外文翻譯---從管理視角再次審視過(guò)去的股利政策

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Revisiting Managerial Perspectives on Dividend Policy </p><p>　　Introduction</p>

2、;<p>　　One of the more puzzling issues in corporate finance involves dividends. Miller and Modigliani (1961) provide a compelling and widely accepted argument for dividend irrelevance in a world with perfect capit

3、al markets. Many years later, Miller (1986) recognized that the observed preference for cash dividends is one of the "soft spots in the current body of theory." So why do corporations pay dividends, and why do

4、investors care? Black (1976) once described this issue as a dividend "puzzle" with "</p><p>　　To help explain this puzzle, financial economists developed various theories-signaling, tax-prefer

5、ence, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand explanations. The profusion of theories led Ang (1987, p. 55) to observe, “Thus, we have moved from a position of not enough good reasons to explain why dividends are paid to one

6、of too many." Advocates of behavioral finance, such as Shefrin and Statman (1984), introduced concepts such as prospect theory and mental accounting to explain why investors like div</p><p>　　One way to

7、 enhance our understanding of why corporations pay dividends is to examine the views of managers who are responsible for making such decisions. Past fieldwork and surveys have provided important insights into how manager

8、s determine their firm's dividend payouts and their views about various dividend policy issues. For example, Lintner (1956) conducted the seminal field study about the determination of dividend policy. Other research

9、ers including Baker,</p><p>　　Farrelly, and Edelman (1985) and Baker and Powell (1999) surveyed managers to obtain their views about dividend policy. Such studies complement other types of empirical research

10、 on dividend policy.</p><p>　　Our study examines how managers view dividend policy but uses a different data set to extend and refine the scope of previous survey research. Specifically, we survey corporate

11、managers of NASDAQ firms that consistently pay cash dividends to determine their views about</p><p>　　Dividend policy , the relationship between dividend policy and value, and four common explanations for pa

12、ying dividends—signaling, tax-preference, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand arguments. Our motivation for conducting this study is to determine whether the evidence simply reaffirms what we already know or provides new

13、insights about dividend policy. The study is timely given evidence by Fama and French (2001) of the declining incidence of dividend payers, which not only reflects the changin</p><p>　　In this study, we do n

14、ot focus on the views about dividend policy of managers from the "typical" NASDAQ firm because most NASDAQ firms either pay no dividends or pay dividends on an irregular basis. Instead, we investigate the views

15、 of a subset of NASDAQ firms, namely, those that</p><p>　　Consistently pay cash dividends. The fact that most NASDAQ firms do not pay dividends is not surprising given their characteristics. As Damodaran (19

16、99) notes, a firm's dividend policy tends to follow the firm's life cycle. During the introduction and rapid expansion stages, firms typically pay no or very low dividends. Such firms characterize a large portion

17、 of firms trading on NASDAQ.</p><p>　　Our study differs from previous research on dividend policy in several ways. First, unlike prior fieldwork and surveys that focus only on NYSE-listed firms from a few in

18、dustries, we study managers from dividend-paying NASDAQ firms from numerous industries. Michel (1979) and Baker (1988) present evidence that dividend policies vary across industries. Our rationale for examining NASDAQ fi

19、rms rests on the belief that the views of NASDAQ managers may differ from those of NYSE-listed firms because of</p><p>　　The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief

20、review of the relevant dividend literature. The third section presents our research questions and empirical predictions followed by a discussion of the methodology and limitations in the fourth section. The fifth section

21、 presents our survey results, and the final section provides a summary and conclusions.</p><p>　　Previous Research</p><p>　　In this section, we present three basic areas of dividend research. Fi

22、rst, we discuss Lintner's (1956) classic study that investigates how corporate managers determine their firms' dividend policies. We also review some of the subsequent research related to Lintner's findings.

23、Second, we review studies that examine whether dividend policy affects， firm value. Third, we present major research findings related to four common explanations for paying dividends--signaling, tax-preference, agency co

24、st</p><p>　　Determining a Firm's Dividend Policy</p><p>　　In his classic study, Lintner (1956) reports that firm have long-run target dividend payout ratios and place their attention more on

25、 dividend changes than on absolute dividend levels. He also finds that dividend changes follow shifts in long-run sustainable earnings (managers’ smooth earnings). And managers are hesitant to make dividend changes that

26、may later need to be reversed. Managers also try to stabilize dividends and avoid dividend cuts. Lintner developed a partial-adjustment model to des</p><p>　　Dividend Policy and Value</p><p>　　M

27、uch empirical research exists investigating whether dividend policy affects firm value. Graham and Dodd (1951) and Gordon (1959) argue that an increase in the dividend payout increases stock price (value) and lowers the

28、cost of equity, but empirical support for this position is weak. Others such as Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979, 1982), Blume (1980), and Ang and Peterson (1985) take the opposite position. Their studies report that sto

29、cks with high dividend payout ratios have higher required r</p><p>　　Explanations for Paying Dividends</p><p>　　The finance literature contains four standard explanations for paying dividends--s

30、ignaling, tax-preference, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand. The signaling, or asymmetric information, models for paying dividends, developed by Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), and Miller and Rock (1985),

31、 suggest that managers as insiders choose dividend payment levels and dividend increases to signal private information to investors. Managers have an incentive to signal this private information to </p><p>　

32、　A second explanation for paying dividends is tax-preference theory. Favorable tax treatment on capital gains (lower capital gains tax rate and deferral of capital gains tax) should cause investors to prefer non-dividend

33、-paying stocks. Tests of this tax-preference explanation for paying or not paying dividends take two forms .According to Brennan's (1970) version of the capital asset pricing model, dividend-paying stocks must offer

34、higher pre-tax returns than non-dividend-paying stocks, all else </p><p>　　Scholes(1974) find no evidence of this tax effect, while Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) and Kalay and Michaely (1993) find eviden

35、ce that pre-tax returns are related to dividend yield.</p><p>　　Other studies examine the ex-dividend date price drop. Favorable capital gains tax treatment could cause the price drop to be less than the div

36、idend payment and cause investors to prefer Non -dividend-paying stocks. Empirical evidence on this matter is also inconclusive. For example, Elton and Gruber (1970) find an ex-dividend date price drop that is less than

37、the dividend amount, but Michaely (I 991) finds an ex-dividend date price drop equal to the dividend payment. </p><p>　　Another explanation for why firms might pay dividends is based on agency relationships

38、between various claimholders of the firm. Easterbrook (1984) argues that firms pay dividends to help reduce the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. By paying dividends, managers must rai

39、se funds more frequently in the capital markets where they are subjected to scrutiny and the disciplining effects of investment professionals. Jensen (1986) makes a similar agency-theory argume</p><p>　　Fina

40、lly, the bird-in-the-hand explanation asserts that paying higher dividends increases firm value because dividends represent a "sure thing" while future share price appreciation is uncertain. Miller and Modiglia

41、ni (1961) refer to this as the bird-in-the-hand fallacy. Bhattacharya (1979) correctly argues that the riskiness of a project's cash flows determines a firm’s risk and an increase in dividend payout today will simply

42、 result in an equivalent drop in the stock's ex-dividend price. Thus, </p><p>　　Research Questions and Empirical Predictions</p><p>　　We address three major research questions in this study.

43、 First, what views do NASDAQ managers from dividend-paying firms have on the dividend-setting process? We expect that our survey respondents strongly agree with statements involving Lintner's (1956) model on dividend

44、 policy. Lintner's famous investigation of dividend policy stresses that firms’ only increase dividends when management believes that earnings have permanently increased. As previously discussed, much support exists

45、for Lintner'</p><p>　　Second, do corporate managers of dividend-paying NASDAQ firms believe a firm's dividend payout can affect firm value? Based on a set of highly restrictive assumptions, Miller an

46、d Modigliani (1961) contend that dividend policy has no effect on either the price of a firm's stock or its cost of capital. We expect that managers generally believe that dividend policy matters because they operate

47、 in a world in which market imperfections can make dividend policy relevant. Therefore, we expect to observ</p><p>　　We do not expect the majority of respondents to agree with statements involving the residu

48、al dividend model, which implies that dividends are paid out of "leftover" earnings. Although using the residual policy may help a firm set its long-run target payout ratio, we believe that managers typically d

49、o not use this approach to guide the payout in any one year because this would lead to erratic dividends.</p><p>　　Third, what explanations for paying dividends do NASDAQ managers tend to favor? As previousl

50、y discussed, researchers have conducted many studies involving various explanations of why companies pay dividends. The empirical evidence is generally consistent with several hypotheses generated by the dividend-signali

51、ng and agency-cost models, and inconsistent with tax preference theory. As indicated earlier, there is virtually no empirical evidence supporting the bird-in-the-hand theory. Because our d</p><p>　　Source: H

52、. Kent Baker, Gary E. Powell, and E. Theodore Veit, 2002 “Revisiting Managerial Perspectives on Dividend policy”. Journal of ECONOMIC AND FINANCE·Volume 26·Number 3·Fall, pp .267-271. </p><p>

53、<b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　從管理視角再次審視過(guò)去的股利政策</p><p><b>　　引言</b></p><p>　　在企業(yè)融資中存在一個(gè)更令人費(fèi)解的問(wèn)題就是關(guān)于股息。米勒和莫迪格里安尼（1961）提供了令人信服的并被廣泛接受的論證，那就是在一個(gè)具有完善的資本市場(chǎng)上，存在股利無(wú)關(guān)論。許多年以后，米

54、勒（1986）認(rèn)為觀察到的現(xiàn)金股利偏好是股利無(wú)關(guān)論其中的一個(gè)“在當(dāng)前這個(gè)理論上的弱點(diǎn)?！蹦敲?，為什么企業(yè)支付股息，為什么投資者會(huì)關(guān)心？布萊克（1976）曾經(jīng)這樣描述這個(gè)問(wèn)題，股息“謎”與“該理論似乎并不合適。</p><p>　　為了幫助解釋這個(gè)難題，金融經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們創(chuàng)造了各種理論，有信號(hào)理論，稅收優(yōu)惠，代理成本，在手之鳥(niǎo)理論。豐富的理論引導(dǎo)安格（1987年，第55頁(yè)）觀察到，“因此，我們已經(jīng)從一個(gè)不完善的理由來(lái)定

55、位解釋為什么支付太多的股息給其中的一個(gè)人。“行為金融學(xué)的倡導(dǎo)者，如舍夫林和特曼（1984），從過(guò)去的理論和心理會(huì)計(jì)的概念解釋為什么投資者喜歡分紅。 特曼（1997）認(rèn)為忽視正常投資者的行為模式，而去解決股利之謎是不可能的。當(dāng)今世界，企業(yè)經(jīng)理們留下了廣闊的和沖突的股利研究。</p><p>　　一個(gè)提高我們理解的方法，是公司支付股息是檢查管理人員作出這樣的決定負(fù)責(zé)與否的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。過(guò)去的實(shí)地考察和調(diào)查,在管理者如何確定公

56、司股利支付率和他們關(guān)于各種股利政策的觀點(diǎn)方面已經(jīng)提供了重要的見(jiàn)解。為公司的股息支出和重要的見(jiàn)解股利政策的各種問(wèn)題的看法。例如，林特納（1956年）對(duì)股利政策所進(jìn)行的開(kāi)創(chuàng)性的實(shí)地研究。包括貝克、法雷利、埃德蒙（1985）、貝克和鮑威爾（1999）在內(nèi)的其他研究者，調(diào)查了管理人員獲得關(guān)于股利政策的觀點(diǎn)。這些研究補(bǔ)充其他類(lèi)型的實(shí)證研究股息政策。</p><p>　　我們的研究探討經(jīng)理人如何檢視股息政策，但使用不同的數(shù)據(jù)

57、開(kāi)始展開(kāi)研究和提煉過(guò)去的調(diào)查結(jié)果。具體來(lái)說(shuō)，我們調(diào)查的納斯達(dá)克公司的企業(yè)管理人員，始終支付現(xiàn)金股利，來(lái)確定他們關(guān)于股利政策的見(jiàn)解，股利政策與價(jià)值之間的關(guān)系，和支付股息四種常見(jiàn)的解釋?zhuān)盘?hào)理論，稅收優(yōu)惠，代理成本和在手之鳥(niǎo)理論。我們進(jìn)行這項(xiàng)研究的動(dòng)機(jī)，是為了確定證據(jù)是否重申了 ，我們已經(jīng)知道或者提供有關(guān)股利政策的新見(jiàn)解。這項(xiàng)關(guān)于股利支付者減少股息的研究，由法瑪和法萊爾（2001年）及時(shí)地給予了證據(jù)，這不僅反映支付者變化的特點(diǎn)，而且反映了他

58、們支付股利的偏好下降。</p><p>　　在這項(xiàng)研究中，我們不集中這個(gè)典型的納斯達(dá)克公司管理人員股利政策的觀點(diǎn)，因?yàn)榇蠖鄶?shù)納斯達(dá)克企業(yè)要么不支付股息，要么不定期支付股息。相反，我們調(diào)查納斯達(dá)克的一個(gè)子集，即那些一貫支付現(xiàn)金股利的子集。事實(shí)上，大多數(shù)納斯達(dá)克公司不支付股息并不奇怪，因?yàn)樗鼈兊奶匦?。達(dá)蒙德理（1999）指出，一個(gè)公司的股息政策傾向于按照企業(yè)的生命周期。在引進(jìn)和快速擴(kuò)張階段，企業(yè)通常不支付或支付很低的

59、股息。這些特點(diǎn)的企業(yè)在納斯達(dá)克占交易的很大一部分。</p><p>　　我們的研究不同于以往對(duì)股利政策研究的幾種方法。首先，不像過(guò)去的實(shí)地考察和調(diào)查那樣，只有在紐約證券交易所上市的少數(shù)幾個(gè)行業(yè)的公司，我們研究的管理者從納斯達(dá)克眾多行業(yè)中支付股利的公司。米歇爾（1979）和貝克（1988）研究表明，股利政策各行業(yè)各不相同。我們對(duì)檢查納斯達(dá)克公司的研究停留在，我們相信納斯達(dá)克經(jīng)理與紐約證券交易所上市的公司經(jīng)理看法可能

60、不同，原因就是企業(yè)特征不同，比如公司規(guī)模不同。第二，我們?cè)谝郧暗难芯恐卸嗵帥](méi)有檢查，如股利的歷史規(guī)律，股利的生命周期，和剩余股利政策。最后，與大多數(shù)的研究不同，即集中在公司為什么支付股利這一解釋?zhuān)覀儥z查多個(gè)解釋。通過(guò)采取這種方法，我們可以評(píng)估相對(duì)重要的不同的原因，源于支付股利基于各個(gè)層次的各類(lèi)報(bào)表分歧。</p><p>　　本文的其余部分組織如下。第二部分提供了有關(guān)股息文獻(xiàn)的簡(jiǎn)要回顧。第三部分介紹我們的研究問(wèn)題

61、和實(shí)證預(yù)測(cè)。第四部分討論方法和局限性。第五部分介紹我們的調(diào)查結(jié)果，最后一節(jié)提供了一個(gè)總結(jié)和結(jié)論。</p><p><b>　　過(guò)去的研究</b></p><p>　　在此，我們提出三個(gè)研究股利的基本領(lǐng)域。第一，我們討論林特納（1956年）的經(jīng)典研究，探討企業(yè)管理者如何確定他們公司的股利政策。我們也回顧了有關(guān)林特納的一些調(diào)查結(jié)果的后續(xù)研究。第二，我們審查研究了股利政策是

62、否影響公司的價(jià)值。第三，我們目前關(guān)于支付股利的研究成果主要有四種常見(jiàn)解釋——信號(hào)、稅收優(yōu)惠、代理成本以及在手之鳥(niǎo)理論。由于在這些領(lǐng)域都實(shí)行了大量的研究，因此我們只能在每個(gè)領(lǐng)域?qū)彶閹讉€(gè)重要的研究結(jié)果。</p><p><b>　　決定公司的股利政策</b></p><p>　　林特納（1956）在他的經(jīng)典研究中說(shuō)，公司要有長(zhǎng)期目標(biāo)派息率，還應(yīng)該把他們的注意力放在對(duì)股利的

63、變化超過(guò)絕對(duì)的股利水平。他還認(rèn)為股利的變化遵循長(zhǎng)期可持續(xù)盈利的變化（經(jīng)理順利收入）和經(jīng)理都不愿使股利變化，因?yàn)橐院罂赡苄枰玫脚まD(zhuǎn)。經(jīng)理還試圖穩(wěn)定股利和避免股利削減。林特納制定了局部調(diào)整模型來(lái)描述股利的決策過(guò)程，解釋了每年有85%的股利在改變。在包括法瑪和班貝克（1968），貝克，法雷利，和愛(ài)德曼（1985）和貝克和鮑威爾（1999年）的幾個(gè)研究支持林特納的行為模式。柏納特斯比納爾希，麥克里，和泰勒（1997，第1032）的結(jié)論是”……

64、林特納的股利模型仍然是股利設(shè)置過(guò)程最好的說(shuō)明?！?lt;/p><p><b>　　股利政策與價(jià)值</b></p><p>　　很多實(shí)證研究，調(diào)查股利政策是否影響公司價(jià)值。格雷厄姆和多德（1951）和戈登（1959）認(rèn)為，股利支付率越高股票的價(jià)格（值）就越高同時(shí)降低了成本，但實(shí)證在這方面的支持很弱。其他的如利真伯格和拉馬斯瓦米（1979，1982），布魯姆（1980），安格

65、和彼得森（1985）采取相反的立場(chǎng)。他們的研究報(bào)告說(shuō)，高股利支付率有較高的回報(bào)，因此需要降低價(jià)格。還有一些人，如布萊克和斯科爾斯（1974），米勒和斯科爾斯（1978年，1982年），米勒（1986），恩斯坦（1996）認(rèn)為股利政策沒(méi)有什么區(qū)別，因?yàn)樗鼘?duì)股票價(jià)格或者權(quán)益成本沒(méi)有影響。研究人員測(cè)試了股利政策中一些可選擇的理論，但沒(méi)有取得決定性的結(jié)果。因此，股利政策中哪種解釋最正確仍然沒(méi)有得到解決。</p><p>

66、<b>　　支付股利的解釋</b></p><p>　　財(cái)務(wù)文獻(xiàn)中支付股利的四個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的解釋——信號(hào)，稅收優(yōu)惠，代理成本以及在手之鳥(niǎo)。由巴特查亞（1979），約翰和威廉姆斯（1985年），以及米勒和羅克（1985）提出信號(hào)或者信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)模型，建議作為內(nèi)部管理人員的經(jīng)理，選擇股利支付水平和股利增加向投資者傳遞私人信息。當(dāng)經(jīng)理認(rèn)為，目前公司的股票價(jià)格低于其內(nèi)在價(jià)值，他們會(huì)向公眾傳遞激勵(lì)信號(hào)的私人信

67、息。增加股利作為一個(gè)可信的信號(hào)，當(dāng)其他公司不具備良好的內(nèi)部信息無(wú)法模仿股利增加，而不會(huì)過(guò)度增加后招致股息削減的機(jī)會(huì)。信號(hào)解釋的存在的擁有強(qiáng)大的支持包括阿哈諾尼和斯瓦瑞（1980）的研究，阿斯奎斯和馬林斯（1983），凱萊與勞恩思坦（1986），希利和派爾普（1988），瓦克寧與謝夫（2001）。</p><p>　　支付股利的第二種解釋是稅收優(yōu)惠的理論。稅收優(yōu)惠資本利得（低資本收益稅率和資本收益稅延遲）會(huì)引起投資

68、者寧愿不支付股票。這種稅收優(yōu)惠的解釋測(cè)試支付或不付股利采取兩種形式。根據(jù)布倫南的（1970年）資產(chǎn)定價(jià)模型，支付股利的股票，應(yīng)當(dāng)提供比不支付股利更高的稅前收益股票，其他的一切平等。布倫南的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)，但好壞參半。此外，布萊克和斯科爾斯（1974）發(fā)現(xiàn)沒(méi)有證據(jù)證明這項(xiàng)稅收的影響，而利真伯格和拉馬斯瓦米（1979）和凱萊和麥克里（1993）找到稅前收益與股息率有關(guān)的證據(jù)。</p><p>　　其他研究探討除息日價(jià)格下降

69、。有利的資本收益稅待遇可能導(dǎo)致的價(jià)格下降到比派發(fā)股息，并導(dǎo)致投資者寧愿無(wú)股利支付股票。在這個(gè)問(wèn)題上的實(shí)證證據(jù)也沒(méi)有定論。例如，埃爾頓和格魯伯（1970）發(fā)現(xiàn)除息日價(jià)格下降低于股息金額，但麥克里（1991）發(fā)現(xiàn)除息日價(jià)格下降等于股息。</p><p>　　另一種關(guān)于公司為什么支付股利的解釋是基于企業(yè)之間的代理關(guān)系。伊斯特布魯克（1984）認(rèn)為，企業(yè)支付股利幫助減少該機(jī)構(gòu)的所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)分離的相關(guān)成本。通過(guò)支付股息，

70、經(jīng)理必須在資本市場(chǎng)上籌集資金，他們會(huì)更頻繁地受到外界的審查和接受投資專(zhuān)業(yè)人士的監(jiān)督。詹森（1986）做了一個(gè)類(lèi)似的代理理論，提出經(jīng)理通過(guò)支付股利來(lái)減少可能被用于欠佳投資的自有資金，這有利于經(jīng)理但不利于股東財(cái)富。瑟夫（1982年），朗和利真伯格（1989年），阿格拉瓦爾和杰亞拉曼（1994），詹森，索伯格和佐恩（1992年）為這些代理解釋提供實(shí)證支持。</p><p>　　最后，在手之鳥(niǎo)解釋聲稱(chēng)支付較高的股利增加企

71、業(yè)價(jià)值，因?yàn)楣衫怼按_定的東西”，而未來(lái)股價(jià)升值是不確定的。米勒和莫迪利亞尼（1961），把這個(gè)作為在手之鳥(niǎo)的謬誤。巴特查亞（1979）正確地認(rèn)為，一個(gè)項(xiàng)目的現(xiàn)金流量的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)決定了企業(yè)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和增加股利支付，相當(dāng)于派息只會(huì)導(dǎo)致該股票的除權(quán)價(jià)格下降。因此，通過(guò)降低未來(lái)現(xiàn)金流的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，不會(huì)使得股利越高企業(yè)價(jià)值越大。雖然幾乎沒(méi)有實(shí)證支持支付股利的在手之鳥(niǎo)解釋?zhuān)覀兿氪_定如果經(jīng)理的意見(jiàn)是否與以前的理論和實(shí)證研究一致。</p><

72、p><b>　　研究問(wèn)題與實(shí)證預(yù)測(cè)</b></p><p>　　本次研究我們要解決三個(gè)主要研究問(wèn)題。首先，納斯達(dá)克分紅公司的經(jīng)理對(duì)股利制定過(guò)程有何看法？我們期望我們的調(diào)查對(duì)象非常同意這個(gè)涉及林特納(1956)的股利政策模型。林特納的著名的股利政策調(diào)查研究強(qiáng)調(diào)，當(dāng)管理層認(rèn)為，公司收入一直增加時(shí)，公司只會(huì)增加股利。正如先前的討論，很多人對(duì)林特納的觀點(diǎn)中如何設(shè)置公司的股利支付投入了很多的支持

73、。我們期望納斯達(dá)克公司的研究，對(duì)所有這些都有既定的股利支付的模式，持類(lèi)似的看法。</p><p>　　其次，納斯達(dá)克分紅公司經(jīng)理認(rèn)為一個(gè)公司的股息支出可能會(huì)影響公司的價(jià)值嗎？基于一個(gè)高度限制性的假設(shè)，米勒和莫迪格里安尼（1961）認(rèn)為，股利政策既不影響一個(gè)公司的股票價(jià)格也不影響它的資本成本。我們期望經(jīng)理們普遍相信股利政策很重要，因?yàn)樗麄児ぷ鞯氖澜缰惺袌?chǎng)不完全可以使股利政策與公司價(jià)值有關(guān)。因此，我們希望納斯達(dá)克公司

74、的經(jīng)理普遍參與我們的關(guān)于股利政策和公司價(jià)值之間的關(guān)系的研究。由林特納（1956），貝克，法雷利，和愛(ài)德曼（1985）研究，以及其他報(bào)告，經(jīng)理認(rèn)為股息穩(wěn)定是可取的。如果這一立場(chǎng)是正確的，投資者更喜歡支付現(xiàn)在的確定的股利的股票而不是未來(lái)的不確定的數(shù)量相等的股票。</p><p>　　我們不期望大多數(shù)的受訪者同意剩余的股利模型，這意味著股利支付的是“剩余”收益。雖然使用剩余的政策可能幫助公司制定其長(zhǎng)期目標(biāo)派息比率，但是

75、我們相信，經(jīng)理通常不使用這種方法來(lái)指導(dǎo)任何一年的支出，因?yàn)檫@將導(dǎo)致不穩(wěn)定的股利。 </p><p>　　最后，納斯達(dá)克管理者傾向于什么樣的支付股利的解釋?zhuān)咳缜八?，研究人員已經(jīng)進(jìn)行了許多研究，涉及各種為什么公司支付股利的解釋。實(shí)證證據(jù)通常與幾個(gè)假說(shuō)相一致，如股利信號(hào)和代理成本模型，而與稅務(wù)偏好理論不一致。如前所述，幾乎沒(méi)有實(shí)證證據(jù)支持在手之鳥(niǎo)理論。因?yàn)槲覀兊馁Y料集包括已建立現(xiàn)金股利支付模式的公司，我們期望