外文翻譯---股利政策爭(zhēng)議問(wèn)題

1、<p><b>　　原文： </b></p><p>　　Dividend policy: The Issues</p><p>　　1. Introduction </p><p>　　The determinants of dividend policy are a continuing puzzle, as noted by B

2、lack (1976). In this paper we review the major issues in dividend policy and relate them to some of the themes explored in companion papers in this volume. The paper is d ivided into five sections. Section 2 surveys the

3、literature on the information signalling properties of dividends. Section 3 discusses some tax issues related to dividend policy and section 4 draws on some agency costs explanations for dividend payments. </p>&l

4、t;p>　　2. Dividend policy and information signalling </p><p>　　In their classic paper, Miller and Modigliani (1961) provide a cogent argument for the claim that dividend policy does not affect the value of

5、 the firm. They assume a world without transactions costs and taxes, a given investment policy and fully informed investors. In these circumstances it follows that "the irrelevance of dividend policy, given investme

6、nt policy, is 'obvious, once you think of it'"(p.414). With a given level of investment, if a firm chooses to pay a dollar more of dividend now</p><p>　　Miller and Modigliani (1961) note that th

7、e "informational content" of dividends is assumed absent from their model. They note, however, that in practice "where a firm has adopted a policy of dividend stabilization with a long-established and gene

8、rally appreciated 'target payout ratio', investors are likely to (and have a good reason to) interpret a change in dividend rate as a change in management's views of future profit prospects for the firm"

9、. This echoed the stance recorded by Lintner (1956)</p><p>　　The importance of the use of payout levels to signal changes in expectations of future earnings is also emphasized. The role of information signal

10、ling has been emphasized in recent theoretical work on dividend policy. Miller and Rock (1985) provide a formal model of the role of dividend policy under asymmetric information. They assume that firm's managers know

11、 more than outside investors about the true state of the firm's current earnings; both dividend payments and external financing will conse</p><p>　　3.Taxation and dividend policy</p><p>　　Th

12、ere are a number of potential linkages between corporate dividend policies and the tax system. Farrar and Selwyn (1967) and Brennan (1970) point out, that in tax regimes where dividend income is taxed at a higher margina

13、l personal tax rate than capital gains, shareholders in different tax brackets will prefer different payout policies. It makes sense for higher personal tax rate investors to invest in lower dividend payout stocks so tha

14、t they can take most of their gains in the form of capital</p><p>　　Trueman (1986) model the interaction of dividend policy, invest-ment decisions and financing decisions in the context of a corporate tax re

15、gime with varying investor personal tax rates. Their model implies that shareholders in different personal tax brackets will not agree on what constitutes the optimal investment/divi-dend policy. Investors in high person

16、al tax brackets would prefer the firm to invest more whilst those in lower tax brackets will prefer higher payouts and lower invest-ment. Thi</p><p>　　The result would be that shareholders would incur transa

17、ctions costs in rearranging their portfolios to achieve desired income streams. Elton and Gruber (1970) examine the drop-off ratio, defined as the difference between the ex-dividend and cum-dividend price scaled by the d

18、ividend, to try and measure clientele effects. If the price declines by the full amount of the dividend, after the payment of the dividend, the drop-off ratio is one. Elton and Gruber report a positive association betwee

19、n th</p><p>　　4. Agency costs and dividend policy</p><p>　　Jensen (1976) demonstrate that if management serve their own interests and not those of outside shareholders, then agency costs could a

20、rise. These will result because shareholders forsee that managers can increase their own wealth at their expense by the excessive use of perks or by shirking. In the Jensen and Meckling (1976) scenario, owner-managers ma

21、y find it optimal to incur monitoring and bonding costs to reduce potential agency costs. These agency costs take a number of forms including mon</p><p>　　5. Conclusion </p><p>　　Dividend policy

22、 remains, as Black (1976) suggested, "a puzzle". The evidence in the West seems to suggest that dividend payments do impart information. There is also some evidence of taxation impacting upon share prices and r

23、eturns via dividend policies. Why do firms pay dividends and raise external finance at the same time? It may be the case that Western companies see some benefit in the form of reduced agency costs resulting from the join

24、t impact of the policy. However, it has to be admitted,</p><p>　　Source: D.E. Allen, H.Y. Izan, (1993) "Dividend Policy: The Issues", Managerial Finance, Vol. 18 Iss: 1, pp.1 – 8.</p><p&

25、gt;<b>　　二、翻譯文章</b></p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p><b>　　股利政策：爭(zhēng)議問(wèn)題</b></p><p><b>　　1、介紹</b></p><p>　　股利政策的決定因素是一個(gè)持續(xù)的謎題,值得注意的是由

26、布萊克(1976)在文中提出的論點(diǎn),在文中我們回顧股利政策的重大課題以及關(guān)注了一些與股利政策相關(guān)的文章。論文分成了五個(gè)部分。第二部分調(diào)查的文獻(xiàn)是信息信號(hào)性能的股息。第三部分討論一些股利政策的相關(guān)的稅收問(wèn)題，第四部分引用了一些代理成本股利發(fā)放的解釋。結(jié)論得出的這些觀點(diǎn)一起強(qiáng)調(diào)了一些懸而未決的問(wèn)題。</p><p>　　2、股利政策和信息發(fā)送信號(hào)</p><p>　　米勒和莫迪里阿尼（1961

27、）在他們的經(jīng)典論文中提供了一個(gè)有力的論據(jù)聲稱股利政策不影響企業(yè)的價(jià)值。They ass他們假設(shè)a world without transactions costs and taxes, a given investment policy and full 世界上沒(méi)有一個(gè)全面的交易成本和稅收，給定的投資政策和投資者informed investors.有的充分信息。在這樣的情況下,遵循“毫不相干的股利政策”, “一旦你認(rèn)為是”對(duì)于投資政策

28、的作用是明顯的。在給定的投資水平下,如果一個(gè)公司現(xiàn)在選擇支付一美圓更多的股息,它必須籌集外部資本額外的一美元以支持他們的投資：更高的的紅利正好抵消現(xiàn)有股東未來(lái)股利的減少和企業(yè)現(xiàn)在必須支付股息給新股東。在缺乏稅收效應(yīng)和交易成本、信息充分下企業(yè)的價(jià)值對(duì)現(xiàn)有股東不受股利政策影響。In the absence of tax effects and transactions costs and given fulDividend policy i

29、s therefore irrelevan因此，股利政策是無(wú)關(guān)。</p><p>　　Miller and Modigliani (1961) note that the "informational content" of dividends米勒和莫迪利亞尼（1961）注意到，“信息內(nèi)容”股息is assumed absent from their model.假設(shè)偏離了他們的模型。They

30、 note, however, that in practice "whereThis echoed the stance recorded by Lintner (1956) in his survey of US company這呼應(yīng)林特納（1956）在他的調(diào)查practices which led him to develop the 'partial adjustment' model of divid

31、end beha-中美國(guó)公司的活動(dòng)中使他產(chǎn)生了用不同的模型部分調(diào)整的股息的記錄。Lintner suggests that the primary determinant of dividend payments is the林特納表明，發(fā)放股利的主要決定因素是relatio</p><p>　　The results are consistent with the implications of the Lin

32、tner model.Respondents受訪者report that a desire to maintain stable dividends and the company's recent dividend報(bào)告說(shuō)，一個(gè)希望保持穩(wěn)定分紅和公司最近股息history are the main factors influencing target payouts.歷史是目標(biāo)支付的主要因素影響。使用的重要性支出水平變化信號(hào)對(duì)股

33、票未來(lái)盈利的預(yù)期也是強(qiáng)調(diào)的重點(diǎn)。The importance of the use oThe role of information signalling has been emphasized in recent theoretical信息的信號(hào)的作用也是最近股息政策理論一直強(qiáng)調(diào)的。Miller and Rock (1985) provide a formal model of the rol米勒和羅克（1985）提供一個(gè)正式模式作用

34、的非對(duì)稱信</p><p>　　Similar evidence in a US context is provided by Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984).</p><p>　　3Taxation and dividend policy稅務(wù)及股息政策 </p><p>　　在股利政策和稅收制度有一些潛在的聯(lián)系。There are a nu

35、mber of potential linkages between corporate dividend policiesFarrar and Selwyn (1967) and Brennan (1970) point out,that in法拉和塞爾溫（1967）和布倫南（1970）指出，法勒和塞爾溫(1967)和布倫南(1970)指出,在稅收制度中在股息收入是在更高的邊際個(gè)人所得稅資本收益中得到的,股東的比例比在不同的稅級(jí)下將喜

36、歡不同的支付政策，It makes sense for higher personal tax rate investors to invest in lower這是有道理的，稅率更高的個(gè)人投資者投資于低派息股票以便他們能夠獲得他們大部分的獲取形式的資本收益。 Indeed, pushed to the limit, this argument suggests that it is tax inefficient,事實(shí)上，是推到了極限

37、，這種說(shuō)法表明，它是稅收效率不高，from a hig</p><p>　　If equilibrium conditions are assumed, the argument alsoThiswill compensate for their relativelyMiller and Scholes (1978) reduce the impact of the above argument by demon

38、-Masulis and Trueman (1986) model the interaction of dividend policy, invest-特魯曼（1986）模型的政策之間的相互作用分紅，投資ment decisions and financing decisions in the context of a corporate tax regime wi決策和融資決策的制度下的法人稅與varying investor pe

39、rsonal tax rates.不同投資者的個(gè)人所得稅稅率。Their model implies that shareholders in different他們的模型意味著在不同的股東personal tax br</p><p>　　克拉克在書中提到,由于在稅收制度上的影響因素的比例下滑所造成了1987年7月澳大利亞股票紅利的股息歸責(zé)于稅收制度。但這些差異未達(dá)到統(tǒng)計(jì)上的顯著水平，因?yàn)橛写罅扛蓴_數(shù)據(jù)很難得出

40、明朗的結(jié)論。Elton and Gruber report a positive association between the meThe implication is that shares with a larger drop-ofThis is because drop-off ratios would be boundeAny period marked by a change in the tax system provid

41、es a fertile opportunityA paper by Clarke, in this volumeClarke reports that unfranked dividends were discounted, on average, moreHowever, these differences were not statistically significant a</p><p>　　4、代理

42、成本和股利政策</p><p>　　杰森(1976)表明,如果管理層只注重他們的自己的利益而不顧及其他外部股東的利益, 代理成本就可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)。造成這些結(jié)果是因?yàn)楣蓶|看到,管理者可以使用過(guò)多的額外津貼或逃避他們的費(fèi)用來(lái)增加自己的財(cái)富。在杰森和麥克林(1976)闡述的情況下,企業(yè)的所有者可以找到最佳承擔(dān)費(fèi)用監(jiān)測(cè)和減少潛在的代理成本得方法。這些代理成本用一個(gè)數(shù)值的形式表示,包括監(jiān)測(cè)成本和過(guò)多的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避程度由管理層他們自

43、己擁有的一個(gè)部分重要財(cái)富與公司利益相捆扎。過(guò)度保守的行為可能有利益于為公司的債權(quán)人服務(wù)而不是股東。羅哲夫(1982)表明,在缺乏稅收情況下,對(duì)于一個(gè)公司極佳的股利政策由于存在的代理成本這是可能的。他認(rèn)為,派息率可能受到籌資的外部資本成本和代理成本降低的權(quán)衡, 當(dāng)意識(shí)到當(dāng)企業(yè)增加派息率。伊斯特布魯克(1984)也表明股利發(fā)放可以降低代理成本。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理能改變公司的形象都通過(guò)改變其真正的投資項(xiàng)目、債務(wù)和股權(quán)的相對(duì)平衡。通過(guò)保持固定的支付紅利避

44、免了建立平衡股權(quán)基金,同時(shí)迫使公司尋求外部資本。公司定期的活動(dòng)的資金的需求導(dǎo)致外部融資的提高。它們的存在因此能夠負(fù)擔(dān)給現(xiàn)有股東。股東也將由于調(diào)整杠桿比例的提高將伴隨外部資本的增加。</p><p>　　另一方面,許多日本公司正在穩(wěn)定公司成員交叉持股系統(tǒng)。該組織銀行持有股權(quán)在集團(tuán)公司以及提供貸款。成為集團(tuán)公司都有分接觸的信息渠道,他們也不大可能需要股息支出的信息信號(hào)。此外,事實(shí)上意味著主要的一些銀行股東利益沖突的代

45、理成本上升到也很可能會(huì)減少。在日本股利政策應(yīng)該有更少的作用在降低代理成本上。事實(shí)上,這令人堅(jiān)信, 在日本有三條截然不同類別的股東: 穩(wěn)定的組織股東、外部的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者和外部個(gè)人股東。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者將可以得到更慷慨的派息政策來(lái)幫助他們完成他們的責(zé)任。在公司年度大會(huì)用會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則和慣例進(jìn)行相加的方法意味著日本個(gè)人投資者用靈通的信息對(duì)公司前景是否相對(duì)穩(wěn)定做出判斷，股東們應(yīng)該更好的靈通的消息。是用收集任何消息的來(lái)制定股利政策嗎?就不清楚為什么日本公司遵循

46、他們目前的紅利政策,同樣也不清楚他們是否能服務(wù)所有的利益相關(guān)者并一視同仁。</p><p><b>　　5、總結(jié)</b></p><p>　　股利政策仍然存在,布萊克(1976)提出,“股利政策是一個(gè)謎”。西方的證據(jù)似乎也暗示股息付款方式傳遞信息。它并不完全清楚他們的是否是引起主要的收入變化的客觀的問(wèn)題或者他們是否哪些方面的獨(dú)立傳遞信息。也有一些證據(jù)表明,稅務(wù)沖擊股票