國(guó)有發(fā)電企業(yè)集團(tuán)治理機(jī)制理論與實(shí)踐.pdf

1、尚翻大學(xué)碩士研究生畢業(yè)(學(xué)位)論文jI攀攀籮褰方向：?！躝雄箕理。：o攀警≥，霉遵I，j，萋鎏”≯璽胡冬磐。，?！?。淤jj≮毒芰7：jl≯；溱溢商2002荔≯蕊蒸萋07：0‘愛(ài)j專鞭j業(yè)：工商管理。j鬻一∥“。≯趣奠：㈡i“、慧j兀r5成日期：2005年。5月一“t豫|“‘，爹‘’：r，‘土pi。。’一二_二o，o導(dǎo)竽囂月三蕊曩蘿，17。。一。㈡、‘^趣誓_r一’≯。二o。，!≮蠢簿幫g，，?！吸傾bstractSincethebegi

2、nningof2002，powermarket—orientedreforillprocessedinpowerindustryistheprofoundestrevolutioninthepowerindustryhistoryinChina，whichtheStateGridCorporationandfivepowergenerationgroupsareestablishedHoweverthesystemreforrnthis

3、time，aswellastherefomlinallstateownedenterprises，sufferstwomajortheoreticaldimculties：firstlyhowtodefinepropercyrightsrelationinstate—ownedenterprises；sccondly，whichpaRemshallbeselectedforenterprisegovernancemechanismsPr

4、opertyrightsareconcernedwiththeradialimpetusproblemofstateownedenterprisesandthelaRerisrelatedtotheproblemhowtosolvetheproblemofrightsbalanceandsupervisionofstateownedenterprisesIntheviewofpractice，afterstate。ownedpowerg

5、enerationenterpnsegroupsgradually11aiTuomzepropertynglats，orintroducesharesofsoeiallegalpersonsandnaturalpersonsinthemodeofcapitalincreasingandshareadditionandtransferandafterpropertyrightsbecomemulticomponentthee伍ciency

6、ofsomeenterprisesfailstobeincreasedobviouslyandsomeofthemdecreaseWithaprobeintothemason，theproblemofgovernancetostate—ownedpowergenerationenterprisegroups，astheauthordeemsisthekeyfactortestrict血edevelopmentandenhanceofvi

7、talityofenterprisegroups，Accordingtotheconsequenceofpostpropertyfightstheory，propertyrightsalterationisnotthenecessaryguaranteetotheincreaseofenterpriseefficiency；andenterpriseefficiencycanbeincreasedonlythrou曲competitio

8、nandmaking廿legovernancemechanismconfornltotherequirementofmarketcompetitionAccordingtotheprinci口leof‘鈾developeconomyand幻developpowerindustrytirstly”，ohineseeconomyISgrowingrapidly；howeverpowergenerationisinsufficientseri

9、ouslyinsomeareasinChinapowerisinanurgentneed，andthereappearsthephenomenonofswitch—offforpowerresuictionMoreandmoreinvestorsaretryingtoenterintothisprofitablemarketwhichwillsurelylcadtodrasticcompetitioninthepowergenerati

10、onmarketinChina；state—ownedpowergenerationenterprisegroupsshallkeeptheshareindomesticmarket，rationalizeresourceconfiguration，andincreasee兩ciencytherefore，itisrealisticallysignificantforstateownedpowergenerationenterprise

11、groupstoimproveenterprisegovernancemechanismintheevolutionpattemoflongtermmarketcompetition珊sarticleismainlybasedonthestudyofpropertyrightstheorypostpropertyriglltsargument，principal—agenttheorycontracttheoryenterprisert

12、heoryandintemalpeoplecontroltheorymeanwhileitmakesananalysistoenterprisegroupingdevelopmentthcories；wi血referencetothreepopularcorporategovernancemechanisms，namelythecorporategovernancemodeofexternalsupervisionandcontr01m

13、ainlyusedinBritainandUSAthecorporategovernancemodeofintemalsupervisionandcontr01mainlyusedinGermanandJapanandthecorf’orategovemancemodeofpatriarchsupervisionandcontrolmalnlyusedinKoreaandbasedontheanalysistothestatusquoa

14、ndexistingproblemsinthepowergenerationenterprisesinChinatheeffeetivemechanismmodeforgovernanceto血estateownedpowergenerationelaterprisegroupswhichissuitableforthenationaIconditionsofChinaisconcluded，soastealizetheaimofres

15、earchinthistextAndaleasiblewaywiIlbeprobediuordertoperfectthestructureandmechanismforgovernancetothestate—ownedpowergenerationenterprisegroups，guaranteescientificcorporatedecisionmaking，andseekforeffectivestructureandmec

16、hanismforgovemancetothepowergenermionenterprisegroupswhichjssuitableforthenationalconditiOilsofChinaKeywords：StateownedPowerGenerationEnterprise，CorporateGroupGovernance，CorporateGroupManagement，BoardofDirectors，Scientif