外文翻譯--用增值稅代替工資稅或企業(yè)所得稅的影響

1、<p><b>　　中文3120字</b></p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p>　　外文出處 Tax Policy Center </p><p>　　外文作者 Eric Toder, Joseph Rosenberg

2、</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Effects of Imposing A Value-added tax to Replace Payroll taxes or Corporate taxes</p><p>　　Economic Effects and Behavioral Responses</p&

3、gt;<p>　　These revenue estimates assumed no behavioral responses. We have estimated the effects of behavioral responses on receipts or the effects of the various policy options on economic efficiency and output, b

4、ut provide below some qualitative discussion.</p><p>　　Benefits of a VAT Relative to a Payroll Tax</p><p>　　A value-added tax is neutral between present and future consumption, so it does not ad

5、versely affect the incentive to save. It does, however, reduce the return from working in the same manner as an individual income tax or payroll tax, although the mechanism for remitting the VAT is very different than th

6、e collection mechanism for direct taxes.The result is that the net effect of substituting a VAT for payroll tax on the incentive to work is not large.</p><p>　　The substitution of a broad-based VAT for a por

7、tion of the employer payroll tax that we simulate would raise the after-tax wage (lower the total tax rate on the employee’s work product) for workers in the 15 and 25 percent brackets, but lower the after-tax wage (incr

8、ease the total tax rate on work) for high-wage employees who earn more than the maximum wage subject to OASDI tax (Table 8).</p><p>　　In the examples shown, all workers contribute an additional $107.65 to th

9、e value of an employer’s sales. The worker’s marginal product is assumed to be invariant under different tax regimes. Under current law, there is no VAT, but employers withhold from wages $7.65 in employer payroll taxes,

10、 leaving $100 of taxable money wages. They also withhold the employee’s $7.65 payroll tax contribution and the employee in the 15 (25) percent bracket pays an additional $15 ($25) of income taxes.</p><p>　　T

11、he employee in the 35 percent bracket is assumed to have earnings above the Social Security wage threshold, so she and her employer both pay only the 1.45 percent ($1.54) Medicare payroll tax on a money wage that is now

12、$106.11 for every $107.65 of worker product. The 35 percent income tax rate raises $37.14 on the higher money wage base. The total tax rate (as a share of marginal product) paid by the workers in the 35 percent bracket i

13、s about the same as the tax rate in the 25 percent bracket,</p><p>　　Introducing a 5 percent VAT on a base that includes just 78.6 percent of consumption (see appendix) is equivalent (in terms of its effect

14、on after-tax income) to introducing a VAT of 3.93 percent on all consumption. Because VAT is expressed in tax-exclusive terms (on sales excluding the tax), the tax on rate on sales including the tax is somewhat lower (3.

15、78 percent). The VAT reduces the gross compensation that can be paid to employees, therefore, by 3.78 percent of the worker’s contribution to </p><p>　　The remaining $101.77 of money wages is then subject to

16、 employee payroll tax on $7.79 (7.65 percent) and income tax of $15.27 (in the 15 percent bracket) and $25.44 (in the 25 percent bracket). Note that the net increase in money wages from substituting a VAT for employer pa

17、yroll tax contributions raises income tax revenues slightly. The bottom lines, combining all the taxes, are fairly modest declines in the total marginal tax rates on the worker’s product. For the worker in the 15 percent

18、 inco</p><p>　　Thus, for the workers in lower marginal tax brackets, substituting a VAT for the employer payroll tax slightly increases the after-tax return from working more. Both the VAT and payroll tax ad

19、versely affect work effort, but because part of the VAT also falls on consumption from old wealth, the net return to work from the payroll tax substitution is slightly higher.</p><p><b>　　Table 8</b

20、></p><p>　　Example: Taxation of Sample Employees, Partial Substitution of a VAT for a Payroll Tax</p><p>　　Notes: VAT is the 5 percent broad-based VAT. It includes 77 percent of consumption,

21、so the VAT rate on all sales is 3.93%. This is a tax exclusive rate; the tax inclusive rate equals (3.93/1.0393) = 3.78%.</p><p>　　The payroll tax rates under current law are 7.65% for both the employer and

22、employee.</p><p>　　The VAT revenues are used to reduce the employer payroll tax rate by 5.9 percentage points to 1.75%.</p><p>　　For taxpayers in the 35 percent income tax rate bracket, it is as

23、sumed that their wages are above the Social Security thresholds, so only the Medicare tax (1.45 percent of the money wage for both the employer and employee) applies at the margin. In the VAT simulations we perform, only

24、 the OASDI tax is reduced.</p><p>　　These calculations assume the workers views the payroll tax as a "tax," and do not take into account any increase in future Social Security benefits from higher

25、payroll tax contributions.</p><p>　　The story is different for the worker in the 35 percent bracket, however. She gets no incentive to work more from the reduction in the OASDI payroll tax rate because she i

26、s already over the wage threshold for OASDI taxes. The employer payroll tax collected from her declines slightly only because the VAT reduces her gross compensation. The resulting decline in her money wages also lowers h

27、er income tax payment. But, after these offsets, the VAT raises the total marginal tax rate she faces on an a</p><p>　　Benefits and Costs of Corporate Rate Reductions</p><p>　　The effects of sub

28、stituting a VAT for part of the corporate income tax are very different than the effects of substituting it for part of the payroll tax. The corporate income tax does not distort the choice between working for current co

29、nsumption and leisure, but it does either reduce the after-tax return on capital or increase the return investors must receive from a corporate investment. Thus, substituting VAT for a portion of the corporate income tax

30、 should increase incentives to save and in</p><p>　　In an open economy with international capital flows, different ways of taxing capital income may affect incentives to save and invest differently. Most cor

31、porate income tax is paid by large multinational corporations. For those companies, the tax is largely a source-based tax on their profits from investments in the United States. Both U.S. and foreign-owned multinational

32、corporations are taxable on their U.S.-source income, but U.S. multinational corporations pay little additional tax on profit</p><p>　　This analysis suggests that the main benefit of lowering the corporate i

33、ncome tax would be to attract more investment to the United States. In addition, because corporations can use transfer pricing and other techniques to shift the source of reported income among countries, a lower corporat

34、e tax rate could lead to more reported profits in the United States. A shift of reported corporate profits to the United States would raise revenue collected from U.S. corporations, partially or fully offsett</p>

35、<p>　　Increased Domestic Investment. Many studies find that the location of investment of multinational corporations is sensitive to the local effective tax rate on corporate income (de Mooij and Ederveen, 2003). Th

36、is means that reducing the U.S. corporate income tax would encourage U.S. companies to substitute domestic for foreign investment and foreign-owned companies to invest more in the United States. The increased investment

37、would also raise the corporate income tax base, therefore offsetting so</p><p>　　Reduction in tax-motivated Income Shifting. A lower U.S. corporate tax rate would also reduce income-shifting within multinati

38、onal corporations from U.S. to foreign affiliates (Clausing, 2007). With a higher corporate rate in the United States than in other countries, companies have an incentive to manipulate transfer prices between their affil

39、iates, overstating the value of goods and services purchased from foreign affiliates and understating the value of goods and services sold or licensed to </p><p>　　Responses of Other Advanced Countries. Sinc

40、e enactment of the 1986 tax reform act, the U.S. federal statutory corporate rate has remained virtually unchanged, rising from 34 to 35 percent in 1993. (The deduction for domestic production activities enacted in 2004

41、reduced the tax rate to 31.85 percent for certain domestic investments.) Most other countries in the OECD reduced their corporate tax rates substantially over the same period. Currently the U.S. federal-state average top

42、 corporate rate o</p><p>　　Reducing the U.S. corporate tax rate would help correct this imbalance. But if other countries react to a lower U.S. corporate tax rate by reducing their tax rates further, the ben

43、efit to the United States of lower rates would be substantially reduced. Instead of a lower rate shifting investment to the United States, its net effect could instead be a loss in revenue to all OECD treasuries.</p&g

44、t;<p>　　Potential Erosion of Individual Income Tax Base. In an income tax system, a corporate income tax is necessary to prevent individuals from accruing tax-free profits within corporations. A neutral rule for t

45、axing investment income under an income tax would tax corporations the same ways as partnerships. There would be no separate corporate income tax, but corporate profits would be allocated to shareholders in proportion to

46、 share ownership and taxed as accrued under the individual income tax. The </p><p>　　Lowering the corporate rate below the top individual income tax rate would provide an incentive for many small closely hel

47、d businesses that are currently taxed as flow-through enterprises (limited partnerships or subchapter S corporations) to choose to be taxed as corporations. With an additional individual income tax of 15 percent on divid

48、end income and a top individual tax rate of 35 percent, the combined corporateindividual rates on dividends would be lower than the tax rate on partnership in</p><p>　　Source: Eric Toder, Joseph Rosenberg. E

49、ffects of Imposing A Value-added tax to Replace Payroll taxes or Corporate taxs[R].Tax Policy Center，2010.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　用增值稅代替工資稅或企業(yè)所得稅的影響</p><p><b&g

50、t;　　經(jīng)濟(jì)效應(yīng)及行為反應(yīng)</b></p><p>　　這些稅收預(yù)算被認(rèn)為沒有行動(dòng)上的回應(yīng)。我們預(yù)計(jì)了稅收對(duì)行為反應(yīng)的作用或各種各樣的政策選擇對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)效率和產(chǎn)出的作用，但這些是在某一定性討論之下所得到的。</p><p>　　增值稅相較于工資稅的優(yōu)點(diǎn)</p><p>　　增值稅在現(xiàn)在和未來的價(jià)值是不變的，因此它不對(duì)人們的儲(chǔ)蓄欲望產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響。確實(shí)，它與個(gè)人

51、所得稅和工資稅采用相同的方式工作，卻減少了回報(bào)，雖然對(duì)于匯款人來說，增值稅的匯集機(jī)制與直接稅的匯集機(jī)制非常不同。但用增值稅替代工資稅對(duì)工作的刺激不大。</p><p>　　如果我們用基礎(chǔ)廣泛的增值稅替代部分雇主的工資稅，對(duì)于采用15%和25%檔次所得稅的雇員，會(huì)提高扣除所得稅后的工資（降低員工的總稅率），但對(duì)于高薪的雇員會(huì)降低扣除所得稅后的工資（增加員工的總稅率），因?yàn)樗麄兛赡芤桓嗟酿B(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)（表8）。<

52、/p><p>　　在所示的例子中，所有的工人在銷售收入中貢獻(xiàn)了額外的107.65美元。工人的邊際產(chǎn)量的假設(shè)前提是不同的稅收制度是不變的。根據(jù)沒有增值稅的現(xiàn)行法律，雇主從工資中扣除雇主工資稅 7.65美元，留下100美元可征稅的現(xiàn)金工資。他們還扣除了雇員工資稅7.65美元，另外，對(duì)于15%（25%）檔次的雇員，還需支付一筆15（25）美元的所得稅。</p><p>　　對(duì)于35%檔次的雇員，假設(shè)

53、擁有在社會(huì)保險(xiǎn)薪水起征點(diǎn)以上的收入，那么她和她的雇主兩個(gè)人只要交納1.45%（1.54美元）的醫(yī)療保障工資稅，也就是說在107.65美元中能夠得到106.11的現(xiàn)金工資。35%檔次的所得稅在較高現(xiàn)金工資的基礎(chǔ)上提高到了37.14美元。35%檔次的雇員和25%檔次的雇員擁有相同的總稅率（把邊際產(chǎn)量作為一個(gè)單位量），因?yàn)闇p少的工資稅率差不多抵消了較高的所得稅率。</p><p>　　5%的增值稅中的78.6%的消費(fèi)(

54、參見附錄)與3.93%的增值稅的消費(fèi)是等效的（在其對(duì)稅后收入的影響方面）。增值稅與其他稅（不包括銷售稅）相比，擁有較低的稅率（3.78%）。增值稅減少了雇員的薪水，因此，雇員的貢獻(xiàn)（含稅）的3.78%是增值稅。在這個(gè)例子中，需要交納4.07美元的增值稅。增值稅的收入用于減少雇主工資稅，使得它從5.9%降低到1.75%。對(duì)于15%和25%檔次的員工來說，雇主工資稅額相當(dāng)于扣除增值稅后的總報(bào)酬(103.58美元)中的1.18美元。</

55、p><p>　　現(xiàn)在，現(xiàn)金工資為101.77美元，之后再交納雇員工資稅7.79美元和所得稅15.27美元（15%檔次）或25.44美元（25%檔次）。請(qǐng)注意，用增值稅代替雇主工資稅，會(huì)提高現(xiàn)金工資，從而使所得稅收入略有提高。將所有稅相加，所得到的總稅率略有下降。對(duì)于15%檔次的員工，用增值稅替代工資稅，使得總稅率從28.1%下降到26.8%。對(duì)于25%檔次的員工，用增值稅替代工資稅，使得總稅率從37.4%下降到36.

56、3%。</p><p>　　因此，對(duì)于采用較低檔次的員工，用增值稅替代雇主工資稅會(huì)獲得更多的稅后收入。增值稅和工資稅都對(duì)工作貢獻(xiàn)產(chǎn)生不利影響，但由于部分增值稅償還負(fù)債，使得代替工資稅能夠得到相對(duì)較高的純收益。</p><p><b>　　表8</b></p><p>　　例如：以增值稅部分替代工資稅，并計(jì)算雇員的稅費(fèi)</p>&l

57、t;p>　　注：1、增值稅是擁有5個(gè)百分點(diǎn)的基礎(chǔ)廣泛的增值稅。它包括77%的消費(fèi)，因此對(duì)所有銷售的增值稅稅率為3.93％。不含稅價(jià)的稅率等于（3.93/1.0393）= 3.78％。</p><p>　　2、根據(jù)現(xiàn)行法律雇主和雇員的工資稅稅率都是7.65％。</p><p>　　3、增值稅的收入減少了5.9個(gè)百分點(diǎn)的雇主工資稅，使得雇主工資稅稅率為1.75％。</p>

58、<p>　　4、對(duì)于在35%檔次的所得稅納稅人，假設(shè)他們的工資高于社會(huì)保障收入，那么他們只需要交納較低的醫(yī)療保險(xiǎn)稅(雇主和雇員的工資稅都是現(xiàn)金工資的1.45%)。在我們執(zhí)行增值稅模擬時(shí)，養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)稅減少了。</p><p>　　5、這些計(jì)算只是把工資稅看作是一種 “稅”， 不考慮工資稅的增加所引起任何未來的社會(huì)保障稅收的增加。</p><p>　　這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)對(duì)于35%檔次的員工是不同

59、的。由于已經(jīng)過了養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)稅的最低收入，因此要有較高的養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)稅。采用增值稅，它的雇主工資稅會(huì)略有下降，因?yàn)樵鲋刀悳p少了總報(bào)酬?，F(xiàn)金工資的下降，也導(dǎo)致了所得稅收入的降低。但是，在最后，增值稅把總稅率從37.4%提高到了39.8%。</p><p>　　減少企業(yè)所得稅的優(yōu)點(diǎn)</p><p>　　用增值稅去替代部分的企業(yè)所得稅，與用增值稅去替代部分工資稅的影響不同。企業(yè)所得稅并不改變當(dāng)前的消費(fèi)，

60、但它不是減少對(duì)資本的稅后回報(bào)，就是增加公司對(duì)投資者的回報(bào)。因此，增值稅代替了部分的企業(yè)所得稅，進(jìn)一步鼓勵(lì)儲(chǔ)蓄和投資。</p><p>　　在國際市場(chǎng)逐漸開放的今天，資本收入征稅方式的不同會(huì)使得儲(chǔ)蓄和投資的激勵(lì)機(jī)制不同。大多數(shù)的企業(yè)所得稅，是由大型跨國公司繳納的。對(duì)于那些企業(yè)，企業(yè)所得稅主要是以在美國投資所獲得的利潤(rùn)為基礎(chǔ)的一種稅。對(duì)于美國和外國所有的跨國公司，企業(yè)所得稅的稅基是他們?cè)诿绹氖杖耄绹鐕局恍?/p>

61、支付一些較少的額外稅收，這主要由于諸如延期和外國稅收抵免的規(guī)定（格布特和阿特舒勒，2006）。這意味著，在美國的投資的國際投資者要比美國當(dāng)?shù)氐墓窘患{更少的稅。除此之外，有研究表明，即使返回美國的收益下降，也可能不會(huì)減少投資，因?yàn)槎惡笫找媛首兓淮螅úＤ罚?002）。</p><p>　　這一分析表明，降低企業(yè)所得稅的主要好處是可以吸引更多的投資到美國。此外，由于公司可以使用轉(zhuǎn)移定價(jià)和其他國家之間的技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移來獲

62、得收入，降低企業(yè)所得稅率可能導(dǎo)致美國獲得的更多利潤(rùn)。企業(yè)利潤(rùn)轉(zhuǎn)移到美國將提高美國公司的收入，即使不增加國內(nèi)投資，也會(huì)部分或完全抵消較低的稅收損失。</p><p>　　增加國內(nèi)投資。許多研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，跨國公司的投資地點(diǎn)是地方企業(yè)所得稅較少的地方（德莫吉和安德威，2003）。這意味著減少美國的企業(yè)所得稅將鼓勵(lì)美國公司，投資于美國更多的地方，以取代外國投資和外國公司。增加的投資也將提高企業(yè)所得稅的稅基，因而抵消了一些低稅

63、率的收入損失。更多的投資在美國會(huì)提高實(shí)際工資并降低稅前收益資金，轉(zhuǎn)移某些稅收減少的好處。</p><p>　　減少稅收激勵(lì)的收入轉(zhuǎn)移。美國較低的企業(yè)所得稅稅率也將使跨國公司減少收入轉(zhuǎn)移（克勞辛，2007）。如果美國比其他國家具有更高的企業(yè)所得稅，那么公司可能會(huì)與其關(guān)聯(lián)方操縱價(jià)格，夸大在外國子公司購買貨物和服務(wù)的價(jià)值和低估銷售或授權(quán)給他們的商品和服務(wù)的價(jià)值（特別是無形資產(chǎn)，因?yàn)樗茈y用一個(gè)固定的方法去測(cè)量）。公司也

64、可以從事其他交易，如以股抵債，轉(zhuǎn)移他們分支機(jī)構(gòu)之間的收入。</p><p>　　其他先進(jìn)國家的響應(yīng)。自1986年稅收改革法案通過后，美國聯(lián)邦法制定的企業(yè)所得稅法維持不變，到1993的時(shí)候，稅率從34%上升到35%。（在2004年宣布對(duì)于國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)活動(dòng)，其稅率降低到31.85%。）在經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織的其他大多數(shù)國家，在同一時(shí)期大幅減少了企業(yè)所得稅稅率。目前，美國聯(lián)邦州最高平均水平為39.3%（不包括國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)活動(dòng)），

65、大大高于七國集團(tuán)平均水平的法定稅率（32.2%）和經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織的平均稅率（26.2%）（奧特修勒、哈里斯、透德，2009）。</p><p>　　降低美國企業(yè)所得稅率將有助于減少這種不平衡。但是，如果其他國家對(duì)于美國降低企業(yè)所得稅稅率反應(yīng)是進(jìn)一步降低其稅率，那么美國將大幅減少低利率的好處。取而代之的是較少的投資轉(zhuǎn)移到美國，可能會(huì)引起損失。</p><p>　　潛在侵蝕個(gè)人所得稅稅基。

66、在所得稅系統(tǒng)中，企業(yè)所得稅是必要的，以防止個(gè)人在企業(yè)內(nèi)累積免稅利潤(rùn)。不會(huì)有獨(dú)立的企業(yè)所得稅，但企業(yè)按持股比例將利潤(rùn)分配給股東和其應(yīng)納稅額根據(jù)個(gè)人所得稅累計(jì)。然而，在行政上有許多股東和股權(quán)變動(dòng)頻繁的大公司是用該企業(yè)征稅方法是不切實(shí)際的。</p><p>　　降低企業(yè)所得稅，使其低于個(gè)人所得稅，將會(huì)對(duì)小型企業(yè)（有限合伙或集團(tuán)下的小公司）提供一種刺激，使其選擇交納企業(yè)所得稅。小企業(yè)要交納15%額外股息收入稅和35%的個(gè)

67、人所得稅，那么采用23.6%的混合稅率最合算。而如果個(gè)人想累積或再投資獲利，可能發(fā)現(xiàn)辦法將勞動(dòng)收入轉(zhuǎn)換成企業(yè)收入，降低企業(yè)稅率將使企業(yè)采用一定的方法避稅，從而削弱個(gè)人所得稅的稅基。應(yīng)該特別規(guī)定，將小型企業(yè)的所有者的勞動(dòng)所得，按照企業(yè)所得稅條例征稅，防止勞動(dòng)報(bào)酬收入轉(zhuǎn)移到利潤(rùn)（霍爾珀林，2009）。</p><p>　　出處：埃里克透德，約瑟夫羅森堡. 用增值稅代替工資稅或企業(yè)所得稅的影響[R].稅務(wù)政策中心,20