國(guó)際貿(mào)易專業(yè)類外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　國(guó)際化經(jīng)營(yíng)</b></p><p>　　Richard. E. Caves</p><p>　　工商企業(yè)日趨國(guó)際化，但他們中大多數(shù)不是出于戰(zhàn)略上的選擇，而是經(jīng)歷了一個(gè)緩慢的“循序漸進(jìn)”的過(guò)程。有些公司開(kāi)始被吸引到國(guó)際市場(chǎng)上來(lái)，是因?yàn)槭盏搅苏疑祥T來(lái)的定單，在發(fā)現(xiàn)新的機(jī)會(huì)之后，通過(guò)一系列步驟走向國(guó)外建立生產(chǎn)廣家。有些公司主動(dòng)進(jìn)行國(guó)際經(jīng)營(yíng)是為了

2、對(duì)付寡頭賣主壟斷的威脅。還有些公司則是碰上了特殊機(jī)遇，通過(guò)在國(guó)外經(jīng)營(yíng)來(lái)開(kāi)發(fā)資源供應(yīng)，獲得外國(guó)技術(shù)或提高生產(chǎn)效率。許多公司在成為全球性企業(yè)的某一階段，都被生動(dòng)地描繪成由一種特別關(guān)系網(wǎng)把不同國(guó)家各種各樣的公司聯(lián)系在一起的投資組合。</p><p>　　這些早期的經(jīng)營(yíng)措施，很難說(shuō)是完整的全球戰(zhàn)略的一部分。但是由于國(guó)際范圍的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、國(guó)家控制措施和公司日漸意識(shí)到增效利益而產(chǎn)生壓力時(shí)，越來(lái)越多的公司在制定全球戰(zhàn)略，采用全球規(guī)劃

3、程序。全球戰(zhàn)略是表示企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略的一項(xiàng)計(jì)劃，考慮到地理來(lái)源和地理機(jī)遇及限制，從其有限資源的地理分布中，最大限度地?cái)U(kuò)大選擇的目標(biāo)。</p><p>　　全球戰(zhàn)略，除了包括公司如何進(jìn)入新的市場(chǎng)、要擁有些什么和如何進(jìn)行全球運(yùn)作外，還包括制定規(guī)劃、選擇時(shí)機(jī)和確定公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)地點(diǎn)和資源。合理地制定全球戰(zhàn)略，需要認(rèn)真評(píng)估全球各種可選擇的方案和每個(gè)方案涉及的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。制訂全球戰(zhàn)略，決策者絕不要對(duì)任何國(guó)家充滿盲目性，必須先考慮到世界市場(chǎng)及

4、世界資源的分布，再考慮單獨(dú)某一國(guó)家的市場(chǎng)和資源。全球戰(zhàn)略旨在于在多國(guó)的基礎(chǔ)上取得最大的效益，而不是把國(guó)際經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)當(dāng)作不同國(guó)家的業(yè)務(wù)組合。</p><p>　　需要有一個(gè)全球戰(zhàn)略的基本原因，是多數(shù)產(chǎn)品和生產(chǎn)要素市場(chǎng)超越了國(guó)家的界限，但最終決定經(jīng)營(yíng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，并不局限在個(gè)別的地點(diǎn)和國(guó)家市場(chǎng)。因此，為了保持具有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性，或者變?yōu)榫哂懈?jìng)爭(zhēng)性，大多數(shù)公司的戰(zhàn)略范圍必須包括國(guó)內(nèi)外市場(chǎng)的威脅和機(jī)遇。如果國(guó)內(nèi)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者的視野拓寬，規(guī)模擴(kuò)大

5、，而這家公司仍舊小規(guī)模經(jīng)營(yíng)，就會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)自己不能在研究或產(chǎn)品開(kāi)發(fā)方面與他人并駕齊驅(qū)。即使國(guó)內(nèi)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)沒(méi)有迅速擴(kuò)展到其他市場(chǎng)，外國(guó)公司也會(huì)采取氣勢(shì)逼人的戰(zhàn)略。當(dāng)日本的公司大規(guī)模地打入歐美傳統(tǒng)市場(chǎng)的時(shí)候，歐美許多產(chǎn)業(yè)的公司對(duì)這種競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性的挑戰(zhàn)大都毫無(wú)準(zhǔn)備。凡在全球戰(zhàn)略中沒(méi)有包括日本人銳意爭(zhēng)取的那些價(jià)格區(qū)段的汽車公司，立即在成本上處于不利地位。在摩托車工業(yè)中，把迅速增長(zhǎng)的市場(chǎng)拱手讓與日本競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者的情況更為嚴(yán)重。很多著名的公司完全銷聲匿跡。</p&g

6、t;<p>　　在美國(guó)市場(chǎng)上，取得成就會(huì)領(lǐng)先，所以美國(guó)公司過(guò)去在產(chǎn)品壽命的最初階段不必從全球的角度來(lái)考慮。由于美國(guó)人口眾多、工資率高、可自由支配的購(gòu)買力大，并且勇于創(chuàng)新，美國(guó)市場(chǎng)多年來(lái)對(duì)許多產(chǎn)品的容納率和增長(zhǎng)率，在世界上都是名列前茅。反過(guò)來(lái)看，美國(guó)以外的公司則從產(chǎn)品開(kāi)發(fā)一開(kāi)始，就需要進(jìn)行全球通盤規(guī)劃。采用先進(jìn)技術(shù)的英國(guó)公司、，很可能發(fā)現(xiàn)美國(guó)的需求比英國(guó)的需求增長(zhǎng)得快。如果把英國(guó)的需求拱手讓與美國(guó)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者，那么美國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者的銷

7、售額和經(jīng)驗(yàn)很快會(huì)超過(guò)英國(guó)公司?，F(xiàn)在美國(guó)的工資率和人均國(guó)民生產(chǎn)總值不再高出歐洲很多，也許輪到美國(guó)公司應(yīng)該按照歐洲市場(chǎng)的需求來(lái)設(shè)計(jì)產(chǎn)品，因?yàn)樵跉W洲市場(chǎng)上銷售這些產(chǎn)品，很可能會(huì)超過(guò)美國(guó)市場(chǎng)。</p><p>　　凡是由于未能選擇最廉價(jià)的貨源而在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中落后的公司，都暴露出缺乏全球戰(zhàn)略思想。在其他一些情況下，企業(yè)也許已經(jīng)獲得世界市場(chǎng)的份額和廉價(jià)的貨源，但是這是以財(cái)政優(yōu)勢(shì)或比其外國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者相對(duì)靈活為代價(jià)取得的。借助于需要變動(dòng)和

8、技術(shù)變革，較小的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者已經(jīng)能夠超過(guò)他們。</p><p>　　世界上國(guó)家很多，跨國(guó)公司必須要在選擇市場(chǎng)時(shí)樹立優(yōu)勢(shì)，根據(jù)市場(chǎng)進(jìn)行戰(zhàn)略評(píng)估和選擇經(jīng)營(yíng)任務(wù)。必須決定戰(zhàn)略評(píng)估是根據(jù)一個(gè)主要的單一市場(chǎng)，許多單一市場(chǎng)，還是許多市場(chǎng)中的某些部分進(jìn)行的。這家公司還要決定為負(fù)責(zé)貫徹這一戰(zhàn)略評(píng)估如何進(jìn)行組織，是由總部來(lái)進(jìn)行，由多國(guó)委員會(huì)來(lái)進(jìn)行，還是由本國(guó)的公司來(lái)進(jìn)行？</p><p>　　單一主要市場(chǎng)方法，也

9、叫做中心市場(chǎng)方法。在這種方法中，公司根據(jù)一國(guó)市場(chǎng)選擇經(jīng)營(yíng)任務(wù)，建立營(yíng)銷組合，以后再擴(kuò)展到其他國(guó)家的市場(chǎng)。這一方法減少?zèng)Q策問(wèn)題，由于地域擴(kuò)展的邊際成本低，還可以帶來(lái)高利潤(rùn)。但是公司應(yīng)該選擇哪一個(gè)為中心市場(chǎng)呢？通常公司從國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)開(kāi)始，但是這不一定是最好的選擇。一些日本和歐洲公司，已經(jīng)為某些有選擇的產(chǎn)品選擇了收入高和要求高的美國(guó)市場(chǎng)。美國(guó)的市場(chǎng)巨大，有利也有弊。許多歐洲人對(duì)在這樣巨大的市場(chǎng)上進(jìn)行通訊和協(xié)調(diào)工作所需要的代價(jià)望而卻步，因此不敢把首

10、先在美國(guó)市場(chǎng)上進(jìn)行生產(chǎn)作為其世界產(chǎn)品戰(zhàn)略的一部分。</p><p>　　多元市場(chǎng)方法意味著高度的分散。如果當(dāng)?shù)厍闆r特殊，需要比如化肥和農(nóng)藥之類的某些特殊商品，大規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)生產(chǎn)并不重要，公司的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)取決于生產(chǎn)能力而不取決于先進(jìn)的產(chǎn)品設(shè)計(jì)等，那么在這些情況下，多元市場(chǎng)方法也許是最好的戰(zhàn)略。比如對(duì)像鋁錠之類的工業(yè)產(chǎn)品，產(chǎn)品的使用方式、顧客的態(tài)度和目標(biāo)客戶團(tuán)體等市場(chǎng)特點(diǎn)，可能在許多國(guó)家都大致相似，因此最佳戰(zhàn)略可能是集中開(kāi)

11、發(fā)更經(jīng)濟(jì)的生產(chǎn)過(guò)程，形成具有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的成本優(yōu)勢(shì)。</p><p>　　在細(xì)分市場(chǎng)方法中，企業(yè)要在國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)中認(rèn)準(zhǔn)那些在境外能夠受到不同對(duì)待從而獲利的細(xì)分市場(chǎng)。有些細(xì)分市場(chǎng)很小，在任何一個(gè)國(guó)家都沒(méi)有充足的理由使單一國(guó)家的企業(yè)開(kāi)發(fā)適宜的產(chǎn)品或?yàn)殚_(kāi)發(fā)市場(chǎng)進(jìn)行必要的投資。然而，在世界范圍內(nèi)或在若干國(guó)家之中，為這一細(xì)分市場(chǎng)付出這樣的代價(jià)則完全是正當(dāng)?shù)摹?lt;/p><p>　　歸根結(jié)底，全球戰(zhàn)略的制訂是由管

12、理人員的全球經(jīng)營(yíng)思路決定的。全球戰(zhàn)略的設(shè)計(jì)和實(shí)施，要求總公司和子公司的管理人員，都要遵循同一全球策略，既不能視子公司為只是跟著總部指揮棒轉(zhuǎn)的附屬機(jī)構(gòu)，也不能視為是獨(dú)立的城邦，而要看作是整體的一部分，無(wú)論從全球目標(biāo)還是從當(dāng)?shù)氐哪繕?biāo)來(lái)說(shuō)，都要如此。全系統(tǒng)的每一部分都發(fā)揮各自的特長(zhǎng)，做出各自的獨(dú)特貢獻(xiàn)。這種方法通常被稱為“地心說(shuō)”，是總公司和子公司齊心協(xié)力制訂出全球的統(tǒng)一標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，但根據(jù)各地情況允許統(tǒng)一標(biāo)準(zhǔn)略有差異，并據(jù)此做出重大決策。但是，地心

13、說(shuō)要求對(duì)子公司的管理人員實(shí)行獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)制度，鼓勵(lì)他們?yōu)槿蚰繕?biāo)努力，而不只是僅僅為了達(dá)到本國(guó)的目標(biāo)。</p><p>　　在國(guó)際化的企業(yè)中，總公司對(duì)子公司的定位一般有三種類型：（重視本國(guó)的）民族中心主義型、（重視所在國(guó)的）多中心型和（重視全世界的）地球中心型。</p><p>　　民族中心主義態(tài)度的特點(diǎn)可以歸納為：“我們本國(guó)人比總公司和子公司中的任何外國(guó)人都優(yōu)越、可靠和值得信任?！痹谶@樣的公司里

14、，工作標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和決策規(guī)則一般要根據(jù)本國(guó)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。民族中心主義是和全球戰(zhàn)略背道而馳的，因?yàn)檫@種方法缺少良好的反饋，并且熟悉經(jīng)營(yíng)地區(qū)當(dāng)?shù)厍闆r的管理人員的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和看法在制定決策中得不到適當(dāng)?shù)闹匾暋?lt;/p><p>　　多中心的公司走向另一個(gè)極端，認(rèn)為當(dāng)?shù)厝藢?duì)情況最為熟悉，他們的想法對(duì)公司總是最有利，跨國(guó)公司在所在國(guó)開(kāi)設(shè)的企業(yè)在特色和做法上部應(yīng)該盡量當(dāng)?shù)鼗?。這類公司更像是一個(gè)半獨(dú)立的子公司的聯(lián)合體。多中心的管理政策可能會(huì)犧牲跨國(guó)

15、經(jīng)營(yíng)的大部分統(tǒng)一和增效利益。多中心主義的代價(jià)是重復(fù)勞動(dòng)和對(duì)本國(guó)經(jīng)驗(yàn)不能有效利用所造成的浪費(fèi)。這種方法的優(yōu)點(diǎn)是能夠充分利用當(dāng)?shù)氐馁Y源和人力，而付出的代價(jià)是犧牲全球的增長(zhǎng)和效率。</p><p>　　地心主義也有代價(jià)，大部分是通訊旅行費(fèi)用，由于想要對(duì)人員進(jìn)行全球目標(biāo)的教育和取得共識(shí)而在決策上花費(fèi)的時(shí)間，以及有一個(gè)相當(dāng)大的總部官僚機(jī)構(gòu)所花的費(fèi)用。但是這些代價(jià)的回報(bào)卻是整個(gè)企業(yè)更加客觀的經(jīng)營(yíng)，利用整個(gè)世界的資源，提高地方

16、公司的管理水平，對(duì)全球目標(biāo)更多的責(zé)任感，以及最后，但并非最不重要的一點(diǎn)是利潤(rùn)。當(dāng)然，全球型企業(yè)的成功取決于它是否有足夠的全球型的管理人員。</p><p>　　選自: Management and Administration, Macmillan Press Ltd., 2005</p><p>　　Going International</p><p>　　Ri

17、chard. E. Caves</p><p>　　Business enterprises have become increasingly international but most of them go international by a process of creeping "incremental-ism" rather than by strategy choice. Som

18、e firms are first attracted to foreign markets by unsolicited export orders and, after discovering new opportunities, move through a series of stages to the establishment of foreign production facilities. Other firms ini

19、tiate international activities in response to threats to an oligopoly position. Still others respond to spec</p><p>　　Rarely are these early moves part of a comprehensive global strategy. But as pressures ar

20、ise from competition in an international scale and from country control programs, and as firms become increasingly aware of synergistic benefits, more and more are building global strategies and adopting global planning

21、procedures. A global strategy is a plan expressing an enterprise's strategy for maximizing its chosen objectives through geographical allocation of its limited resources, taking into account </p><p>　　A

22、global strategy encompasses the planning, timing, and location of a firm's activities and resources as well as its strategies for how it will enter new markets, what it will own, and how it will manage the global ope

23、ration. The construction of a global strategy on a rational basis requires a careful assessment of the global alternatives and the risks involved for each. To build a global strategy, the decision maker must be free of a

24、ny national blinders and consider world markets and world reso</p><p>　　The basic reasons for having a global strategy are that most product and factor markets extend beyond the boundaries of a single countr

25、y and the competition that ultimately determines performance is not constrained to individual locations and country markets. To remain competitive, or to become competitive, the strategy horizon for most firms must, ther

26、efore, encompass threats and opportunities of both domestic and foreign origin. If its domestic competitors extend their horizons to include a br</p><p>　　Many U. S. firms did not need in the past to think g

27、lobally at the early stages of a product's life because leadership coincided with achievement in the U. S. market. With its large population, high-wage rates, high discretionary spending power, and high propensity to

28、 innovate, the U-S. market was for many years the leader in adoption and growth rates for many products. Conversely, firms outside the United States had more need to plan globally from the beginning of any product develo

29、pment. A U. </p><p>　　Absence of global thinking also shows up where firms have been left behind in the competitive race because they failed to tap the cheapest sources of supply. In still other cases, firms

30、 may have achieved global market share and cheapest supplies, but at the expense of their financial strength or flexibility relative to foreign competitors. Assisted by a fluctuation in demand or technological changes, s

31、maller competitors have been able to overtake them.</p><p>　　Since there are so many countries in the world, the multinational firm must establish priorities for selecting those markets against which it will

32、 make this strategic evaluation and choice of its business mission. It must decide whether strategic evaluation is carried out against one major single market, many single markets, or some segments of many markets. It mu

33、st also decide how it is going to organize the responsibility for carrying through this strategic assessment. Will it be done by centr</p><p>　　In the major single market, or central market, approach, the fi

34、rm selects its mission based on one national market and establishes a marketing mix, and later expands to other national markets. This approach reduces decision problems and can bring high profits because of the low marg

35、inal cost of geographic extensions. But which central market should the firm choose? Normally, the firm begins with its home market, but this may not be the best choice. Some Japanese and European firms have selected <

36、;/p><p>　　The multiple market approach implies a high degree of decentralization. It may be the best strategy in situations where special local conditions require particular products, such as fertilizers and pe

37、sticides, where economies of large-scale production are not important, and where the firm's competitive advantage depends upon capabilities other than advanced product design. In the case of an industrial product suc

38、h as aluminum ingots, for example, the market characteristics such as product usage </p><p>　　In the market segment approach, the firm identifies segments of national markets that could profitably be given s

39、eparate treatment across national boundaries. Small market segments in individual countries may be insufficient for any one country unit to justify development of an appropriate product or to make the necessary investmen

40、t in market development. World-wide or for a number of countries, however, such a segment may readily justify the expense.</p><p>　　In the last analysis, developing a global strategy depends upon the way exe

41、cutives think about doing business around the world. The design and implementation of a global strategy require that managers in both headquarters and subsidiaries follow a worldwide approach which considers subsidiaries

42、 as neither satellites nor independent city-states but as parts of a whole, the focus of which is on worldwide as well as local objectives. And each part of the system makes its unique contribution with it</p><

43、;p>　　In international enterprises, there are three general types of headquarters' orientation toward subsidiaries; ethnocentric (home-country oriented), polycentric (or host-country oriented) , and geocentric (wo

44、rld oriented).</p><p>　　The ethnocentric attitude can be characterized as: "We, the home-country nationals, are superior to, more trustworthy than, and more reliable than any foreigners in headquarters

45、or the subsidiaries.” In such firms, performance criteria and decision rules are generally based on home-country standards. Ethnocentrism works against a global strategy because of a lack of good feed back and because th

46、e experience and views of managers familiar with local conditions in the areas of operation do not car</p><p>　　Polycentric firms go to the other extreme by assuming that local people always know what is bes

47、t for them and that the unit of the multinational enterprise located in a host country should be as local in identity and behavior as possible. A polycentric firm is more akin to a confederation of quasi-independent subs

48、idiaries. A polycentric management philosophy is likely to sacrifice most of the unification and synergistic benefits of multinational operation. The costs of polycentrism are the waste</p><p>　　Egocentrism

49、also has costs, largely-related to communication and travel expense, time spent in decision making because of the desire to educate personnel about global objectives and to secure consensus, and the expense of a relative

50、ly large headquarters bureaucracy. But the payoffs are a more objective total enterprise performance, worldwide utilization of resources, improvement of local company management, a greater sense of commitment to worldwid