外文翻譯-----小額信貸的可持續(xù)發(fā)展問(wèn)題

1、<p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　The Question of Sustainability for</p><p>　　Microfinance Institutions</p><p><b>　　1.Preface</b></p><p>　　Microentr

2、epreneurs have considerable difficulty accessing capital from mainstream financial institutions. One key reason is that the costs of information about the characteristics and risk levels of borrowers are high. Relationsh

3、ip-based financing has been promoted as a potential solution to information asymmetry problems in the distribution of credit to small businesses. In this paper, we seek to better understand the implications for providers

4、 of “microfinance” in pursuing such a strategy. We </p><p>　　2.The MFI Lending Model in the United States </p><p><b>　　Marketing</b></p><p>　　Marketing drives the busine

5、ss model in terms of the volume of potential borrowers that an MFI is able to access and the pool of loans it can develop. Given that MFIs do not accept deposits and have no formal prior insight into a fresh potential cu

6、stomer base, they must invest in attracting new borrowers. Marketing leads are generated from a variety of sources: soliciting loan renewals from</p><p>　　existing borrowers, marketing to existing clients fo

7、r referrals, “grassroots” networking with institutions possessing a complimentary footprint in the target environment, and the mass media.</p><p>　　At the outset of operations, before a borrower base is deve

8、loped, portfolio growth is determined by the effectiveness of marketing through network and mass media channels. Once a borrower pool is established, marketing efforts can be shifted toward lower-cost marketing to existi

9、ng borrowers and their peer networks. Even so, loans will likely attrite from a portfolio at a faster rate than renewals and borrower referrals can replenish it—new leads must continue to be generated through other, less

10、 </p><p>　　The Loan Application Process</p><p>　　In economic terms, the loan application process represents an investment at origination with the aim of minimizing credit losses in the future. A

11、ll else being equal, a greater investment in the credit application process will result in lower subsequent rates of delinquency and default; conversely, a less stringent process would result in greater rates of credit l

12、oss in the future. Setting the appropriate level of rigor in a credit application process is an exercise in analyzing loan</p><p>　　applicant characteristics and forecasted future behaviors while being cogni

13、zant of the cost of performing these analyses.</p><p>　　Three steps characterize the loan application process.</p><p>　　Preliminary Screen. The applicant is asked a short set of questions to est

14、ablish the applicant’s eligibility for credit under the MFI’s guidelines. This is sufficient to determine the likely strength of an application and whether an offer of credit could, in principle, be extended.</p>

15、<p>　　Interview. At the interview stage, due diligence is performed to ensure that the loan purpose is legitimate and that the borrower’s business has sufficient capacity and prospects to make consistent repayments.

16、 Cash-flow analysis is the core of the MFI due diligence procedure and for microfinance borrowers the data is often insufficiently formal, hindering easy examination of cash flow stability and loan payment coverage. As a

17、 result, this is a less standardized, more timeconsuming task than its </p><p>　　Underwriting and Approval. If a loan is recommended by an officer following the interview the application is then stresstested

18、 by an underwriter, who validates the cash flow and performs auxiliary analysis to ensure that the loan represents a positive addition to the lending portfolio.</p><p>　　The dynamics of loan origination illu

19、strate the trade-offs to be made to ensure an efficient credit process. Improved rigor could lead to a higher rate of declined applicants, and so higher subsequent portfolio quality, but at the expense of increased proce

20、ssing costs. For medium and larger loans, as application costs increase past an optimal point, the marginal benefit of improved portfolio quality is outweighed by the marginal expense of the credit application itself. Ho

21、wever, for small loans </p><p>　　$5,000. MFIs can disburse such loans more quickly and cheaply by fast-tracking them through a transaction-based process and context learning.</p><p>　　Loan Monit

22、oring</p><p>　　Post-loan monitoring is critical toward minimizing loss. In contrast to the credit</p><p>　　application process, which attempts to preempt the onset of borrower delinquency</p&

23、gt;<p>　　by declining high risk loans, monitoring efforts minimize the economic impact of delinquency once a borrower has fallen into arrears. In addition to the explicit risk to institutional equity through defau

24、lt, managing delinquent borrowers is an intensive and costly process.</p><p>　　When dealing with repeat clients, there exists the opportunity to leverage information captured through monitoring on previous l

25、oans, enabling the MFI to shorten the full credit application without materially impacting the risk filter. In short, there is an opportunity to reduce operational costs without a corresponding increase in future loss ra

26、tes. Repeat borrowers enable the information accrued during the relationship to be leveraged to mutual benefit of MFI and borrower. In this case, much o</p><p>　　previous lending relationship. An MFI will al

27、so possess the borrower’s payment</p><p>　　history, a more accurate indicator of future performance than an isolated financial snapshot taken during the standard application process. The challenge, however,

28、is that for many MFI, a part of their mission is to graduate customers into mainstream commercial banking, which would not allow the MFI to collect additional interest payments from those customers.</p><p>　

29、　Overhead Costs</p><p>　　For an MFI to sustain itself, each outstanding balance must contribute a proportional amount to institutional costs. Institutional costs are driven primarily by the size of the portf

30、olio being maintained. The necessary staff, tools, technology, work environment, and management are functions of portfolio scale.</p><p>　　We outline in Table 2 the institutionallevel costs of five MFIs with

31、 varying portfolio sizes to identify the proportional cost loading necessary to guarantee that</p><p>　　central costs are compensated for. The table shows that institutional costs increase at a slower rate t

32、han the rate at which the loan portfolio grows, so that the overhead allocation declines as an MFI achieves scale. We find that an MFI with a $500,000 portfolio will incur indirect costs of 26 percent, while an MFI with

33、a $20 million portfolio will experience a much lower indirect cost loading of 6 percent. In the United States, the largest institution engaging solely in microfinance presently </p><p>　　3.Discussion and Con

34、clusions</p><p>　　Continued subsidization of credit also has implications for the long-term sustainability of MFIs. Our high-level analysis of projected self-sufficiency levels of various MFI sizes shows the

35、 importance of pricing appropriately. Even a modest deviation from the value-neutral price has a significant impact on the amount of subsidies needed to sustain the institution. As a consequence, it is imperative that MF

36、Is rigorously analyze the true costs and review their pricing structures accordingly.</p><p>　　It has yet to be demonstrated that microfinance can be performed profitably</p><p>　　in the United

37、States. Nondepository MFIs may not have better information and/or technology to identify and serve less risky microbusinesses than formal institutions. It would therefore appear that formal institutions are acting ration

38、ally in choosing not to serve this market at present. However, MFIs have succeeded in channeling capital to</p><p>　　microbusinesses. Still, MFIs often operate with certain public and/or private subsidies. U

39、ltimately, more research is needed to ascertain whether the provision of microfinance offers a societal benefit in excess of economic costs. This paper is one of the first to document a very wide dispersion in the differ

40、ence between value-neutral and actual pricing for a sample of MFIs. This suggests a wide dispersion in the economic subsidies inferred by these MFIs. More specifically,these subsidies are no</p><p>　　If subs

41、idies are required to serve the market at palatable interest rates for lenders and borrowers, it is incumbent on the microfinance industry to demonstrate that theirs is an efficient mechanism for delivering such subsidie

42、s. Once a subsidy is justified, institutions must be motivated to improve their operational efficiency so that they may offer microfinance borrowers the lowest possible equitable prices while not jeopardizing institution

43、al viability.</p><p>　　外文題目：The Question of Sustainability for Microfinance Institutions </p><p>　　出 處：Journal of Small Business Management 2007 45(1), pp. 23–4

44、1. </p><p>　　作 者：J. Jordan Pollinger, John Outhwaite,and Hector Cordero-Guzmán </p><p><b>　　譯 文：</

45、b></p><p>　　小額信貸的可持續(xù)發(fā)展問(wèn)題</p><p><b>　?。ㄒ唬┣把?lt;/b></p><p>　　微型企業(yè)從主流金融機(jī)構(gòu)獲得資金有相當(dāng)大的困難，其中的一個(gè)重要原因是對(duì)了解借款者所花費(fèi)的信息費(fèi)以及風(fēng)險(xiǎn)等級(jí)是很高的。關(guān)系型融資在解決分配信息不對(duì)稱的小企業(yè)信貸問(wèn)題時(shí)被晉升為一個(gè)潛在的方案。在本論文中，我們力求更好地了解“小

46、額信貸”這樣的戰(zhàn)略供應(yīng)商的含義。我們討論在美國(guó)實(shí)行的關(guān)系型融資的小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)（MFIs），分析其貸款過(guò)程中，確定目前的小額貸款產(chǎn)品盈虧平衡價(jià)格的模式。該模型比較符合實(shí)際的結(jié)果是由現(xiàn)有機(jī)構(gòu)提供的價(jià)格來(lái)顯示的，信貸通常是在可提供的范圍內(nèi)對(duì)微型企業(yè)補(bǔ)貼利率。這意味著，小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)必須提高從贈(zèng)款或每年其他基金的額外資源，以維持其運(yùn)營(yíng)。因?yàn)閮H僅從它們的貸款及相關(guān)業(yè)務(wù)產(chǎn)生的收入來(lái)看，很少有人能夠生存。此項(xiàng)信貸的資助已對(duì)這一為市場(chǎng)服務(wù)的機(jī)構(gòu)的長(zhǎng)期可持

47、續(xù)發(fā)展形成影響，可以幫助解釋主流金融機(jī)構(gòu)為什么沒(méi)有直接資助微型企業(yè)。最后，我們討論非營(yíng)利組織在小企業(yè)信貸市場(chǎng)的作用及其影響定價(jià)，討論他們的可持續(xù)性發(fā)展?jié)摿妥越o自足性，并得到相關(guān)結(jié)構(gòu)戰(zhàn)略的啟示，以便更好地為微型企業(yè)的信貸市場(chǎng)服務(wù)。</p><p>　?。ǘ┟绹?guó)的小額信貸模型</p><p>　　在本節(jié)中，我們描述了當(dāng)前在美國(guó)小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)所應(yīng)用小額貸款模式的過(guò)程和經(jīng)驗(yàn)。我們討論小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)

48、經(jīng)營(yíng)模式的每個(gè)環(huán)節(jié)和從現(xiàn)實(shí)世界得到的成本以及作者在產(chǎn)業(yè)研究過(guò)程中所得經(jīng)驗(yàn)來(lái)總結(jié)出結(jié)果。在實(shí)踐中，我們承認(rèn)經(jīng)營(yíng)成本的高低和分布可能會(huì)受到各種因素的影響，其中包括地理區(qū)位因素，機(jī)構(gòu)戰(zhàn)略因素，以及每一個(gè)小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)的貸款效率。</p><p><b>　　1.市場(chǎng)營(yíng)銷</b></p><p>　　這么一個(gè)市場(chǎng)驅(qū)動(dòng)的商業(yè)模式，為小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)在數(shù)量上提供了許多的潛在借款人。鑒于

49、小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)的不接受存款性，已經(jīng)決定他們進(jìn)入一個(gè)新的沒(méi)有正式事先洞察潛在客戶群前，他們必須在投資上吸引新的借款人。市場(chǎng)營(yíng)銷，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)了各種資源的產(chǎn)生：招攬新的貸款來(lái)更新現(xiàn)有的借款者，營(yíng)銷關(guān)系的存在，使得“草根”網(wǎng)絡(luò)與小額貸款機(jī)構(gòu)擁有廣闊的目標(biāo)環(huán)境和大眾媒體。</p><p>　　在行動(dòng)開(kāi)始前，要發(fā)展借款人池，投資組合的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)是通過(guò)營(yíng)銷網(wǎng)絡(luò)和媒體渠道來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)的。一旦借款人池建立，營(yíng)銷工作可由成本較低的市場(chǎng)轉(zhuǎn)移到現(xiàn)有借款

50、人及他們的對(duì)等網(wǎng)絡(luò)。即便如此，貸款仍然可能會(huì)流失，從投資組合中可以以更快的速度更新借款人，可以及時(shí)補(bǔ)充資金而不必繼續(xù)通過(guò)其他不太有效的渠道。</p><p><b>　　2.貸款申請(qǐng)過(guò)程</b></p><p>　　在經(jīng)濟(jì)方面,貸款申請(qǐng)放在總投資過(guò)程的起點(diǎn),目的是為了減少未來(lái)的信貸損失。在其它條件都相同, 更大規(guī)模的投資信貸申請(qǐng)程序?qū)?dǎo)致隨后較低的拖欠率；相反，一個(gè)不

51、太嚴(yán)格的信貸申請(qǐng)過(guò)程將導(dǎo)致未來(lái)更大的信用損失率。設(shè)置適當(dāng)嚴(yán)格信貸申請(qǐng)的水平，在分析一個(gè)貸款申請(qǐng)人風(fēng)險(xiǎn)特征和預(yù)測(cè)未來(lái)行為的過(guò)程中是被認(rèn)為是值得付出分析成本的。</p><p>　　3.貸款申請(qǐng)的三個(gè)步驟</p><p>　　(1)初步印象。根據(jù)小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)的指導(dǎo)方針建立一套信貸申請(qǐng)人資格，向申請(qǐng)人問(wèn)一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)短的問(wèn)題。這足以能確定一個(gè)申請(qǐng)人的等級(jí)以及是否可以提供信用。 </p>&

52、lt;p>　　(2)面談。在面試階段，由于誠(chéng)懇的態(tài)度是明確的，以確保貸款目的是合法的，而借款人所從事的業(yè)務(wù)要有足夠的能力和前景，能夠到期還款。小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)調(diào)查程序的核心是對(duì)借款人進(jìn)行財(cái)務(wù)分析，但小額貸款借款人數(shù)據(jù)往往是不夠正規(guī)的，阻礙了檢查其現(xiàn)金流量的穩(wěn)定及貸款的支付范圍。因此，與同等規(guī)模正規(guī)的貸款市場(chǎng)相比，這是一個(gè)不太規(guī)范、更加耗時(shí)的任務(wù)。</p><p>　　小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)經(jīng)常代理執(zhí)行技術(shù)援助，同時(shí)在貸款

53、發(fā)放中，幫助編制借款人的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表，例如。在這個(gè)信用欺詐更廣泛的社會(huì)中，許多小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)扮演了一個(gè)阻礙借貸活動(dòng)效率的角色。反之，較大的企業(yè)可能并不需要這種類型的技術(shù)幫助，但這是抵消了其業(yè)務(wù)復(fù)雜性的增加。</p><p>　　小額貸款的借款人往往缺乏傳統(tǒng)的抵押資產(chǎn)，而小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)需要其他相關(guān)擔(dān)保人對(duì)高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)貸款進(jìn)行擔(dān)保.但低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)貸款則可以免除安排一個(gè)連帶保證人的擔(dān)保。在拖欠貸款的情況下，對(duì)借款人的連帶保證人施加壓力。這

54、種關(guān)系在與借款人的訪談期間可以進(jìn)一步深化，并且可以對(duì)申請(qǐng)人的業(yè)務(wù)操作進(jìn)行觀察。</p><p>　　(3)包銷和批準(zhǔn). 如果一筆貸款發(fā)放后，由審貸人員采訪申請(qǐng)人，然后由承銷商來(lái)驗(yàn)證借款人的現(xiàn)金流量，并執(zhí)行輔助分析，以確保貸款是一個(gè)積極的貸款組合。</p><p>　　貸款動(dòng)力學(xué)的產(chǎn)生得以確保一個(gè)有效的信貸過(guò)程。嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)母倪M(jìn)制度可導(dǎo)致申請(qǐng)人的上升速度的下降，因此能保證后續(xù)貸款組合擁有較高的質(zhì)量

55、，但需要超過(guò)所增加的處理成本。對(duì)于大、中貸款，申請(qǐng)成本會(huì)增加，邊際組合質(zhì)量效益的提高是沒(méi)法改變信貸申請(qǐng)邊際費(fèi)用本身的。然而，對(duì)于小額貸款，至少不存在這樣最佳平衡機(jī)制費(fèi)用點(diǎn)。這促使當(dāng)一個(gè)較低的密集的信貸申請(qǐng)程序的貸款請(qǐng)求下降到一定值時(shí),通常是在五千美元以內(nèi)，小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)可以更快、更廉價(jià)發(fā)放此類貸款，并且快速跟蹤他們所通過(guò)的每一個(gè)貸款所運(yùn)用的過(guò)程和內(nèi)容。</p><p><b>　　4.貸款監(jiān)測(cè)</b

56、></p><p>　　貸后監(jiān)督是最大限度地減少損失的關(guān)鍵步驟。與此相反的信貸申請(qǐng)過(guò)程中，它試圖降低對(duì)借款人拖欠及搶占高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)貸款的發(fā)生率，努力進(jìn)行經(jīng)濟(jì)監(jiān)測(cè)可以減少借款人落入欠款的深淵。此外通過(guò)機(jī)構(gòu)的默認(rèn)股權(quán)來(lái)管理拖欠借款人是一個(gè)相當(dāng)昂貴的過(guò)程。</p><p>　　當(dāng)處理重復(fù)的客戶時(shí)，對(duì)先前的貸款就存在便利的財(cái)務(wù)杠桿監(jiān)測(cè)機(jī)會(huì)，使得小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)可以縮短信貸申請(qǐng)過(guò)程，過(guò)濾掉一些沒(méi)有重大影

57、響的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。簡(jiǎn)而言之，就是有機(jī)會(huì)降低相應(yīng)的運(yùn)營(yíng)成本及未來(lái)可能增加的損失率。重復(fù)借款可以不斷積累借款人的信息，這對(duì)于借款人與小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)是互惠互利的。因此在這種情況下大部分的資料信息都來(lái)自以前收集的信貸申請(qǐng)關(guān)系。一個(gè)小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)也擁有借款人歷史的準(zhǔn)確支付指標(biāo)，而不是一個(gè)孤立的、不確定的未來(lái)表現(xiàn)。過(guò)去的融資印象也在新的貸款申請(qǐng)過(guò)程中作為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。面對(duì)這些挑戰(zhàn)，對(duì)于許多小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)來(lái)說(shuō)，他們的一部分任務(wù)是爭(zhēng)取一些在正規(guī)金融機(jī)構(gòu)的忠實(shí)顧客。這讓小額信

58、貸機(jī)構(gòu)為收集可靠顧客而支付額外的費(fèi)用。</p><p><b>　　5.管理費(fèi)用</b></p><p>　　對(duì)于小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)維持自身發(fā)展，每個(gè)未償貸款必須在費(fèi)用制度上達(dá)成相應(yīng)的比例，費(fèi)用制度的驅(qū)動(dòng)和維持很大程度上取決于小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)的規(guī)模。這包括必要的工作人員，工具，技術(shù)，工作環(huán)境，以及投資組合規(guī)模。</p><p>　　我們?cè)谥贫葘用娴男☆~信

59、貸費(fèi)用，是根據(jù)5個(gè)不同的投資組合比例大小來(lái)確定必要的管理費(fèi)用的，以保證其核心費(fèi)用能得到補(bǔ)償。研究表明，小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)費(fèi)用的增加的速度要慢于該貸款組合的增長(zhǎng)，開(kāi)銷的下降也能幫助小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)實(shí)現(xiàn)規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)。具體地，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)一個(gè)小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)用50萬(wàn)美元的投資組合將招致26%的間接費(fèi)用，而一個(gè)小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)用2000萬(wàn)美元的投資組合并可以將間接費(fèi)用降到6%。在美國(guó)，最大的小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)的投資組合是1500萬(wàn)美元。</p><p>

60、;<b>　?。ㄈ┯懻摵徒Y(jié)論</b></p><p>　　對(duì)小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)繼續(xù)補(bǔ)助對(duì)于其可持續(xù)發(fā)展是具有一定的意義的。從更高層次來(lái)說(shuō)，根據(jù)小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)自給能力的大小以及其規(guī)模的大小來(lái)定價(jià)是十分重要的。即便只是輕微的補(bǔ)貼金額的偏差對(duì)于小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)維持中立價(jià)值的定價(jià)都是影響深遠(yuǎn)的。因此，小額信貸信貸機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行嚴(yán)格的真實(shí)成本費(fèi)用分析和審查，與他們的定價(jià)結(jié)構(gòu)是息息相關(guān)的。</p><

61、;p>　　在美國(guó)，小額信貸還未被證明是有利可圖的。非存款性的小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)由于不是正規(guī)金融機(jī)構(gòu)，沒(méi)有更好的信息和技術(shù)來(lái)識(shí)別風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較小的微型企業(yè)。所以，正規(guī)的金融機(jī)構(gòu)理性地選擇不服務(wù)于這一市場(chǎng)。然而，小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)卻把資金成功的引入了微型企業(yè)。盡管如此，小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)還在公共的或是個(gè)人資助方面運(yùn)作。最終，還需要更多的研究以確定小額信貸是否提供了一個(gè)令社會(huì)受益過(guò)剩的經(jīng)濟(jì)代價(jià)。這也表明把經(jīng)濟(jì)補(bǔ)貼廣泛的分散于這些小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)并不明智。更具體地說(shuō)，