外文翻譯--中國樓市泡沫幾何

1、<p>　　What the property bubble of china</p><p>　　Among the captivating figures released in China’s 2010 census is a nifty little stat: Chinese urbanites went up from 36 per cent of the population in

2、2000, to a hair’s-breadth short of 50 per cent in 2010. It’s pretty safe to assume, then, that by the end 0f 2011 there will be more Chinese living in cities than in the countryside.</p><p>　　Neat timing, th

3、erefore, for a fresh report on whether China is experiencing a property bubble in its major cities.</p><p>　　Commerzbank’s Ashley Davies takes many of the China bubble arguments head on.</p><p>

4、　　“There are too many empty houses” – no, he says. While estimates vary, a commonly used figure of 64m empty homes equates to 4.8 vacant homes per hundred people. In the US, that figure is 5.9 per 100.</p><p&g

5、t;　　“Chinese properties are expensive” – yes, he says, but not too expensive. House price to income ratios in some parts of China are dizzying – take Beijing, where Commerzbank says it’s 38 times average annual incomes.

6、But in other cities, like Shenyang, the figure is still around 10 – i.e. somewhere in between Frankfurt (5) and New York (12), but less than Taipei (20) and Singapore (18). If wages rise quickly enough, some of these rat

7、ios will fall back to more comfortable levels.</p><p>　　More importantly, prices haven’t hit Japanese levels. In the 1980s, Tokyo office space went for as much as $250,000 a square metre. In Beijing, that fi

8、gure is currently just $4,100 – a third that of Singapore. What’s more, people have been discussing a potential property bubble in China for years – in Japan nobody saw it coming. (Which raises the question – does a bubb

9、le only exist if you can’t see it?).</p><p>　　“There’s too much investment in residential construction” – not necessarily, he says. While housing investment as a percentage of GDP is 8 per cent – more than i

10、t was at the peak in Japan – there’s no historical evidence of how much is too much. China builds poor quality buildings that will need replacing relatively quickly. Combined with high urbanisation rates, this means a hi

11、gh level of residential investment can be sustained for a long time in China.</p><p>　　Davies admits that the finances of local governments – which have sold land in order to generate revenue – are a concern

12、. They have relied heavily on the housing boom, and a turn in the market would damage their ability to meet payments.</p><p>　　The impending slowdown of the Chinese economy will also put the question of a pr

13、operty bubble - and what it means for the banking system – in sharper focus. Meanwhile the (mooted) opening of the Chinese capital account could result in huge outflows of capital as wealthy Chinese sell mainland assets

14、to buy up property, stocks etc overseas.</p><p>　　In conclusion:</p><p>　　In our view the property market is guilty of exuberance but does not yet constitute a true bubble. Hence, the rationale

15、policy response is to proceed with capital account liberalisation while keeping an iron grip on the property market. This seems to be exactly the approach being attempted by the authorities.</p><p>　　But one

16、 thing that sticks out is this chart, showing residential investment against fixed asset investment over the past 7 years.</p><p>　　It makes you wonder – while there may not be a housing investment bubble in

17、 China – might there be an investment bubble in something else? (Airports, train stations, shopping malls…)</p><p>　　Signs are growing that China's government is discreetly adjusting its medium-term stra

18、tegy of tackling the country's red-hot property sector. In recent weeks, there's been a notable lower volume on calls for the introduction of some sort of property tax, a potentially powerful fiscal tool widely c

19、onsidered one of the last resorts for the government to rein in runaway housing prices</p><p>　　That said, populists would still argue that the Chinese government needs a better explanation for being so late

20、 in elevating public housing to a key role in the dual purpose of cooling the market and reining in inflation. Under the excuse of treating real estate as an economic engine, there's deep-rooted resistance within the

21、 bureaucracy to give up guaranteed windfalls from land sales and property-transaction taxes.</p><p>　　Once again, conflict of interest, not technicalities such as hot money and cheap financing, is the long-t

22、erm hurdle for what the PBOC describes as 'the healthy development' of China's property market.</p><p><b>　　中國樓市泡沫幾何</b></p><p>　　中國2010年人口普查所產(chǎn)生的各項令人著迷的數(shù)據(jù)中，有這樣一個有意思的數(shù)字：中國

23、城市人口占總?cè)丝诘谋壤褟?000年的36%，升至2010年的近50%。因此，人們可以相當有把握地假定，到2011年底，中國城市人口將超過農(nóng)村人口。</p><p>　　就此而言，有關(guān)中國各大城市是否正在經(jīng)歷一場房產(chǎn)泡沫的一份新報告，發(fā)表得很及時。</p><p>　　德國商業(yè)銀行的阿什利·戴維斯正面回擊了有關(guān)中國正出現(xiàn)泡沫的種種說法。</p><p>

24、　　“有太多空置房”——他說，實際情況并非如此。盡管各種估計有所不同，但通常采用的數(shù)字（6400萬套空置住房）相當于每100人4.8套住房。美國的空置率達到每100人5.9套住房。</p><p>　　“中國房產(chǎn)相當昂貴”——他說，沒錯，但并不貴得太離譜。房價收入比在中國一部分地區(qū)高得令人頭暈。以北京為例，德國商業(yè)銀行表示，北京的房價已達到平均年收入的38倍。但在其它城市，如沈陽，這個數(shù)字仍在10倍左右，即在法蘭

25、克福（5倍）和紐約（12倍）之間，但低于臺北（20倍）和新加坡（18倍）。如果工資上升得足夠快，這些比率中有一些將回落至更加令人舒適的水平。</p><p>　　更重要的是，中國房價尚未達到日本的水平。上世紀80年代，東京的寫字樓價格曾經(jīng)高達每平米25萬美元。在北京，這個數(shù)字目前僅為4100美元，相當于新加坡水平的三分之一。況且，人們談?wù)撝袊赡艹霈F(xiàn)房產(chǎn)泡沫已有多年，而當年在日本沒有人預(yù)見到房產(chǎn)泡沫。（這引出一個

26、問題：泡沫是否只在你預(yù)見不到它的情況下才會存在？）</p><p>　　“住房建設(shè)的投資過多“——他說，未必如此。盡管住房投資占國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值(GDP)的8%——超出日本頂峰時期水平——但并無歷史證據(jù)顯示多高的水平才算過高。中國建造的許多樓房質(zhì)量低劣，需要以較快的速度更換。再加上高速城市化，這意味著高水平的住房投資在中國能夠長期持續(xù)。</p><p>　　戴維斯承認，對依靠出售土地來產(chǎn)生收入

27、的中國地方政府來說，其財政狀況令人擔憂。它們嚴重依賴于樓市繁榮，市場逆轉(zhuǎn)將損害它們的支出能力。</p><p>　　中國經(jīng)濟即將出現(xiàn)的放緩，也將令人更加關(guān)注房產(chǎn)泡沫問題、以及該問題對銀行體系意味著什么。與此同時，中國（據(jù)稱正在醞釀的）開放資本賬戶可能導(dǎo)致資本大量流出，因為有錢的中國人可能賣出國內(nèi)資產(chǎn)，轉(zhuǎn)而在海外大量買入房地產(chǎn)、股票等。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)論是：<

28、/b></p><p>　　在我們看來，中國房產(chǎn)市場確實有些活躍過度，但并未構(gòu)成真正意義上的泡沫。因此，理智的政策回應(yīng)是推進資本賬戶自由化，同時嚴格管束房產(chǎn)市場。這似乎也正是中國官方正在嘗試的做法。</p><p>　　但這幅顯示過去7年住房投資相對于固定資產(chǎn)投資的圖表有一點值得注意。</p><p>　　它讓你揣測：如果中國不存在住房投資泡沫，會不會在其它領(lǐng)

29、域存在投資泡沫呢？（機場、火車站、購物中心……）</p><p>　　不斷有跡象顯示，中國政府正在謹慎調(diào)整應(yīng)對房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)過熱的中期策略。最近幾個星期，推出某種形式物業(yè)稅的呼聲明顯調(diào)低了聲調(diào)。這種財政政策工具的影響可能非常巨大，被普遍視為政府遏止房價失控的終極手段之一。</p><p>　　但民粹派還是會說，中國政府需要解釋，為什么這么晚才把公共住房提升到一個對于冷卻房地產(chǎn)市場同時遏制通貨膨