金融學(xué)外文翻譯-----一個(gè)國(guó)際歷史性的比較2007美國(guó)次貸金融危機(jī)是否不同

1、<p><b>　　外文原文</b></p><p>　　Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison</p><p>　　Carmen M. Reinhart University of Maryland an

2、d the NBER and Kenneth S. Rogoff Harvard University and the NBER</p><p>　　The first major financial crisis of the 21st century involves esoteric instruments, unaware regulators, and skittish investors. It al

3、so follows a well-trodden path laid down by centuries of financial folly. This time is a problem of sub-prime mortgages, but this time is not different. In fact, there are stunning quantitative parallels across a number

4、of major crisis indicators from the standard literature on international financial crises. For example, the run-up in U.S. equity and housing price</p><p>　　The book is still open on the how the current disl

5、ocations in the United States will play out, but some precedent can be found in the aftermath of other bank-centered financial crises in industrial economies. Depending on the degree of trauma to the banking system, they

6、 can be quite severe. A severe banking crisis typically has a far deeper and more protracted effect on growth than does a severe currency crisis, if the latter occurs in isolation. The average drop in (real per capita) o

7、utput grow</p><p>　　1. Post War Bank-Centered Financial Crises: The Data</p><p>　　Our main purpose here is to make simple and straightforward comparisons of the</p><p>　　United Stat

8、es 2007 crisis with other post-war crises, employing a small piece of a much larger and longer historical data set we have constructed (see Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2008.) The extended data set catalogues banking

9、 and financial crises around the entire world dating back to 1800 (in some cases earlier). In order to focus here on data most relevant to present U.S. situation, we do not consider the plethora of emerging market crises

10、, nor industrialized country financial crises fro</p><p>　　First came the rationalizations. This time, many analysts argued, the huge run-upin U.S. housing prices was not at all a bubble, but rather justifie

11、d by financial innovation (including to sub-prime mortgages, as well as by the steady inflow of capital from Asia and petroleum exporters. The huge run-up in equity prices was similarly argued to be sustainable thanks t

12、o a surge in U.S. productivity growth a fall in risk that accompanied the “Great Moderation” in macroeconomic volatility. As for the</p><p>　　Next came the reality. In the past few month, we have seen a stri

13、king contractionin wealth, increases in risk spreads, and deterioration in market functioning. The 2007</p><p>　　United States sub-prime crisis, of course, has it roots in falling U.S. housing prices,</p&

14、gt;<p>　　which have in turn led to higher default levels particularly among less credit worthy</p><p>　　borrowers. The impact of these defaults on the financial sector has been greatly magnified due t

15、o complex bundling techniques that were thought to spread risk efficiently, but in fact have made the resulting instruments extremely nontransparent and illiquid in the face of falling house prices.</p><p>　

16、　As a benchmark for the 2007 U.S. sub-prime crisis, we draw on data from nineteen bank-centered financial crises from the post-War period. We have included postwar episodes in which an important financial institution or

17、segment of financial sector collapsed in a manner similar to that described by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). For further discussion and documentation, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).</p><p>　　These crisis ep

18、isodes include:</p><p>　　The Five Big Five Crises: Spain (1977), Norway (1987), Finland (1991), Sweden (1991) and Japan (1992), where the starting year is in parenthesis. Other Banking and Financial Crises:

19、Australia (1989), Canada (1983), Denmark (1987), France (1994), Germany (1977), Greece (1991), Iceland (1985), and Italy (1990), and New Zealand (1987), United Kingdom (1974, 1991, 1995), and United States (1984, 2007).

20、</p><p>　　The “Big Five” crises are all protracted large scale financial crises that are associated with major declines in economic performance for a protracted period. Japan (1992), of course, is the start

21、of the “l(fā)ost decade,” although the Nordic Crises and the Spanish crisis of 1977 all left deep marks on their economies as well.</p><p>　　The remaining rich country financial crises represent a broad range of

22、 lesser events. The 1984 U.S. crisis is the savings and loan crisis and, of course, the 2007 crisis is the sub-prime crisis, which we have represented as a U.S. crisis though of course it has had a severe impact on banks

23、 from Europe to Central Asia.</p><p>　　While generally all the crises centrally involved the banking system, we have included the 1995 UK crisis that resulted from the bankruptcy of Barings, which was essent

24、ially an investment bank. </p><p>　　We note that one crisis episode not encompassed by our selection criteria is the period of severe bank stress in the U.S. and Europe, especially, caused by the developing

25、country debt crisis that began in 1982. We omit it because the bank crisis was not clearly at the epi-center of problem (which had it roots in U.S. disinflation and a drop in world commodity prices). Moreover, it overlap

26、s somewhat with our dating of the thrift crisis. However, including it would not weaken our results.</p><p>　　2. Comparisons</p><p>　　We now proceed to a variety of simple comparisons between th

27、e 2007 U.S. crisis and previous episodes. Drawing on the standard literature on financial crises, we look at asset prices, growth and public debt. We begin in Figure 1 by comparing the run-up in housing prices. Period T

28、represents the year of the onset of the financial crisis. So period T-4 is four years prior to the crisis, and the graph in each case continues to T+3, except of course in the case of the U.S. 2007 crisis.1 The chart con

29、</p><p>　　Figure 2 looks at real rates of growth in equity market price indices. (For the United States, the index is the S&P 500; Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008 provide the complete listing for foreign mar

30、kets.)</p><p>　　The U.S. again looks like the archetypical crisis country, only more so. Here, however, the big five crisis countries tended to experience equity price falls earlier on. Of course, each of th

31、ese crises occurred at different points in the global productivity cycle, which may explain some of the difference. Then, too, the monetary responses differed across these episodes, with the Federal Reserve pumping in an

32、 extraordinary amount of stimulus in the early part of the most recent episode.</p><p>　　Figure 3 looks at the current account as a share of GDP, again starting four years before the crisis. Again, the Unite

33、d States looks like the typical pre-crisis country, in the capital inflows accelerate going into the crisis. However, the U.S. deficits are more severe, reaching over six percent of GDP. As already mentioned, there is a

34、large and growing literature that attempts to rationalize why it might be beneficial for the United States to a sustained current deficit. The simplest argument i</p><p>　　Real per capita GDP growth in the r

35、un-up to debt crises is illustrated in Figure 4. The United States 2007 crisis follows the same inverted V shape that characterizes the earlier episodes. Growth momentum falls going into the typical crisis, and remains

36、low for two years after. In the more severe “Big Five” cases, however, the growth shock is ever larger and more prolonged. Not encouraging for the U.S. economic outlook, the aftermath of a banking crisis tends to have a

37、protracted effect on real</p><p>　　Figure 5 looks at public debt as a share of GDP. Rising public debt is a near universal precursor of other post-war crises, not least the 1984 U.S. crisis. Nevertheless, a

38、lthough public debt is rising prior to the 2007 U.S. crisis, it is rising notably more slowly than in the average of the other 18 episodes, and much more slowly than the Big Five. This shallow path of U.S. public debt al

39、so makes it clear that the large current account deficits shown earlier owe to factors other than just gover</p><p>　　The correlations in these graphs are not necessarily causal, but in combination neverthel

40、ess suggest that if the United States does not experience a significant and protracted growth slowdown, it should either be considered very lucky or even more “special” that most optimistic theories suggest. Indeed, giv

41、en the severity of most crisis indicators in the run-up to its 2007 financial crisis, the United States should consider itself fortunate if it can have post-crisis trajectory parallel to the </p><p>　　3. Con

42、clusions</p><p>　　Tolstoy famously begins his classic novel Anna Karenina with the line “Every happy family is alike, but every unhappy family is unhappy in their own way.” While each financial crisis no dou

43、bt has its own distinctions, there are also striking similarities, in the run-up of asset prices, in debt accumulation, in growth patterns, and in current account deficits. The majority of historical crises are preceded

44、by financial liberalization, as documented in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). While in the ca</p><p>　　Perhaps the United States will prove a different kind of happy family. Despite</p><p>　　many

45、superficial similarities to a typical crisis country, it may yet suffer a growth lapse comparable only to the mildest cases. Perhaps this time will be different as so many argue. Whatever the long-term outcome, the quant

46、itative parallels to earlier post-war industrialized-country financial crises, at least in the pre-crisis period, is worthy of note. Of course, inflation is lower and better anchored today worldwide, and this may prove a

47、n important mitigating factor.</p><p>　　One last parallel deserves mention. During the 1970s, the U.S. banking system stood as an intermediary between oil-exporter surpluses and emerging market borrowers in

48、Latin America and elsewhere. While much praised at the time, 1970s petro-dollar recycling ultimately led to the 1980s debt crisis, which in turn placed enormous strain on money center banks.3 It is true that this time, a

49、 great deal of petro-dollars are again flowing into the United States, but many emerging markets have been runnin</p><p><b>　　翻譯文章</b></p><p>　　一個(gè)國(guó)際歷史性的比較：2007美國(guó)次貸金融危機(jī)是否不同</p>

50、<p>　　卡門(mén)萊因哈特米馬里蘭大學(xué)和國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)研究局和哈佛大學(xué)肯尼斯羅格夫?qū)W和國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)研究局</p><p>　　21世紀(jì)的第一次重大金融危機(jī)涉及深?yuàn)W的手段，不易察覺(jué)的調(diào)整機(jī)構(gòu)和活躍的投資者。它也良好地遵循了百年來(lái)金融危機(jī)的鬧劇規(guī)律。這一次我們將面臨抵押貸款的問(wèn)題,但與之前相比，也并無(wú)什么差異。事實(shí)上，在定量指標(biāo)上，很大一批危機(jī)指標(biāo)都和國(guó)際金融危機(jī)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)文獻(xiàn)相吻合。例如，卡明斯基和卡門(mén)萊因哈特米（19

51、99年）通過(guò)密切跟蹤二戰(zhàn)后十九次主要工業(yè)國(guó)家的銀行危機(jī)研究，發(fā)現(xiàn)美國(guó)股票上漲和住房?jī)r(jià)格,是引起經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)中國(guó)家大量資本流入的最好指標(biāo)。因此，也就是倒V形實(shí)際增長(zhǎng)在未來(lái)數(shù)年之前的危機(jī)。盡管2000年代初期，人們廣泛關(guān)注減稅國(guó)家的債務(wù)情況，但美國(guó)的公共債務(wù)卻低于其他經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)波及的國(guó)家。與此相反，美國(guó)的赤字格局是明顯惡化。 </p><p>　　該書(shū)還對(duì)如何改變美國(guó)目前混亂的情況做深入的研究，但一些先例可在其他銀行的善后

52、事宜中找到。根據(jù)銀行系統(tǒng)不同程度的損傷，工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體的金融危機(jī)的相當(dāng)嚴(yán)重。較之發(fā)生在隔離狀態(tài)下的貨幣危機(jī)，一次嚴(yán)重的銀行危機(jī)通常具有更深遠(yuǎn)，更持久影響。平均降低產(chǎn)出的增長(zhǎng)（人均）超過(guò)百分之二時(shí)通常需要2年時(shí)間才能恢復(fù)到原有趨勢(shì)。五個(gè)最災(zāi)難性的案例（其中包括發(fā)作在瑞典，芬蘭，日本，挪威，西班牙）， 年產(chǎn)量從高峰下降到低谷，但三年后，其增長(zhǎng)率超過(guò)百分之五，并保持良好的勢(shì)頭。</p><p>　　1.戰(zhàn)后銀行經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)數(shù)據(jù)

53、：</p><p>　　我們的主要目的是將美國(guó)2007年危機(jī)與其他戰(zhàn)后危機(jī)做簡(jiǎn)單的比較，使用一小塊更大和較長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)的歷史數(shù)據(jù)集延長(zhǎng)數(shù)據(jù)，我們已經(jīng)構(gòu)建（見(jiàn)萊因哈特和肯尼斯學(xué) 羅格夫，2008。）危機(jī)圍繞設(shè)定的目錄銀行和金融擴(kuò)展數(shù)據(jù)，整個(gè)世界可以追溯到1800年（在某些情況下更早）。為了集中這些數(shù)據(jù)，目前在美國(guó)的相關(guān)情況下，我們不過(guò)多地考慮新興市場(chǎng)危機(jī)，也不涉及十九世紀(jì)的工業(yè)化國(guó)家或金融危機(jī)大蕭條。 不過(guò)，驚人的是“這一

54、次是不同的”綜合癥已經(jīng)被重復(fù)。 </p><p>　　首先是合理化。這一次，許多分析師認(rèn)為，不是所有的美國(guó)房?jī)r(jià)的龐大升值都是泡沫經(jīng)濟(jì)，而是金融創(chuàng)新的理由（包括次級(jí)抵押貸款，以及來(lái)自亞洲的穩(wěn)定資金流入 和石油出口國(guó)。股票價(jià)格的巨大運(yùn)行也同樣被認(rèn)為伴隨持續(xù)激增得益于美國(guó)生產(chǎn)率增長(zhǎng)下降的風(fēng)險(xiǎn) 下“大穩(wěn)定”的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)波動(dòng)。至于非凡串聯(lián)的美國(guó)項(xiàng)目赤字過(guò)于龐大，目前大約吸收世界上所有賬戶盈余的三分之二。受到全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的新元素的

55、影響，許多分析家認(rèn)為，這些也可能是合理的。由于經(jīng)濟(jì)與科技創(chuàng)新熱潮的靈活結(jié)合，美國(guó)可望在未來(lái)的幾十年里享受卓越生產(chǎn)力的不斷增長(zhǎng)，而與外國(guó)人相比，優(yōu)越的美國(guó)人更能發(fā)現(xiàn)物理和經(jīng)濟(jì)投資所能帶來(lái)的高回報(bào)。</p><p>　　接下來(lái)是現(xiàn)實(shí)。在過(guò)去數(shù)月，我們已經(jīng)看到了顯著的財(cái)富收縮和增加的傳播風(fēng)險(xiǎn)還有市場(chǎng)運(yùn)作的惡化。2007年，美國(guó)次貸危機(jī)，當(dāng)然受美國(guó)房?jī)r(jià)下跌的影響， 這反過(guò)來(lái)又導(dǎo)致較高水平信貸違約，特別是信譽(yù)不高的借款人。

56、這些機(jī)構(gòu)的影響金融領(lǐng)域的拖欠率已經(jīng)大大放大捆綁技術(shù)，被認(rèn)為分散風(fēng)險(xiǎn)有效投資,但實(shí)際上其取得的結(jié)果非常不透明，技術(shù)流動(dòng)性不足，且不易面對(duì)下跌的房產(chǎn)價(jià)格。 </p><p>　　作為2007年美國(guó)次貸危機(jī)的基準(zhǔn)，我們繪制了一戰(zhàn)后十九家銀行危機(jī)的數(shù)據(jù)圖。我們已經(jīng)涉及戰(zhàn)后波及點(diǎn)，其中一些重要的金融機(jī)構(gòu)或金融部門(mén)的倒塌類(lèi)似于卡明斯基和萊因哈特在1999年進(jìn)一步討論的文件（見(jiàn)Reinhart和Rogoff，2008）。<

57、;/p><p><b>　　這些危機(jī)事件包括：</b></p><p>　　“五大”的危機(jī)：西班牙（1977），挪威（1987年），芬蘭（1991），瑞典（1991年）和日本（1992年），其中今年開(kāi)始在括號(hào)。其他銀行和金融危機(jī)：澳大利亞（1989年），加拿大（1983年），丹麥（1987年），法國(guó)（1994年），德國(guó)（1977年），希臘（1991年），冰島（1985年）

58、，意大利（1990年）和新西蘭（1987年），英國(guó)（1974年，1991年，1995年），美國(guó)（1984年，2007年）。</p><p>　　“五大”的危機(jī)，都是大規(guī)模的曠日持久的金融危機(jī)，表現(xiàn)在在較長(zhǎng)的一段時(shí)間內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)大幅下降。雖然北歐和西班牙1977年的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)也留下了深刻的印記，但日本1992年的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)才是“失去的十年”的開(kāi)始。</p><p>　　其余的富裕國(guó)家的金融危機(jī)代表了廣

59、泛范圍內(nèi)的小事件。1984年美國(guó)的危機(jī)是儲(chǔ)蓄和貸款危機(jī)，當(dāng)然，2007年危機(jī)是次貸危機(jī)，一開(kāi)始我們錯(cuò)誤地只把它當(dāng)成美國(guó)的危機(jī)，但它卻波及了整個(gè)歐洲還有中亞。</p><p>　　雖然一般危機(jī)都集中在銀行系統(tǒng)，1995年英國(guó)的危機(jī)是導(dǎo)致巴林銀行（本質(zhì)上是一個(gè)投資銀行）的破產(chǎn)的主要原因。</p><p>　　我們注意到，危機(jī)事件的選擇標(biāo)準(zhǔn)不涵蓋美國(guó)和歐洲的銀行壓力，特別是1982年發(fā)展中國(guó)家造

60、成的國(guó)家的債務(wù)危機(jī)年。我們忽略它，因?yàn)殂y行危機(jī)并不是問(wèn)題的中心，它植根于通貨緊縮和世界商品價(jià)格下降。此外,它有點(diǎn)重疊于我們所說(shuō)的節(jié)儉危機(jī)。</p><p><b>　　2.比較</b></p><p>　　我們現(xiàn)在進(jìn)行的2007年美國(guó)的金融危機(jī)和以往的各種事件的簡(jiǎn)單比較。在金融危機(jī)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)文獻(xiàn)繪圖中，我們來(lái)看看資產(chǎn)和公共債務(wù)的價(jià)格增長(zhǎng)。我們開(kāi)始通過(guò)比較圖1進(jìn)行房屋價(jià)格上

61、漲的比較。T期間代表了金融危機(jī)爆發(fā)的一年。所以周期T - 4是前四年的危機(jī)，并在每一種情況下繼續(xù)為T(mén) +3期間，在美國(guó)2007年crisis.1圖表案件個(gè)案研究文獻(xiàn)證實(shí)，顯示了金融危機(jī)時(shí)期的房?jī)r(jià)，特別是在 “五大”危機(jī)的嚴(yán)重影響的情況下極為明顯。在美國(guó)住房?jī)r(jià)格中甚至有進(jìn)一步上升的情形。</p><p>　　圖2著眼于市場(chǎng)的股票價(jià)格指數(shù)增長(zhǎng)的實(shí)際利率。 （對(duì)于美國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)，該指數(shù)是標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500;萊因哈特和Reinha

62、rt，2008年國(guó)外市場(chǎng)提供完整的清單。）</p><p>　　美國(guó)又看起來(lái)更加像如此原型危機(jī)的國(guó)家。在這里，從五個(gè)發(fā)生危機(jī)的國(guó)家的經(jīng)驗(yàn)來(lái)看，跟之前相比股票價(jià)格趨于下跌。當(dāng)然，這些危機(jī)發(fā)生在每一個(gè)全球生產(chǎn)力的周期，這也許可以解釋一些共同點(diǎn)。然后，這也是有差異的，在這些事件與美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)在最近的事件的初期，貨幣的反應(yīng)就說(shuō)明了這一切。</p><p><b>　　朗讀</b>&

63、lt;/p><p>　　Měiguó yòu kàn qǐlái xiàng yuánxíng wéijī de guójiā, zhǐyǒu gèng rúcǐ. Zài zhèlǐ,Ránér, cóng dà wǔ gè fāshē

64、ng wéijī de guójiā de jīngyàn gǔpiào jiàgé qū yú xiàdié jiào zǎo qián. Dāngrán, zhèxiē wéijī fāshēng zài měi yīgè zài quánqiú

65、 shēngchǎnlì de zhōuqí, zhè yěxǔ kěyǐ jiěshì yīxiē bùtóng de chāyì diǎn. Ránhòu, yěyǒu chāyì, zài zhèxiē shìjiàn yǔ měiliánchǔ zài cìjī

66、 fēifán de chōushuǐ liàng zài zuìjìn de shìjiàn chūqí, huòbì de fǎnyìng.</p><p>　　字典 - 查看字典詳細(xì)內(nèi)容</p><p>　　Tú 2 zhuóyǎn yú sh&

67、#236;chǎng de gǔpiào jiàgé zhǐshù zēngzhǎng de shíjì lìlǜ. (Duìyú měiguó lái shuō, gāi zhǐshù shì biāozhǔn pǔěr 500; lái yīn hā tè hé Reinha

68、rt,2008 nián guówài shìchǎng tígōng wánzhěng de qīngdān.)</p><p>　　字典 - 查看字典詳細(xì)內(nèi)容</p><p><b>　　朗讀</b></p><p>　　Wǒmen xiànzài jì

69、;nxíng de 2007 nián měiguó zhī jiān de wéijī hé yǐwǎng de gè zhǒng shìjiàn de jiǎndān bǐjiào. Zài jīnróng wéijī de biāozhǔn wénxiàn huìtú, w

70、ǒmen lái kàn kàn zīchǎn jiàgé, zēngzhǎng hé gōnggòng zhàiwù. Wǒmen kāishǐ tōngguò bǐjiào tú 1 yùnxíng zài fángwū jiàgé shàngz

71、hǎng. Qíjiān T dàibiǎo le jīnróng wéijī bàofā de yī nián. Suǒyǐ zhōuqí T - 4 shì qián sì nián de wéijī, bìng zài měi yī zhǒng qíngkuàng xi&#

72、224; jìxù wèi T +3 tú chú dāngrán, zài měiguó 2007 nián crisis.1 Túbiǎo ànjiàn gèàn y</p><p>　　字典 - 查看字典詳細(xì)內(nèi)容</p><p>　　從圖3中看出

73、，作為一個(gè)經(jīng)常賬戶占GDP的份額，在危機(jī)開(kāi)始的四年之前。美國(guó)看起來(lái)像典型的危機(jī)前的國(guó)家，其資本流入加速了沒(méi)過(guò)進(jìn)入危機(jī)時(shí)代。然而，美國(guó)的赤字是如此的嚴(yán)重，甚至超過(guò)國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的百分之六之遠(yuǎn)。如前所述，有一個(gè)龐大而越來(lái)越多的文獻(xiàn)資料庫(kù)，試圖找出各種理由，將美國(guó)當(dāng)前的持續(xù)赤字進(jìn)行合理化。最簡(jiǎn)單的說(shuō)法是，隨著全球貿(mào)易和金融的全球化支持較大的經(jīng)常賬戶失衡（Obstfeld和Rogoff，2001）。對(duì)于美國(guó)經(jīng)常的巨額赤字的各種理由會(huì)更放心，如果沒(méi)

74、有美國(guó)的赤字幾乎兩倍于危機(jī)前的早期發(fā)作的平均水平，金融危機(jī)也不會(huì)那么快發(fā)生。</p><p>　　人均國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值增長(zhǎng)實(shí)際運(yùn)行中的后續(xù)債務(wù)危機(jī)，如圖4所示。美國(guó)2007年危機(jī)遵循相同的倒V形為特征的早期事件。增長(zhǎng)勢(shì)頭將持續(xù)下降的典型危機(jī)，兩年后仍然偏低。在較嚴(yán)重的“五大”的情況中，增長(zhǎng)沖擊是越來(lái)越大，并且時(shí)間在不斷的延長(zhǎng)。不為美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)前景令人鼓舞，但銀行危機(jī)之后往往有一個(gè)長(zhǎng)期的影響實(shí)際增長(zhǎng)的過(guò)程。</p&g

75、t;<p>　　圖5看起來(lái)占GDP的比例在公共債務(wù)上比較大。公共債務(wù)增加是一個(gè)幾乎普遍的情況，它預(yù)示著金融危機(jī)的開(kāi)始，是危機(jī)的前兆，尤其是1984年美國(guó)的危機(jī)。然而，盡管公共債務(wù)上升到2007年之前，美國(guó)的危機(jī)，它正在崛起，但是比所有危機(jī)的平均水滿，甚至遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)慢于所有的五大危機(jī)。這個(gè)現(xiàn)象在美國(guó)的公共債務(wù)淺路徑也有清楚地表明，龐大的經(jīng)常帳赤字前面顯示負(fù)的因素不僅僅是政府的責(zé)任，其他的因素也不可忽視。</p>&l

76、t;p>　　而這些圖的相關(guān)性并不一定是因果關(guān)系，但在組合起來(lái)可以看出它給我們的建議，如果美國(guó)不發(fā)生重大和長(zhǎng)期的增長(zhǎng)放緩，它要么被認(rèn)為是非常幸運(yùn)的，甚至更多的“特殊”是最樂(lè)觀的理論認(rèn)為。事實(shí)上，在金融危機(jī)的最嚴(yán)重的程度指標(biāo)，在運(yùn)行到2007年的金融危機(jī)，美國(guó)應(yīng)該考慮它本身的好日子，如果能有危機(jī)后的軌跡平行設(shè)置在比較溫和的銀行危機(jī)，相對(duì)于更大的增長(zhǎng)停頓的嚴(yán)重財(cái)政危機(jī)期間，要參考西班牙，日本，瑞典，挪威和芬蘭的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，來(lái)作出最合理的決策。

77、</p><p><b>　　3.結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　托爾斯泰在他的經(jīng)典小說(shuō)安娜卡列尼娜中說(shuō)到“每一個(gè)幸福的家庭是一樣的，但每個(gè)不幸的家庭都有他們自己的不幸。”雖然毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)，每一個(gè)金融危機(jī)有其自身的區(qū)別，也有驚人的相似之處，在運(yùn)行的資產(chǎn)價(jià)格上漲，債務(wù)積累，以及增長(zhǎng)模式，并有經(jīng)常帳赤字。歷史的危機(jī)大多是在金融自由化之前，如卡明斯基和Reinhart（199

78、9）記載。而在美國(guó)的情況下，一直沒(méi)有顯示出的法律上的自由化，但確實(shí)事實(shí)上是自由化的。新的管制，或?qū)捤傻谋O(jiān)管，金融實(shí)體來(lái)發(fā)揮在金融體系中的作用越來(lái)越大，無(wú)疑對(duì)提高某些類(lèi)型的穩(wěn)定性沖擊，但可能增加對(duì)他人的安全漏洞。</p><p>　　也許美國(guó)會(huì)成為一個(gè)不同的幸福家庭。盡管一個(gè)典型的危機(jī)，國(guó)內(nèi)許多表面上否相似，它可能還受失誤相比只增長(zhǎng)了最溫和的案件。也許這次會(huì)是不一樣的，因?yàn)檫@么多的爭(zhēng)論都強(qiáng)調(diào)了。無(wú)論長(zhǎng)期結(jié)果，提供了

79、量化的相似之處早期戰(zhàn)后工業(yè)國(guó)的金融危機(jī)，至少在危機(jī)前的時(shí)期，是值得注意的。當(dāng)然，通貨膨脹較低，當(dāng)今世界上更好地錨，就是能證明這是一個(gè)重要的緩和因素。 值得一提的最后一點(diǎn)。 在20世紀(jì)70年代，美國(guó)的銀行體系作為一站之間的石油出口國(guó)的盈余，是拉丁美洲和其他地區(qū)的新興市場(chǎng)借款人的中介。雖然當(dāng)時(shí)很多好評(píng)，但是20世紀(jì)70年代石油美元循環(huán)，最終還是導(dǎo)致了1980年代的債務(wù)危機(jī)，而這又放在貨幣中心銀行，造成巨大負(fù)擔(dān)，這是事實(shí)，這一次的石油