們能夠更準(zhǔn)確地估計(jì)出每個(gè)公司的剩余收益，使其更符合公司要求，并對(duì)應(yīng)用后資本成本變化的貢獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行審查。</p><p>　　有效的公司治理和財(cái)務(wù)控制，包括使用監(jiān)控和激勵(lì)機(jī)制來鼓勵(lì)股東價(jià)值的創(chuàng)造

57、?；趦r(jià)值的管理系統(tǒng)試圖通過為管理者提供一套決策工具來達(dá)到這一目標(biāo)，用其來確定哪些選擇可以創(chuàng)造或損壞價(jià)值，并經(jīng)常將報(bào)酬和升職與股東價(jià)值的衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)相聯(lián)系。雖然VBM的使用在過去幾年已有顯著的增加，但是我們僅僅擁有其作為公司治理有效方法的有限信息。為了闡明這個(gè)問題，我們調(diào)查了兩個(gè)相關(guān)問題：（1）VBM系統(tǒng)的采用是否提高了經(jīng)濟(jì)效益？（2）加強(qiáng)或者阻礙VBM系統(tǒng)效果的因素是什么？</p><p>　　我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在我們樣本

58、中的典型公司，在采用VBM后，剩余收益有了顯著提高。沒有一個(gè)剩余收益的組成部分（稅后營(yíng)業(yè)利潤(rùn)，投資資本或資本成本）可以促成結(jié)果，而是三個(gè)組成部分共同作用的結(jié)果。當(dāng)VBM被用于報(bào)酬或當(dāng)公司采用或高或低的資本支出，成長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)或投資于運(yùn)營(yíng)資本時(shí)，VBM似乎沒有多少的效果。我們沒有找到任何證據(jù)表明剩余收益的增加是以犧牲長(zhǎng)期投資為代價(jià)的。</p><p>　　當(dāng)公司采用VBM系統(tǒng)之前的業(yè)績(jī)較好，或者同行業(yè)中的其他公司將報(bào)酬與

59、VBM相聯(lián)系時(shí)，公司更有可能將報(bào)酬與VBM相聯(lián)系。面臨較高成長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)的公司較不傾向于將報(bào)酬與VBM相聯(lián)系，這符合這些公司的最優(yōu)選擇。具有較高運(yùn)營(yíng)資本水平的公司也較不傾向于將報(bào)酬與VBM相聯(lián)系。通過對(duì)這些特點(diǎn)的控制，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)在采用VBM之后的公司業(yè)績(jī)與公司規(guī)模呈負(fù)相關(guān)。我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)，在頭兩年采用VBM的企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)改善與報(bào)酬呈負(fù)相關(guān)。然而，這些回歸調(diào)整系數(shù)R2s較低。雖然咨詢公司常常宣傳自己獨(dú)特的VBM業(yè)績(jī)指標(biāo)，但我們沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)任何證據(jù)表明這個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)

60、比其他的要好。最后，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)公司在采用VBM后減少了資本支出。這些在費(fèi)用上的減少不因公司發(fā)展機(jī)會(huì)的不同而不同，這表明公司業(yè)績(jī)的改善是不以犧牲長(zhǎng)期利益為代價(jià)的。</p><p>　　總之，我們的分析表明VBM產(chǎn)生了經(jīng)濟(jì)效益的改善。總體來說，適合公司調(diào)整的剩余收益在采用VBM后的五年均比使用前的剩余收益要高?；趦r(jià)值管理系統(tǒng)的使用與持續(xù)期間的經(jīng)濟(jì)業(yè)績(jī)改善有關(guān)。</p><p>　　出處: 哈利