外文翻譯---瑞士的股利政策

1、<p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯譯文</b></p><p><b>　　一、外文原文</b></p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Dividend policy in Switzerland</p><p>　　Dividend poli

2、cy has long been a subject of research and debate. There are many theoretical and empirical results describing the decisions companies make in this area. At the same time, however, there is no generally accepted model de

3、scribing payout policy. Moreover, empirical findings are often contradictory or difficult to interpret in light of the theory.</p><p>　　In the ideal world of Miller and Modigliani (1961), dividends are irrel

4、evant. The value of a firm is given by its investment opportunities. Dividends are just the residual, and investors faced with consumption shocks can always get their own “homemade” dividends.</p><p>　　In “r

5、eal life”, however, dividend policy is one of the main concerns for managers and investors. Empirical studies have generally found that dividend increases are considered good news by investors, while dividend decreases l

6、ead to negative reactions.</p><p>　　Several explanations for the existence and importance of dividends have been suggested over the last decades. Dividends could be used as signals for the actual position of

7、 a firm. Companies could communicate their better quality by paying higher dividends: low-quality firms will not be able to imitate them since dividends involve costs in terms of foregone investment, taxes, or the need t

8、o attract external capital. Agency theory suggests that dividends may be a way to reduce the overinvestment p</p><p>　　Each of the main theories concerning dividend policy has found at least some support in

9、actual data. However, empirical research has also revealed weaknesses of these explanations, and a broad consensus concerning the “best” theory of corporate payout seems far away. We may know more about the “dividend puz

10、zle”, but we are still without a definite solution.</p><p>　　The present paper examines some of the characteristics of dividend policy using Swiss data. The first part presents factors that influence variati

11、ons in dividend payments across companies at a given point in time. The second part analyzes the changes in dividends over time.</p><p>　　The cross-sectional analysis for the 2000–2003 periods compares the c

12、haracteristics of dividend payers and non-payers. It then identifies several determinants of the differences between dividend payers in terms of payout ratios and dividend yields. The results show that companies that are

13、 less risky, larger, with lower growth opportunities, and with lower leverage tend to pay higher dividends. Institutions show a preference for dividend-paying companies, but there is little evidence that they pr</p>

14、;<p>　　Quite interestingly, the factor that turns out to have the strongest influence on payout ratios and dividend yields is price volatility. This may be interpreted as a sign that companies with higher earnings

15、 uncertainty are less likely to pay high dividends - or to pay dividends at all.</p><p>　　Dividends per share are much more widespread as a headline indicator of dividend policy. The final section of the pap

16、er looks at changes in (split-adjusted) dividends per share and seeks to determine whether these changes have informational content. The results show that dividend increases follow periods of high earnings and cash flow

17、growth, whereas dividend decreases follow declines.</p><p>　　A closer look at the data reveals that there may nevertheless be some information conveyed by dividend changes. The average future level of earnin

18、gs after dividend increases is significantly higher than the mean over the previous few years. The earnings of companies that decrease the dividend decline slightly and remain at a persistently low level around the divid

19、end change.</p><p>　　An important class of models is based on the idea that the assumption of perfect information may be unrealistic and that dividends can be used as signals of firm quality. Bhattacharya (1

20、979) builds a two-period model with two types of firms. Investments are made during the first period; their expected profitability is known to management, but not to outside investors. In order to signal the quality of t

21、heir investment, the managers of “good” firms (managers are assumed to act in the interest of </p><p>　　The signaling models provide an explanation for the positive stock price reaction to the announcement o

22、f dividend increases or initiations. However, the empirical evidence on this hypothesis is mixed. In an early study, Watts (1973) found that unexpected changes in earnings and unexpected changes in dividends were related

23、, although he remained skeptical about the possibility to make money by exploiting this regularity. Penman (1983) finds that “both dividend announcements and management’s earnin</p><p>　　Based on the mixed r

24、esults for the signaling theory, Grullon et al (2002) suggest that, rather than an increase in profitability, dividend increases could reflect a decrease in risk – the “maturity hypothesis”. They find that while profitab

25、ility declines following a dividend increase, systematic risk in a three-factor Fame French model decreases. They argue that as firms become more mature (and therefore less risky, but with lower growth opportunities), th

26、ey will be more likely to pay large divi</p><p>　　Agency theory suggests that dividends can be used as a means to control a firm’s management. Distributing dividends reduces the free cash flow problem and in

27、creases the management’s equity stake. Easterbrook (1984) also suggests that dividends can be used to keep firms in capital markets, where they are monitored by potential investors. This is useful since monitoring by exi

28、sting shareholders can be hindered by coordination problems. Lang (1989) find that dividend increases are associated with h</p><p>　　Other evidence, however, tends to qualify the agency explanation. Capital

29、expenditures increase following dividend increases, and decrease following dividend decreases and omissions compared to the previous average (This is in line with the findings of Yoon and Starks 1995 and Denis et al. 199

30、4). Moreover, companies that increase dividends have not had significantly higher increases in capital expenditure over the previous 2 years, while companies that omit dividends show a significant slowdown </p>&l

31、t;p>　　Dividends may thus become informative about earnings in a way not envisaged in classical signaling models. Since managers want to avoid dividend decreases, they will only increase dividends when they are reasona

32、bly sure that there has been a sustainable increase in earnings. They will also cut or omit dividends only when the firm’s earnings position has deteriorated considerably. As a result, a dividend increase will follow a p

33、eriod of significant earnings growth and confirm that the new, higher</p><p>　　The paper has examined several features of dividend policy for a sample of Swiss companies. Cross-sectional comparisons show neg

34、ative relationships between dividend payments and market-to-book ratios, price volatility, and leverage, as well as positive relationships with profitability and (to a lesser extent) firm size and institutional holdings.

35、 Ownership concentration does not seem to have significant effects. Companies that used repurchases over the recent years were riskier and less profitab</p><p>　　Signaling models suggest that dividend change

36、s predict future profitability. Still, the analysis of the data indicates that when dividends increase, earnings have already increased. There are no obvious signs of faster growth after positive changes in dividends.<

37、;/p><p>　　Nonetheless, there is evidence that when dividends increase, future average earnings will be at a higher level compared to the past. Companies that decrease or omit dividends have been in a difficult

38、position for several years, and they will still have inferior cash flows and earnings over the medium term. They will also have significantly lower capital expenditures.</p><p>　　This part of the paper exami

39、nes the factors that determine variations in dividend policy across firms. The comparison is based both on averages for the 2000–2003 period and on data for the single year 2003.</p><p>　　There are several g

40、roups of variables that are considered in the cross-sectional comparisons:</p><p>　　Market-to-book ratios, as a proxy for growth opportunities. Since low market-to-book companies are more likely to have fre

41、e cash flow problems, it is to be expected that they pay (higher) dividends.</p><p>　　Total assets and total sales, as proxies for firm size. Large companies are usually “mature” companies and therefore have

42、 more available cash relative to their positive NPV projects. Moreover, they are more likely to have widely dispersed shareholdings, and dividends could be used as a way to “keep” firms “in the capital markets” in order

43、to enhance monitoring. At the same time, however, large companies are usually considered less information ally opaque than small companies, and so there may be</p><p>　　The firms’ betas and price volatility

44、(computed as the band within which the share price moved around the mean price during the year), as measures of firm risk. The “maturity hypothesis” suggests that dividend increases are associated with decreases in risk

45、rather than increases in profitability. Also, risk is an important firm characteristic in itself, and it is important to control for it.</p><p>　　Capital gearing, as a measure of leverage in book terms. Debt

46、 covenants often include limits concerning dividend payments as a way to mitigate the agency problem between shareholders and debt holders. On a different level, both debt and dividends can be used to reduce the free cas

47、h flow problem. Johnson (1995) suggests that debt and dividends could be alternative means to control management. Returns on assets and returns on equity, as measures of firm profitability. While it may seem obvious tha&

48、lt;/p><p>　　Several indicators for the ownership structure of these companies. The ownership of large Swiss companies is quite varied – from family-owned companies to widely-held ones, or companies owned by inv

49、estment funds. Thus, it is interesting to examine the impact of the ownership structure on dividend policy.</p><p>　　These findings suggest that dividend changes can become informative due to the manager’s a

50、symmetric perception of rewards for dividend increases and negative consequences of dividend cuts. Since managers try to avoid cutting dividends until they “have to”, and only increase them when they think earnings are s

51、ufficient, dividend increases show that earnings have shifted to a higher level over the medium term, while dividend decreases are a sign that the firm’s problems are likely to continue in t</p><p>　　This me

52、chanism can also explain why price volatility is such an important factor in the cross-sectional comparisons. If price volatility is taken to be a sign of uncertainty concerning future earnings, then its strong negative

53、relationship with dividends may mean that managers try to keep dividends at a low level in order to avoid having to cut them in low earnings states. Thus, dividend changes can actually be informative, although the mechan

54、ism may be different from that considered in classica</p><p>　　Source: Bogdan stacescu, “Dividend policy in Switzerland” Fin Mkts Portfolio Mgmt(2006)20:153-183</p><p><b>　　二、翻譯文章</b>

55、;</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p><b>　　瑞士的股利政策</b></p><p>　　股利政策一直是研究和辯論的話題。有很多理論和實證研究結(jié)果說明公司在這一領(lǐng)域做出的決定。然而，在同一時間沒有一個普遍接受的描述股利政策的模式。此外，實證結(jié)果往往是矛盾的或難以解釋的理論根據(jù)。</p&g

56、t;<p>　　在米勒和莫迪里阿尼(1961)的理想世界里，股息是無關(guān)緊要的。一個企業(yè)的價值是由其投資機(jī)會決定的。股息只是一小部分因素，投資者的目的是能讓他們一直得到自己想要的消費(fèi)股的紅利。</p><p>　　然而，在“現(xiàn)實生活”中，股利政策是投資者和管理者主要關(guān)注的問題之一。實證研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，紅利增加對投資者來說一般是好消息，而股息降低時會給投資者造成負(fù)面的影響。</p><p&

57、gt;　　在過去幾十年里，幾種關(guān)于股息的存在及其重要性的解釋已被提出。紅利可以作為公司實際情況的標(biāo)志。高質(zhì)量的公司可以支付較高的股息；低質(zhì)量的公司將無法與他們比擬，因為股息需要已知投資、稅收和吸引外部資本成本。代理理論認(rèn)為，股息可能是一個用以減少過度投資問題的方法，或是用來保持公司立足于資本市場上的方法。股息也可以用來吸引那些因為一些監(jiān)管原因較注重紅利的較精明的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者。關(guān)于行為的方面，例如自我控制，公正或者憎恨反感，也許也是這個部分

58、的原因。</p><p>　　其中每一種關(guān)于股利政策的主要理論都能在實際數(shù)據(jù)中找到一些支持。然而，實證研究也透露了這些解釋的缺陷，那就是公司支出的“最好”理論與公眾廣泛的共識似乎相差很遠(yuǎn)。我們可能對“紅利難題”有很深的了解，不過我們現(xiàn)在仍然沒有明確的解決辦法。</p><p>　　本論文利用瑞士的數(shù)據(jù)探討了股利政策的一些特征。第一部分介紹了影響股息變化的因素；第二部分分析了股利隨著時間的推

59、移而產(chǎn)生的變化。</p><p>　　2000-2003年期間，我們通過分析橫斷面的特點比較了股息納稅人和非納稅人。然后確定幾個影響股息支付率和股息收益率差異的幾個因素。結(jié)果表明，公司以較低的杠桿傾向于支付較高股息。機(jī)構(gòu)顯示了支付股息的公司的偏好，但很少有證據(jù)表明，他們寧愿支付更高的比率或股利收益率。</p><p>　　有趣的是，原來的因素，價格波動對支付率和股息收益率有強(qiáng)烈的影響。這種

60、解釋可能被作為一個標(biāo)志，具有較高的收益不確定性的公司不太可能支付高股息。</p><p>　　每股股息作為股利政策的標(biāo)題指標(biāo)是很普遍的。該文件的最后部分著眼于每股股利的變化，并尋求以確定這些變化信息的內(nèi)容。結(jié)果表明，股利增加后續(xù)時期會因為高收益和現(xiàn)金流的增長而使股利降低。</p><p>　　仔細(xì)觀察數(shù)據(jù)后發(fā)現(xiàn)，有可能是一些信息轉(zhuǎn)達(dá)了分紅的變化。股利增加后，未來的平均盈利水平顯著高于前幾年

61、的平均盈利水平。</p><p>　　一類重要模型基于這樣一種假說，完全信息可能并不現(xiàn)實，紅利可能才是公司質(zhì)量的標(biāo)志。巴特查亞 (1979年)用兩種類型的公司建立了一個兩期模型。在前一時期進(jìn)行投資，他們的預(yù)期收益，管理者是眾所周知的，而外來投資者不知曉。為了表示他們的投資質(zhì)量，“好”公司的經(jīng)理（經(jīng)理被認(rèn)定為在股東大會上首選股東權(quán)益）將承諾在第二階段支付高股利。因為吸引外來的融資（在第二時期）交易成本昂貴，“低質(zhì)量

62、”的企業(yè)無法在這方面與“高品質(zhì)”的企業(yè)比擬。米勒和洛克(1985年)、約翰和威廉姆斯(1985年)的替代模型分別考慮了投資和稅收損失方面的股息成本。</p><p>　　信號模型為因紅利上漲而股票價格上漲提供了一個好的解釋。然而，實證結(jié)果對這個假設(shè)是喜憂參半的。在早期的研究中，美國瓦茨(1973)意外地發(fā)現(xiàn)收入的變化會引起股利意想不到的變化，盡管他為了繼續(xù)賺錢而對這種規(guī)律性持懷疑態(tài)度。佩因曼發(fā)現(xiàn)，“股息公告和經(jīng)營

63、盈利預(yù)測都具能預(yù)測信息管理”。希利(1988)通過研究股利政策和遺漏樣本發(fā)現(xiàn)股息政策和遺漏的信息內(nèi)容，但這只成立了一年。尹和斯塔克斯、丹尼斯等人(1994)表明，現(xiàn)金股利變動宣告與分析家對目前收入預(yù)測修正有關(guān)。</p><p>　　基于不同結(jié)果的信號理論，Grullon等人(2002)表明，股利的上升不僅僅能表示盈利的增加，也可能反映了風(fēng)險下降——“成熟假說”。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，利潤下降時股息就會增加，在法國的系統(tǒng)模式下

64、會減少。他們說，當(dāng)企業(yè)更成熟時（因此風(fēng)險較低，但增長機(jī)會較低），他們將更有可能支付巨額股利給股東。</p><p>　　代理理論表明，股利可以用來作為一種手段去控制公司的管理。分配股息減少自由現(xiàn)金流問題，并提高了管理層的股權(quán)。伊斯特布魯克(1984)也表明，股息可使公司立足于資本市場，在那里他們受到潛在投資者的監(jiān)督。這是有益的，因為被潛在股東監(jiān)管可以避免協(xié)合問題。朗(1989)發(fā)現(xiàn)，股利增加伴隨著更高的積極的股價

65、反應(yīng)，比如托賓的Q公司，就是因為規(guī)模較小而缺乏增長機(jī)會的公司。</p><p>　　其他的證據(jù)往往會限定代理的解釋。股利增加使支出增加，資本下降。此外，公司在過去2年的資本并沒有因為分紅增加而有顯著的增長，而忽略公司股息表現(xiàn)出比同期明顯放緩。因此，股利增加不遵守投資熱潮，而股息削減和遺漏不與后續(xù)較高的投資相適應(yīng)，可能抓住更好的增長機(jī)會?，F(xiàn)金流量和股利現(xiàn)金水平增加，甚至在中期內(nèi)增加，能使公司維持在一個較高的水平。&

66、lt;/p><p>　　在經(jīng)典的信號模型下，股息可能因此成為判斷企業(yè)是否盈利的方式。由于管理者避免股息下降，他們只會增加分紅。因為他們有理由相信，只有增加分紅才能保持盈利的可持續(xù)增長。只有當(dāng)公司的盈利狀況已經(jīng)嚴(yán)重惡化，他們才會減少或不分紅。因此，股利的增加將遵循一定的盈利增長時期，并確認(rèn)新的，更高的，持久的盈利水平。在同時間，股息減少，盈利也會跟隨下滑，并確認(rèn)該公司在未來仍然是一個困境。本納特茲等人發(fā)現(xiàn)，收入下降不太

67、可能引起股息增加。</p><p>　　本文已審查了以瑞士公司為樣本的股利政策的幾個特點。通過橫截面數(shù)據(jù)的對比結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)，負(fù)分紅之間的關(guān)系和市場對賬面的比例，充分利用價格波動，以及與盈利能力和（一個較小的程度上）公司規(guī)模、機(jī)構(gòu)持有的關(guān)系。股權(quán)集中度似乎不會有明顯的效果。近幾年，使用回購方法的公司風(fēng)險比選擇分紅的公司更大，利潤卻要少。盡管這些關(guān)系有些是意料之中的，但杠桿和分紅之間的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，股利發(fā)放，股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的影響

68、，強(qiáng)大的價格波動的影響和紅利與回購之間的對比結(jié)果并沒有在理論和以往經(jīng)驗明顯表現(xiàn)出來，因此，這個方面就更重要的。 </p><p>　　股利信號模型表明，股息變化能預(yù)測未來的盈利能力。然而，通過對數(shù)據(jù)的分析表明，當(dāng)紅利增加，收入就已經(jīng)增加了。股利正向改變后，沒有明顯的快速增長的跡象。</p><p>　　盡管如此，還是有證據(jù)證明當(dāng)股息增加時，未來的平均工資水平會比過去高一個層次。這幾年里，那

69、些減少或忽略分紅的公司都處在困境中，而且到中期時他們還有較差的資金流動性和較少的利潤。他們的資本性支出也將大幅降低。</p><p>　　本文的這一部分研究的因素，確定不同股利政策的企業(yè)的股利變化。這個比較是基于雙方2000-2003年和2003年的單一數(shù)據(jù)的平均值。</p><p>　　以下是幾個在橫截面考慮的變量：</p><p>　　- 市場與賬面價值比率，作

70、為一個成長的機(jī)會代理。因為低市場與賬面價值的 公司更有可能預(yù)料到自由的現(xiàn)金流問題，他們支付（更高的）股利。</p><p>　　- 總資產(chǎn)和銷售總額，作為企業(yè)規(guī)模的代理。大公司通常是“成熟”的公司，因此有更多的可用現(xiàn)金。此外，他們有更多的股權(quán)和紅利加以監(jiān)督。然而，人們通常認(rèn)為大公司的信息透明程度比小公司低，所以可能不太需要股息作為昂貴的信號。因此，觀察企業(yè)的股利政策可以很有趣。</p>

71、<p>　　- 該公司的貝塔值和價格波動，作為公司風(fēng)險的措施?！俺墒臁奔僬f認(rèn)為，與股息增幅相關(guān)的是風(fēng)險的降低，而不是利潤的增加。此外，風(fēng)險本身是一個公司的重要特點，重要的是要控制它。</p><p>　　- 資本結(jié)構(gòu)，作為一個杠桿的實施。債務(wù)契約往往包括有關(guān)限制，以此來減輕分紅。在不同層次，債務(wù)和紅利可用于減少現(xiàn)金流動問題。約翰遜（1995）認(rèn)為，債務(wù)和紅利可替代控制管理手段。</p>

72、<p>　　- 資產(chǎn)和股本收益率，作為公司的盈利情況。這似乎是顯而易見的，更多的公司將支付更高股息，重要的是為這項措施采取的控制，同事檢查其他因素的影響。</p><p>　　- 對于這些公司的所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的若干指標(biāo)。瑞士公司的所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)有很大的不同，家族企業(yè)是要廣泛持有的，或由公司自有資金投資。因此，有趣的是研究所有制結(jié)構(gòu)可以得出所有制結(jié)構(gòu)對股利政策的影響。 </p><p>　

73、　這些研究結(jié)果表明，紅利的改變是經(jīng)理對紅利獎勵的不對稱感知增大和紅利減少這種負(fù)面影響的信息來源。管理者盡量避免減少紅利直到他們不得不這么做，他們也只會在他們認(rèn)為利潤足夠的情況下才會增加紅利。股息的增加表明，收入在中期時已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)移到一個更高的水平，紅利減少就表明該公司的問題很可能在以后的幾年會繼續(xù)存在。</p><p>　　該機(jī)制也解釋了為什么價格波動在橫斷式的比較中是如此重要的一個因素。如果價格波動是作為未來收益的

74、不確定性的一個標(biāo)志，那么它和紅利很強(qiáng)的負(fù)相關(guān)就意味著管理者必須盡可能的使紅利保持在低水平以避免在低利潤情況下不得不再減少它。因此，雖然機(jī)制可能與想象的經(jīng)典信號模型不同，股利的變化可以很大。探究這個假說需要更多的樣品，而且對其他不同的監(jiān)管環(huán)境的國家來說，可能是未來研究的一個有趣的領(lǐng)域。</p><p>　　出處：博格丹·絲塔克斯克，《瑞士的股利政策》，投資組合管理（2006）20：153-183</