外文翻譯---股利政策一個(gè)綜述

1、<p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　一、外文原文</b></p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Dividend policy: a review</p><p>　　1. Introduction</

2、p><p>　　Explaining dividend policy has been one of the most difficult challenges facing financial economists. Despite decades of study, we have yet to completely understand the factors that influence dividend p

3、olicy and the manner in which these factors interact. Allen and Michaely (1995) conclude that ‘‘much more empirical and theoretical research on the subject of dividends is required before a consensus can be reached’’ (p.

4、 833). The fact that a major textbook such as Brealey and Myers (2002) lists d</p><p>　　2. Dividend irrelevance and tax clienteles</p><p>　　While Lintner (1956) provided the stylistic descriptio

5、n of dividends, the watershed in the theoretical modelling of dividends was almost surely the classic paper Miller and Modigliani (1961), which first proposed dividend irrelevance. Essentially, their model is a one-perio

6、d model under certainty. Given a firm’s investment program, the dividend policy of the firm is irrelevant to the firm value, since a higher dividend would necessitate more sale of stock to raise finances for the investme

7、nt pro</p><p>　　The argument rests on the assumptions that the investment program is determined independently and that every stockholder earns the same return (i.e. the discount rate remains constant). Mille

8、r and Modigliani’s dividend-irrelevance argument is elegant, but this does not explainwhy companies, the public, investment analysts are so interested in dividend announcements. Clearly, the observed interest in dividend

9、 announcement must be related to some violation of theMiller andModigliani assumptions.Mi</p><p>　　Miller and Scholes (1978) provide an ingenious scheme to convert dividend income to capital gains income. Re

10、cently Allen et al. (2000) have advanced a theory based on the clientele paradigm to explain why some firms pay dividends and others repurchase shares. A variant of the clientele theory has also been advanced by Baker (

11、2004) where they posit that dividend payments are in response to demands from investors for dividends.</p><p>　　3. Informational asymmetry and signalling models</p><p>　　Deviations from the Mill

12、er and Modigliani (1961) dividend irrelevance proposition is obtainable only when the assumptions underlying the setting of Miller and Modigliani are violated. The tax-clientele hypothesis uses the market imperfection of

13、 differential taxation of dividends and capital gains to explain the dividend puzzle. Bhattacharyya (1979) develops another explanation for the dividend policy based on asymmetric information. Managers have private knowl

14、edge about the distributional suppor</p><p>　　In the signalling equilibrium higher value of the support is signalled by higher dividend. In other words, the better the news, the higher is the dividend. Heink

15、el (1978) considers a set up where different firms have different return-generating abilities. This information is transmitted to the market by means of dividends, or equivalently, from investing at less than the first b

16、est level. In the equilibrium of Heinkel’s model, the firm with less productivity invests up to its first best level an</p><p>　　Notable works in signalling paradigm of dividend policy are those of Miller an

17、d Rock (1985), John andWilliams (1985) andWilliams (1988). These signalling models typically characterize the informational asymmetry by bestowing the manager or the insider with information about some aspect of the futu

18、re cash flow. In the signalling equilibriums obtained in these models, the higher the expected cash flow, the higher is the dividend. In Miller and Rock (1985), the signalling cost is the opportunity co</p><p&

19、gt;　　4. Free cash flow hypothesis</p><p>　　The rich theoretical development in modelling dividends as signals of private managerial/entrepreneurial information also gave rise to empirical research seeking to

20、 determine the fit of the signalling theory to real world data. Typically, the empirical literature attempted to test the signalling paradigm counterpoised against an alternative rationale for dividends advanced by Jense

21、n (1986), based on the principal- agent framework. According to this framework, dividends are used by shareholders a</p><p>　　5. Conclusion</p><p>　　We have seen that the empirical evidence is e

22、quivocal about the existing theories of dividend policy. Research has discovered a large number of stylized facts but the explanation of dividend policy in an integrated framework still eludes us. In his PhD dissertation

23、, Bhattacharyya (2000) explains dividend policy by using the asymmetric information paradigm. However, unlike the signalling models (where the informed manager/insider uses the dividend as a signalling device), he posits

24、 dividend polic</p><p>　　The proof of the pudding, as the adage goes, is in eating, and the validity of a theory is the degree of its congruence with empirical reality. A properly conducted research will tak

25、e into account the empirical implications of all the theories and test them simultaneously. This is the task for future.</p><p>　　Source: N. Bhattacharyya, (2007) "Dividend policy: a review", Manag

26、erial Finance, Vol. 33 Iss: 1, pp.4 – 13.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p><b>　　股利政策：一個(gè)綜述</b></p><p>　　1、Introductio簡(jiǎn)介 </p><p>　　Explaining dividend p

27、olicy has been one of the most difficult challenges facing解釋股利政策對(duì)financial economists.財(cái)務(wù)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家來說已經(jīng)是面臨的最困難挑戰(zhàn)之一。Despite decades of study, we have yet to completely understan盡管經(jīng)過了幾十年的研究，但我們還沒有完全理解the factors that influence di

28、vidend policy and the manner in which these factors影響股利政策的因素，以及這些因素以何種方式interact.相互影響。Two decades ago, Black (1976) wrote, ''The harder we look at the dividend艾倫和邁克爾（1995）的結(jié)論是“在達(dá)成一致意見前，進(jìn)行更多的有關(guān)股利分配主題的實(shí)證和理論研究是必需的”。

29、事實(shí)上,在一本重要的教科書中布萊雷和梅耶(2002)列出了股利成為十大加強(qiáng)財(cái)務(wù)管理必須解決的問</p><p>　　Over the years, dividends are increased slowly at a particular speed of adjustment, so2.2 、股息和稅收的客戶群無關(guān) </p><p>　　有關(guān)于描述股息的文章有林特納（1956）所提供的

30、，該領(lǐng)域theoretical modelling of dividends was almost surely the classic paper Miller and股利理論模型幾乎可以肯定的是米勒和Modigliani (1961), which first proposed dividend irrelevance.莫迪里阿尼（1961）的經(jīng)典論文，但其中也首次提出了股利無關(guān)理論。Essentially, their model

31、 is a從本質(zhì)上講，他們的模型是一個(gè)確定性的one-period model under certainty.單期模型。Given a firm's investment program, the dividend policy鑒于一個(gè)公司的投資計(jì)劃，股利政策與of the firm is irrelevant to the firm value, since a higher dividend would necessita

32、te more該公司的價(jià)值是無關(guān)的，因?yàn)檩^高的股息將需要更sale of sto</p><p>　　米勒和斯科爾斯(1978)。他們選擇從個(gè)人所得稅申報(bào)表歸檔來返還。他們發(fā)現(xiàn),85%的申報(bào)收益報(bào)告是股息收入。最近艾倫(2000)已提出一種基于客戶范式理論來解釋為什么有些公司分紅而其他公司回購(gòu)股份?？蛻舻囊粋€(gè)變化理論也是促進(jìn)貝克(2004)認(rèn)為股利發(fā)放的要求是為了響應(yīng)一起投資者對(duì)股息的要求。</p>

33、<p>　　This specific3、信息不對(duì)稱和信號(hào)模型 </p><p>　　從Deviations from the Miller and Modigliani (1961) dividend irrelevance proposition is莫迪里阿尼和米勒（19

34、61）股利無關(guān)理論的差異中我們知道obtainable only when the assumptions underlying the setting of Miller and Modig只有當(dāng)與米勒和莫迪利亞尼理論are violated.相違背的假設(shè)條件可設(shè)立下才能得出結(jié)論。客戶稅假說使用的是不完善的市場(chǎng)微分紅利課稅和資本收益來解釋股息難題。The tax-clientele hypothesis uses the market

35、 imperfection of differential巴特查里亞（1979)發(fā)展的股利政策是在另一種解釋信息不對(duì)稱的基礎(chǔ)上。BhattacharyyaManagers have private knowledge about the distributional support of the經(jīng)理人的私人支持有關(guān)知識(shí)分布project cash flow and </p><p>　　在 Bhattachary

36、ya and Heinkel's work was followed by a number of other papers whichNotable works in signalling paradigm of dividend policy are those of Miller股利政策的股利信號(hào)模型中，最著名的范例是米勒和羅克（1985），約翰和威廉姆斯（1985）和威廉斯（1988）等。這些信號(hào)模型的信息不對(duì)稱是由于經(jīng)

37、理或和相關(guān)的某些方面未來現(xiàn)金流量的內(nèi)幕信息。In the signalling equilibriums obtained in these models, the higher the在這些信號(hào)模型取得均衡就能實(shí)現(xiàn)更高的expected cash flow, the higher is the dividend.預(yù)期現(xiàn)金流量，更高的股息。In Miller and Rock (1985), the signalling在米勒和羅克（1

38、985），信息的cost is the opportunity cost of less than f</p><p><b>　　4、自由現(xiàn)金流假設(shè)</b></p><p>　　股利模型豐富的理論發(fā)展中分紅私人管理/企業(yè)信息也引起實(shí)證研究試圖找到一個(gè)最適合的實(shí)際數(shù)據(jù)的信號(hào)理論。杰森(1986)基于委托-代理框架提出典型的實(shí)證文獻(xiàn)試圖測(cè)試信號(hào)平衡針對(duì)一個(gè)以紅利為提前的

39、合理選擇。根據(jù)該分析框架,股利成為一種被管理者減少過度投資的機(jī)制。管理人員控制著公司,因此他們可能會(huì)把現(xiàn)金投資在消極的凈現(xiàn)值的項(xiàng)目中，但是這樣卻增加了管理人員的個(gè)人功利。降低股息這個(gè)自由現(xiàn)金流量的范圍,從而降低過度投資。魯克卷(1984)和杰森(1986)在文章中提出了兩種最會(huì)引用這類型的方法。不幸的是,這兩種方法試圖模擬實(shí)際情況,然而他們提出的假說卻是似是而非的。一方面, 伊斯特布魯克(1984)提出股息是用來拿走從公司高級(jí)管理人員控

40、制的自由現(xiàn)金償付給股東的。這樣要確保經(jīng)理人了解資本市場(chǎng),以滿足新的項(xiàng)目所需的資金。需要面向資本市場(chǎng)就需要管理人員加強(qiáng)自律,從而縮減監(jiān)控新產(chǎn)品的經(jīng)理的成本。此外,他還假設(shè)必須把資本市場(chǎng)問題,也是作為一個(gè)經(jīng)理人的自己的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)一樣去回避。另一方面,杰森(1986)認(rèn)為在大公司中現(xiàn)金流量大,管理者將趨向于去投資低回報(bào)的項(xiàng)目。根據(jù)杰森的理論,債務(wù)將減少現(xiàn)金流量。杰森認(rèn)為收購(gòu)與兼并</p><p><b>　　5、結(jié)

41、論</b></p><p>　　我們已經(jīng)看到,利用實(shí)證證據(jù)來對(duì)股利政策理論進(jìn)行解釋存在模棱兩可的問題。研究已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn)了大量的典型事實(shí)但解釋在一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的理論框架下股利政策仍然同我們無緣。在巴特查里亞(2000)的博士論文中利用非對(duì)稱信息范式解釋股利政策。然而,不像信號(hào)模型(即告知管理層/內(nèi)部采用的股息作為一個(gè)信號(hào)裝置), 假定以股利政策作為篩選合同的的一個(gè)原則。在信號(hào)模型中, 隱藏信息來源造成了信息不對(duì)稱

42、。在文章中,他用更豐富的信息的來源這是由于道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的存在(因?yàn)榇沓杀臼遣豢梢?,由于隱藏信息(因?yàn)榇砣说墓ぷ餍适遣豢梢?。他假設(shè)管理層需要自身的凈財(cái)富最大化，主要交易者認(rèn)識(shí)到這一點(diǎn),并建立識(shí)別合同,并在生產(chǎn)企業(yè)利用代理的能力。他發(fā)現(xiàn)建立在股息模型基礎(chǔ)上的結(jié)果是相反的,股利信息范式條件有現(xiàn)金可用性,建立在逆相關(guān)管理類型上。也就是說,為了保持一個(gè)固定的可觀的現(xiàn)金,管理層會(huì)用以降低生產(chǎn)力來宣布更高的宣告股利比管理層提供更高的生產(chǎn)率更好。

43、他總結(jié)說,他的模型可以用來解釋了許多其他研究人員的實(shí)證調(diào)查結(jié)果。在他的模型上一個(gè)有趣的推論是當(dāng)我們包括花費(fèi)很多的個(gè)人的效率和不同的生產(chǎn)力, 股息之間的關(guān)系和管理類型轉(zhuǎn)換從單調(diào)增長(zhǎng)到單調(diào)減少</p><p>　　以實(shí)證研究來檢驗(yàn)理論的有效性，適當(dāng)開展研究活動(dòng)，將實(shí)證方面的理論和試驗(yàn)同時(shí)進(jìn)行，這是完成任務(wù)的有效途徑。</p><p>　　出處: 巴塔查耶，《股利政策:一個(gè)綜述》，理財(cái)雜志.20