研發(fā)政策，貿(mào)易和工藝創(chuàng)新[外文翻譯]

1、1外文翻譯外文文獻(xiàn)原文Title:R&DpoliciestradeprocessinnovationNo.4784CEPRDiscussionPaperMaterialSource:R&DpoliciestradeprocessinnovationAuth:JanI.HaalNwegianSchoolofEconomicsBusinessAdministrationCEPRHansJarleKindNwegianSchoolofEcon

2、omicsBusinessAdministrationWesetupasimpletrademodelwithtwocountrieshostingonefirmeach.ThefirmsinvestincostreducingR&DeachgovernmentmaygrantR&Dsubsidiestothedomesticfirm.WeshowthatitisoptimalfagovernmenttoprovidehigherR&D

3、subsidiesthelowertheleveloftradecostsevenifthefirmsareindependentmonopolies.Iffirmsproduceimperfectsubstitutespolicycompetitionmaybecomesofiercethatonlyoneofthefirmssurvives.Internationalpolicyharmonizationeliminatespoli

4、cycompetitionensuresasymmetricoutcome.Howeveritisshownthatharmonizationisnotnecessarilywelfaremaximizing.TheoptimalcodinatedpoliciesmayimplyanasymmetricoutcomewithR&Dsubsidiestoonlyoneofthefirms.Thispaperhastwomainpurpos

5、es.ThefirstistoexpletherelationshipbetweentradecostsR&Dinvestments.Weshowthatincreasedintegration(lowertradecosts)mayincreasebothprivatesocialincentivestoinvestinR&Dmayleadfirmstosellmebothdomesticallyabroad.Thesecondpur

6、poseistostudytheeffectsofpolicycompetitioncooperationinimperfectlycompetitiveinternationalmarketsinparticulartoshowthatR&Dsubsidiesmayinfactreducethenumberofproductvarietiesinthemarket.Thisturnsouttobetruebothifthesubsid

7、iesaresetinapolicygamebetweengovernmentsmaximizingdomesticwelfareifthegovernmentssetR&Dsubsidiescooperativelytomaximizeaggregatewelfare.Theseresultsaredevelopedinasimpletwocountrymodelwithtradecosts3sufficientlyclosesubs

8、titutesitwillnotbeoptimalfromsociety’spointofviewtoinvestinprocessinnovationinbothfirms.HencetheoptimalcooperativeR&DpolicyfthetwocountriescouldbetosubsidizeR&Dinoneofthecountriesbutnotintheother.Infactitmayevenbeoptimal

9、totaxR&Dintheothercountry.Theintuitionisthattheconsumersdonotgainverymuchfromhavingaccesstodifferentvarietiesifthegoodsareclosesubstitutes.Sotoavoidduplicationoftheinvestmentcoststhefirstbestcooperativepolicycouldbetosti

10、mulateR&DinonefirmreducetheR&Dincentivesintheother.LittleresearchhasbeendoneonthelinksbetweentradeliberalizationR&Dpolicieswearenotawareofanyotherstudiesshowinghowtradeliberalizationmayincreaseprivatesocialincentivestoin

11、vestinR&Dthusleadfirmstosellmebothdomesticallyabroadeveninabsenceofstrategicinteractions.HoweverstartingwithSpencerBrer(1983)thereisalargeliteraturefocusingonthebusinessstealingmotivefsubsidizingR&D.Thisfocuscanpartlybee

12、xplainedbythefactthatinternationalagreementsprohibittheuseoffinstancepureexptsubsidies.InsuchsettingsNearyLeahy(2000)emphasizetheimptantpointthatR&Dpoliciesmaybeasecondbestoptiontosupptdomesticfirmsininternationalmarkets

13、.MeoverBagwellStaiger(1994)Brer(1995)LeahyNeary(2001)havefoundthatR&Dsubsidiescanbeamerobustinstrumentthanexptpolicies.Itshouldbenotedthoughthatthesestudiestypicallyabstractfromconsumersurpluseffectsmakethesimplifyingass

14、umptionthatallproductionisexptedtoathirdmarket.ThisstrofliteraturethusarguesthatpolicycompetitiontendstoresultinexcessiveR&D.D’AspremontJacquemin(1988)initiatedawaveofresearchthatanalyzestheconsequencesofR&Dcooperationbe

15、tweenfirmsthatcompeteintheendusermarket.BothD’AspremontJacqueminlaterstudieshavefoundthatthiskindofcooperationmaybewelfareimprovingincreaseindustryprofit.3HoweverSalantShaffer(19981999)AmirWooders(1998)pointtothefactthat

16、thesestudiespresupposethatthefirmschoosethesamelevelofR&Dsellthesamequantitieswhiletheoptimalsolutionmayactuallybeasymmetric.4InparticularSalantShaffer(1999)dealwiththefactthatitmaybeoptimaltotreatexanteidenticalagentsun

17、equallyifthereisCournotcompetitionintheproductmarket.Hencethesymmetricequilibriaidentifiedintheliteraturemaynotrepresentoptimaloutcomes.LeahyNeary(2004)relatetheresultsfromSalantShaffertothequestionofwhetherthesecondderc