財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)信息與公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的關(guān)系外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　中文2450字</b></p><p><b>　　1980單詞</b></p><p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯譯文</b></p><p><b>　　外文原文 </b></p><p><b>　　原文

2、：</b></p><p>　　Financial accounting information and corporate governance systems</p><p><b>　　Abstract</b></p><p>　　We posit that limited transparency of firms’ ope

3、rations to outside investors increases demands on governance systems to alleviate moral hazard problems. The accounting information system is one part of the company governs, which has a close relation with the corporate

4、 governance. The accounting information system has a reaction to the corporate governance. And the quality of the accounting information would be influenced by the corporate governance .In current society, the phenomenon

5、 that accoun</p><p>　　IntroductionIn the U.S. and in other economies with strong legal protection of outside shareholders’ rights, transparency of a firm’s operations and activities to outside investors dis

6、ciplines managers to act in shareholders’ interests.1 Wepos it that limited corporate transparency increases demands on corporate governance systems to alleviate moral hazard problems resulting from a more severe informa

7、tion gap between managers and shareholders, ceteris paribus. We consider two factors that limit</p><p>　　Accounting information can have a significant impact on econom

8、ic life. Real reliable accounting information is the important basis for companies to operate day-to-day business and make correct

9、 decisions, the important reference for the Government's to make macro-economic regulation and control, the favorable protection fo

10、r the normal operation of market economy. As China's market economic system has improved steadily, the role of accounting 

11、;is increasingly important in economy, it is the greates</p><p>　　With respect to monitoring technology, we conjecture that inherent limitations o</p><p>

12、　　firms’ information systems in generating information relevant for monitoringmanagerial behavior influence governance structure formation by affecting the costbenefit trade-off underlying governance mechanism configurat

13、ions. Financialaccounting systems are a logical starting point for investigating properties ofinformation systems important for addressing moral hazard problems. Auditedfinancial statements prepared under Generally Accep

14、ted Accounting Principles (GAAP) produce extensive, credible, </p><p>　　Measuring governance value of accounting numbers </p><p>　　We conjecture that the extent to which current accounting numbe

15、rs capture theinfor mation set underlying current changes in value (i.e., earnings timeliness, asdefined in our study) is a fundamental determinant of their governance value todirectors and in vestors. Directors monitor

16、managerial and firm performance, ratify managerial decisions, provide managerial incentives, and aid in strategic planningactivities (e.g., strategy development, succession planning). To carry out these duties, direc<

17、;/p><p>　　The detailed information set reflected in stock price is not freely available to the board and residual claimants. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) demonstrate that fullyrevealing stock prices are incompa

18、tible with costly information collection activities of investors. In an equilibrium where private information collection and processing activities are costly, prices cannot be fully revealing. This implies that boards an

19、d others cannot extract the underlying information from price.</p><p>　　However, one could argue that even if prices are not invertible back to the market’s underlying information set, managers and director

20、s have direct access to all this information. Is this the case? Research documents a significant relation between</p><p>　　changes in stock price and subsequent investment decisions (e.g., Morck et al., 1990

21、; Baker et al., 2001). One potential explanation for this is that stock pricecommunicates new information to a firm’s managers that is then incorporated into investment decision (see Morck et al., 1990 for a discussion o

22、f competing hypotheses).4 But, even if a firm’s managers know the entire information set, thisdoes not imply that the board of directors knows it, and so board structure mayrespond to low earnings</p><p>　　W

23、hile accounting information systems per se may directly influence governancechoices, we must acknowledge the possibility that governance structures also influence the properties of accounting numbers through accounting p

24、olicy choices and earnings management activities.27 One econometric solution to this question would involve using an instrumental variable technique. This, however, does not appear to be a fruitful approach in this case

25、, as it is not obvious what to use as areasonable instrumen</p><p>　　While we cannot definitively rule out reverse causality, we note that our timelinessmetrics are based on ‘‘core’’ earnings, defined as ear

26、nings before special items, extraordinary items and discontinued operations. While it is of course possible to manipulate core earnings, the focus on core earnings excludes discretionary accruals within special items, ex

27、traordinary items and discontinued operations, which are arguably outlets for earnings management activity.</p><p>　　Further, it is not clear how much discretion managers have over earnings</p><p&

28、gt;　　timeliness. range of important firm characteristics. Even if executives were significantly manipulating earnings, it is not clear if this would impact earnings timeliness. If marginal sophisticated investors see thr

29、ough earnings management, then earnings management unlikely impacts timeliness. In this instance, our timeliness composite; could also be impacted if earnings management introducesnoise in earnings. If they are being foo

30、led, then earnings management could increasee arnings timeliness </p><p>　　Summary and implications</p><p>　　This paper investigates how ownership concentration, equity incentives of directors,

31、 executive compensation and board structure vary with inherent limitationsof firms’ information systems and with firms’ organizational complexity. We adopt the perspective that observed governance structures represent op

32、timal contracting arrangements endogenously determined by firms’ contracting environments. We proxy for the intrinsic governance usefulness of accounting information with earnings timeliness, def</p><p><

33、b>　　Source : </b></p><p>　　Robert Bushman,Qi Chen.Financial accounting information, organizational complexity and corporate governance systems[J].Journal of Accounting &amp; Economics,2004,37(2)

34、 </p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)信息與公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的關(guān)系</p><p><b>　　[摘要]</b></p><p>　　我們要增加公司治理制度所要求的透明度，以減輕道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題。因此我們就有必要研究會(huì)計(jì)信息系統(tǒng)與公司治理之間的關(guān)系，會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量優(yōu)劣會(huì)影

35、響公司治理好壞且會(huì)計(jì)信息系統(tǒng)對公司治理具有反作用。在目前的社會(huì)中，會(huì)計(jì)信息失真現(xiàn)象屢見不鮮。要完善公司治理，以提高會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量迫在眉睫。在本文中本人解釋什么是公司治理與會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量。然后，我會(huì)盡量分析公司治理缺陷對會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的影響。</p><p><b>　　介紹</b></p><p>　　在美國和其他國家的法律保護(hù)下, 股東具有較全面的了解公司的經(jīng)營操作和活動(dòng)

36、空間，以及在一定程度上限制了投資者經(jīng)理的行為。公司透明度的增加對公司治理系統(tǒng)是有要求的。而減輕道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)遺留下來的問題更加嚴(yán)重阻礙了管理者和股東之間溝通。在其它條件不變的情況下，我們認(rèn)為這兩個(gè)因素在不同程度的限制在公共場合下美國公司的透明度。(1)在公認(rèn)的會(huì)計(jì)原則下，公司將收入的變化跟隨股東價(jià)值的變化而變化(2)公司治理的復(fù)雜性是由于廣泛地理因素和業(yè)務(wù)多樣化而形成的。</p><p>　　針對監(jiān)視機(jī)制,我們推測,公

37、司的內(nèi)部控制能夠?qū)镜男畔⑾到y(tǒng)在生成相關(guān)治理結(jié)構(gòu)中所需的信息進(jìn)行監(jiān)測管理。但同時(shí)成本效益在治理機(jī)制配置上具有潛在的影響。會(huì)計(jì)信息系統(tǒng)重要的解決問題是道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題。在公認(rèn)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則下，審計(jì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表編制具有廣泛性,可靠性。而其形成的特定基礎(chǔ)的可供解決代理問題。高層管理者,董事會(huì)和外部投資者不能僅僅依靠股票價(jià)格變化所提供的信息來改變的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)和方向。例如,代理模型通常意味著管理者應(yīng)該為控制事件和無法控制的事件負(fù)責(zé), 而股票收益率的高低無法

38、看出是受到哪方面的影響，但是會(huì)計(jì)信息可以在一定程度上將不可控制和可控制因素區(qū)分開。舉一個(gè)例子,管理者經(jīng)常向董事會(huì)提交預(yù)算,然后使周期報(bào)告從預(yù)算出發(fā)，來解釋差異的來源。 (如,Zimmerman,2002年,第6章)</p><p>　　測量的治理價(jià)值會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)字和組織的復(fù)雜性</p><p>　　我們推測,目前會(huì)計(jì)信息數(shù)據(jù)的變化(如盈利的及時(shí)性)其根本決定因素是由董事會(huì)和投資者決定的。董事監(jiān)控

39、管理層、批準(zhǔn)公司業(yè)績的管理決策,提供管理創(chuàng)新、并有助于戰(zhàn)略計(jì)劃活動(dòng)(例如,戰(zhàn)略發(fā)展、接續(xù)計(jì)劃)。執(zhí)行這些活動(dòng),董事需要會(huì)計(jì)信息,以幫助他們了解為何公司股票價(jià)值正在改變。例如,詳細(xì)的會(huì)計(jì)信息可以有利于董事會(huì)將無法控制的事件撇開，而在評價(jià)過程中客觀的評價(jià)目前的管理控制。外部投資者和金融分析師們在監(jiān)控公司管理業(yè)績時(shí)也需要這樣的信息。例如提供有關(guān)股權(quán)價(jià)值的整體變化的信息。</p><p>　　會(huì)計(jì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告，通過收集和總結(jié)

40、企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)資料來影響投資和融資活動(dòng)，傳達(dá)有關(guān)權(quán)益變動(dòng)的基本來源。盈余及時(shí)性措施,在一定程度上是收集同期股票價(jià)格變動(dòng)的信息。我們承認(rèn)，該措施的本質(zhì)問題提出了我們所想要提出的假設(shè)，即時(shí)效性是盈余影響治理結(jié)構(gòu)的決定因素。實(shí)際上, 如果股價(jià)有效地將所有信息提供給市場的參與者，那么是不是信息也同時(shí)會(huì)提供給剩余索取者和董事會(huì)呢？如果是這樣,為什么公司還需要昂貴的監(jiān)控機(jī)制或特定信息收集來取代低收入呢?為什么不直接使用股票價(jià)格,或簡單地提取股票價(jià)格內(nèi)載

41、的資料呢?我們利用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論來解決這些問題的同時(shí)，也來支持我們的假說。載于股票價(jià)格的詳細(xì)資料反映的，不是免費(fèi)提供給董事會(huì)和剩余索取者的資料。</p><p>　　格羅斯曼和斯蒂格利茨（1980）表明，股票價(jià)格揭示了會(huì)計(jì)信息的不對稱。在一個(gè)相對平衡的環(huán)境里,信息的收集和處理活動(dòng)所需的成本是極為昂貴的, 同時(shí)價(jià)格也不能完全說明問題。這意味其他一般人并不能從股票價(jià)格提取到所需的基本信息。然而,有人也許會(huì)認(rèn)為,即使價(jià)格不

42、可逆性回市場所需的信息,那么直接向管理人員和主管索要這些信息。不就可以了嗎？可是事實(shí)真是這樣的嗎?研究股票價(jià)格的變化與隨后的投資決策(例如,Morck 1990)是有極為重要的關(guān)系。</p><p>　　因此即使公司的高層經(jīng)理了解整個(gè)信息并確定是準(zhǔn)確的的,這并不意味著董事會(huì)也同樣會(huì)知道這一點(diǎn),所以管理層的收入高低決定著其與董事會(huì)之間是否存在溝通的問題,此外,即使董事會(huì)知道整個(gè)信息集,它不一定將剩余的情況讓外在投資

43、者所知道, 花費(fèi)如此高昂成本監(jiān)測活動(dòng)是想試圖彌補(bǔ)信息溝通中的差距。最后,股票價(jià)格的形成是一個(gè)復(fù)雜的過程,對于基本信息將被扣留在價(jià)格之中，可能限制了其治理用途(例如,保羅,1992)。因此,利用股票價(jià)格作為會(huì)計(jì)信息的來源,有可能導(dǎo)致大量的誤差,因此要求董事會(huì)成員具有淵博的專業(yè)知識和準(zhǔn)確的專業(yè)判斷能力。</p><p>　　當(dāng)然，以上論述與我們的假設(shè)是一致的。雖然從股票價(jià)格的變化可以提供公司的價(jià)值部分的信息,但從會(huì)計(jì)

44、信息系統(tǒng)的角度去讓董事和投資者來理解企業(yè)價(jià)值的變化更加合理。股票價(jià)格并不足以是統(tǒng)計(jì)資料濃縮而成的。</p><p><b>　　反向因果關(guān)系的問題</b></p><p>　　雖然會(huì)計(jì)信息系統(tǒng)本身可能直接影響治理結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇，但我們必須承認(rèn)這一可能性，就是治理結(jié)構(gòu)也通過會(huì)計(jì)政策選擇和盈余管理活動(dòng)來影響的會(huì)計(jì)信息的屬性。解決這個(gè)問題將使用工具性變量法。但是這看起來并不是一

45、項(xiàng)富有成效的方法, 因?yàn)樗⒉幻黠@表明這是一個(gè)合理的工具。最后,雖然我們不能排除反因果關(guān)系,但我們注意到我們的及時(shí)性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是在“核心”收入的基礎(chǔ)上。當(dāng)然它可能是操縱的核心收益,將精力集中于核心的收入不包括審計(jì)師在特殊的物品上變更,特殊項(xiàng)目的停止操作, 這可以說是盈余管理活動(dòng)中可操縱應(yīng)計(jì)利潤的部分。時(shí)效性是公司相對不敏感的地帶。即使高管操縱收入顯著,也尚不清楚這將是否會(huì)影響到收入及時(shí)性。如果成熟的投資者看到通過收益管理政策, 識破公司的盈余

46、管理。那么收入時(shí)效性所起到的影響不到。如果投資者被愚弄, 那么可以增加盈余管理的時(shí)效性，因?yàn)橥顿Y者都以為當(dāng)前的收入比他們自己的更豐厚，那就真的上當(dāng)了。</p><p><b>　　總結(jié)和意義</b></p><p>　　本文探討了股權(quán)集中制度、董事會(huì)與高管薪酬激勵(lì)體制與企業(yè)的信息系統(tǒng)以及企業(yè)組織的復(fù)雜性所固有的限制是有所不同。據(jù)推測我們發(fā)現(xiàn)公司治理系統(tǒng)具有較高的股權(quán)集

47、中度,強(qiáng)大的董事、高管的股票獎(jiǎng)勵(lì),和強(qiáng)烈的名聲(即外部董事)的變化與會(huì)計(jì)信息的及時(shí)性成反比,。此外,我們還有一些證據(jù)表明，股權(quán)集中程度高和董事的股票激勵(lì)增加并不能使內(nèi)部董事比例也同樣的發(fā)生了顯著變化。本文擴(kuò)展了資本市場和管理會(huì)計(jì)文獻(xiàn)，（例如，布須曼和史密斯，2001）。但仍有許多地方需要加以修正。</p><p>　　來源：羅伯特·布西、陳奇.財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)信息與公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的關(guān)系</p>&l