外文翻譯---從管理視角再次審視過去的股利政策

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設計）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Revisiting Managerial Perspectives on Dividend Policy </p><p>　　Introduction</p>

2、;<p>　　One of the more puzzling issues in corporate finance involves dividends. Miller and Modigliani (1961) provide a compelling and widely accepted argument for dividend irrelevance in a world with perfect capit

3、al markets. Many years later, Miller (1986) recognized that the observed preference for cash dividends is one of the "soft spots in the current body of theory." So why do corporations pay dividends, and why do

4、investors care? Black (1976) once described this issue as a dividend "puzzle" with "</p><p>　　To help explain this puzzle, financial economists developed various theories-signaling, tax-prefer

5、ence, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand explanations. The profusion of theories led Ang (1987, p. 55) to observe, “Thus, we have moved from a position of not enough good reasons to explain why dividends are paid to one

6、of too many." Advocates of behavioral finance, such as Shefrin and Statman (1984), introduced concepts such as prospect theory and mental accounting to explain why investors like div</p><p>　　One way to

7、 enhance our understanding of why corporations pay dividends is to examine the views of managers who are responsible for making such decisions. Past fieldwork and surveys have provided important insights into how manager

8、s determine their firm's dividend payouts and their views about various dividend policy issues. For example, Lintner (1956) conducted the seminal field study about the determination of dividend policy. Other research

9、ers including Baker,</p><p>　　Farrelly, and Edelman (1985) and Baker and Powell (1999) surveyed managers to obtain their views about dividend policy. Such studies complement other types of empirical research

10、 on dividend policy.</p><p>　　Our study examines how managers view dividend policy but uses a different data set to extend and refine the scope of previous survey research. Specifically, we survey corporate

11、managers of NASDAQ firms that consistently pay cash dividends to determine their views about</p><p>　　Dividend policy , the relationship between dividend policy and value, and four common explanations for pa

12、ying dividends—signaling, tax-preference, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand arguments. Our motivation for conducting this study is to determine whether the evidence simply reaffirms what we already know or provides new

13、insights about dividend policy. The study is timely given evidence by Fama and French (2001) of the declining incidence of dividend payers, which not only reflects the changin</p><p>　　In this study, we do n

14、ot focus on the views about dividend policy of managers from the "typical" NASDAQ firm because most NASDAQ firms either pay no dividends or pay dividends on an irregular basis. Instead, we investigate the views

15、 of a subset of NASDAQ firms, namely, those that</p><p>　　Consistently pay cash dividends. The fact that most NASDAQ firms do not pay dividends is not surprising given their characteristics. As Damodaran (19

16、99) notes, a firm's dividend policy tends to follow the firm's life cycle. During the introduction and rapid expansion stages, firms typically pay no or very low dividends. Such firms characterize a large portion

17、 of firms trading on NASDAQ.</p><p>　　Our study differs from previous research on dividend policy in several ways. First, unlike prior fieldwork and surveys that focus only on NYSE-listed firms from a few in

18、dustries, we study managers from dividend-paying NASDAQ firms from numerous industries. Michel (1979) and Baker (1988) present evidence that dividend policies vary across industries. Our rationale for examining NASDAQ fi

19、rms rests on the belief that the views of NASDAQ managers may differ from those of NYSE-listed firms because of</p><p>　　The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief

20、review of the relevant dividend literature. The third section presents our research questions and empirical predictions followed by a discussion of the methodology and limitations in the fourth section. The fifth section

21、 presents our survey results, and the final section provides a summary and conclusions.</p><p>　　Previous Research</p><p>　　In this section, we present three basic areas of dividend research. Fi

22、rst, we discuss Lintner's (1956) classic study that investigates how corporate managers determine their firms' dividend policies. We also review some of the subsequent research related to Lintner's findings.

23、Second, we review studies that examine whether dividend policy affects， firm value. Third, we present major research findings related to four common explanations for paying dividends--signaling, tax-preference, agency co

24、st</p><p>　　Determining a Firm's Dividend Policy</p><p>　　In his classic study, Lintner (1956) reports that firm have long-run target dividend payout ratios and place their attention more on

25、 dividend changes than on absolute dividend levels. He also finds that dividend changes follow shifts in long-run sustainable earnings (managers’ smooth earnings). And managers are hesitant to make dividend changes that

26、may later need to be reversed. Managers also try to stabilize dividends and avoid dividend cuts. Lintner developed a partial-adjustment model to des</p><p>　　Dividend Policy and Value</p><p>　　M

27、uch empirical research exists investigating whether dividend policy affects firm value. Graham and Dodd (1951) and Gordon (1959) argue that an increase in the dividend payout increases stock price (value) and lowers the

28、cost of equity, but empirical support for this position is weak. Others such as Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979, 1982), Blume (1980), and Ang and Peterson (1985) take the opposite position. Their studies report that sto

29、cks with high dividend payout ratios have higher required r</p><p>　　Explanations for Paying Dividends</p><p>　　The finance literature contains four standard explanations for paying dividends--s

30、ignaling, tax-preference, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand. The signaling, or asymmetric information, models for paying dividends, developed by Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), and Miller and Rock (1985),

31、 suggest that managers as insiders choose dividend payment levels and dividend increases to signal private information to investors. Managers have an incentive to signal this private information to </p><p>　

32、　A second explanation for paying dividends is tax-preference theory. Favorable tax treatment on capital gains (lower capital gains tax rate and deferral of capital gains tax) should cause investors to prefer non-dividend

33、-paying stocks. Tests of this tax-preference explanation for paying or not paying dividends take two forms .According to Brennan's (1970) version of the capital asset pricing model, dividend-paying stocks must offer

34、higher pre-tax returns than non-dividend-paying stocks, all else </p><p>　　Scholes(1974) find no evidence of this tax effect, while Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) and Kalay and Michaely (1993) find eviden

35、ce that pre-tax returns are related to dividend yield.</p><p>　　Other studies examine the ex-dividend date price drop. Favorable capital gains tax treatment could cause the price drop to be less than the div

36、idend payment and cause investors to prefer Non -dividend-paying stocks. Empirical evidence on this matter is also inconclusive. For example, Elton and Gruber (1970) find an ex-dividend date price drop that is less than

37、the dividend amount, but Michaely (I 991) finds an ex-dividend date price drop equal to the dividend payment. </p><p>　　Another explanation for why firms might pay dividends is based on agency relationships

38、between various claimholders of the firm. Easterbrook (1984) argues that firms pay dividends to help reduce the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. By paying dividends, managers must rai

39、se funds more frequently in the capital markets where they are subjected to scrutiny and the disciplining effects of investment professionals. Jensen (1986) makes a similar agency-theory argume</p><p>　　Fina

40、lly, the bird-in-the-hand explanation asserts that paying higher dividends increases firm value because dividends represent a "sure thing" while future share price appreciation is uncertain. Miller and Modiglia

41、ni (1961) refer to this as the bird-in-the-hand fallacy. Bhattacharya (1979) correctly argues that the riskiness of a project's cash flows determines a firm’s risk and an increase in dividend payout today will simply

42、 result in an equivalent drop in the stock's ex-dividend price. Thus, </p><p>　　Research Questions and Empirical Predictions</p><p>　　We address three major research questions in this study.

43、 First, what views do NASDAQ managers from dividend-paying firms have on the dividend-setting process? We expect that our survey respondents strongly agree with statements involving Lintner's (1956) model on dividend

44、 policy. Lintner's famous investigation of dividend policy stresses that firms’ only increase dividends when management believes that earnings have permanently increased. As previously discussed, much support exists

45、for Lintner'</p><p>　　Second, do corporate managers of dividend-paying NASDAQ firms believe a firm's dividend payout can affect firm value? Based on a set of highly restrictive assumptions, Miller an

46、d Modigliani (1961) contend that dividend policy has no effect on either the price of a firm's stock or its cost of capital. We expect that managers generally believe that dividend policy matters because they operate

47、 in a world in which market imperfections can make dividend policy relevant. Therefore, we expect to observ</p><p>　　We do not expect the majority of respondents to agree with statements involving the residu

48、al dividend model, which implies that dividends are paid out of "leftover" earnings. Although using the residual policy may help a firm set its long-run target payout ratio, we believe that managers typically d

49、o not use this approach to guide the payout in any one year because this would lead to erratic dividends.</p><p>　　Third, what explanations for paying dividends do NASDAQ managers tend to favor? As previousl

50、y discussed, researchers have conducted many studies involving various explanations of why companies pay dividends. The empirical evidence is generally consistent with several hypotheses generated by the dividend-signali

51、ng and agency-cost models, and inconsistent with tax preference theory. As indicated earlier, there is virtually no empirical evidence supporting the bird-in-the-hand theory. Because our d</p><p>　　Source: H

52、. Kent Baker, Gary E. Powell, and E. Theodore Veit, 2002 “Revisiting Managerial Perspectives on Dividend policy”. Journal of ECONOMIC AND FINANCE·Volume 26·Number 3·Fall, pp .267-271. </p><p>

53、<b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　從管理視角再次審視過去的股利政策</p><p><b>　　引言</b></p><p>　　在企業(yè)融資中存在一個更令人費解的問題就是關于股息。米勒和莫迪格里安尼（1961）提供了令人信服的并被廣泛接受的論證，那就是在一個具有完善的資本市場上，存在股利無關論。許多年以后，米

54、勒（1986）認為觀察到的現(xiàn)金股利偏好是股利無關論其中的一個“在當前這個理論上的弱點。”那么，為什么企業(yè)支付股息，為什么投資者會關心？布萊克（1976）曾經(jīng)這樣描述這個問題，股息“謎”與“該理論似乎并不合適。</p><p>　　為了幫助解釋這個難題，金融經(jīng)濟學家們創(chuàng)造了各種理論，有信號理論，稅收優(yōu)惠，代理成本，在手之鳥理論。豐富的理論引導安格（1987年，第55頁）觀察到，“因此，我們已經(jīng)從一個不完善的理由來定

55、位解釋為什么支付太多的股息給其中的一個人。“行為金融學的倡導者，如舍夫林和特曼（1984），從過去的理論和心理會計的概念解釋為什么投資者喜歡分紅。 特曼（1997）認為忽視正常投資者的行為模式，而去解決股利之謎是不可能的。當今世界，企業(yè)經(jīng)理們留下了廣闊的和沖突的股利研究。</p><p>　　一個提高我們理解的方法，是公司支付股息是檢查管理人員作出這樣的決定負責與否的標準。過去的實地考察和調(diào)查,在管理者如何確定公

56、司股利支付率和他們關于各種股利政策的觀點方面已經(jīng)提供了重要的見解。為公司的股息支出和重要的見解股利政策的各種問題的看法。例如，林特納（1956年）對股利政策所進行的開創(chuàng)性的實地研究。包括貝克、法雷利、埃德蒙（1985）、貝克和鮑威爾（1999）在內(nèi)的其他研究者，調(diào)查了管理人員獲得關于股利政策的觀點。這些研究補充其他類型的實證研究股息政策。</p><p>　　我們的研究探討經(jīng)理人如何檢視股息政策，但使用不同的數(shù)據(jù)

57、開始展開研究和提煉過去的調(diào)查結果。具體來說，我們調(diào)查的納斯達克公司的企業(yè)管理人員，始終支付現(xiàn)金股利，來確定他們關于股利政策的見解，股利政策與價值之間的關系，和支付股息四種常見的解釋，信號理論，稅收優(yōu)惠，代理成本和在手之鳥理論。我們進行這項研究的動機，是為了確定證據(jù)是否重申了 ，我們已經(jīng)知道或者提供有關股利政策的新見解。這項關于股利支付者減少股息的研究，由法瑪和法萊爾（2001年）及時地給予了證據(jù)，這不僅反映支付者變化的特點，而且反映了他

58、們支付股利的偏好下降。</p><p>　　在這項研究中，我們不集中這個典型的納斯達克公司管理人員股利政策的觀點，因為大多數(shù)納斯達克企業(yè)要么不支付股息，要么不定期支付股息。相反，我們調(diào)查納斯達克的一個子集，即那些一貫支付現(xiàn)金股利的子集。事實上，大多數(shù)納斯達克公司不支付股息并不奇怪，因為它們的特性。達蒙德理（1999）指出，一個公司的股息政策傾向于按照企業(yè)的生命周期。在引進和快速擴張階段，企業(yè)通常不支付或支付很低的

59、股息。這些特點的企業(yè)在納斯達克占交易的很大一部分。</p><p>　　我們的研究不同于以往對股利政策研究的幾種方法。首先，不像過去的實地考察和調(diào)查那樣，只有在紐約證券交易所上市的少數(shù)幾個行業(yè)的公司，我們研究的管理者從納斯達克眾多行業(yè)中支付股利的公司。米歇爾（1979）和貝克（1988）研究表明，股利政策各行業(yè)各不相同。我們對檢查納斯達克公司的研究停留在，我們相信納斯達克經(jīng)理與紐約證券交易所上市的公司經(jīng)理看法可能

60、不同，原因就是企業(yè)特征不同，比如公司規(guī)模不同。第二，我們在以前的研究中多處沒有檢查，如股利的歷史規(guī)律，股利的生命周期，和剩余股利政策。最后，與大多數(shù)的研究不同，即集中在公司為什么支付股利這一解釋，我們檢查多個解釋。通過采取這種方法，我們可以評估相對重要的不同的原因，源于支付股利基于各個層次的各類報表分歧。</p><p>　　本文的其余部分組織如下。第二部分提供了有關股息文獻的簡要回顧。第三部分介紹我們的研究問題

61、和實證預測。第四部分討論方法和局限性。第五部分介紹我們的調(diào)查結果，最后一節(jié)提供了一個總結和結論。</p><p><b>　　過去的研究</b></p><p>　　在此，我們提出三個研究股利的基本領域。第一，我們討論林特納（1956年）的經(jīng)典研究，探討企業(yè)管理者如何確定他們公司的股利政策。我們也回顧了有關林特納的一些調(diào)查結果的后續(xù)研究。第二，我們審查研究了股利政策是

62、否影響公司的價值。第三，我們目前關于支付股利的研究成果主要有四種常見解釋——信號、稅收優(yōu)惠、代理成本以及在手之鳥理論。由于在這些領域都實行了大量的研究，因此我們只能在每個領域?qū)彶閹讉€重要的研究結果。</p><p><b>　　決定公司的股利政策</b></p><p>　　林特納（1956）在他的經(jīng)典研究中說，公司要有長期目標派息率，還應該把他們的注意力放在對股利的

63、變化超過絕對的股利水平。他還認為股利的變化遵循長期可持續(xù)盈利的變化（經(jīng)理順利收入）和經(jīng)理都不愿使股利變化，因為以后可能需要得到扭轉。經(jīng)理還試圖穩(wěn)定股利和避免股利削減。林特納制定了局部調(diào)整模型來描述股利的決策過程，解釋了每年有85%的股利在改變。在包括法瑪和班貝克（1968），貝克，法雷利，和愛德曼（1985）和貝克和鮑威爾（1999年）的幾個研究支持林特納的行為模式。柏納特斯比納爾希，麥克里，和泰勒（1997，第1032）的結論是”……

64、林特納的股利模型仍然是股利設置過程最好的說明。”</p><p><b>　　股利政策與價值</b></p><p>　　很多實證研究，調(diào)查股利政策是否影響公司價值。格雷厄姆和多德（1951）和戈登（1959）認為，股利支付率越高股票的價格（值）就越高同時降低了成本，但實證在這方面的支持很弱。其他的如利真伯格和拉馬斯瓦米（1979，1982），布魯姆（1980），安格

65、和彼得森（1985）采取相反的立場。他們的研究報告說，高股利支付率有較高的回報，因此需要降低價格。還有一些人，如布萊克和斯科爾斯（1974），米勒和斯科爾斯（1978年，1982年），米勒（1986），恩斯坦（1996）認為股利政策沒有什么區(qū)別，因為它對股票價格或者權益成本沒有影響。研究人員測試了股利政策中一些可選擇的理論，但沒有取得決定性的結果。因此，股利政策中哪種解釋最正確仍然沒有得到解決。</p><p>

66、<b>　　支付股利的解釋</b></p><p>　　財務文獻中支付股利的四個標準的解釋——信號，稅收優(yōu)惠，代理成本以及在手之鳥。由巴特查亞（1979），約翰和威廉姆斯（1985年），以及米勒和羅克（1985）提出信號或者信息不對稱模型，建議作為內(nèi)部管理人員的經(jīng)理，選擇股利支付水平和股利增加向投資者傳遞私人信息。當經(jīng)理認為，目前公司的股票價格低于其內(nèi)在價值，他們會向公眾傳遞激勵信號的私人信

67、息。增加股利作為一個可信的信號，當其他公司不具備良好的內(nèi)部信息無法模仿股利增加，而不會過度增加后招致股息削減的機會。信號解釋的存在的擁有強大的支持包括阿哈諾尼和斯瓦瑞（1980）的研究，阿斯奎斯和馬林斯（1983），凱萊與勞恩思坦（1986），希利和派爾普（1988），瓦克寧與謝夫（2001）。</p><p>　　支付股利的第二種解釋是稅收優(yōu)惠的理論。稅收優(yōu)惠資本利得（低資本收益稅率和資本收益稅延遲）會引起投資

68、者寧愿不支付股票。這種稅收優(yōu)惠的解釋測試支付或不付股利采取兩種形式。根據(jù)布倫南的（1970年）資產(chǎn)定價模型，支付股利的股票，應當提供比不支付股利更高的稅前收益股票，其他的一切平等。布倫南的實證檢驗，但好壞參半。此外，布萊克和斯科爾斯（1974）發(fā)現(xiàn)沒有證據(jù)證明這項稅收的影響，而利真伯格和拉馬斯瓦米（1979）和凱萊和麥克里（1993）找到稅前收益與股息率有關的證據(jù)。</p><p>　　其他研究探討除息日價格下降

69、。有利的資本收益稅待遇可能導致的價格下降到比派發(fā)股息，并導致投資者寧愿無股利支付股票。在這個問題上的實證證據(jù)也沒有定論。例如，埃爾頓和格魯伯（1970）發(fā)現(xiàn)除息日價格下降低于股息金額，但麥克里（1991）發(fā)現(xiàn)除息日價格下降等于股息。</p><p>　　另一種關于公司為什么支付股利的解釋是基于企業(yè)之間的代理關系。伊斯特布魯克（1984）認為，企業(yè)支付股利幫助減少該機構的所有權和控制權分離的相關成本。通過支付股息，

70、經(jīng)理必須在資本市場上籌集資金，他們會更頻繁地受到外界的審查和接受投資專業(yè)人士的監(jiān)督。詹森（1986）做了一個類似的代理理論，提出經(jīng)理通過支付股利來減少可能被用于欠佳投資的自有資金，這有利于經(jīng)理但不利于股東財富。瑟夫（1982年），朗和利真伯格（1989年），阿格拉瓦爾和杰亞拉曼（1994），詹森，索伯格和佐恩（1992年）為這些代理解釋提供實證支持。</p><p>　　最后，在手之鳥解釋聲稱支付較高的股利增加企

71、業(yè)價值，因為股利代表“確定的東西”，而未來股價升值是不確定的。米勒和莫迪利亞尼（1961），把這個作為在手之鳥的謬誤。巴特查亞（1979）正確地認為，一個項目的現(xiàn)金流量的風險決定了企業(yè)的風險和增加股利支付，相當于派息只會導致該股票的除權價格下降。因此，通過降低未來現(xiàn)金流的風險，不會使得股利越高企業(yè)價值越大。雖然幾乎沒有實證支持支付股利的在手之鳥解釋，我們想確定如果經(jīng)理的意見是否與以前的理論和實證研究一致。</p><

72、p><b>　　研究問題與實證預測</b></p><p>　　本次研究我們要解決三個主要研究問題。首先，納斯達克分紅公司的經(jīng)理對股利制定過程有何看法？我們期望我們的調(diào)查對象非常同意這個涉及林特納(1956)的股利政策模型。林特納的著名的股利政策調(diào)查研究強調(diào)，當管理層認為，公司收入一直增加時，公司只會增加股利。正如先前的討論，很多人對林特納的觀點中如何設置公司的股利支付投入了很多的支持

73、。我們期望納斯達克公司的研究，對所有這些都有既定的股利支付的模式，持類似的看法。</p><p>　　其次，納斯達克分紅公司經(jīng)理認為一個公司的股息支出可能會影響公司的價值嗎？基于一個高度限制性的假設，米勒和莫迪格里安尼（1961）認為，股利政策既不影響一個公司的股票價格也不影響它的資本成本。我們期望經(jīng)理們普遍相信股利政策很重要，因為他們工作的世界中市場不完全可以使股利政策與公司價值有關。因此，我們希望納斯達克公司

74、的經(jīng)理普遍參與我們的關于股利政策和公司價值之間的關系的研究。由林特納（1956），貝克，法雷利，和愛德曼（1985）研究，以及其他報告，經(jīng)理認為股息穩(wěn)定是可取的。如果這一立場是正確的，投資者更喜歡支付現(xiàn)在的確定的股利的股票而不是未來的不確定的數(shù)量相等的股票。</p><p>　　我們不期望大多數(shù)的受訪者同意剩余的股利模型，這意味著股利支付的是“剩余”收益。雖然使用剩余的政策可能幫助公司制定其長期目標派息比率，但是

75、我們相信，經(jīng)理通常不使用這種方法來指導任何一年的支出，因為這將導致不穩(wěn)定的股利。 </p><p>　　最后，納斯達克管理者傾向于什么樣的支付股利的解釋？如前所述，研究人員已經(jīng)進行了許多研究，涉及各種為什么公司支付股利的解釋。實證證據(jù)通常與幾個假說相一致，如股利信號和代理成本模型，而與稅務偏好理論不一致。如前所述，幾乎沒有實證證據(jù)支持在手之鳥理論。因為我們的資料集包括已建立現(xiàn)金股利支付模式的公司，我們期望