稅制改革外文翻譯

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文）外文翻譯譯文</p><p>　　學(xué)生姓名： xxx </p><p>　　院 （系）： 經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院 </p><p>　　專業(yè)班級(jí)： 財(cái)管0802 </p><p>　　指導(dǎo)教師： xxx

2、 </p><p>　　完成日期： 20 年 月 日 </p><p><b>　　21世紀(jì)的稅制改革</b></p><p>　　Tax Reform in the 21st Century</p><p>　　作者：奧爾巴赫,艾倫?J</p><p><b>

3、;　　起止頁碼：</b></p><p>　　出版日期（期刊號(hào)）：2006年5月6日</p><p>　　出版單位：Berkeley Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper Series, Berkeley Program in Law and Economics, UC Berkeley</p><p>

4、<b>　　外文翻譯譯文：</b></p><p><b>　　引言</b></p><p>　　在未來的10年左右的時(shí)間中，美國(guó)能否保證這一可以使稅收系統(tǒng)更簡(jiǎn)單、更公平、更有效率的重要改革？為了得到問題的答案，我將會(huì)集中于大多數(shù)至少融合了幾種消費(fèi)稅的改革，因?yàn)檫@是近幾年經(jīng)濟(jì)研究和政策討論提出的方向。但是什么構(gòu)成了消費(fèi)稅，或者是以什么特點(diǎn)來定義消

5、費(fèi)稅務(wù)處理，是很難直觀看得出來的。有很多區(qū)分消費(fèi)稅的特征，甚至，不同特征的重要性在交付一個(gè)更簡(jiǎn)單、更公平、更有效的稅收中，很大程度上決定于會(huì)議被討論到什么程度。</p><p>　　因此，我會(huì)設(shè)計(jì)討論，通過分析消費(fèi)稅的不同屬性，考慮在提出不同的改革方案時(shí)所做出不同選擇的影響。這是一個(gè)我們所了解的運(yùn)作的國(guó)家，因?yàn)槲覀兯私獾囊恍﹩栴}是很重要的，所以加大研究力度也是很必要的。當(dāng)一些決定具有不確定的特性時(shí)，或許是因?yàn)楸?/p>

6、要的數(shù)據(jù)變的不可用，或許是我們未來要面對(duì)的事情無法用歷史的經(jīng)驗(yàn)解決。</p><p>　　盡管，我開始通過回顧基本的我們所了解的問題相關(guān)性來在收入和消費(fèi)方面進(jìn)行抉擇。在這里我們也可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，我們的思維已經(jīng)進(jìn)化，不僅是因?yàn)槟撤N程度上，經(jīng)濟(jì)理論和實(shí)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)得到了改進(jìn)，也是因?yàn)槲覀冇^察比較事物的方式得到了改變。當(dāng)在多種消費(fèi)稅的選擇方面，很多重要的問題是得不到解答的。</p><p>　　在所得稅和消

7、費(fèi)稅間的選擇</p><p>　　A：是否資本收益應(yīng)該納稅？</p><p>　　在某種程度并相比于之后的討論中，消費(fèi)稅可以有效保證稅收。因此，辯論從使至終圍繞著是否消費(fèi)稅比所得稅更好，其中包括質(zhì)問其是否是資本收益稅收方面的一個(gè)好的手段。</p><p>　　這些年來，我們?cè)谙M(fèi)稅是否可以提高我們的稅收制度的觀點(diǎn)，尤其是其是否可以使稅收變的更為有效，已經(jīng)變的十分復(fù)雜

8、和朝向消費(fèi)稅方向傾斜?，F(xiàn)在又一些文獻(xiàn)爭(zhēng)論認(rèn)為消費(fèi)稅比所得稅更有效。我不會(huì)嘗試的詳細(xì)調(diào)查這豐富的文學(xué)在這里,嘗試改為強(qiáng)調(diào)一些重要的結(jié)果。</p><p>　　因此,盡管資本稅收收入扭曲了越來越多的消費(fèi)在民眾的視野之外,如果我們對(duì)再分配稅收去執(zhí)行一項(xiàng)計(jì)劃,積極的資本稅收收入可能是有利的,資本收入消極稅收可能抵消不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的影響。這并不令人驚訝,因?yàn)闆]有明顯的直觀感受表明為什么這樣一個(gè)結(jié)果可能是有意義的。這并非偶然的文

9、獻(xiàn)主要集中在是否有效資本收入的稅率為零,而不是在是否應(yīng)該對(duì)資本收入和勞動(dòng)收入有平等的稅收。</p><p>　　未來的研究可以改進(jìn)這些預(yù)測(cè)嗎?大部分的工作,在動(dòng)態(tài)最優(yōu)稅收是最近的研究成果,所以我們可能會(huì)獲得一個(gè)更好的主意來說明資本收入稅收契入應(yīng)該是多大。這些模型對(duì)于個(gè)人決策和承擔(dān)相當(dāng)大的靈活性對(duì)稅收的選擇工具一般都有一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的結(jié)構(gòu),所以他們將繼續(xù)作為指導(dǎo),而不是作為一個(gè)源的估計(jì),除非它們納入更多的現(xiàn)實(shí)的個(gè)人和機(jī)構(gòu)

10、行為的表征。但這是一個(gè)重要的服務(wù)體系,因?yàn)殛P(guān)于比較收入和消費(fèi)稅負(fù)的思維或想法進(jìn)步了。</p><p><b>　　B.遺贈(zèng)和遺產(chǎn)</b></p><p>　　有許多潛在的理論可以解釋遺贈(zèng),這將與前期影響分析不同。一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的利他遺贈(zèng)動(dòng)機(jī),就像在巴羅(1974),將決定轉(zhuǎn)變一個(gè)生命周期的個(gè)體使之變成一個(gè)無限視野計(jì)算的王朝,從而增加了從資本稅收收入無謂損失。在另一個(gè)極端,偶

11、然發(fā)生的遺贈(zèng)由于不完整的年金市場(chǎng)并不意味著任何個(gè)人的擴(kuò)展。期間的模式是由一些不同大小的遺贈(zèng)所構(gòu)成的。年代的遺產(chǎn),要么就是因?yàn)橐粋€(gè)給予快樂的還是因?yàn)檫z贈(zèng)的前景可用于引出有利的行為從一個(gè)。年代潛在繼承人。盡管有證據(jù)強(qiáng)烈反對(duì)極端版本的巴羅。年代的預(yù)測(cè)(1997),它是可能的,觀察多種動(dòng)機(jī)的遺贈(zèng)反映。事實(shí)上,這是Bernheim(2002)從實(shí)證文獻(xiàn)基于審查我們的知識(shí)所總結(jié)出來的。</p><p>　　目前尚不清楚在消費(fèi)

12、和所得稅的選擇方面有多少遺贈(zèng)動(dòng)機(jī)。證明了阿爾蒂希(2001)等人模擬提出了并證明,甚至還計(jì)劃遺贈(zèng),如果相比于某人的消費(fèi)繼承，利益給予更會(huì)給他們帶來積極性，即需求對(duì)消費(fèi)稅愿景影響很小。此外,正如上述已經(jīng)討論的,未來消費(fèi)的扭曲是由于資本收入稅收已經(jīng)具有長(zhǎng)時(shí)程生命周期環(huán)境的象征所造成的。因此,潛在的時(shí)程遠(yuǎn)長(zhǎng)于事物的年限，使之對(duì)于消除日益強(qiáng)壯的資本收入稅收無法有效的得到論證。</p><p>　　當(dāng)然,自然的遺贈(zèng)動(dòng)機(jī)問題

13、更多的是考慮到未來的地產(chǎn)稅或遺產(chǎn)稅的角色。征稅無計(jì)劃的遺贈(zèng)的是一個(gè)非扭曲的稅收,而稅收計(jì)劃遺贈(zèng)更像是資本所得稅在其影響儲(chǔ)蓄行為。了解遺贈(zèng)動(dòng)機(jī)的性質(zhì),然后,判斷交易稅在稅收系統(tǒng)中的作用是非常重要的。</p><p>　　C：在資產(chǎn)和負(fù)債的處理中消除畸變</p><p>　　稅收改革的討論往往不盡是涉及資本收入稅收的總體水平,而且也涉及資本收入稅收的細(xì)微差異。自戴蒙德和莫里斯(1971)顯示了

14、生產(chǎn)中資源的優(yōu)化配置在可以成為一個(gè)理想的結(jié)果甚至在出現(xiàn)的其他稅收扭曲,總體感覺是,不同類型的資本收入征稅以不同的速率降低經(jīng)濟(jì)效率超出了必要的程度來提高收入的政府支出和再分配。因此,我們知道至少在某些假設(shè)下，微分資本收入稅收是一個(gè)不好的概念。有些人認(rèn)為,這是一個(gè)額外的理論支持消費(fèi)征稅,而對(duì)所有資本收入率為零,如果一個(gè)方法來實(shí)現(xiàn)統(tǒng)一的資本收入征稅。</p><p>　　因此,根據(jù)我們目前的知識(shí)很難量化，潛在收益的減少

15、或消除債券和股票之間的區(qū)別。當(dāng)然,這種轉(zhuǎn)變到一個(gè)明顯不同的稅收體系將給我們一個(gè)機(jī)會(huì),來了解更多是從觀察反應(yīng)。但是這些信息不會(huì)提前可用。</p><p>　　D：有多少資本收益進(jìn)入稅收</p><p>　　計(jì)算的效率收益從消除資本收入稅收楔子靠,當(dāng)然,在這個(gè)大小的這種楔形。如果資本回報(bào)的稅前利率很高,資本所得稅可以改變未來的消費(fèi)大幅的價(jià)格;如果稅前收益率為零。另一方面,資本所得稅以相同的速度

16、會(huì)收集并強(qiáng)加任何收入沒有扭曲。因此,盡管理論可能指向消除資本所得稅,潛在效率主要依靠的是多大的稅收楔子是開始。</p><p>　　因此,相關(guān)的回報(bào)率在計(jì)算跨變形可能會(huì)低于已被認(rèn)為在仿真模型中,但是適用的稅率納稅,較低的回報(bào)率會(huì)更高。高了多少很難知道,因?yàn)樗蕾囉谝环N資產(chǎn)。年代的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的程度,公司能夠抵消一個(gè)資產(chǎn)。年代,與另一家資產(chǎn)損失。年代回報(bào),稅收不對(duì)稱與調(diào)整的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。已經(jīng)有一些嘗試文獻(xiàn)來調(diào)整有效稅率分別為稅收不

17、對(duì)稱和ris(如巴赫1983),但這些計(jì)算更直觀全面相比。測(cè)定這些調(diào)整目前已知的更好懂。</p><p>　　E：概述：消費(fèi)稅Vs所得稅</p><p>　　消費(fèi)稅可能優(yōu)于所得稅作為計(jì)稅基數(shù),甚至將分配問題考慮在內(nèi)。更大的收益可能是如果差壓的資本收入稅收待遇蘊(yùn)含在現(xiàn)有的稅收制度是至少部分不可避免的在所得稅,或者如果使用資本是扭曲的,即使沒有稅收。但也可能激勵(lì)理由維持資本所得稅,資本收入的重

18、要性稅收楔子可能已經(jīng)大大夸大了通過計(jì)算基于觀察的稅前的回報(bào)率。這些結(jié)論,暫時(shí)的、在沖突,反映了近幾十年來的研究進(jìn)展,我們考慮選擇稅基。我們可以學(xué)習(xí)更多來自未來的研究。但是結(jié)論基于相當(dāng)抽象的表征和消費(fèi)稅收入不能用于評(píng)價(jià)的具體改革建議沒有考慮進(jìn)一步的細(xì)節(jié)的設(shè)計(jì)和實(shí)現(xiàn)。</p><p><b>　　消費(fèi)稅的屬性</b></p><p>　　描述一種消費(fèi)稅,讓我們先從一個(gè)版本

19、的國(guó)民收入身份有關(guān)的產(chǎn)品和收入兩方面的國(guó)民生產(chǎn)總值(GNP),</p><p>　　GNP = C + I +G + X ?M + R f = W + R + R f</p><p>　　這里C是消費(fèi),我是投資國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值,G是政府支出,X是出口,M是進(jìn)口,W是工資收入,R是國(guó)內(nèi)總資本收入、射頻是凈外匯收入,也就是說,外匯收入的國(guó)內(nèi)居民家庭收入少的外國(guó)居民。標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的方法實(shí)施消費(fèi)稅。因?yàn)樵谠鲋?/p>

20、稅,是開始在收入方面,所有因素征稅的回報(bào),但然后減免營(yíng)業(yè)稅,不代表消費(fèi),特別是:</p><p>　　C = W + R ? I ?G ? X + M</p><p>　　所以售出,投資和出口都是免費(fèi)的稅收而稅是針對(duì)進(jìn)口商品。</p><p><b>　　A:政府采購</b></p><p>　　如果稅基意味著私人消費(fèi),

21、那么政府采購也應(yīng)該被排除在稅基。一個(gè)同等待遇就是政府預(yù)算需要進(jìn)行調(diào)整,以抵消政府采購的稅收,因?yàn)椴粫?huì)有改變的數(shù)量的商品和服務(wù)由政府購買。但政府預(yù)算不可能調(diào)整,特別是如果聯(lián)邦政府稅收的州和地方政府的購買,使補(bǔ)償不足轉(zhuǎn)移到這些低級(jí)別的政府。在這種情況下,政府采購的征稅將減少預(yù)算的真正的州和地方政府。</p><p>　　是否活動(dòng)征稅的國(guó)家和地方政府將提高福利是未知的,很大程度上不可知的。從一開始的視圖,它是一個(gè)好主意

22、,政府提供的商品和服務(wù)稅以相同的速度提供那些私人提供給家庭、政治經(jīng)濟(jì)因素和的一個(gè)評(píng)價(jià)殃及政府活動(dòng)可以在任意方向偏差可能可取的。但這將是一項(xiàng)艱巨的任務(wù)，曾經(jīng)知道回答對(duì)不對(duì)。</p><p><b>　　B:現(xiàn)有資本的處理</b></p><p>　　對(duì)于一個(gè)zero-present-value今天作出的投資,未來添加到R或射頻相等成本的現(xiàn)值今天。年代投資添加到我或如果。

23、因此,隨著稅率隨時(shí)間變化,決定是否包括或者排除組件(R?I)和(R（f）?I（f）)不會(huì)影響政府收入的現(xiàn)值,也不會(huì)有任何影響的激勵(lì)進(jìn)行邊際投資。有效稅率為零等的投資會(huì)在這兩種方法。對(duì)于一些資產(chǎn),特別是自住房和其他耐用消費(fèi)品的,也很難開征新稅的元素(R?我),因?yàn)檫@將要求估算租金收入的稅收。那就是,我們觀察投資流作為組件的我,但我們不遵守的所有組件R,只是隨后的資產(chǎn)出售,而不是流的估算租金收入期間的所有權(quán)。因此,幾乎所有的消費(fèi)稅提案將排除

24、這些組件。根據(jù)增值稅,這相當(dāng)于新住房的銷售征稅而不是隨后的估算房租。</p><p>　　因此,如果資本征稅出現(xiàn)的副產(chǎn)品的立法,而不是因?yàn)樗麄兊闹醒氲哪康?他們可能不會(huì)有同樣的負(fù)面后果高效一些可能會(huì)害怕。原理上,我們可以了解更多關(guān)于這個(gè)通過檢查的行為反應(yīng)之前和之后的稅收改革,以獲得某種意義上的期望的特工。但這似乎是一個(gè)非常具有挑戰(zhàn)性的計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的任務(wù),鑒于資本征稅都嵌在更廣泛的政策變化,有額外的激勵(lì)效應(yīng)。<

25、/p><p><b>　　C:起源和目標(biāo)根據(jù)</b></p><p>　　一個(gè)特定的消費(fèi)稅基數(shù)元素，即關(guān)于很大的來自經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)專業(yè)之外的討論，來自外國(guó)凈資產(chǎn),(R（f）?I（f）)。因?yàn)楫?dāng)前的項(xiàng)目和資本項(xiàng)目的平衡，在基于終點(diǎn)增值稅的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)之下,這些會(huì)間接通過關(guān)稅來調(diào)整對(duì)進(jìn)口和出口。基于終點(diǎn)已經(jīng)被一些以如果采用一個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的增值稅，將為美國(guó)創(chuàng)造巨大價(jià)值的人所發(fā)現(xiàn)。但是一些稅收,特別是

26、Hall-Rabushka的統(tǒng)一稅,將對(duì)一個(gè)起源的基礎(chǔ),因此將對(duì)沒有特殊處理現(xiàn)金流與跨境投資相關(guān)。</p><p>　　在上面的討論資本征稅,似乎不太可能導(dǎo)致的資產(chǎn)重估決定征收邊境調(diào)節(jié)會(huì)有顯著作用的政府政策預(yù)期隨后;你可以。t介紹邊界調(diào)整稅收制度的不止一次。</p><p>　　D：金融資產(chǎn)和負(fù)債的處理</p><p>　　正如上面所討論的,一種消費(fèi)稅將消除微分稅收

27、待遇的來源和使用方面的資本市場(chǎng),強(qiáng)加一個(gè)零稅收對(duì)資本收入的無論哪一類型的投資,也不管的資金來源。但還有一個(gè)更微妙的差別不同方法之間的各種消費(fèi)征稅,這些區(qū)別可能影響的相對(duì)吸引力的不同方法。</p><p><b>　　E：納稅的時(shí)機(jī)</b></p><p>　　除了他們對(duì)于現(xiàn)有資產(chǎn)的租金和和回報(bào)處理的分歧,對(duì)于消費(fèi)稅款的現(xiàn)金流和免稅方案也不同于征稅的時(shí)機(jī)這一方面。雖然免

28、稅待遇只是沒有強(qiáng)加任何稅收,通過在不同的日期抵消扣除和稅收現(xiàn)金流到達(dá)同樣的零現(xiàn)值。</p><p>　　因此,就時(shí)機(jī)而言,就是一個(gè)能讓消費(fèi)稅看起來更像一個(gè)所得稅,而且還可以使一個(gè)所得稅看起來更像一種消費(fèi)稅。在任意方向移動(dòng)有它的成本和收益,以及二者沒有相對(duì)的平衡。在任何情況下,有“興趣基礎(chǔ)的方法”對(duì)消費(fèi)的稅收并沒有成為廣泛競(jìng)標(biāo)者中的消費(fèi)稅提案。</p><p>　　F：個(gè)人所得稅VS商業(yè)稅收

29、</p><p>　　消費(fèi)稅可以被應(yīng)用在業(yè)務(wù)級(jí)別，或是在個(gè)體層面。商業(yè)級(jí)別的增值稅已經(jīng)被討論過。一個(gè)消費(fèi)所得稅將伴隨著個(gè)人收入基數(shù)減去凈儲(chǔ)蓄開始。假設(shè)儲(chǔ)蓄一直是測(cè)量收入的手段,所有不保留的收入即是消費(fèi),那么結(jié)果將會(huì)是一種消費(fèi)稅。類似地,可以采用一種混合的方法,在固定稅收或是未知的稅,從業(yè)務(wù)到個(gè)人層面這始于一個(gè)增值稅和工資的稅收變化。從一些抽象的層面上來說，雖然稅收征管的位置是無關(guān)緊要的,但是它可能會(huì)有一些真正的效

30、果在實(shí)踐中。</p><p>　　我們不了解什么,及我們什么時(shí)候會(huì)了解</p><p>　　在考慮到我們認(rèn)知的情況下，從現(xiàn)行的稅收系統(tǒng)到某種形式的消費(fèi)征稅，大規(guī)模的稅收的改革好處是可枚舉的，但是難以衡量的。</p><p>　　從資本稅收中獲益是有效地,但這些收益的規(guī)模是非常不確定,因?yàn)榕c他們的估計(jì)有關(guān)技術(shù)問題和其性質(zhì)偏離標(biāo)準(zhǔn)建模假設(shè)的行為。從現(xiàn)有的財(cái)富也有可能增

31、加稅收的轉(zhuǎn)型,但它們的大小和存在的程度取決于過渡政策預(yù)期同時(shí)改變個(gè)人的期望值。消費(fèi)稅可以大幅減少畸變的金融和投資決策,但我們不知道通過簡(jiǎn)單的上下文內(nèi)實(shí)施現(xiàn)行的稅收系統(tǒng)，這些畸變可以消除的程度。雖然現(xiàn)實(shí)的消費(fèi)稅可以改進(jìn),但我們也不知道這是否屬實(shí)收入分配的最頂端。房產(chǎn)稅可以說在先進(jìn)、有效的稅收系統(tǒng)中起到一個(gè)關(guān)鍵作用。但這取決于不同遺贈(zèng)動(dòng)機(jī)的相對(duì)優(yōu)勢(shì)。</p><p>　　我們知道為了改善我們的貿(mào)易平衡或我們的能力，不

32、能采用一種消費(fèi)稅，或者進(jìn)行地下的稅收活動(dòng)。我們也知道,我們現(xiàn)有的知識(shí)必須不斷優(yōu)化調(diào)整到一個(gè)移動(dòng)的目標(biāo)。在金融活動(dòng)中，由于金融創(chuàng)新之間的差別變得模糊,,例如,一個(gè)忽略了這種區(qū)別且可能在增長(zhǎng)的收益系統(tǒng)。</p><p>　　對(duì)許多事情采用一個(gè)大型的稅務(wù)改革,就其本身而言,可能會(huì)提高我們的知識(shí)。但采取一系列更小的步驟在正確的方向上看起來確實(shí)很有吸引力，如一個(gè)可替代的選擇,尤其是當(dāng)他們的利益不依靠從我們不確定的捕獲中得出

33、的強(qiáng)有力的假設(shè)。</p><p><b>　　外文原文</b></p><p>　　I. Introduction</p><p>　　During the next decade or so, can the United States undertake a major reform to make its tax system simpl

34、er, fairer and more efficient? In addressing this question, I will focus mostly on reforms that incorporate at least some elements of consumption taxation, because this is the direction in which both economic research an

35、d policy discussions have pointed in recent years. But what constitutes a consumption tax, or entitles a system to be characterized as providing “consumption-tax treatment,” i</p><p>　　Thus, I will frame my

36、discussion by going through the attributes of a consumption tax, considering the impact of the choices made in constructing different reform proposals. This is one place where the state of our knowledge comes into play,

37、 as on some issues our knowledge is considerable, on others more research is required, while some decisions are of an unknowable nature, either because the necessary data won’t be available or because the circumstances w

38、e confront for the future go beyond ou</p><p>　　I begin, though, with a review of our state of knowledge on the fundamental issues relating to the choice between income and consumption taxation. Here, too,

39、our thinking has evolved over the years, in part because of advances in economic theory and empirical evidence, but also because of changes in the way we view the comparison. As with the choices among particular types o

40、f consumption tax, though, many important questions are still unanswered.</p><p>　　II. The Choice Between Income and Consumption Taxes</p><p>　　A. Should Capital Income Be Taxed?</p><

41、p>　　A consumption tax effectively exempts the return to saving from taxation, in a manner discussed more fully below. Thus, the debate over whether a consumption tax would be more desirable than an income tax involve

42、s asking whether it is a good idea to tax capital income.</p><p>　　Through the years, our perspective on whether a consumption tax would improve our tax system, in particular whether it would make the tax sy

43、stem more efficient , has become considerably more sophisticated and has tended to push in the direction of a consumption tax. There are now several strands of the literature arguing that a consumption tax would be more

44、efficient than an income tax. I will not attempt a detailed survey of this rich literature here, trying instead to highlight some key resul</p><p>　　Thus, even though capital income taxes distort consumptio

45、n more and more over the infinite horizon, positive taxes on capital income may be desirable if we seek to implement a plan for redistributive taxation, and negative taxes on capital income may be desirable to offset the

46、 effects of imperfect competition. On the other hand, one can scour the literature without finding a result suggesting that labor income and capital income should be treated equally by the tax system. This is hardly su

47、rpr</p><p>　　Can future research sharpen these predictions? Much of the work on dynamic optimal taxation is very recent, so we are likely to gain a better idea of how large capital income tax wedges should b

48、e, at least in the very stylized models of the literature. These models typically have a simple structure with regard to individual decisions and assume considerable flexibility with respect to the choice of tax instrum

49、ents, so they will continue to serve as a guide rather than as a source of estimates u</p><p>　　B. Bequests and Inheritances</p><p>　　There are many potential explanations for bequests, and they

50、 differ in how they would affect the previous analysis. A strong altruistic bequest motive, as in Barro (1974), turns the decisions of a life-cycle individual into the infinite horizon calculations of a dynasty, thereby

51、 increasing the deadweight loss from capital income taxation. At the other extreme, accidental bequests that occur because of incomplete annuity markets do not imply any extension of an individual’s planning horizon. I

52、</p><p>　　It is not clear how much the nature of the bequest motive matters for the choice between income and consumption taxes. As confirmed by simulations presented in Altig et al. (2001), even planned beq

53、uests, if they are motivated by the benefits of giving rather than the ultimate consumption of one’s heirs, need have little impact on the desirability of consumption taxes. Moreover, as already discussed above, the di

54、stortions of future consumption resulting from capital income taxation are already </p><p>　　Of course, the nature of the bequest motive matters considerably more as one considers the future of the estate ta

55、x or the possible role of inheritance taxes. A tax on unplanned bequests is a nondistortionary tax, whereas a tax on planned bequests is more akin to a capital income tax in its effects on saving behavior. Understandin

56、g the nature of the bequest motive, then, is very important to decisions about the role that transfer taxes should play in the tax system.</p><p>　　C. Eliminating Distortions in the Treatment of Assets and L

57、iabilities</p><p>　　Tax reform discussion often relates not just to the overall level of capital income taxation, but also to differential capital income taxation. Since Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) showed t

58、hat the efficient allocation of resources in production can be a desirable outcome even in the presence of other tax distortions, there has been a general sense that taxing different types of capital income at different

59、rates reduces economic efficiency beyond the degree necessary to raise revenue for government</p><p>　　The potential gains from reducing or eliminating the distinction between debt and equity, therefore, are

60、 hard to quantify based on our present knowledge. Certainly, the shift to a markedly different tax system would give us an opportunity to learn more from observed responses. But this information would not be available

61、in advance.</p><p>　　D. How Large is the Capital Income Tax Wedge?</p><p>　　Calculations of the efficiency gains from eliminating the capital income tax wedge depend, of course, on this size of

62、this wedge. If the before-tax rate of return to capital were high, a capital income tax could alter the price of future consumption substantially; if the before-tax rate of return were zero, on the other hand, a capital

63、 income tax at the same rate would collect no revenue and impose no distortions. Thus, although the theory might point toward elimination of capital income taxes</p><p>　　Thus, the rate of return relevant i

64、n calculating the intertemporal distortion may be lower than has been assumed in simulation models, but the tax rate applicable to that lower rate of return is likely to be higher. How much higher is difficult to know,

65、because it depends on an asset’s riskiness, the extent to which the firm is able to offset one asset’s losses with another asset’s gains, and how tax asymmetries interact with adjustments for risk. There have been some

66、attempts in the literatur</p><p>　　E. Summary: Income Taxation versus Consumption Taxation</p><p>　　Consumption taxes may be superior to income taxes as a tax base, even taking distributional co

67、nsiderations into account. The gains may be greater still if the differential tax treatment of capital income present under the existing tax system is at least partially unavoidable under the income tax, or if the use o

68、f capital is distorted even in the absence of taxation. But there may also be incentive reasons to maintain capital income taxes, and the significance of the capital income tax wedge ma</p><p>　　III. Attrib

69、utes of Consumption Taxes</p><p>　　To characterize a consumption tax, let us start with one version of the national income identity relating the product and income sides of Gross National Product (GNP),</

70、p><p>　　(1) GNP = C + I +G + X ?M + R f = W + R + R f</p><p>　　where C is consumption, I is gross domestic investment, G is government spending, X is exports, M is imports, W is wage income, R is

71、 domestic gross capital income, and R fis net foreign income, i.e., foreign income of domestic residents less domestic income of foreign residents.</p><p>　　The standard method for imposing consumption taxes

72、, as under the VAT, is to start on the income side, taxing all factor returns but then forgiving taxes on sales that do not represent consumption, in particular:</p><p>　　(2) C = W + R ? I ?G ? X + M</p&

73、gt;<p>　　So that sales for investment and export are free of tax while tax is imposed on imports.</p><p>　　A. Government Purchases</p><p>　　If the tax base is meant to be private consumpt

74、ion, then government purchases should also be excluded from the tax base. An equivalent treatment would be for the government budget to be adjusted to offset the taxation of government purchases, for there would be no c

75、hange in the quantities of goods and services purchased by the government. But the government budget may not adjust, particularly if the federal government taxes the purchases of state and local governments and makes in

76、sufficient co</p><p>　　Whether taxing the activities of state and local governments would improve welfare is unknown and largely unknowable. Starting from the view that it is a good idea to tax government-p

77、rovided goods and services provided at the same rate as those provided privately to households, political economy considerations and an evaluation of the spillovers from government activities can make deviations in eithe

78、r direction possibly desirable. But it will be a difficult task ever to know the “right” answer</p><p>　　B. The Treatment of Existing Capital</p><p>　　For a zero-present-value investment made t

79、oday, the future additions to R or R f are equal in present value to the cost of today’s investment added to I or If. Thus, with tax rates constant over time, the decision of whether to include or exclude the components

80、( R- I)and(Rf-If)would have no impact on the present value of government revenues, nor would it have any impact on the incentive to undertake marginal investments ñ the effective tax rate on such investments would b

81、e zero under both appro</p><p>　　Thus, if capital levies appear as byproducts of legislation, rather than as their central purpose, they may not have the same negative consequences for efficiency as some mig

82、ht fear. In principle, one could learn more about this by examining the behavioral responses leading up to and following tax reforms, to gain a sense of what the expectations of agents were. But this seems like a very

83、challenging econometric task, given that capital levies are embedded in broader policy changes that have a</p><p>　　C. Origin versus Destination Basis</p><p>　　One particular element of the cons

84、umption tax base about which there has been considerable debate outside the economics profession is the flows from net foreign assets, (Rf-If).Under a standard destination-based value added tax, these would be included i

85、ndirectly, through the border tax adjustments on imports and exports, since the current and capital accounts balance. The destination basis has been seen by some as providing a major competitive benefit for the United S

86、tates if it adopts a stand</p><p>　　As in the discussion of capital levies above, it seems unlikely that asset revaluations that result from the decision to impose a border adjustment would have any signific

87、ant effects on expectations of subsequent government policy; one can’t introduce border adjustments to a tax system more than once.</p><p>　　D. The Treatment of Financial Assets and Liabilities</p>&l

88、t;p>　　As discussed above, a consumption tax would eliminate the differential tax treatment on the sources and uses sides of the capital market, imposing a zero tax on capital income regardless of the type of investmen

89、t and regardless of the source of funds. But there are still distinctions of a more subtle variety among different approaches to consumption taxation, and these distinctions may affect the relative attractiveness of th

90、e different approaches.</p><p>　　E. The Timing of Tax Payments</p><p>　　Aside from their differences in the treatment of rents and normal returns to existing assets, the cash-flow and tax-exempt

91、 approaches to consumption taxation also differ with respect to the timing of tax collections. While the tax-exempt treatment simply imposes no taxes, cash-flow treatment arrives at the same zero present value through d

92、eductions and taxes at different dates that offset.</p><p>　　Thus, in terms of timing, one can make a consumption tax look more like an income tax, and one can also make an income tax look more like a consum

93、ption tax. Moving in either direction has its costs and benefits, and the balance between the two is not clear. In any event, the “basis with interest” approach to consumption taxation has not become widely featured am

94、ong consumption tax proposals.</p><p>　　F. Individual versus Business Taxation</p><p>　　Consumption taxes can be imposed either at the business level or at the individual level. The working of

95、the business-level VAT has already been discussed. A consumed income tax would start with the individual income base and subtract net saving. Assuming that saving is measured consistently with income, all income that i

96、s not saved is consumed, so the result would be a consumption tax. Similarly, one can adopt a mixed approach, as under the flat tax or the X tax, that starts with a VAT and </p><p>　　IV. What Don’t We Know,

97、 and When Will We Know It?</p><p>　　The benefits of a large scale tax reform that shifts from the current tax system to some form of consumption taxation are enumerable but difficult to measure, given the st

98、ate of our knowledge.</p><p>　　There are efficiency gains from reducing the capital income tax wedge, but the size of these gains is very uncertain, given technical issues associated with their estimation an

99、d the nature of behavioral deviations from standard modeling assumptions. There may also be gains in transition from the taxation of existing wealth, but their size and existence depends on the extent to which transitio

100、n policy is anticipated and alters individual expectations. Consumption taxes can sharply reduce the di</p><p>　　We do know not to adopt a consumption tax in order to improve our trade balance or our abilit

101、y to tax underground activities. We also know that our existing knowledge must be continually recalibrated to a moving target. As financial innovation blurs the distinction between real and financial activities, for ex