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1、 AbstractIIAbstractMany company listed in the new three board grow quickly , small andmedium-sized enterprises want to seek financing and expansion in recent years. Thesecompanies generally have a high and new technolog
2、y, still in its early stage of thedevelopment , the enterprises don’t have standard operation consciousness ,don’tform a stable profit model and have poor quality of accounting information. Manycompanies attempt to manip
3、ulate profit to highlight the financial performance by themeans of earnings management, so the risk of investment in the new three board ishigher. As a financing platform for small and medium-sized enterprises, standardi
4、zingthe management, improving accounting information and restraining earningsmanagement can protect the lawful rights and interests of investors, what mechanismcan suppress the degree of earnings management?Reputation as
5、 a sort of intangible assets, once it was damaged ,it was difficult torestore, in the process of due diligence and continuous supervision, the host brokerswith higher reputation will be more dedicated to perform its duti
6、es, regulating thebehavior of earnings management of listed companies. According to the theory ofactive institutional shareholder, investors take part in the corporate governance,perform their supervisory duty and restra
7、in earnings management. Using the listedcompanies in the new three board as research samples in 2014, empirical tests showthat the relationship between reputation of host brokers , institutional investors andearnings man
8、agement for the previous year, that year ,year after the listing . Thisempirical results show that: (1) The broker reputation and institutional investors caninhibit earnings management. (2)The institutional investors hol
9、d more time, they caneffectively retain earnings management . (3) The amount of institutional investors canrestrain |da|.(4) When there exit institutional investors, they can improve the effect ofreputation of host broke
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