外文翻譯--捷克共和國(guó)的公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效的關(guān)系

1、<p>　　中文3100字，1900單詞</p><p>　　外文題目：Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech Republic</p><p>　　出 處： The William Davidson Institute

2、 </p><p>　　作 者： Stijn Claessens and Simeon Djankov </p><p>　　The association between ownership structure and corporate performance

3、 is a much studied topic in both transition and market economies. The research on this topic dates back more than sixty years to Berle and Means（1933），who contend that diffuse ownership yields significant power in the ha

4、nds of managers whose interests do not coincide with the interest of shareholders. As a result，corporate resources are not used for the maximization of shareholders’ value. Several studies find a strong positive</p>

5、;<p>　　Much of the empirical work on the relation between ownership structure and corporate performance has had difficulty controlling for the possible feedback of firm characteristic to ownership, especially sinc

6、e it has focused mainly on market economies with low transactions costs in changing ownership. Using a data set that, by construction , alleviates the endogeneity problem can contribute to the dabate on the direction of

7、causality. The design of the Czech privatization program precluded the adj</p><p>　　Thus, we can study the link between concentrated ownership and firm performance following voucher privatization. The Czech

8、voucher scheme prevented insiders from acquiring large ownership stakes, as few direct sales of assets took place before the voucher privatization. The short time before privatization, with the first round starting only

9、three months after the initial announcement, made it difficult for investors with insider knowledge to accumulate sufficient capital to buy significant quant</p><p>　　We relate ownership concentration to two

10、 corporate performance parameters for a crosssection of Czech firms over the period 1992 through 1997. In particular, we test whether firms with more concentrated ownership have experienced larger positive changes in pro

11、fitability and labor productivity. Controlling for some firm-specific variables, we find that both profitability and productivity changes are positively related with ownership concentration. A 10% increase in concentrati

12、on leads to a 2% inc</p><p>　　Empirical design：</p><p>　　We have survey data on Czech firms compiled by a private consulting firm. The database contains financial and ownership information for 1

13、782 firms listed on the Prague stock exchange. All financial variables were defined using international accounting standards from the onset of the survey in 1992. A number of firms do not report revenues，expenditures, or

14、 employment changes. We exclude them from our analysis. The 1992 through 1997 data are complete for 371 firms that went through the first phase</p><p>　　Using accounting data to test the effect of changes in

15、 corporate performance may be objectionable in formerly centrally planned economies. Data quality is weak as new accounting standards were introduced in the Czech republic only in 1992. nevertheless, firm in our sample d

16、o report quite complete information and accounting has improved considerably since the onset of the transition. Especially in the last years of our sample, profitability and productivity can be expected to reflect the ef

17、fects </p><p>　　For the empirical tests, we use profitability and labor productivity as indicators of corporate performance. Profitability is defined as gross operating profit over net fixed assets plus inve

18、ntory. Table 1 shows its increase over time, from 14.4% in 1993 to 16.9% in 1995 on average, followed by a decline in 1996. Seven of the top firms, firms with the highest profitability, operate in the engineering and arc

19、hitectural design, management, accounting sectors. Six of the bottom 10 operate in the ba</p><p>　　As in Demsetz and Lehn（1985）and Weiss and Nikitin（1999）, we use the share of equity held by the top five inv

20、estors （T5）and a logistic transformation of this share（L5）, defined as log{T5/[100-T5]} as the indicators for ownership concentration. Summary statistics for these measures are also provided in Table 1。 Note that the ma

21、gnitude of T5 increase by 40% between 1993 and 1997. The frequency distribution of T5 at the beginning and the end of our sample shows a strong rightward shift, with signi</p><p>　　We also find a positive n

22、on-monotonic relation between ownership concentration and both profitability and labor productivity. Firm with ownership concentration above 50% in 1994 display a 30% higher labor productivity on average in 1996, compare

23、d to firms with less ownership concentration. Profitability shows a similar relation to concentrated ownership, with firm in the seventh decile displaying the highest value. In both cases, the dependent variables peak in

24、 the 60% through 70% range and decl</p><p><b>　　Evidence：</b></p><p>　　We estimate regressions using a pooled sample of 2860 observations, 371 firms with five years of data and 335 f

25、irms with three years of data. This sample is used consistently in all four specifications reported in Table 2. As control variables, we used a dummy for the first phase of privatization and also dummies for years and se

26、ctors. The first phase dummy is used to control for selection bias. Sector dummies are commonly used in studies on firm performance to capture sector-specific shocks，e.g</p><p>　　The empirical tests reveal t

27、hat the lower the dispersion of ownership, the higher profitability and labor productivity. In both specifications，profitability and labor productivity are positively，and statistically significantly，correlated with owner

28、ship concentration. In the year-by-year regressions, not reported, the significance of the ownership concentration variables increases over time, suggesting an improvement in the role of owners in corporate governance. T

29、he coefficient on the squared te</p><p>　　Conclusion：</p><p>　　The Czech voucher scheme provides a unique experiment for empirical research on the relationship between ownership structure and fi

30、rm characteristic as it allows us to study the effects of ownership on firm performance，in a situation in which ownership is exogenous to firm performance. Analysis of market valuation and profitability for 706 Czech fir

31、m yields some evidence that more concentrated ownership tests， we do not find much evidence to suggest that the relationship is the result of the own</p><p>　　The empirical results question the value of dist

32、ribution shares of firm to a large number of individual in an environment that gives them little chance to exercise their ownership control rights. The argument for the mass-privatization program was that investment fund

33、s would concentrate shares and exercise control，which we show did happen in the Czech republic. New non-voucher investors were expected to accumulate shares and take over companies. Thus，the voucher scheme was seen as an

34、 intermediat</p><p>　　Estimating the true costs and benefits of mass privatization in the Czech republic is beyond the scope of this study. Previous work argues that the voucher experiment failed to deliver

35、the promised results， because ownership concentration did not take place，leading to bad performance of companies and the opportunity for asset stripping by incumbent managers. We show that the first argument at least is

36、not supported by the data. Our results lend more support to the alternative view that the Czech</p><p>　　Our findings may be driven by the prevalent method of mass-privatization in the Czech republic that pr

37、ecluded managers and outside investors form gaining a significant corporate ownership. In Hungary and Poland，where mass-privatization was either not used or comprised a small share of the total number of privatized compa

38、nies，other results may obtain. The results here have，however，implication for the other transition economies that followed mass-privatization，Bulgaria and Romania in Eastern Europ</p><p>　　While we investigat

39、e the link between ownership concentration and corporate performance，several related questions remain outstanding. Most importantly，one would like to know what is the precise mechanism through which ownership concentrati

40、on affects performance. One hypothesis is that concentration allows the owners to monitor incumbent managers better through the use of their seats on the Board of Directors. Alternatively，concentrated ownership may give

41、owners sufficient clout in the selection </p><p>　　捷克共和國(guó)的公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效的關(guān)系</p><p>　　公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效之間的關(guān)系無(wú)論在轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟(jì)還是市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)中都是一個(gè)熱門(mén)的研究話題。關(guān)于這個(gè)話題的研究，最多可以追溯到60年前的Berle和Means（1933），他們主張分散的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)使得經(jīng)理人的利益與股東的利益不一致。其結(jié)

42、果是，公司的資源未使得股東的利益最大化。幾項(xiàng)研究表明，在美國(guó)和一些其他市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)國(guó)家中，股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效之間有著很強(qiáng)的正向相關(guān)性，并作為一個(gè)重要的監(jiān)測(cè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)被用于公司監(jiān)控。在過(guò)渡經(jīng)濟(jì)中，實(shí)證研究發(fā)現(xiàn)在中國(guó)與捷克的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境下，集中的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與憑證價(jià)格和股市價(jià)格之間有著正相關(guān)的關(guān)系。其他一些研究表明，在俄羅斯，股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司的實(shí)際表現(xiàn)之間也有著積極的正面相關(guān)性。</p><p>　　許多關(guān)于股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效的實(shí)證研究

43、在公司股權(quán)特征對(duì)于績(jī)效的反作用上難以把握，特別是在市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)，這種較低股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓花費(fèi)的環(huán)境下。捷克的私有化程序設(shè)計(jì)使得對(duì)于公司股權(quán)特性的調(diào)整問(wèn)題被解決了，個(gè)別而言，股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的改變決定是由州來(lái)決定的，而非公司自身。招標(biāo)程序的規(guī)則讓參與代理的中間商無(wú)法獲得最佳的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。</p><p>　　因此，我們可以通過(guò)憑證私有化來(lái)研究股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效之間的聯(lián)系。捷克的憑證方案防止了內(nèi)幕人員通過(guò)設(shè)立大規(guī)模的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，就像一些

44、在憑證私有化程序之前發(fā)生的資金的直接銷(xiāo)售。捷克的憑證程序，不同于俄羅斯的憑證程序，是無(wú)法轉(zhuǎn)讓的，因此個(gè)人股份的積累從而從私人憑證處得到百分比的分成無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)。</p><p>　　在此，我們把捷克公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)用1992年至1997年之間的兩個(gè)顯著的參數(shù)來(lái)表示。特別是，我們研究了擁有相對(duì)較高股權(quán)集中度的公司是否在盈利能力與勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)力上有更好的表現(xiàn)。對(duì)于一些公司的特殊變量而言，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)盈利能力與生產(chǎn)力的改變與公司股權(quán)

45、結(jié)構(gòu)有正面相關(guān)性。10%的股權(quán)集中度的提升可以導(dǎo)致2%的短期勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)力的提升，以及3%的短期盈利能力的提升。這些結(jié)論可以用計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)結(jié)論來(lái)說(shuō)明。</p><p><b>　　實(shí)證部分：</b></p><p>　　我們通過(guò)一個(gè)咨詢公司調(diào)查了捷克許多公司的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)。這些數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)源于布拉格股票交易市場(chǎng)上所列出的1782家公司的財(cái)政與股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)相關(guān)信息。有些公司并不公

46、布收入，支出以及職員雇傭的變化。我們通過(guò)我們的研究總結(jié)出這些數(shù)據(jù)。1992年至1997年的數(shù)據(jù)有371家公司通過(guò)了第一階段的私有化憑證機(jī)制，其中的335家公司通過(guò)了第二階段。其中我們選取了22家來(lái)進(jìn)行建模研究。</p><p>　　利用會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)去研究在以前集中的計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)下股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的變化對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效的影響效果是令人生厭的。數(shù)據(jù)的質(zhì)量并不好，直到1992年，新的會(huì)計(jì)記賬制度被引入捷克使用。然而，我們的樣本公司數(shù)據(jù)直到最

47、近幾年并沒(méi)有很好的反映出記賬制度的變化。</p><p>　　在實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)中，我們使用企業(yè)盈利能力和勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率作為性能指標(biāo)。盈利能力被定義為資產(chǎn)凈值加上庫(kù)存。表一顯示了其隨著時(shí)間的增加，從1993年的14.4%，至1995年達(dá)到16.9%的平均值，緊接著在1996年下跌。7家最好的公司，具有最高的盈利能力的企業(yè)，分別是工程和建筑設(shè)計(jì)，管理和會(huì)計(jì)部門(mén)中的佼佼者。位于最底部的10家公司，本別是基本金屬及金屬制品業(yè)的公司

48、，包括武器裝備等部門(mén)。勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率是指每位員工創(chuàng)造的價(jià)值增量，其中具體的部門(mén)的價(jià)值增量是由捷克統(tǒng)計(jì)局提供的指數(shù)得出的。勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率在1992年至1996年間是逐步提高的。</p><p>　　按照Demsetz 和Lehn（1985）以及Weiss和Nikitin（1999）的研究，我們用平均的份額分配前5個(gè)因素（T5）和這5個(gè)因素的轉(zhuǎn)化形態(tài)（L5）,將股權(quán)集中度指標(biāo)定義為log{T5/[100-T5]}。這些數(shù)據(jù)的

49、統(tǒng)計(jì)資料總結(jié)見(jiàn)表1。注意T5的數(shù)據(jù)在1993年至1997年之間增長(zhǎng)了40%。我們的樣本的頻率分布在開(kāi)始和最后的時(shí)候發(fā)生了強(qiáng)力的右側(cè)移動(dòng)，伴隨著明顯的前5大股份類(lèi)型的增長(zhǎng)達(dá)到70%以上。因?yàn)樵S多股權(quán)交易并不是在布拉格交易中心交易的，而是通過(guò)談判直接在地下進(jìn)行的，這可能導(dǎo)致并非價(jià)值最大化動(dòng)機(jī)對(duì)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的改變起到?jīng)Q定作用。</p><p>　　我們同時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)了股權(quán)集中度與盈利能力和勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率之間并非直接正相關(guān)的關(guān)系。股權(quán)

50、集中度在50%以上的公司在1994年相對(duì)股權(quán)集中度低的公司有超過(guò)30%的更高的勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率。盈利情況顯示了類(lèi)似的所有權(quán)關(guān)系。在這兩種情況下，因變量從60%到70%范圍內(nèi)變動(dòng)，然后下降。這些發(fā)現(xiàn)與研究中國(guó)公司的徐和王的發(fā)現(xiàn)是相似的。</p><p><b>　　論證：</b></p><p>　　我們建立回歸模型用的是2860個(gè)樣本的觀測(cè)數(shù)據(jù)，371個(gè)公司的5年數(shù)據(jù)和35

51、5個(gè)公司的3年數(shù)據(jù)。此例中我們應(yīng)用的所有數(shù)據(jù)都在表2中。為了控制變量，我們先假設(shè)第一階段的私有化，年份，行業(yè)等因素，第一階段的假設(shè)是為了控制選擇偏好，行業(yè)的假設(shè)是為了研究特定行業(yè)對(duì)企業(yè)的沖擊，例如，增加國(guó)際貿(mào)易，增長(zhǎng)的機(jī)會(huì)等其他一系列會(huì)影響企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)表現(xiàn)的行業(yè)特殊因素。最終，年份的假設(shè)是為了控制在規(guī)定的年份里環(huán)境因素的改變對(duì)于模型的影響。徐和王（1997）和Weiss以及Nikitin（1999）的OLS的估計(jì)報(bào)告，提供了一個(gè)比較的基準(zhǔn)，

52、雖然f檢驗(yàn)拒絕假設(shè)，但是所有企業(yè)在盈利能力和勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率情況下都表現(xiàn)為一個(gè)常數(shù)項(xiàng)。奧斯曼規(guī)格檢驗(yàn)的測(cè)試表明，隨機(jī)效應(yīng)模型是比較合適的，計(jì)算值分別為25.32和27.81。</p><p>　　實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)表明，所有權(quán)分散程度越低，企業(yè)的盈利能力和勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率越高。這兩種情況表明，在統(tǒng)計(jì)研究下，盈利能力與勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率同股權(quán)集中度之間呈現(xiàn)正相關(guān)。一年又一年的年回歸數(shù)據(jù)表明，雖然沒(méi)有報(bào)道，但是隨著時(shí)間的推移，所有權(quán)集中度變大的意

53、義，就表明了持股人在公司治理中的作用的提高。所有權(quán)平方項(xiàng)的系數(shù)在兩個(gè)規(guī)格中都為負(fù)。雖然勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率隨著股權(quán)集中度的增加有少量的降低，但只是在隨機(jī)效用模型中比較顯著。這可能反映了由Shleifer和 Vishny（1997）研究調(diào)查得出的所有權(quán)成本概念。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)論：</b></p><p>　　捷克券計(jì)劃提供了關(guān)于股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司特征的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了實(shí)證

54、研究的一個(gè)獨(dú)特的實(shí)驗(yàn)，因?yàn)樗刮覀兡軌驅(qū)ζ髽I(yè)績(jī)效研究所有制的影響，所有權(quán)是外生的公司業(yè)績(jī)。對(duì)于706家捷克公司的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值與盈利能力的評(píng)估，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)股權(quán)集中度越高，對(duì)公司業(yè)績(jī)有影響。并沒(méi)有發(fā)現(xiàn)公司特點(diǎn)對(duì)公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的影響。然而我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，某些強(qiáng)力的持股人，即國(guó)外投資者和非空資金，更明顯的表現(xiàn)出與業(yè)績(jī)提高的相關(guān)性。有證據(jù)表明，總體擁有集中，以及特定類(lèi)型的投資者，是使盈利能力與勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)力發(fā)生變化的關(guān)鍵。實(shí)證研究的結(jié)果顯示，個(gè)人股股東很少有機(jī)會(huì)行

55、使其所有權(quán)，而是將大部分的權(quán)利控制權(quán)交給了公司。大規(guī)模私有化方案的論據(jù)是，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)在捷克共和國(guó)，投資股票和基金將集中行使控制。新的非卷投資者預(yù)計(jì)將累積股份，并且接管公司。因此，學(xué)卷計(jì)劃被看作是與國(guó)家所有制和私人所有制結(jié)構(gòu)中，分配股份的費(fèi)用由憑證持有人支付的中間步驟。</p><p>　　估計(jì)在捷克共和國(guó)的真實(shí)成本和大規(guī)模私有化的好處已經(jīng)超出了本研究的范圍。以往的工作經(jīng)驗(yàn)得出，卷實(shí)驗(yàn)未能達(dá)到所承諾的結(jié)果，因?yàn)楣蓹?quán)集

56、中度沒(méi)有發(fā)生轉(zhuǎn)變，從而導(dǎo)致了不良的公司業(yè)績(jī)和現(xiàn)任經(jīng)理員有可能剝離資產(chǎn)的機(jī)會(huì)。</p><p>　　我們發(fā)現(xiàn)至少第一個(gè)參數(shù)不被數(shù)據(jù)支持。我們的研究結(jié)果支持另一種觀點(diǎn)，捷克政府通過(guò)不引進(jìn)適當(dāng)?shù)臋C(jī)構(gòu)來(lái)監(jiān)督資本市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展，使得私有化的受害者失敗，而自己獲得成功。</p><p>　　我們的研究結(jié)果表明，大規(guī)模的私有化是在捷克共和國(guó)以排除管理者和外部投資者的形式來(lái)獲得一個(gè)重大的企業(yè)的所有權(quán)的普遍方法

57、。在匈牙利和波蘭，大規(guī)模的私有化不僅僅是組成一個(gè)私有化的公司，那只是一小部分，還有其他的途徑可以達(dá)到這結(jié)果。這里的結(jié)果，對(duì)于其他轉(zhuǎn)型經(jīng)濟(jì)體大規(guī)模私有化的含義有不同的應(yīng)用，如東歐的保加利亞和羅馬尼亞，摩爾多瓦，哈薩克斯坦，吉爾吉斯共和國(guó)，烏克蘭，前蘇聯(lián)，蒙古等。最后，這些發(fā)現(xiàn)可能有助于像中國(guó)和越南這樣的經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型還未發(fā)生的國(guó)家在未來(lái)制定方案。</p><p>　　雖然我們探討股權(quán)集中度與企業(yè)績(jī)效之間的聯(lián)系，幾個(gè)相關(guān)的