關(guān)于中小企業(yè)人融資的畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)外文翻譯---香港創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場前景

1、<p>　　The Future of the Hong Kong Growth Enterprise Market</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　The difficulties that Hong Kong has experienced in its attempts to establish a successful growth ma

2、rket are similar to those encountered in the United Kingdom. It was only after the failures of the Unlisted Securities Market and the so-called Rule 4.2 trading system, that the London Stock Exchange (the “LSE”) came up

3、with the concept of a lightly regulated, disclosure-based, caveat emptor market as the model for its Alternative Investment Market (“AIM”). As detailed in the Discussion Paper, AIM </p><p>　　In contrast, Hon

4、g Kong’s Growth Enterprise Market (“GEM”), described as “A ‘Buyers Beware’ Market for Informed Investors” on the Stock Exchange website, had only 10 new listings in 2005[4]. As outlined in the Discussion Paper, the origi

5、nal initiatives for GEM, namely that it should be a disclosure-based, lightly regulated market administered separately from the Main Board, have been abandoned. Indeed, the greater regulatory burdens on GEM companies (as

6、 the GEM listing rules have become more clos</p><p>　　Question 1: Is there a need for a growth company market in Hong Kong?</p><p>　　Hong Kong should have a comprehensive and diversified capital

7、 market and should provide facilities for both small growth companies and larger, established companies to gain access to capital. In particular, a growth enterprise market plays an important role in enabling entrepreneu

8、r or family-owned companies to seek expansion, facilitating management buy-outs and buy-ins and providing an exit route for venture capitalists and a venue for further fund raising for venture capital investments.</p&

9、gt;<p>　　As a general comment, it is considered that the Stock Exchange needs a clearly articulated policy for the SME sector and that, if this is a sector which the Stock Exchange does not wish to service, the SF

10、C should nominate a separate exchange to serve this sector. As the SME sector is likely to be the most dynamic sector of the market in the long term, failure to provide facilities for this sector would be a lost opportun

11、ity for Hong Kong.</p><p>　　Question 2: If so, should the market primarily serve local Hong Kong companies, or should it target Mainland-based companies or regional/international companies?</p><p&

12、gt;　　It is not necessary for Hong Kong’s growth market to target companies from any particular jurisdiction. It should instead be open to companies from all jurisdictions, as was originally intended for the existing GEM[

13、5]. London’s AIM welcomes companies from all jurisdictions and has specifically targeted companies from the growth markets of China, India and Russia. If Hong Kong is to establish itself as a truly international finance

14、centre, it needs to make it easier for overseas companies to list</p><p>　　Question 3: At what stage of development should companies be admitted to the growth market – at start-up stage, or at a more mature

15、stage?</p><p>　　This question pre-supposes that there should be a qualitative assessment of companies prior to listing. On the contrary, investors and not the Stock Exchange should assess the commercial viab

16、ility and investment merits of listing applicants. It should therefore be left to the market to determine whether a particular listing applicant is successful. Any risks associated with a particular applicant should be d

17、ealt with by way of disclosure. In addition, the responsibility for ensuring that the app</p><p>　　The Exchange should not be overly concerned about the risk of growth company failures. On any growth board,

18、it must be expected that a certain percentage of companies will fail. The failure of individual GEM companies should not however be regarded as a failure of GEM itself, nor should they tarnish the reputation of the Hong

19、Kong market overall. NASDAQ started with many small, often unattractive, companies: it now dominates the new issues market in the United States.</p><p>　　Question 4: What should be the core investor group fo

20、r the growth company market – retail, professional and/or institutional? Should the growth company market be restricted to professional and institutional investors only?</p><p>　　It is not necessary to restr

21、ict investors in the growth company market to any particular group. Institutional investors will be attracted to stocks that they think will perform well. For AIM to have succeeded there must have been considerable inves

22、tor appetite for smaller growing companies with potential for higher returns to off-set the greater risk. It is however worth noting that, according to the Discussion Paper[8], the return of the FTSE AIM Index was higher

23、 and its risk lower than that of</p><p>　　If the intention is to make the growth market effectively a market for institutional investors only, this could be achieved by requiring listings to be achieved by w

24、ay of placings, thus forcing investors to go through their brokers.</p><p>　　Question 5: Depending on your answers to the foregoing questions, what kind of regulatory regime would be appropriate for the grow

25、th company market? In particular, should growth companies have low-cost access to public capital, or should they, because of their higher risk, be required to comply with procedures that dictate relatively higher costs t

26、han those for Main Board companies?</p><p>　　GEM should follow AIM in adopting a light, disclosure-based regulatory regime with emphasis on the responsibilities of sponsors. It should be a true alternative m

27、arket which would compete against the Main Board in the same way as NASDAQ competes against the New York Stock Exchange. It would need to be administered entirely separately from the Main Board and would require its own

28、staff and rules.</p><p>　　On the issue of costs, the current approval process for listing GEM applicants already imposes significant costs on applicants relative to the size of their business operations and

29、the amounts they raise and delays applicants’ access to the market. A simpler, more streamlined listing application process should be adopted to provide small growth companies with faster, low cost access to public capit

30、al.</p><p><b>　　外文資料翻譯譯文</b></p><p><b>　　香港創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場前景</b></p><p><b>　　簡介</b></p><p>　　香港在嘗試建立一個(gè)成功的成長型公司市場時(shí)所面臨的問題與英國差不多相同——倫敦證券交易所是在經(jīng)歷了非

31、上市證券市場和所謂的規(guī)則第4.2 條市場的失敗后，才推出了以輕度監(jiān)管，披露為主及買方注意承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)為概念的AIM。如討論文件中所述，AIM在多方面均為世界領(lǐng)先的增長型公司市場。確實(shí)，一般意見皆認(rèn)為AIM是除倫敦證券交易所主板外任何一間尋求上市的重要公司的首選目的地。雖然表面上乃一個(gè)增長型公司市場，但仍吸引了不少重要的公司：首50位公司的市值均在1億歐元以上，其中最大公司，Sportingbet，其市值超過了15億歐元。此外，受到倫敦證券交

32、易所主板不斷增加的規(guī)管壓力所影響，從主板轉(zhuǎn)到AIM上的公司數(shù)量大大超過了從AIM轉(zhuǎn)到主板的公司數(shù)量。在2005年，從主板市場轉(zhuǎn)到了AIM的公司共有40家，而只有兩家公司從AIM轉(zhuǎn)到主板市場；而在2006年頭三個(gè)月，有8家公司從主板市場轉(zhuǎn)到了AIM，而沒有一家從AIM轉(zhuǎn)到主板市場。AIM 已經(jīng)被機(jī)構(gòu)投資者普遍接受，并被認(rèn)為是已確立的現(xiàn)已不太可能失敗的市場。</p><p>　　與之相比，香港創(chuàng)業(yè)板（創(chuàng)業(yè)板）在聯(lián)交所

33、網(wǎng)站被稱為「針對(duì)充份掌握市場資訊的投資者的買方注意市場」，在2005年僅有10家公司上市。如討論文件所述，創(chuàng)業(yè)板初始的打算，即成為一獨(dú)立于主板市場，并以披露為主及輕度監(jiān)管市場的方針已經(jīng)中止。誠然，隨著創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場采取更為嚴(yán)格的監(jiān)管措施（創(chuàng)業(yè)板與主板的上市規(guī)則日益趨同）以及通常冗長而高成本的申請(qǐng)手續(xù)，意味著AIM已成為不少香港及中國公司的增長型市場選擇。此外，AIM較寬松的監(jiān)管范圍和簡單迅捷的上市申請(qǐng)程序助其將來成為許多香港和中國公司比香港

34、主板更理想的上市地點(diǎn)。同時(shí)，AIM吸引著越來越多得期望獲得海外資金和在海外市場提高知名度的中國公司。倫敦證交所稱AIM（已有247家國際上市公司）目標(biāo)為在未來10年內(nèi)成為國際增長型公司市場。如果香港要保持其作為中國內(nèi)地企業(yè)重要本土市場的地位，其增長型公司市場需要提升至可同AIM媲美：僅認(rèn)為香港和中國內(nèi)地企業(yè)更樂意在本地或者靠近本地的地方上市無助于香港增長型公司市場安全發(fā)展。</p><p>　　香港是否有需要建立

35、成長型公司市場？</p><p>　　香港應(yīng)該建立一個(gè)綜合的和多元化的資本市場，并為小型增長型公司及大型已確立公司獲取資本提供便利。特別是在幫助企業(yè)或者家族公司擴(kuò)張、管理層收購及買進(jìn)、為創(chuàng)業(yè)資本家提供退出途徑及為創(chuàng)業(yè)資金投資提供進(jìn)一步集資地點(diǎn)方面，增長型公司市場將發(fā)揮重要作用。</p><p>　　總的而言，聯(lián)交所應(yīng)為中小企業(yè)建立一個(gè)清楚明確的政策，如果聯(lián)交所不希望為該等行業(yè)服務(wù)，香港證券

36、期貨委員會(huì)應(yīng)另設(shè)一單獨(dú)交易場所為該等行業(yè)服務(wù)。鑒于中小企業(yè)從長期來看很可能成為市場最活躍的行業(yè)，如果放棄，香港將會(huì)失去一個(gè)發(fā)展機(jī)會(huì)。</p><p>　　如需要，該市場應(yīng)否主要為香港本地公司服務(wù)，抑或該市場應(yīng)以中國內(nèi)地公司或者地區(qū)性或者國際性公司為服務(wù)對(duì)象？</p><p>　　香港沒有必要指明某特定司法地區(qū)的公司為其增長型市場的目標(biāo)，而應(yīng)如現(xiàn)有的創(chuàng)業(yè)板初期打算的那樣向來自所有司法地區(qū)的公

37、司提供服務(wù)。倫敦的AIM歡迎世界各地的公司，同時(shí)把中國、印度和俄國的公司作為目標(biāo)服務(wù)對(duì)象。如果香港要成為真正的國際金融中心，為海外公司提供更簡捷的上市服務(wù)是必要的。如今，對(duì)于成立地非香港、中國內(nèi)地、百慕達(dá)或者開曼群島的公司，如果希望在香港創(chuàng)業(yè)板或者主板上市，它必須讓聯(lián)交所滿意其成立地的股東保護(hù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)至少同香港的相關(guān)準(zhǔn)則相近。此外，對(duì)于旨在實(shí)現(xiàn)主板二次上市的公司，聯(lián)交所設(shè)定額外條件要求該公司首次上市交易所的股東保護(hù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)應(yīng)至少同香港的相關(guān)準(zhǔn)則

38、相近。而這些要求即使是來自英國和澳大利亞這些有完善司法制度的國家的申請(qǐng)上市公司也不一定可以滿足，再加上要承擔(dān)證明該國家法律和交易所的相關(guān)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)與香港的相似性的舉證責(zé)任，整個(gè)申請(qǐng)過程將時(shí)間冗長兼成本高昂。雖然，海外公司實(shí)際上可以通過在香港、百慕達(dá)或者開曼群島設(shè)立控股公司方式進(jìn)行重組以解決上述問題，但是仍會(huì)有海外公司基于稅賦或者其他原因不希望在香港或者其他避稅港進(jìn)行重組。假如他們可以在香港實(shí)現(xiàn)二次上市或者同步首次上市，重組就會(huì)變得完全沒有必要

39、了。這樣</p><p>　　公司發(fā)展至什麼階段才可于增長型公司市場上市？是在始創(chuàng)的階段抑或是較成熟的階段？</p><p>　　該問題預(yù)先假定了存在一個(gè)上市前的公司量化評(píng)核體系。然而相反地，應(yīng)該由投資者而非聯(lián)交所對(duì)上市申請(qǐng)人的商業(yè)可行性及投資價(jià)值作出評(píng)核。因此，某位上市申請(qǐng)人成功與否應(yīng)交由市場決定。所有關(guān)于該特定申請(qǐng)人的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)應(yīng)以披露的方式處理。此外，英國AIM指定投資顧問保證申請(qǐng)人適宜上

40、市的角色，在某程度上是由保薦人取代。</p><p>　　交易所不必過于擔(dān)心增長型公司失敗的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。在任何增長型市場上，總會(huì)有一定比例的公司失敗。創(chuàng)業(yè)板上個(gè)別公司的失敗不意味著整個(gè)創(chuàng)業(yè)板的失敗，也不應(yīng)影響整體香港市場的聲譽(yù)。納斯達(dá)克始于許多小型、通常不具吸引力的公司：而現(xiàn)在則成為美國新上市公司的聚集地。</p><p>　　增長型公司市場的核心投資者群應(yīng)屬于甚么類別——散戶、專業(yè)及/或機(jī)構(gòu)投

41、資者？增長型公司市場應(yīng)否只限專業(yè)及機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與？</p><p>　　沒有必要把增長型公司市場的投資者限定為任何特定人或者集團(tuán)。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者會(huì)受到其認(rèn)為表現(xiàn)良好的股票所吸引。對(duì)于AIM來說，要成功就必須有相當(dāng)?shù)耐顿Y者對(duì)有潛在高回報(bào)的小型增長型公司有興趣，以抵銷其較大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。但是值得注意的是，根據(jù)討論文件，于2003年1月至2005年6月這兩年半間，F(xiàn)TSE AIM的指數(shù)回報(bào)比起同期的FTSE 100較高，而其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較

42、低。隨著市場的發(fā)展，散戶投資者會(huì)自己決定是否投資。伴隨特定公司而來的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)應(yīng)以上市文件中清晰的披露來處理。</p><p>　　如果把增長型市場定位為針對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的市場，則可要求上市通過配售方式完成，這會(huì)使投資者通過各自的經(jīng)紀(jì)進(jìn)行投資。</p><p>　　根據(jù)你對(duì)上述問題的回答，何種監(jiān)管制度會(huì)適合增長型公司市場？尤其是增長型公司應(yīng)否有渠道以低廉的成本向公眾集資？抑或，因其本身風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較高的關(guān)

43、系，該等公司應(yīng)否遵守一套成本比主板相對(duì)較高的集資程序？</p><p>　　創(chuàng)業(yè)板應(yīng)跟隨AIM采用較寬松及以披露為主的制度，并強(qiáng)調(diào)保薦人的責(zé)任。其應(yīng)當(dāng)成為可同主板媲美的另類市場，就像納斯達(dá)克之于紐約證交所一樣。這將需要把創(chuàng)業(yè)板同主板完全分開來監(jiān)管，擁有自己的工作人員和規(guī)則。</p><p>　　關(guān)于申請(qǐng)成本問題，現(xiàn)行創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市申請(qǐng)人的批核程序，已加上了相對(duì)其商業(yè)運(yùn)作的規(guī)模及其集資的金額而言