在合并的欲望涌動并購趨勢與分析外文翻譯

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目： Surge inurge to merge: M&A Trends and Analysis </p><p>　　出 處： Journal of Applied Corporate Finance </p><p>　　作 者： Mic

2、hael J.Mauboussin </p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Surge in the Urge to Merge: M&A Trends and Analysis </p><p>　　by Michael J. Mauboussin, Legg

3、 Mason Capital Management*</p><p>　　We may be at the front end of another mergers and acquisition (M&A) boom. Historically,upswings in deal activity have coincided with improvements in the economy and th

4、e stock market. Figure 1 shows the relationship between deal volume and the price level of the S&P 500 Index over the past 15 years. Te strong rally in equities of the March 2009 lows, sharply improved credit conditi

5、ons, solid non-fnancial corporate balance sheets, and companies seeking to enhance their strategic positions all poin</p><p>　　Source: Bloomberg, Reuters estimates; data through 2009.</p><p>　　A

6、fter reaching an all-time high in 2007, M&A activity tumbled during the next two years, refecting the financial and economic tumult. While 2008’s deal volume was respectable given the stock market’s sharp decline, th

7、e deals were heavily skewed toward the frst half of the year. Announced activity was weak in 2009, but the fourth quarter was the strongest of the year, refecting the improvement in equity and credit markets. For all of

8、2009, global M&A volume was roughly $2 trillion, about half of </p><p>　　During the deep recession of the past two years, falling earnings and limited access to capital made executives more risk averse.

9、As a result, frms slashed expenses, squeezed their balance sheets, and reined in growth initiatives. Tis has allowed companies to generate healthy free cash fows and to sustain strong fnancial positions. While consumer a

10、nd government debt may be of concern, the balance sheets of many companies are solid. As the recovery gains momentum, companies are again setting thei</p><p>　　M&A activity tends to rise and fall along w

11、ith the stock market, and almost every company is either involved in a deal, or afected by one, at some point. For instance, research suggests that roughly 2-3 percent of public companies are acquired in any given year.

12、Often, a move by one competitor triggers cascading moves by its competitors hoping to sustain their competitive position. Mergers and acquisitions play a large role in shaping competitive landscapes and can have a large

13、impact on corpora</p><p>　　Many companies and investors do not have a frm grasp on how M&A deals create or destroy shareholder value. Companies do deals for a host of reasons, including the pursuit of gr

14、owth, diversifcation of their businesses, or to consolidate an industry. And companies often feel compelled to do a deal simply because other companies in their industry are doing them. Generally, companies, investment b

15、ankers, and investors assume that deals that add to earnings per share are virtuous. But for an acquirer</p><p>　　On this point, however, the evidence is far from reassuring. Research shows that roughly two-

16、thirds of public M&A transactions destroy shareholder value for the acquiring companies. In addition, the market’s initial reaction to a deal is a reasonably unbiased predictor of long-term value creation. Mark Sirow

17、er and Sumit Sahni, consultants versed in M&A economics, looked at the persistence of returns for deals that the market initially deemed favorable or unfavorable. While the initial response w</p><p>　　On

18、e important reason that so many M&A deals fail to create value for buyers is that acquirers tend to overpay for targets. A host of factors might explain this tendency, including an overly optimistic assessment of mar

19、ket potential, overestimation of synergies, poor due diligence, and hubris. But while deals are harmful for the shareholders of acquirers on average, some buyers do create value. Acquirers can increase their chance of su

20、ccess by paying low premiums and executing on operational impr</p><p>　　A recent study by three professors of management showed that companies that do deals early in an acquisition wave generally enjoy share

21、-price rises, while those that buy later tend to sufer stock-price declines. Acquirers at the beginning of a wave see their shares increase more than 4% above what would be expected, based on past performance and market

22、trends, over the three weeks following the M&A announcement Buyers acting roughly two-thirds through the wave see average declines of approximate</p><p>　　Te professors defned an acquisition wave as any

23、six-year period where the peak year of acquisition activity was twice as high as the base year, and where there was a subsequent decline of greater than 50%. Te sample included over 3,000 companies in a wide range of ind

24、ustries from 1984 through 2004. All returns were adjusted for market factors.</p><p>　　There are several benefts to acting early in a cycle, including choosing from a greater pool of potential targets and th

25、e ability to buy assets cheaply. Naturally, the larger the number of potential acquisition candidates, the more likely it is that a buyer can fnd a suitable target. Further, companies that move early can generally do dea

26、ls at cheaper prices—usually against a background of economic growth—than companies that act late in the cycle. Finally, benefits to moving early are most prono</p><p>　　Underperformance for late movers is g

27、enerally the result of taking strategic action based on the previous action of other firms. While early movers can scan the landscape for the besttargets, late movers act less rationally and with greater haste,often lead

28、ing them to acquire suboptimal targets at elevated prices. Bandwagon pressures motivate the late movers to focus on social cues. As a result, they assume other companies have superior information and plunge into deals wi

29、thout fully considering</p><p>　　Bandwagon pressures also help explain why returns improve late in the wave. Te pressures subside as the M&A boom simmers out, allowing frms to complete more rational asse

30、ssments of acquisition targets and their values. Even so, the latest movers still generate shareholder returns that lag those made by early movers. Finally, the form of financing plays a role in determining shareholder r

31、eturns for acquirers later in the cycle. Companies that finance their deals primarily with cash see smaller de</p><p>　　Setting the Stage</p><p>　　There are two basic types of acquirers: strateg

32、ic and financial. Strategic buyers are companies that use M&A as a tool to implement corporate objectives. The most common rationales for doing deals include industry capacity reduction, product or market line extens

33、ion, geographic rollup, indus-try convergence, and M&A as research and development.Strategic buyers generally assume that they can realize significant operational synergies, which justifes the premium they pay for th

34、eir targets. </p><p>　　Financial buyers are typically private equity frms that acquire companies, business units, or assets and seek to improve their operating performance. Te substantial use of debt—private

35、 equity frms typically use $3-4 dollars of debt for every $1 of equity they contribute—allows them to enhance their cash-on-cash returns. Further, there is a perception that private equity frms, because less susceptible

36、to pressure from the public markets, can make more optimal capital allocation decisions. (While </p><p>　　Companies generally pursue strategic deals to expand their core strengths. This may involve plans t

37、o extend their product or geographic scope. Recent instances of this horizontal expansion include Kraft and Cadbury, Stanley Works and Black & Decker, and Disney and Marvel.</p><p>　　While horizontal exp

38、ansion may be the most popular rationale for doing a deal, there has been a notable increase in deals based on vertical integration. A vertically integrated company controls a product or service throughout the value chai

39、n, from raw materials to the end product. In recent decades the trend has been toward greater specialization,as companies have increasingly focused on one part of the value chain. In the last two years—perhaps spurred by

40、 the economic downturn—some prominent co</p><p>　　One factor slowing the pace of deals is that banks have been hesitant to fund them. In the U.S., bank loans for M&A fell sharply in 2009 to approximately

41、 $100 billion, about one-third of 2008’s volume and only one-sixth of the volume of 2007.After a brutal period in 2008 and early 2009, there are encouraging signs in the credit markets. Deal financing is picking up, inte

42、rest rates are falling, credit spreads are narrowing, and bond issuance is at record highs.</p><p>　　Along with the falling cost of debt, we have also seen a major increase in bond issuance. U.S. corporate b

43、ond issuancehit an annual record of $1.2 trillion in 2009, just ahead of the issuance in 2007 and up nearly 34% compared to 2008.Much of this increase has been the result of latent demand that built up during the credit

44、freeze in 2008. Government initiatives and low interest rates also helped. </p><p>　　Improvement in the credit markets is encouraging, but banks are not likely to return to pre-crisis mode any time soon. Eve

45、n if the volume of loans recovers, lenders are likely to be more conservative on the terms in the future than they were in the past. Tis might include, for example, insisting on a lower ratio of debt to the company opera

46、ting cash flow or as a percentage of total capitalization. Banks remain fearful that another market downturn will leave them with vulnerable debt instruments.</p><p>　　Some of the largest institutional inves

47、tors have already begun to cut back on their investments in private equity. For example, California Public Employees Retirement System, the biggest pension plan in the U.S., has reduced its allocation to private equity b

48、y more than 60%. In addition, over 40% of the largest university endowments are currently above their target allocations to private equity, suggesting they are also likely to reduce their investments in the future.</p

49、><p>　　These factors have led to the virtual disappearance of large private equity deals. Based on trends through the frst half of 2009, we estimate private equity M&A to be about $70 billion in 2009, or 3-

50、4% of total deals, much lower than the 15% average over the past decade .</p><p>　　For the foreseeable future, private equity deals will likely be smaller, and will include more upfront cash. Lower amounts o

51、f leverage may reduce returns, as the use of leverage has accounted for between one-quarter and one-third of returns. Transaction fees of about 1 to 2 percent will come under pressure as well, as fees this high are hard

52、to justify in an environment of lower expected returns.</p><p>　　Implications for Investors</p><p>　　Resurgent M&A activity is by no means inevitable, but the now</p><p>　　evide

53、nce strongly points toward a reversal of the 2008-2009 decline. Should deal volume pick up, investors need to be prepared to assess these transactions properly. Investors should ask three question when companies announce

54、 a deal:</p><p>　　1. Does the deal have material economic consequences for Share</p><p>　　Holders of the buying and selling companies?</p><p>　　2. Is the buyer sending signals by ch

55、oosing to pay for the deal with stock instead of cash?</p><p>　　3. What is the stock market’s likely reaction?</p><p>　　譯文： 在合并的欲望涌動：并購趨勢與分析</p><p>　　我們可能站在兼并與收購（M＆A）熱潮的另一前端。從歷史上看

56、，并購活動高漲也恰逢在經(jīng)濟和股票市場改善時。下圖顯示了過去15年里交易量與S＆P500的價格指數(shù)水平的關(guān)系。2009年3月低點股市強勁反彈，信貸條件大幅度改善，公司通過尋求更多的交易加強其戰(zhàn)略據(jù)點。值得注意的是，根據(jù)研究顯示，一些在年初制定收購周期并斷言這個收購周期的最終發(fā)展情況的公司，給股東帶來了更高的回報。</p><p>　　全球并購數(shù)量和標準普爾500指數(shù)</p><p>　　數(shù)目

57、（萬億美元）標準普爾500指數(shù)</p><p>　　資料來源：彭博資訊，路透社對2009年的數(shù)據(jù)估計。</p><p>　　并購活動在2007年達到了空前的高度，而在其后兩年內(nèi)暴跌，這正反映了金融和經(jīng)濟的動蕩。就2008年的交易量而言，僅是07年的一半，使得股市大幅下跌。而2009年則是最弱的，但第四季度卻是那年最強的，這也反射出股票和信貸市場的改善。對于2009年來說，全球并購量是2萬億

58、美元，約為過去五年的平均水平的一半以上。</p><p>　　在過去經(jīng)濟嚴重衰退的兩年里，收入的下降和資金的有限使得管理人員更不愿承擔風險。因此，財政資源管理處削減開支、壓縮他們的資產(chǎn)負債表、并勒住增長計劃，這些使得公司有現(xiàn)金能夠自由流動和維持健康強勁的金融立場。雖然消費者和政府債務(wù)的可能會被關(guān)注，但許多公司的資產(chǎn)負債表顯然才是最重要的。當恢復增長勢頭時，公司會再次將注意力放在經(jīng)濟增長上。</p>

59、<p>　　并購活動與股市一起趨于上升或下降，每家公司要么幾乎是參與了交易，要么就是在某一點上被其他影響。研究表明，大約有2%-3%的上市公司在一些特定年度會被收購。通常，競爭者的一個舉動將觸發(fā)其競爭對手的一系列操作，希望借此來維持其競爭地位。而兼并和收購可以在形成的競爭格局中發(fā)揮重要的作用，并能對公司價值產(chǎn)生很大的影響。</p><p>　　許多公司和投資者對通過并購創(chuàng)造或摧毀股東價值沒有強有力的把握

60、。公司做交易的原因有很多，其中包括追求成長，使其業(yè)務(wù)多元化，或鞏固一個行業(yè)。他們常常覺得有必要做一些簡單的處理，因為其他公司也在他們的行業(yè)里。一般來說，公司、投資銀行、交易商和投資者認為，添加每股的盈利是良性的。但對于收購方來說，最終只有一個測試交易的優(yōu)點：即它是否創(chuàng)造股東價值。因為投資者有強烈的動機去正確評價一個交易的經(jīng)濟價值，而股票價格的變動公告常常是一個優(yōu)秀的交易晴雨表的可取之處。</p><p>　　然而

61、，事實卻遠不能讓人放心。研究表明，大約有三分之二的收購公司在上市并購交易中摧毀了股東價值。此外，市場對于處理的最初反應(yīng)是一個合理的長期的價值創(chuàng)造的無偏預測，而一些并購經(jīng)濟學顧問認為持久的回報才是市場最初認為有利或不利的。雖然最初的反應(yīng)并不總是等于最后的結(jié)果，大約有一半的交易在一年后與積極的初步反應(yīng)一樣有利，同時，約有三分之二的初始交易仍然不利的消極反應(yīng)。</p><p>　　許多并購交易使買家失去創(chuàng)造價值，其中的

62、一個重要原因是往往以多付為收購的目標。許多因素可以解釋這一趨勢，包括對市場潛力過于樂觀的評估、高估的協(xié)同作用、缺乏盡職的調(diào)查，以及傲慢。不過，雖然交易對股東有害，有些卻能為購買者創(chuàng)造價值。收購方可以通過支付低保費和執(zhí)行相關(guān)業(yè)務(wù)增加他們成功的機會。有關(guān)的研究還指出收購成功得另一個原因，即好時機。</p><p>　　最近一個由三個管理學教授所作的研究表明，如果一公司在收購交易早期普遍股價上漲，那么在購買后股票價格往

63、往下跌。在開始收購前，基于過去的表現(xiàn)以及并購一宣布后市場在三個星期內(nèi)的趨勢，可以預期看到他們的股份增加超過4％以上。三分之二的買方行事大約可以引起約3％的平均跌幅。到后期雖然有些改善，但還是大大低于早期。</p><p>　　一些教授認為收購潮應(yīng)是在連續(xù)的六年期間收購活動高于基準年的兩倍，且在隨后有一次大于50％的跌幅。研究的對象包括從1984到2004年各個行業(yè)的3000個公司，所有市場回饋的因素也進行了調(diào)整。

64、</p><p>　　在這個周期的早期有幾個好處，包括選擇一個更大的潛在目標和獲得購買廉價資產(chǎn)的能力。當然，潛在的收購對象越多，買家越有可能找到一個合適的目標。此外，公司運作的越早，一般在交易中可以得到越便宜的價格，通常對經(jīng)濟的增長要晚于公司的行為。最后，較突出的是早運作的行業(yè)的增長和穩(wěn)定。</p><p>　　采取逾期操作的戰(zhàn)略行動所導致的一般結(jié)果是以以前的其他行動為基礎(chǔ)。而先行者可以看

65、到更好的前景，逾期不理智的行為和推動者的操作，常常能使他們在高溫價格時獲得最理想的目標，而從眾的壓力則會促使逾期操作者更加關(guān)注社會信息。因此，他們會認為其他公司的優(yōu)越信息并沒有完全投身在交易中。</p><p>　　從眾的壓力也有助于解釋為什么在收購潮中收益的提高會如此滯后。壓力消退的并購蘊積了繁榮，使財政資源管理處能更合理的評估收購目標和收購價值。即便如此，逾期操作者產(chǎn)生的股東回報也是由先行者制成的。最后，融資

66、的形式在確定股東回報周期里起著決定性的作用。公司融資主要是看他們的股票跌幅而不是使用公司自己的現(xiàn)金。</p><p><b>　　步驟設(shè)置</b></p><p>　　收購有兩個基本類型：戰(zhàn)略與融資。戰(zhàn)略的買方是以并購作為手段來實現(xiàn)企業(yè)目標的公司。最常見的交易理由包括產(chǎn)業(yè)能力縮減、產(chǎn)品或生產(chǎn)線的延伸、地理匯總、產(chǎn)業(yè)集群，以及并購的研究和發(fā)展。戰(zhàn)略的買方普遍認為他們能夠

67、實現(xiàn)該重大業(yè)務(wù)的協(xié)同效應(yīng)，其中溢價收購是他們自己的目標。</p><p>　　金融買家通常是一些私人股本的收購公司、業(yè)務(wù)部門、或資產(chǎn)，并尋求提高經(jīng)營業(yè)績的產(chǎn)品。大量使用債務(wù)的私人股本公司通常每使用3-4美元的債務(wù)就有1美元的股本有助于光大他們，提高他們現(xiàn)金到現(xiàn)金的回報。此外，有一種看法認為，私人股本公司，因為不容易受公開市場的壓力，可以行使更多的優(yōu)化資金分配的決策。（雖然我承認這個看法，但我強烈反對上市公司被阻止

68、是股東作出的最好的長期資本分配的決定。）</p><p>　　公司普遍追求的戰(zhàn)略是以擴大他們的優(yōu)勢為核心，這可能涉及延長他們的產(chǎn)品或地域范圍計劃。最近這一次橫向擴張的實例包括卡夫和吉百利、史丹利和百得、迪斯尼和奇跡。</p><p>　　而橫向擴張，可能是做交易最流行的理由，在以垂直整合為基礎(chǔ)的交易中起著的重要的作用。垂直整合公司控制了整個產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)從原材料到最終產(chǎn)品的價值鏈。隨著企業(yè)越來

69、越注重價值鏈中的某一個部分，使得最近幾十年來的趨勢走向了更細的專業(yè)化。在過去的兩年，也許是受到經(jīng)濟衰退的刺激，一些著名的公司做了交易變得更加垂直整合。其中包括甲骨文和太陽微系統(tǒng)公司、百事可樂公司和百事裝瓶集團及民族生活和特瑪。</p><p>　　交易速度減緩的一個因素是銀行一直遲遲未給他們投資。在美國，銀行給予并購公司的貸款在2009年急劇下降至約1000億美元，約是2008年三分之一，只有2007年的六分之一

70、。在經(jīng)歷了殘酷的2008年和2009年初期后，信貸市場出現(xiàn)了令人鼓舞的跡象。交易融資正在復蘇，利率下降，信貸息差縮小，債券發(fā)行量達到歷史新高。</p><p>　　隨著債務(wù)成本的下降，我們也看到債券發(fā)行大幅增加。美國發(fā)行的公司債券在2009年達到了1.2萬億美元的年度紀錄，領(lǐng)先于2007年的發(fā)行量，比2008年上漲了近34％，這一增長中的大部分建立在2008年信貸凍結(jié)期間的潛在需求。當然政府的推動和低利率也起了作

71、用。</p><p>　　信貸市場的改善是令人鼓舞的，但銀行不可能用很快的時間回到危機前的模式。即使是貸款的回收量，貸款人在未來也可能比過去有了更為保守的計算。這些可能包括堅持較低的債務(wù)比率對公司的營運現(xiàn)金阜或作為總市值的百分比。銀行仍然擔心另一個市場低迷會使他們的債務(wù)工具變得脆弱。此外，銀行在運作中對資本的要求更嚴格，限制其擴大并購的融資數(shù)量。</p><p>　　一些大型機構(gòu)的投資者已

72、經(jīng)開始削減其私人股本的投資。例如，加州公共雇員退休系統(tǒng)作為美國最大的養(yǎng)老金計劃準備減少其分配超過60％的私人股本。此外，超過40％的大學捐贈基金目前已超過其分配的私人股權(quán)，這表明他們也可能減少未來的投資，這些因素導致一些了大型民營交易的虛擬資產(chǎn)的失蹤。根據(jù)2009年上半年的發(fā)展趨勢，我們估計2009年的私人股權(quán)并購約700億美元或3-4％的交易總額，比過去十年的平均值低15％。</p><p>　　在可預見的將來

73、，私人股本交易可能將會更小，也會包括更多的預付現(xiàn)金。杠桿較低的數(shù)額可能會減少回報，而杠桿的使用，已經(jīng)在回報中占四分之一到三分之一。約1%-2%的交易費也將會比較有壓力，因為這種高收費很難證明在一個較低的預期環(huán)境中有所回報。</p><p><b>　　對投資者的啟示</b></p><p>　　復活的并購活動絕不是必然的，但證據(jù)強烈指向2008-2009年的反轉(zhuǎn)下跌。