公司金融理論答案

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4、uppose now that the private benefit B is ob­servable and verifiable. Determine the optimal con­tract between the entrepreneur and the investors (note that the reimbursement can now be made con­tingent on

5、the level of private benefits: Rl = rl( B) I). Exercise 3.4 (product-market competition and fi-nancing). Two firms, i = 1, 2, compete for a new market. To enter the market, a firm must develop a new technology. It mus

6、t invest (a fixed amount) I. Each firm is run by an entrepreneur. Entrepreneur i has initial cash Ai D > 0. Assume that pH( M ? B/ ?p) A for i = 1, 2, both firms receive funding. (iii) Show that if A pH, and su

7、cceeds if and only if the entrepre­neur works when pL 0, R? ?1/ pH, R? ( ∞)< 1/ pH. The rest of the model is unchanged. (The entrepreneur starts with cash A. The probability of success is pH if the entrepreneur

8、 behaves and pL = pH ? ?p if she misbehaves. The entrepreneur obtains private benefit BI if she mis­behaves and 0 otherwise. Only the final outcome is observable.) Let I? denote the level of investment that maxi

9、mizes total surplus: pHR? ( I?) 1. = (i) How does investment I( A)vary with assets? (ii) How does the shadow value v of assets (the de­rivative of the borrower’s gross utility with respect to assets) vary with the l