外文翻譯---轉(zhuǎn)讓定價(jià)方法的概況和批判性

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Overview and Critique of Existing Transfer Pricing Methods</p><p>　　In this Chapter,

2、we provide an overview of the current transfer pricing regulations pertaining to intra-group transfers of tangible and intangible property, the performance of services, cost-sharing and global dealing. Our discussion con

3、sists of (a) a description of individual methodologies and the circumstances in which they are applied; (b) a review of the economic rationale for each methodology; (c) a critique of such rationale; and (d) an assessment

4、 of practical implications.</p><p>　　The U.S. and OECD transfer pricing regulations and guidelines sanction five transfer pricing methodologies:</p><p>　　1. The comparable profits method or “CPM

5、” (referred to in the OECD Guidelines as the transactional net margin method or “TNMM”);</p><p>　　2. The resale price method or “RPM”;</p><p>　　3. The cost plus method;</p><p>　　4.

6、The comparable uncontrolled price (or “CUP”) method; </p><p>　　5. The profit split method.</p><p>　　Taxpayers are also permitted to establish fees for inter company services rendered to affiliat

7、es based on costs alone (without a profit element) under certain circumstances. Affiliated lenders may charge a published safe harbor floating loan rate (the “Applicable Federal Rate”), or, alternatively, they may determ

8、ine the prevailing market loan rate given the credit rating of the borrower and the loan terms.</p><p>　　The U.S. transfer pricing regime also encompasses intra-firm “cost-sharing” and “global dealing” as sp

9、ecial cases, addressed in separate provisions. Cost-sharing regulations govern circumstances in which related companies jointly contribute to research and development activities, and are assigned specific, non-overlappin

10、g ownership rights in the research results. The term “global dealing operation” refers to multinational financial intermediaries that buy and sell financial products, manage risk</p><p>　　3.2 Resale Price an

11、d Cost Plus methods</p><p>　　Consider next the resale price and cost plus methods. Both are transactions-based methods that the OECD favors over the CPM/TNMM.</p><p>　　3.2.1 Circumstances when R

12、esale Price and Cost Plus methods Apply</p><p>　　The resale price and cost plus methods (and, under the U.S. Temporary Regulations, the gross services margin method and the cost of services plus method) can

13、be applied under the following fact patterns:</p><p>　　1. A single manufacturer sells similar products to both affiliated and unaffiliated distributors;</p><p>　　2. A single distributor sources

14、similar products from both affiliated and unaffiliated suppliers;</p><p>　　3. A single services provider renders similar liaison or agency services (in the case of the gross services margin method) to both a

15、ffiliated and unaffiliated companies, and, if relevant, utilizes the same intangible assets in doing so;</p><p>　　4. A single services provider renders similar services (other than liaison services in the ca

16、se of the cost of services plus method) under the same contractual terms to both affiliated and unaffiliated companies and utilizes the same intangible assets, if any, in doing so;</p><p>　　5. Two or more ma

17、nufacturers sell similar products, in one instance to affiliated distributors, and in the other instances, to unaffiliated distributors;</p><p>　　6. Two or more distributors source similar products, in one i

18、nstance from affiliated suppliers and in the other instances, from unaffiliated suppliers; and</p><p>　　7. A group member performs routine manufacturing or distribution functions and licenses intellectual pr

19、operty from another group member.</p><p>　　Given one of the above fact patterns, one’s choice between the resale price and cost plus methods depends principally on whether (a) one of the group members engage

20、s in internal arm’s length transactions, and (b) the affiliated manufacturer or the affiliated distributor is the least complex entity (and therefore, the designated tested party). For example, under the first fact patte

21、rn, one would ordinarily apply the cost plus method, and under the second, the resale price method. As indicated abo</p><p>　　The U.S. regulations impose higher standards of comparability under the resale pr

22、ice and cost plus methods, as compared to the CPM: Products must be “of the same general type (e.g., consumer electronics),”11 and the parties being compared should perform similar functions, bear similar risks and opera

23、te under similar contractual terms. As previously noted, the OECD Guidelines do not differentiate between transfer pricing methods in establishing comparability criteria to the same degree as the U.S</p><p>

24、　　3.2.2 Description of Resale Price and Cost plus Methods</p><p>　　Briefly stated, under the resale price method, one compares the captive distributor’s gross margin on product sourced from affiliated compan

25、ies with its gross margin on product sourced from unaffiliated companies. If the captive distributor does not source similar products from both affiliated and unaffiliated companies, one can compare its resale margin on

26、products sourced from affiliated suppliers with the resale margins reported by unaffiliated distributors that source similar products from i</p><p>　　3.2.3 Underlying Economic Rationale </p><p>

27、　　Less than one interpretation, the resale price method, applied to internal transactions, presupposes that individual distributors would pay similar purchase prices to their multiple suppliers on an arm’s length basis a

28、nd charge their unrelated customers similar selling prices. This set of assumptions, in turn, implies that (a) suppliers operate in the same competitive market or have no binding capacity constraints and value the subjec

29、t distributor’s business relatively highly, and (b) the distri</p><p>　　3.2.4 Critique of Economic Reasoning</p><p>　　As previously discussed, there is no reason to expect gross margins or gross

30、 markups to be equalized across firms, and, therefore, no good reason to compare an affiliated distributor’s (or manufacturer’s) resale margin (or gross markup) with the corresponding results reported by its unaffiliated

31、 counterparts. Therefore, as with the CPM, the resale price and cost plus methods, as applied to external transactions, are not founded on valid economic principles.</p><p>　　Absent suppliers’ manufacturing

32、capacity constraints and the potential for price discrimination, comparisons of an individual distributor’s resale margins on product sourced from related and independent suppliers, respectively, makes a certain amount o

33、f sense. On an arm’s length basis, the distributor would source exclusively from the lowest cost supplier if its suppliers’ selling prices differed, thus forcing them to charge the same price (or similar prices, in the c

34、ase of similar products). Th</p><p>　　However, as a practical matter, the circumstances that permit such internal comparisons are relatively unlikely to arise. If we do not require internal arm’s length tran

35、sactions to take place in the same geographic market as the parallel inter-company transactions, price discrimination will often be feasible. Most geographic markets are segmented to one degree or another one, and both d

36、emand and supply conditions in individual markets will likely differ. For obvious reasons, this possibility und</p><p>　　3.2.5 Summary and Practical Implications</p><p>　　In sum, comparisons of

37、an individual distributor’s resale margins or an individual manufacturer’s gross markups on internal transactions with related and unrelated parties, respectively, are valid in certain hypothetical circumstances, but are

38、 rarely feasible in practice. Comparisons of resale margins or gross markups across firms have the same shortcomings as comparisons of accounting rates of return, operating markups, and other accounting measures of perfo

39、rmance.</p><p>　　As previously noted, both IRS agents in the field and IRS personnel in the National Office hold prospective comparable companies to a higher standard of comparability than the U.S. regulatio

40、ns themselves would seem to require under the resale price and the cost plus methods. As a result, U.S. firms and the IRS use these methods very sparingly. On the other hand, the OECD Guidelines look substantially more f

41、avorably on these transactions-based methods than the CPM and TNMM, and favor internal com</p><p>　　Just as there is no reason to expect close correlations in accounting rates of return, gross margins and gr

42、oss mark ups across firms, there is no compelling reason to believe that two unaffiliated companies with similar accounting rates of return will also have similar gross margins or gross markups. Hence, if OECD member cou

43、ntries apply the resale price and/or cost plus methods to the same inter company transactions that the IRS analyzes under the CPM, the two (or more) tax authorities are like</p><p>　　Source:　E. King, 2009. “

44、Transfer Pricing and Corporate Taxation”. Springer Science + Business Media, LLC .pp.11-48.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　轉(zhuǎn)讓定價(jià)方法的概況和批判性</p><p>　　在這一章中，我們主要對(duì)目前轉(zhuǎn)讓定價(jià)在有關(guān)的集團(tuán)內(nèi)部

45、轉(zhuǎn)讓有形和無形財(cái)產(chǎn)，服務(wù)性能，成本分擔(dān)和全球交易中的法規(guī)進(jìn)行概述。本文主要討論包括：（一）各種方法和它們所適用的情況說明；（二）對(duì)每種方法的經(jīng)濟(jì)理由進(jìn)行審查；（三）對(duì)上述方法進(jìn)行批評(píng)；（四）評(píng)估各種方法實(shí)際影響。</p><p>　　美國(guó)和經(jīng)合組織根據(jù)轉(zhuǎn)讓定價(jià)法規(guī)和準(zhǔn)則制定五種轉(zhuǎn)讓定價(jià)方法：</p><p>　　1、可比利潤(rùn)方法或者 （是指在經(jīng)合組織的準(zhǔn)則，作為交易凈利潤(rùn)方法）</p

46、><p><b>　　2、再銷售價(jià)格法</b></p><p><b>　　3、成本加成法</b></p><p>　　4、可比非受控價(jià)格方法</p><p><b>　　5、利潤(rùn)分割法</b></p><p>　　納稅人基于在某些情況的成本單獨(dú)（無利潤(rùn)因素

47、）基礎(chǔ)上也獲準(zhǔn)建立公司間對(duì)附屬機(jī)構(gòu)的服務(wù)費(fèi)。關(guān)聯(lián)貸款人可收取已公布安全港的浮動(dòng)貸款利率（以下簡(jiǎn)稱“適用的聯(lián)邦利率”），或者，他們可以決定市場(chǎng)的普遍貸款利率給予借款人的貸款條件和信貸評(píng)級(jí)。</p><p>　　美國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)讓定價(jià)制度還包括公司內(nèi)部的“成本分擔(dān)”和作為單獨(dú)的條款處理特殊情況下的“全球交易”。成本分?jǐn)偣芾硪?guī)定了在什么情況下相關(guān)企業(yè)共同促進(jìn)研究和開發(fā)活動(dòng)，并指派具體的，非重疊的研究成果所有權(quán)權(quán)利。所謂“全球性交

48、易運(yùn)作”，是指跨國(guó)金融中介機(jī)構(gòu)買賣金融產(chǎn)品，管理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和執(zhí)行代表客戶交易。擬議的全球處理?xiàng)l例沒有正式包括了（從不同的金融產(chǎn)品）實(shí)物商品的全球貿(mào)易，盡管“國(guó)稅局征求這些法規(guī)是否應(yīng)擴(kuò)大至包括在商品交易商評(píng)……”。</p><p>　　3.2轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格和成本加方法</p><p>　　考慮未來轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格和成本加方法。兩者都是交易為基礎(chǔ)的方法，在可比利潤(rùn)方法下的通過經(jīng)合組織。</p>&l

49、t;p>　　3.2.1當(dāng)轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格和成本加方法適用環(huán)境</p><p>　　轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格和成本加方法（根據(jù)美國(guó)暫行規(guī)定，總服務(wù)毛利率法和服務(wù)的成本加成法）可以應(yīng)用在以下的事實(shí)模式：</p><p>　　1、單一制造商銷售同類產(chǎn)品為附屬和獨(dú)立分銷商；</p><p>　　2、單分銷商源同類產(chǎn)品從附屬和獨(dú)立的供應(yīng)商；</p><p>　　3、有一

50、個(gè)服務(wù)提供商將類似聯(lián)絡(luò)或代理服務(wù) （在總服務(wù)毛利率法的情況下）呈現(xiàn)到附屬和獨(dú)立的公司，如果有關(guān)，相同的無形資產(chǎn)也這可以這樣做； </p><p>　　4、單一的服務(wù)供應(yīng)商呈現(xiàn)類似的服務(wù)在這兩個(gè)相關(guān)聯(lián)公司及非關(guān)聯(lián)公司相同的合同條款（具有較完善的服務(wù)成本加成法案件聯(lián)絡(luò)服務(wù)除外），如果有關(guān)，相同的無形資產(chǎn)也這可以這樣做；</p><p>　　5、兩個(gè)或更多的獨(dú)立分銷商或與實(shí)例關(guān)聯(lián)的分銷商生產(chǎn)廠家

51、為出售類似產(chǎn)品；</p><p>　　6、兩個(gè)或多個(gè)分銷商源類似的產(chǎn)品，從一個(gè)實(shí)例中非獨(dú)立供應(yīng)商，在其他實(shí)例中獨(dú)立的供應(yīng)商；</p><p>　　7、一組成員從另一個(gè)組成員執(zhí)行例行制造或分發(fā)功能和許可證的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)。</p><p>　　鑒于上述事實(shí)模式，轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格和成本加方法兩者之間的選擇主要取決于（a）本集團(tuán)成員從事內(nèi)部公平交易，以及（b）附屬制造商或下屬分銷商是否

52、是最不復(fù)雜的實(shí)體。例如，在第一個(gè)事實(shí)格局，通常適用成本加成法，而第二個(gè)事實(shí)格局，適用轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格法。如上所述，總服務(wù)毛利率法一般適用于問題服務(wù)中介的情況下，而成本加成法適用于測(cè)試方將相同的服務(wù)呈現(xiàn)到附屬和獨(dú)立的公司。在第五和第六的事實(shí)格局，轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格和成本加方法之間的選擇將取決于每個(gè)成員的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)及其所擁有的相對(duì)值。在最后一個(gè)事實(shí)格局，方法的選擇取決于該持牌人是一個(gè)制造商還是分銷商。</p><p>　　在美國(guó)的規(guī)例規(guī)

53、定下，轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格和成本加的方法與可比利潤(rùn)方法比較，需要更高的可比性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)：產(chǎn)品必須是“相同的一般類型（例如，消費(fèi)電子產(chǎn)品）”，被比較部分具有類似的功能，承擔(dān)類似的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和操作在類似的合同條款。如先前所指出，經(jīng)合組織的準(zhǔn)則不區(qū)分轉(zhuǎn)讓定價(jià)方法在建立美國(guó)規(guī)定相同等級(jí)的可比性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。這些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)包括由當(dāng)事人、合同條款、經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境和經(jīng)營(yíng)策略執(zhí)行的財(cái)產(chǎn)或服務(wù)性質(zhì)，職能。</p><p>　　3.2.2轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格和成本加方法的描述</p

54、><p>　　簡(jiǎn)單地說，轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格法是比較其對(duì)來自非關(guān)聯(lián)公司采購(gòu)的產(chǎn)品毛利率和關(guān)聯(lián)公司采購(gòu)產(chǎn)品的毛利率。如果固定經(jīng)銷商從無關(guān)聯(lián)公司或附屬公司不能獲得同類產(chǎn)品的來源，可以比較從附屬供應(yīng)商獲得的產(chǎn)品來源再售率和從由同類產(chǎn)品獨(dú)立供應(yīng)商提供的獨(dú)立經(jīng)銷商報(bào)告的再售率。類似的比較是根據(jù)成本加成法和服務(wù)的成本加成法，但不同的利潤(rùn)水平指標(biāo)。尤其是，根據(jù)成本加和服務(wù)成本加成方法，利潤(rùn)水平等于在商品銷售（或服務(wù)）除以成本毛利。</p

55、><p>　　3.2.3基本經(jīng)濟(jì)原理</p><p>　　根據(jù)解釋，轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格法，適用于國(guó)內(nèi)交易的前提是個(gè)別分銷商將支付相同的購(gòu)買價(jià)格向自己的多供應(yīng)商在一個(gè)公平水平上并向他們無關(guān)客戶收取類似的銷售價(jià)格。這一套假設(shè)，反過來意味著（a）在同一競(jìng)爭(zhēng)市場(chǎng)運(yùn)作供應(yīng)商或沒有綁定能力約束值主題分銷業(yè)務(wù)相對(duì)較高，以及（b）經(jīng)銷商不能在客戶中建立其銷售價(jià)格區(qū)分。如果轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格的方法取決于對(duì)這些假設(shè)及其有效性，只有生

56、成這種非常類似毛利不只是相似的同一普通型的產(chǎn)品才會(huì)有效。同樣，成本加成法，適用于國(guó)內(nèi)交易先決條件是個(gè)別廠商無法區(qū)分在建立銷售價(jià)格顧客和使用相同或相似的技術(shù)生產(chǎn)產(chǎn)品的不同的客戶。同樣，根據(jù)這一理由，在用來比較的標(biāo)記的產(chǎn)品必須十分相似。另外，轉(zhuǎn)售利潤(rùn)或成本加標(biāo)記的內(nèi)部比較的經(jīng)濟(jì)理由可能只是個(gè)別的分銷商和制造商賺取一定合理地統(tǒng)一的毛利潤(rùn)或標(biāo)記交易達(dá)到投資者需要的回報(bào)。對(duì)適用于對(duì)外交易，再轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格和成本加方法的經(jīng)濟(jì)理由可能是市場(chǎng)的力量會(huì)平衡不同

57、企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)售的利潤(rùn)和跨國(guó)企業(yè)總標(biāo)記。</p><p>　　3.2.4經(jīng)濟(jì)推理批判</p><p>　　如前所述，我們沒有理由期望毛利率或嚴(yán)重標(biāo)記能夠在整個(gè)企業(yè)中均衡，因此，沒有充分的理由來通過分銷商（或制造商）這兩個(gè)不同行業(yè)的報(bào)告來比較的轉(zhuǎn)售利潤(rùn)。因此，如同可比利潤(rùn)法，用于對(duì)外交易的轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格和成本加成法都不是建立在有效的經(jīng)濟(jì)原則基礎(chǔ)上的。</p><p>　　缺少對(duì)供應(yīng)

58、商制造能力的限制和價(jià)格變化的估計(jì)，通過比較個(gè)人經(jīng)銷商來自相關(guān)并且獨(dú)立的供應(yīng)商的產(chǎn)品的零售利潤(rùn)，有一定的意義。在一個(gè)公平的基礎(chǔ)上，分銷商以最低成本從供應(yīng)商處得到的銷售價(jià)格也迫使他們收取相同全不同的價(jià)格（或相似的價(jià)格在同類產(chǎn)品的情況）。因此，如果經(jīng)銷商不能自由選擇價(jià)格，那么他的客戶將不堅(jiān)持不同的價(jià)格（其中，“價(jià)格”包括合作社的廣告安排，數(shù)量折扣等），它賺取的利潤(rùn)應(yīng)該在供應(yīng)商轉(zhuǎn)售公平的基礎(chǔ)上。同樣，如果沒有專用生產(chǎn)線，個(gè)體生產(chǎn)廠家為相關(guān)和獨(dú)立

59、的客戶生產(chǎn)類似產(chǎn)品時(shí)通常會(huì)使用同樣的設(shè)施（相同或類似的制造技術(shù)和工藝）。如果制造商不能自由選擇價(jià)格，它的客戶就不會(huì)在公平的基礎(chǔ)上堅(jiān)持不同的價(jià)格，它應(yīng)該在公平的原則上從客戶那獲取的類似毛利潤(rùn)。這種內(nèi)部的比較并不依賴于市場(chǎng)的均衡（盡管某些市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)假設(shè)是隱含的）的理論概念，而是一個(gè)單一的企業(yè)利潤(rùn)最大化的行為。</p><p>　　但是，作為一個(gè)實(shí)際問題，允許內(nèi)部比較這樣的情況是相對(duì)不太可能出現(xiàn)。如果我們不要求在同行關(guān)聯(lián)

60、交易的地域市場(chǎng)內(nèi)采取內(nèi)部的公平交易，價(jià)格歧視往往是可行的。大多數(shù)地區(qū)市場(chǎng)被分割為一個(gè)個(gè)，而在個(gè)別市場(chǎng)需求和供給條件可能會(huì)有所不同。由于這顯而易見的原因，這種可能性破壞了整個(gè)地區(qū)市場(chǎng)比較的可靠性。相反，如果我們所要求比較的交易發(fā)生在相同的地理市場(chǎng)，事實(shí)模式允許下內(nèi)部比較將會(huì)很少出現(xiàn)。制造商不太可能在同一地理市場(chǎng)同時(shí)賣給附屬和獨(dú)立分銷商，因?yàn)檫@樣做會(huì)破壞附屬分銷商。同樣的推理也適用于從附屬和獨(dú)立的供應(yīng)商采購(gòu)（除非附屬供應(yīng)商的能力限制，通常是

61、臨時(shí)性質(zhì)的狀態(tài)）。此外，地域市場(chǎng)的價(jià)格歧視內(nèi)可能發(fā)生：當(dāng)大型采購(gòu)商在某些市場(chǎng)擁有相當(dāng)大的市場(chǎng)力量（特別是美國(guó)），并定期與供應(yīng)商協(xié)商非常有利定價(jià)安排。不同的是，大型零售商往往有權(quán)力在他們的供應(yīng)商的價(jià)格歧視中施加某些有利的形式。</p><p>　　3.2.5總結(jié)和實(shí)踐意義</p><p>　　總之，分別比較個(gè)別經(jīng)銷商的零售利潤(rùn)，或者來自各方的內(nèi)部交易個(gè)人生產(chǎn)總值，在某些假設(shè)的情況下有效，但很

62、少在實(shí)踐中可行。比較轉(zhuǎn)售或跨公司的毛利潤(rùn)率和比較會(huì)計(jì)收益率，經(jīng)營(yíng)利潤(rùn)，性能及其他會(huì)計(jì)措施有相同的缺點(diǎn)。</p><p>　　如前所述，無論是國(guó)稅局在外代理或者在國(guó)稅局人員準(zhǔn)可的公司都比美國(guó)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)規(guī)范具有更高的可比性，似乎都需要根據(jù)轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格和成本加利潤(rùn)的方法。因此，美國(guó)公司和美國(guó)國(guó)稅局使用這些方法非常謹(jǐn)慎。另一方面，比較可比利潤(rùn)法和交易凈利潤(rùn)法，經(jīng)合組織準(zhǔn)則從實(shí)質(zhì)上更看好這些交易為基礎(chǔ)的方法，并贊成內(nèi)部非受控交易比

63、較超過外部非受控交易比較。上述草案的問題由負(fù)責(zé)稅務(wù)政策的經(jīng)合組織發(fā)布，行政中心重申了經(jīng)合組織的可比利潤(rùn)法和交易凈利潤(rùn)法負(fù)面看法，因?yàn)樗鼈儙淼摹敖鹑谛污E的機(jī)械比較”。</p><p>　　正如我們沒有理由期望回報(bào)，公司的毛利率與整個(gè)毛分帳密切相關(guān)，也沒有令人信服的理由相信，兩個(gè)會(huì)計(jì)回報(bào)率相似的公司的毛利率也有類似。 因此，如果經(jīng)合組織成員國(guó)申請(qǐng)轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格或成本加成方法相同的公司間交易，國(guó)稅局根據(jù)可比利潤(rùn)法進(jìn)行分析，