公共環(huán)境外文翻譯---- 當(dāng)?shù)丨h(huán)境的控制與公共機(jī)構(gòu)的擠出效應(yīng)

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯之一</b></p><p>　　Determining the External Social Costs of Public Space Crowding</p><p>　　Author(s): Roberts, Russell D</p><p>　　Nationality: US</p>

2、;<p>　　Source: Political Economy Working Papers, no. 137</p><p>　　Abstract：This paper uses simple models of private and public behavior to model the relationship between public and private spending on

3、 public goods. The standard discussion of the relationship between public and private spending assumes that public spending is exogenous. When public spending is exogenous, each dollar of public spending reduces private

4、spending by a dollar, unless public spending is large enough to drive donors to a corner solution. When government decision-making is endogenous, </p><p>　　I. INTRODUCTION</p><p>　　The effect of

5、 an increase in government spending on private spending is a central theoretical and empirical question in macroeconomics and public finance. What is the effect of public borrowing on private investment? What is the effe

6、ct of government housing on private housing ?What is the effect of food stamp expenditure on private food consumption? What is the effect of social security spending on private saving? What is the effect of government we

7、lfare programs on private charity?</p><p>　　The standard theoretical answer to these questions is that government will either reduce private spending or leave it unchanged—the case of neutrality. These analy

8、ses almost always assume the increase in government spending is random or exogenous.</p><p>　　This paper studies the interaction between public and private spending on public goods when government is endogen

9、ous, responding to the preferences of citizens. The paper begins with what I call the "simple model" of the private provision of public goods followed by a brief literature review. The succeeding sections look

10、at the relationship between public and private spending on the poor and the elderly, under different assumptions about how government responds to the preferences of citizens. Th</p><p>　　1. Public spending i

11、s never neutral in equilibrium.</p><p>　　2. When public spending is exogenous, an increase in public spending must drive some donors to a comer solution in order to be non-neutral. But when public spending i

12、s endogenous, corner solutions are no longer necessary for non-neutrality. The relationship between public and private spending can be positive in equilibrium.</p><p>　　3. When public spending is endogenous,

13、 the relationship between public and private spending depends on the source of the change in public spending as well as the structure of preferences, the heterogeneity of citizens, the flexibility of taxation and the dis

14、tribution of benefits.</p><p>　　4. Efficiency considerations push public spending towards a level large enough to crowd out all private spending. Whether public and private spending coexist depends on the st

15、ructure of preferences, the heterogeneity of citizens, the flexibility of taxation and the distribution of benefits. </p><p>　　決定公共空間擁擠的外部社會(huì)成本</p><p>　　作者：羅伯特.羅素.D</p><p><b>　

16、　國(guó)籍：美國(guó)</b></p><p>　　來(lái)源：政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)文稿第137頁(yè)</p><p><b>　　一、引言</b></p><p>　　政府開(kāi)支的增加對(duì)私人投資的影響是關(guān)于宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)和公共財(cái)政的理論和實(shí)踐問(wèn)題。公共借貸對(duì)私人投資有什么影響嗎？政府投資房地產(chǎn)對(duì)私人住房有什么影響？食物券支出對(duì)私人餐飲消費(fèi)有什么影響嗎？社會(huì)保障支出在私

17、人儲(chǔ)蓄有什么的影響嗎？政府福利計(jì)劃對(duì)私人慈善機(jī)構(gòu)捐款有什么影響嗎？</p><p>　　標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的理論對(duì)這些問(wèn)題的回答是，政府將要么減少私人開(kāi)支的情況下或者離開(kāi)并保持中立。這些分析幾乎總是承擔(dān)增加政府支出的隨機(jī)性或外源性。</p><p>　　本文研究了公共支出和私人支出之間的交互作用當(dāng)把政府支出作為內(nèi)生變量時(shí)，滿足公民的特殊偏好。本文構(gòu)建了所謂的“簡(jiǎn)單的模型”，私人提供公共物品，緊隨其后的是

18、一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)短的文獻(xiàn)回顧。接下來(lái)的部分之間的關(guān)系看起來(lái)是在公共和私人消費(fèi)，窮人和老年人的不同假設(shè)條件下，政府如何回應(yīng)有特殊偏好的公民。主要分析的結(jié)果是：</p><p>　　1、公共支出從來(lái)就不是中性的平衡。</p><p>　　2、當(dāng)公共開(kāi)支是外生的，增加公共支出必須促使一些捐助者采取能夠提出解決的方法為了使其不保持中立的情況。但當(dāng)公共開(kāi)支是內(nèi)生對(duì)的,轉(zhuǎn)角的解決方案將不在是中性的，也沒(méi)有存在的

19、必要了。公共和私人之間的關(guān)系平衡的支出可以是積極的。</p><p>　　3、當(dāng)公共開(kāi)支是內(nèi)生的關(guān)系，公共和私人消費(fèi)取決于變化的公共支出的結(jié)構(gòu)參數(shù)，對(duì)公民的稅收的靈活性和稅收利益分配。</p><p>　　4、考慮到效率推動(dòng)公共支出在水平方向足夠大時(shí)排擠了所有私人消費(fèi)。公共和私人支出是否共存的結(jié)構(gòu)取決于偏好、公民的異質(zhì)性、靈活性和稅收利益分配。</p><p>&l

20、t;b>　　外文翻譯之二</b></p><p>　　Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out</p><p>　　Author(s): Juan Camilo Cardenas, John Stranlund, Cleve Willis</p><p>　　Nationa

21、lity: USA</p><p>　　South: University of Virginia Library Research literature pp.1-5</p><p>　　Abstract: Regulations that are designed to improve social welfare typically begin with the premise th

22、at individuals are purely self-interested. Therefore, in a situation in which private and social interests diverge, it should be possible to bring about a welfare improvement by imposing rules that provide the necessary

23、incentives for more socially efficient choices. However, experimental evidence shows that individuals do not typically behave as if they are purely self-interested; they tend to m</p><p>　　Keywords: Institut

24、ional Crowding-Out, External Regulation, Local Environmental Quality, Experiments, South America, Colombia</p><p>　　1. Introduction </p><p>　　Economic institutions are designed to alter behavio

25、r, to stimulate actions intended to produce outcomes that are socially superior to those expected to flow from self-regarding individual choices. However, a small empirical literature suggests that institutions designed

26、to induce Pareto-superior outcomes may affect individual choices in surprised sing and contrary ways. In this paper we present results from a series of experiments designed to study the effects of external regulatory con

27、trol of l</p><p>　　We are by no means the first to suggest that institutions designed and expected to do good might actually engender contrary behavior. A number of authors have suggested that paying a mone

28、tary reward to motivate socially desirable behavior may actually do the opposite because it may crowd out an individual’s sense of public-spiritedness. Tim (1971) suggested that individuals donate blood more willingly wh

29、en they do so purely voluntarily than when they are offered money for their donations. In th</p><p>　　Evidence that regulatory institutions may crowd out public motivations in favor of greater self-interest

30、is not limited to the effects of monetary incentives. Ostman (1998) suggests that external control of common pool resources may have a negative effect by shifting responsibility to the regulatory agency and essentially a

31、bsolving individuals from other-regarding moral obligations. Frolich and Oppenheimer (1998) designed a series of experiments to operationalize John Rawls’ (1971) “veil of igno</p><p>　　We are interested in e

32、xamining the effects of external institutions (rules and regulations imposed from outside a community) on behavior in an experimental setting, in particular the effects of external control of environmental quality in rur

33、al settings of the developing world. Our design has a number of features, which combine to make it rather unique. (The details of our experimental design are provided in section 2). First, rather than conducting experime

34、nts in a laboratory setting, our exper</p><p>　　We consider two treatments to examine whether external control of local environmental quality may crowd out group-oriented behavior. Each group of subjects pl

35、ays a number of initial rounds of the game without regulation and without being able to communicate with each other .A subset of groups go on to play additional rounds in which they are confronted with the government-imp

36、osed regulation. The other groups also play additional rounds, but instead of facing an external regulation, individuals </p><p>　　Allowing some groups to communicate was motivated by the fact that local coo

37、perative efforts are frequently the alternative to external regulation in developing countries. And by the fact that relatively more is known about the role of face-to-face communication in enhancing levels of cooperati

38、on in experiments of this general type. Much of the literature on this subject is summarized by Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994), and Ledyard (1995). In brief, the findings show that communication enhan</p><

39、p>　　In section 3 we report our results. Consistent with findings of the experimental literature on contributions to public goods and exploitation of common properties [Ledyard (1995), Ostrom (1997, p. 7)], we find th

40、at when subjects do not face external restrictions and cannot communicate with each other, their decisions tend to be neither pure Nash strategies nor efficient choices, but somewhere between these extremes. Absent regu

41、lation, the simple ability to communicate allows individuals to mak</p><p>　　Institutional crowding-out suggests that well-intentioned but modestly enforced government controls of local environmental quality

42、 and natural resource use may perform rather poorly, especially as compared to informal local management. In section 4 we discuss this and other implications of the crowding-out effect, as well as suggest ways in which

43、this line of research should be extended.</p><p>　　當(dāng)?shù)丨h(huán)境的控制與公共機(jī)構(gòu)的擠出效應(yīng)</p><p>　　作者：朱.卡梅隆，克羅諾斯, 約翰.斯路德，克利.威爾</p><p><b>　　國(guó)籍：美國(guó)</b></p><p>　　出處：維吉尼亞大學(xué)圖書(shū)館研究文獻(xiàn)第1-

44、5頁(yè)</p><p>　　摘要:規(guī)則的設(shè)定是為了提高社會(huì)福利，但通常個(gè)人是純粹的利己主義作為前提。因此,在這樣的情況即私人和社會(huì)利益的無(wú)法達(dá)成一致,它應(yīng)該有可能帶來(lái)一個(gè)福利政策的改進(jìn)制,提供必要的誘因,社會(huì)才能更加有效的選擇。然而,實(shí)驗(yàn)證據(jù)表明個(gè)人通常都不會(huì)表現(xiàn)得好像他們是純粹的利己主義,他們更傾向于做出選擇,在自我和團(tuán)體之間找到利益平衡點(diǎn)。我們?cè)诟鐐惐葋喌膸讉€(gè)村莊試驗(yàn),發(fā)現(xiàn)有監(jiān)督管理的解決方案。這個(gè)令人驚訝的結(jié)

45、果是因?yàn)閭€(gè)體在面臨外部性時(shí),所做的選擇盡可能的符合自身的最大化利益；那就是,該制度本身似乎排擠自身的選擇行為。其中含義就是，一個(gè)政策的設(shè)計(jì)是建立在激勵(lì)個(gè)人朝更有效率的利己行為的方向出發(fā)，減少外部性，盡量的降低外部性，提高社會(huì)效率。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞:制度 擠出效應(yīng) 外部監(jiān)管 當(dāng)?shù)氐沫h(huán)境質(zhì)量 實(shí)驗(yàn) 南美 哥倫比亞</p><p><b>　　1、引言</b&g

46、t;</p><p>　　經(jīng)濟(jì)制度的設(shè)立是為了改變個(gè)人行為,以刺激計(jì)劃產(chǎn)生的效率的結(jié)果,是社會(huì)優(yōu)于個(gè)人預(yù)期的選擇。然而,實(shí)證文獻(xiàn)表明,機(jī)構(gòu)的成立誘使帕累托最優(yōu)的結(jié)果。影響個(gè)人的選擇并出現(xiàn)相反的選擇結(jié)果。本文中我們提出結(jié)果從一系列的實(shí)驗(yàn)設(shè)計(jì),研究了外部監(jiān)管的影響對(duì)當(dāng)?shù)氐沫h(huán)境的擠出效應(yīng)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn),他們的情況會(huì)很糟糕當(dāng)他們面臨了一個(gè)寬松的政府規(guī)定，但理論標(biāo)準(zhǔn)卻表明其福利會(huì)上升。這樣做的原因似乎是不可思議的結(jié)果,當(dāng)實(shí)驗(yàn)的

47、對(duì)象面臨一個(gè)監(jiān)管約束對(duì)他們的行為的情況時(shí),他們往往更傾向于純粹的平均主義,利己主義行為(也就是說(shuō),向純納什策略),而在缺乏監(jiān)管他們的選擇會(huì)更加的明顯。</p><p>　　我們并非首次表明制度的設(shè)計(jì)和行為的預(yù)期在實(shí)際上可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生相反的行為。許多學(xué)者建議支付高額報(bào)酬激勵(lì)社會(huì)所期望的行為，但實(shí)際上相反,因?yàn)樗锌赡芘艛D了個(gè)人的在某種意義上的公德心。提姆(1971)認(rèn)為個(gè)人在捐血時(shí)更心甘情愿當(dāng)他們作為志愿者時(shí)，而不是純

48、粹的自愿出錢(qián)為他們的捐贈(zèng)。在環(huán)境方面,弗雷和奧博(1997)發(fā)現(xiàn)瑞士居民愿意在他們的社區(qū)接受核廢物處理,只是出于一種道德上的良心,他們通常會(huì)接受這個(gè)提議賠償?shù)呢?fù)外部性。坤仁素和埃斯特拉達(dá)(1990)在內(nèi)華達(dá)州發(fā)現(xiàn)有類似的現(xiàn)象; 在拉斯維加斯山脈核廢物設(shè)施附近提高出口退稅未必能得到民眾的支持。</p><p>　　證據(jù)顯示,監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)公眾支持排擠了更大的利益，但其動(dòng)機(jī)卻不受限于貨幣報(bào)酬激勵(lì)的效果。奧斯曼(1

49、998)表明,外部控制的公共資源可能會(huì)有產(chǎn)生負(fù)面的影響,通過(guò)轉(zhuǎn)變管理機(jī)構(gòu)的責(zé)任,而且并非單單從個(gè)人道德上的義務(wù)說(shuō)明。弗拉羅奇和奧本海默(1998)設(shè)計(jì)了一系列的實(shí)驗(yàn)來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)約翰·羅爾斯正義(1971)“無(wú)知之幕”語(yǔ)境中的所謂私人貢獻(xiàn)比公共投資要好的多。除了這樣一個(gè)結(jié)果外,實(shí)驗(yàn)對(duì)象在賭一場(chǎng)比賽中,他們利益的起因出自于一個(gè)隨機(jī)個(gè)人償付的調(diào)動(dòng)。這兩方面之間的聯(lián)系并不是個(gè)人的選擇和強(qiáng)迫主體償付的選擇考慮的后果。事實(shí)上,設(shè)計(jì)這款游戲是在處

50、理轉(zhuǎn)讓中夾雜生成的一個(gè)優(yōu)勢(shì)戰(zhàn)略，它十分有效率的滿足了公眾的利益。正如所預(yù)測(cè)的,實(shí)驗(yàn)對(duì)象所做的貢獻(xiàn)也會(huì)跟著其大幅增加的公眾利益而增加。然而,這似乎對(duì)我們而言是最重要的發(fā)現(xiàn),但同時(shí)也發(fā)現(xiàn)證據(jù)表明,制度的個(gè)人動(dòng)機(jī)轉(zhuǎn)移了隨機(jī)利潤(rùn),走向更大的利益,即使事實(shí)是這個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)是一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的有方向的團(tuán)體。簡(jiǎn)言之,政府完成了它的目的,但是這似乎排擠了其他人的偏好。</p><p>　　我們對(duì)在考察外部機(jī)構(gòu)的影響(法規(guī)強(qiáng)加誒一個(gè)團(tuán)體)以及實(shí)

51、驗(yàn)設(shè)置對(duì)行為的影響有興趣,特別是發(fā)展中國(guó)家中農(nóng)村環(huán)境質(zhì)量的外部控制。我們的設(shè)計(jì)有一定數(shù)量的特點(diǎn),這二者相結(jié)合,使它相當(dāng)獨(dú)特。(我們?cè)敿?xì)的實(shí)驗(yàn)設(shè)計(jì)是在第二節(jié)提供)。第一, 不是在實(shí)驗(yàn)室環(huán)境下而進(jìn)行實(shí)驗(yàn), 我們的實(shí)驗(yàn)在田野中進(jìn)行,在南美哥倫比亞的三個(gè)鄉(xiāng)村。第二,我們?cè)O(shè)計(jì)實(shí)驗(yàn)時(shí)有意識(shí)地近似環(huán)境質(zhì)量問(wèn)題,在發(fā)展中國(guó)家農(nóng)村村民很有可能要面對(duì)。具體地說(shuō),實(shí)驗(yàn)者被要求去決定他們要花多少時(shí)間從周遭山林搜集柴火,雖然我知道這個(gè)活動(dòng)都有負(fù)面影響,因?yàn)楫?dāng)?shù)厮?/p>

52、質(zhì)的土壤侵蝕。第三,我們要考慮一系列的關(guān)于政府課稅的時(shí)間長(zhǎng)短問(wèn)題,才能夠使用搜集的柴火。課稅的執(zhí)行是適可而止,這是典型的指令指導(dǎo)環(huán)境政策。發(fā)展中國(guó)家的農(nóng)村村民實(shí)際上要面對(duì)的。標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的經(jīng)濟(jì)理論預(yù)言外部控制會(huì)產(chǎn)生更有效的選擇盡管配額的實(shí)施不是很強(qiáng)勢(shì)。</p><p>　　我們認(rèn)為兩種方法審查外部控制對(duì)當(dāng)?shù)丨h(huán)境質(zhì)量可能產(chǎn)生的擠出效應(yīng)。每組實(shí)驗(yàn)的對(duì)象參加有一定數(shù)量初始回合的比賽,沒(méi)有規(guī)定,沒(méi)有互相交流。其中的一個(gè)組團(tuán)體繼續(xù)

53、在回合中發(fā)揮額外的作用,他們將要面臨政府的規(guī)定。其他小組也在回合中發(fā)揮額外作用,但是外部規(guī)定, 在回合之間自己的小組允許個(gè)人與他人交流。</p><p>　　允許一些群體溝通是出自這一事實(shí), 在發(fā)展中國(guó)家經(jīng)常是當(dāng)?shù)氐暮献髋θ〈獠恐贫?。通過(guò)這一事實(shí),比較并了解在提高水平的面對(duì)面的交流合作的一般類型的實(shí)驗(yàn)。大部分關(guān)于這個(gè)主題的文獻(xiàn)總結(jié)是由加德納和沃克(1994),并Ledyard (1995)總結(jié)。總之,研究結(jié)果

54、表明,提高個(gè)人交流的可能性將是由利己主義決定。</p><p>　　在第3部分,我們報(bào)告了我們的結(jié)果。相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)關(guān)于公共貨物的捐贈(zèng)和公共財(cái)產(chǎn)的利用的實(shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)果相一致的, [理查德 (1995),奧斯曼(1997,p.7)],我們發(fā)現(xiàn)當(dāng)實(shí)驗(yàn)對(duì)象不會(huì)面臨外部約束,不能互相交流,他們的決策往往是有效的策略，不存在純粹的“納什”的選擇,但存在于這兩個(gè)極端之間的某個(gè)地方。缺席的規(guī)定,簡(jiǎn)單的溝通能力允許個(gè)人做更有效率的選擇。然而

55、,我們的研究結(jié)果的影響是外部監(jiān)管主體。平均來(lái)看,做出選擇,更接近他們的單純的納什的策略。因此,個(gè)人參與遠(yuǎn)低于規(guī)定利潤(rùn)的水平的情況下,只是允許那些實(shí)驗(yàn)對(duì)象,互相交流,盡管事實(shí)是監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)設(shè)計(jì)誘使更有效率的選擇。</p><p>　　制度上的擠出效應(yīng)表明政府控制當(dāng)?shù)氐沫h(huán)境質(zhì)量和自然資源的利用是出于好意,尤其是可以與不和諧的履行相比,非正式的本地的管理顯的更為有效。在第四節(jié)我們討論擠出效應(yīng)的含義, 建議如何擴(kuò)大這條線并加