how brazil transferred billions to foreign coffee importersthe international coffee agreement, rent seeking and export tax rebates【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Material Source: Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics University of California Davis Autho

2、r: Lovell S. Jarvis</p><p>　　How Brazil Transferred Billions to Foreign Coffee Importers:The International Coffee Agreement, Rent Seeking and Export Tax Rebates</p><p>　　Introduction. To raise t

3、he price of coffee, the International Coffee Agreement (ICA)imposed a global quota on the amount of coffee that producing countries could export duringmost of the period 1963-1989. Brazil, the world’s largest coffee prod

4、ucer, received the largestshare of the quota. Although the quota may have increased the international price and thusimproved Brazil’s gross terms of trade1, the quota also created large quota rents within Braziland these

5、 rents motivated considerable rent s</p><p>　　Rent seeking in Brazil occurred in many of the traditional forms (Jarvis 2001). However,an exceptional, but previously unidentified example of how rent seeking a

6、ffected the coffeesector involves Brazil’s use of coffee export tax rebates. These rebates were introduced soonafter the ICA quota was implemented. The amount of these rebates was initially small,averaging $21million per

7、 year during 1965-69, but grew rapidly and reached a peak of nearly $2 billion in 1981. In total, between 1965 and 1989</p><p>　　The rebates were initially justified as a means to price discriminate and incr

8、ease Brazil’s coffee revenues (Delfim Netto and Andrade Pinto, 1965). Once this policy had come under fire, rebates were justified as necessary to maintain the competitiveness of Brazilian coffee, given that Brazil requi

9、red exporters to pay export taxes and turn over foreign exchange reserves based on a government-imposed Minimum Registration Price that sometimes exceeded the prices of Brazil’s competitors (Bacha 1992)</p><p&

10、gt;　　The second justification was invalid since the Minimum Registration Price had little effect on the price at which coffee was actually sold. Brazilian coffee was fully competitive without the export tax rebates. The

11、best explanation for the abundant emission of export tax rebates is that they provided benefits to recipients, who engaged in rent-seeking activity to obtain more rebates.</p><p>　　Export Tax Rebates. When B

12、razil first received an ICA country export quota in 1963, the IBC imposed a large export tax that restricted exports to less than them amount of the quota that Brazil had been awarded. The IBC did so believing that Brazi

13、l had market power even within the quota amount (Bacha 1992). However, the IBC changed it policy in 1965 to ensure that it fulfilled its quota. It began to sign secret discriminatory contracts with a few large importers,

14、 paying them export tax rebates in</p><p>　　countries (roasters) was highly price elastic, implying that Brazilian exports could be profitably increased via a price discount (Delfim Netto 1959, Delfim Netto

15、and Pinto 1965). Internationally, the coffee importing and roasting industry was highly concentrated.6 Brazil therefore thought that it could “exert its capacity to discriminate among buyers according to their respective

16、 bargaining power” (Bacha, 1992).</p><p>　　Because private firms handled all coffee exports, to achieve the desired price discrimination the IBC had to develop some mechanism like the export tax rebates. Thi

17、s mechanism had to ensure that any importer that signed a long-term contract could purchase coffee from any exporter and pay only the agreed discounted price, while also ensuring that the exporter received the actual mar

18、ket price. The mechanism adopted was a negotiable, U.S. Dollarde nominated certificate called an Aviso de Garantia t</p><p>　　purchaser, but not to the exporter or farmer. While the formulas that determined

19、the specific export tax rebates to individual importers were secret, it is known that the magnitude of the rebates was tied to the difference between Brazil’s export price and an average of its main competitors’ prices,

20、as listed on the New York and London markets.</p><p>　　The Use of Export Tax Rebates to Price Discriminate. The hypothesis that the rapid rise in export tax rebates was a response to rent seeking can be test

21、ed using the model of price discrimination shown in Figure 2. Demand for Brazilian coffee is divided into two components, one from the largest foreign importers, DII, who are assumed to have purchased about 40% of Brazil

22、’s member market exports prior to initiation of the export tax rebates, and the other from all other exporters, DI. See Figure 2</p><p>　　The Effect of Export Tax Rebates on Brazil’s Coffee Export Price. Bec

23、ause different policies were followed in different periods when export tax rebates were utilized, it seemed likely that the effect of the export tax rebates should have differed from one subperiod to another. I identifie

24、d three subperiods for comparison: 1965-71, 1972-79, and 1980-88. During 1965-71, an export quota was in effect, the export tax was greater than the unit quota rent—thus constraining exports to the quota market,</p>

25、;<p>　　During 1980-88, an export quota was in place, but the export tax was smaller than the unit quota rent and did not constrain exports to the member market. Export tax rebates were provided to “all” importers

26、of Brazilian coffee. Assuming that the market was perfectly competitive, Brazil’s nominal export price should have risen by the amount of the unit export tax rebate, leaving the net export price unchanged. For example, l

27、et there be an initial situation in which there is no export tax and no ex</p><p>　　During 1972-79, a somewhat different situation held since no export quota was in effect. Brazil nonetheless imposed a subst

28、antial export tax. Since the export tax rebate was always paid to the importer following the purchase, the world market price remained the purchase price from the exporter’s viewpoint. The domestic producer price was det

29、ermined in keeping with the price received by the exporter, net of the gross coffee export tax. However, the foreign purchaser effectively paid a price net o</p><p>　　Conclusions. The International Coffee Ag

30、reement (ICA) restricted world coffee exports from 1965 to 1989 in an effort to increase world coffee prices. The ICA imposed a global export quota that was divided among producing countries, thereby creating significant

31、 domestic rents. In Brazil, the largest exporting country, these rents led to significant rent seeking and, ultimately, to significant welfare loss. The greatest component of this loss was associated with the issue of ex

32、port tax rebates tha</p><p>　　The Brazilian Coffee Institute (IBC) captured a significant fraction of the domestic coffee quota rent through imposition of an export tax. However, when the coffee export quota

33、 was implemented in 1965, Brazil was underselling its quota. As this situation suggested that the export tax was too high, Brazil decided to provide export tax rebates to qualifying purchasers of its coffee. These rebate

34、s were designed to achieve a “price discriminating” reduction in the export tax paid by some importers,</p><p>　　I show econometrically that the export tax rebates stimulated foreign demand for Brazilian cof

35、fee, increasing its price relative to those of its competitors. However, Brazil’s export price rose less than the amount of the export tax rebate so that the net price fell. This caused a large real transfer of domestic

36、coffee quota rents to foreign importers and/or consumers. Indeed, as a result of the export tax rebates, foreign roasters may have gained more from the ICA quota than did Brazil.</p><p>　　The ICA export quot

37、a created a market context within which the export tax rebates appeared attractive to Brazil, i.e., the export quota encouraged further government intervention in the market and, though the rents created, provided the ta

38、x revenues that facilitated payment of the rebates. Nonetheless, it is surprising that Brazil used coffee export tax rebates to effectively transfer a large share of its domestic ICA quota rent to foreign roasters. The I

39、CA was designed to increase coffee export</p><p>　　It is still somewhat unclear why Brazil initiated the use of coffee export tax rebates. Perhaps they were only intended as a mechanism to allow price discri

40、mination, though Bates (personal communication) has suggested that the rebates were implemented to share the benefits of the ICA global quota with the large international coffee roasters in at least tacit exchange for th

41、eir political support within the United States during the negotiation of the ICA (see also Bates 1997). Others, including Jo</p><p>　　Whatever the origin of the export tax rebate policy, the continuous and e

42、xpanded use of the rebates over a long period, despite reducing net IBC revenue and worsening Brazil’s net terms of trade, points to the insidious nature of rent seeking. Any transfer was strikingly at odds with the Braz

43、ilian government’s often stated objective that it wanted to use the IBC to offset the roasters’ perceived market power and thus achieve better prices and higher revenues from coffee. It appears likely that r</p>&

44、lt;p>　　Although less developed countries are increasingly adopting market oriented policies and eschewing distortions that lead to rent seeking, it is worth noting that the ICA was a commodity agreement created jointl

45、y by less developed and more developed countries to increase and stabilize coffee prices. The price increase was expected to benefit coffee producing countries and, particularly, the coffee producers therein. Instead, it

46、 appears that Brazil and most other producing countries suffered large</p><p>　　Developed country importers gained greatly and such gains may have contributed to their longer term political support for maint

47、enance of the ICA (Bates, Jarvis, 2001), as well as their pursuit of export rebates within Brazil. Thus, rent seeking in this case had international as well as national characteristics.</p><p><b>　　譯文&

48、lt;/b></p><p>　　資料來源：加州戴維斯大學(xué)農(nóng)業(yè)和資源經(jīng)濟(jì)系 作者：洛弗爾賈維斯</p><p>　　出口退稅。當(dāng)巴西在1963年第一次收到一個(gè)ICA（國際咖啡協(xié)定）國家的出口配額，巴西咖啡研究（IBC）所征收了大規(guī)模的出口關(guān)稅，這少于巴西已經(jīng)獲得的限制出口配額。巴西咖啡研究所相信即使在配額數(shù)量之內(nèi)，巴西也擁有市場(chǎng)力量（帕夏，1992）。然而，巴西咖啡研究所

49、在1965年改變了它的政策，以確保它履行了其配額。它開始與一些大進(jìn)口商簽署保密歧視性合同，付給他們出口退稅，以換取他們每年購買大量的咖啡和在整年中均衡的出售他們所購買咖啡的承諾。巴西咖啡研究所認(rèn)為，雖然世界咖啡需求缺乏彈性，但來自個(gè)別國家的咖啡需求有高度的價(jià)格彈性，這意味著巴西的出口通過提高價(jià)格折扣可能會(huì)獲利（德爾芬內(nèi)托，1959；德爾芬內(nèi)托和托，1965）。在國際上，咖啡進(jìn)口和烘焙工業(yè)是高度集中的。因此，巴西認(rèn)為它可以“發(fā)揮其能力，按

50、照他們各自的討價(jià)還價(jià)能力來辨別不同的買家”（帕夏，1992）。</p><p>　　因?yàn)樗接衅髽I(yè)處理所有的咖啡出口，以達(dá)到預(yù)期的價(jià)格來歧視IBC已經(jīng)發(fā)展的機(jī)制，比如出口退稅。這一機(jī)制用以確保每一個(gè)進(jìn)口商都簽訂了一份長期合同可以從任何一個(gè)出口商購買咖啡和只支付約定的折扣價(jià)格，同時(shí)確保出口商得到了實(shí)際的市場(chǎng)價(jià)格。被采用的該機(jī)制是可轉(zhuǎn)讓的，這是稱為Aviso de Garantia的由巴西咖啡研究所向炙烤人簽發(fā)的完成收

51、購的以美元計(jì)價(jià)的證書。當(dāng)進(jìn)口商進(jìn)行他們下一輪的購買時(shí)可以贖回證書。因此，假設(shè)重新采購，對(duì)買方來說出口退稅降低了咖啡的凈價(jià)，但對(duì)出口商和農(nóng)民卻不是。雖然規(guī)則決定對(duì)個(gè)別進(jìn)口商的特別出口退稅是保密的，但據(jù)了解，出口退稅的多少取決于巴西的出口價(jià)格和主要競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的平均價(jià)格，如紐約和倫敦市場(chǎng)。</p><p>　　出口退稅對(duì)巴西咖啡的出口價(jià)格的影響。當(dāng)在利用出口退稅時(shí)，不同的時(shí)期要遵循不同的政策，從一個(gè)子時(shí)期到另一個(gè)子時(shí)期的

52、出口退稅的影響可能是不同的。我確定了三個(gè)子時(shí)期作比較：1965-1971，1972-1979和1980-1988。在1965年至1971年間，出口配額是有效的，出口退稅大于配額的單位租金，從而限制配額市場(chǎng)出口，而且出口退稅只付給少數(shù)用協(xié)議去交換購買更多的咖啡的大進(jìn)口商。德爾芬內(nèi)托的理論假設(shè)，出口退稅將減少出口關(guān)稅的制約，允許一個(gè)沒有對(duì)出口價(jià)格產(chǎn)生重大影響的出口商擴(kuò)大出口（見圖2）。然而，如果進(jìn)口商覺得出口退稅定的太高，這就有可能導(dǎo)致進(jìn)口

53、商增加超出限制配額的巴西咖啡的購買量，這將造成名義出口價(jià)格的上升。</p><p>　　在1980至1988年間，出口正在舉行，但是出口退稅較小于單位配額租金，且沒有限制出口到其成員國。出口退稅已提供給“所有的巴西咖啡”進(jìn)口商。假設(shè)市場(chǎng)是完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的，巴西咖啡的名義出口價(jià)格通過出口退稅額增加而上升，使凈出口價(jià)格不變。例如，有一個(gè)沒有出口稅和出口退稅的初始情況，其中，一個(gè)需求對(duì)應(yīng)一個(gè)供應(yīng)（出口配額），即D(p)=x-

54、βp=qA, β是需求曲線的斜率。這產(chǎn)生了最初的均衡價(jià)格，p0=(x-qA)/ β。然后假設(shè)將出口退稅支付給進(jìn)口商，使它作為出口價(jià)格的凈減少而出現(xiàn)：D(p1-α)=x-β(p1-α)=qA。新的均衡價(jià)格是p1=(x-qA)/ β+α，即在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈的市場(chǎng)，該通報(bào)減少了巴西咖啡相對(duì)于其他咖啡的價(jià)格，并可使進(jìn)口商增加為巴西咖啡支付的名義金額。自從由出口退稅而導(dǎo)致出口價(jià)格上升，進(jìn)口商沒有凈收益，巴西不用遭受損失。然而，如果是不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)市場(chǎng)，進(jìn)口

55、商不得通過全額出口退稅抬高價(jià)格，在這種情況下，進(jìn)口商享有凈收益，而從巴西出口商遭受到損失。</p><p>　　在1972-1979期間，情況有點(diǎn)不同了，因?yàn)闆]有了出口配額的影響。盡管如此，巴西還是征收了大量的出口稅。由于出口退稅一直在進(jìn)口商購買咖啡后支付給他們，世界市場(chǎng)價(jià)格仍然是從出口商的角度定價(jià)。國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)的咖啡的價(jià)格是由咖啡出口稅的凈總值所決定，與出口商收到的價(jià)格保持一致。然而，外國購買者有效地支付了出口退稅

56、的凈價(jià)格，其中退稅的成本由巴西政府的咖啡出口稅收支付。實(shí)施出口退稅的凈出口稅降低，會(huì)導(dǎo)致出口的增加，以及外國進(jìn)口商的需求曲線下移，巴西的名義出口價(jià)格有所下降。沒有出口退稅，它是不可能確定是否處在咖啡出口退稅的最佳水平的，雖然非正式的分析表明，巴西咖啡的出口稅普遍定得太高了，因?yàn)殡S著時(shí)間的推移，它的市場(chǎng)份額大量的流失。假設(shè)出口稅過高，出口退稅的使用可能使福利改善。然而，這將更有效地減少出口稅。</p><p>　　

57、如果這些廣泛的特點(diǎn)是正確的，巴西的出口退稅可能僅在1980至1988年期間有顯著的負(fù)面影響。在1965年至1971年間，出口退稅可能導(dǎo)致出口市場(chǎng)的擴(kuò)大，這種擴(kuò)張可能已經(jīng)達(dá)到了超出成本的收益。無論如何，出口退稅的發(fā)行總額只有2.2億美元，任何租金的轉(zhuǎn)讓都很小。假設(shè)由擴(kuò)大出口帶來的大約每年40億美元的收益，巴西的福利在這一段時(shí)間內(nèi)可能是沒有顯著影響的。在1972年至1979年間，巴西發(fā)行了18億美元。這些出口退稅減少了了稅收收入（假設(shè)出口退