私募股權(quán)基金投資的真正影響證據(jù)來自創(chuàng)新企業(yè)【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　On The Real Effects of Private Equity Investment: Evidence from New Business Creation</p><p>　　Material So

2、urce: On The Real Effects of Private Equity Investment: Evidence from New Business Creation, Working Paper Series of European Central Bank, No 1078, august 2009</p><p>　　Author: Alexander Popov & Peter R

3、oosenboom</p><p><b>　　Abstract</b></p><p>　　Using a comprehensive database of European firms, we study how private equity affects the rate of firm entry. We find that private equity

4、investment benefits new business incorporation, especially in industries with naturally higher entry rates and R&D intensity. A two standard deviation increase in private equity investment explains as much as 5.5% of

5、 the variation in entry between high-entry and low-entry industries. We address endogeneity by exploiting data on laws that regulate private equit</p><p>　　Keywords: private equity, venture capital, firm ent

6、ry</p><p>　　JEL Classification: G24, L26, M13</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　It is generally accepted that access to credit is an important determinant of firm entry and growth (Raj

7、an and Zingales (1998)). However, banks are often reluctant to finance small new firms because of high uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs (Beck et al. (2005)). Private equity investors are specialized t

8、o overcome these problems through the use of staged financing, private contracting, and active monitoring (Hellmann (1998); Gompers and Lerner (1999, 2001a); Kaplan and Strombe</p><p>　　We first study if the

9、 volume of private equity investment, aggregated as well as by stage distribution, affects the extent of incorporation, using data on 1998-1999. We aim at identification by following the difference-in-differences methodo

10、logy first introduced by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and focus on cross-country cross-industry interaction effects. In essence, we study whether the fraction of new incorporation is higher in an industry with higher "

11、natural" entry rates when there is more priv</p><p>　　Alternative measures of propensity to entry</p><p>　　We account for the possibility that our measure of entry is not the best proxy of

12、propensity to entry. Prior literature (e.g. Gerotski (1995)) has suggested that exit rates are a good proxy for propensity to entry because higher firm creation is necessarily associated with higher firm destruction. We

13、use the Dun and Bradsteet data to calculate the average share of exiting firms for 1998-1999, per 2-digit industry. US industry exit rates turn out to be as good proxies for propensity to entry as U</p><p>　

14、　We next make use of the fact that new firms are generally small because entry by larger firms may reflect M&A activity. As much as it applies to the rest of the world, it should also apply to our benchmark US case.

15、We therefore replace the original proxy for "natural" entry with a measure of the average industry entry rates over 1998-1999 for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), or firms with less than 250 workers. When w

16、e apply that methodology, the estimate of it remains positive, implying rel</p><p>　　Private equity and entry: main results</p><p>　　We present the basic OLS regression when private equity inves

17、tment (as reported by EVCA) is aggregated by country of destination. The coefficient on the interaction term is significantly positive, implying that relative entry into industries with naturally higher entry is dispropo

18、rtionately higher in countries with large levels of private equity investment, normalized by GDP. What the coefficient means numerically is the following: let’s take a high entry-industry and a low-entry industry, and l&

19、lt;/p><p>　　This simple empirical test shows that first, private equity investment has a real effect through firm creation. Second, the magnitude of increasing private equity investment by two standard deviatio

20、ns in our 16-country sample is about half of the effect of lowering entry barriers by two standard deviations in the 24-country sample used by Klapper et al. (2006). In later tests, we perform horse race regressions to c

21、ompare the effect of private equity against the effect of barriers to entry, prope</p><p>　　Private equity and entry: contemporaneous vs. long-term effect</p><p>　　There are a number of robustne

22、ss checks we need to perform on our measure of private equity. First, we have only regressed so far new business entry in 1998-1999 on the contemporaneous measure of private equity investment. Alternatively, we could do

23、so using an average measure of private equity investment over several years back. Such an approach would make sure that the estimated effects are not biased by a temporary idiosyncratic shock to private equity investment

24、. It is also conceivable to hy</p><p>　　Conclusion</p><p>　　This paper uses a cross-industry cross-country estimation technique in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998) to identify the impact

25、of private equity and venture capital investment in general and start-up finance in particular on entrepreneurship. We use two waves of the Amadeus database, which includes data on about three million firms all across Eu

26、rope: a sample for the years 1998-1999 in the main empirical analysis, and a sample from 2006-2007 for robustness purposes. The Amadeus represents</p><p>　　We find that private equity investment has a benefi

27、cial effect on entry, which is relatively higher for industries which naturally have higher entry rates and are more R&D intensive. The effect remains strong once we exclude investment allocated to buy-outs, suggesti

28、ng that early stage finance is important in this respect. Our results hold both in 1998-1999 and 2006-2007, when we account for industry size, and when we exclude the transition economies. The results stay unchanged afte

29、r we address </p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　私募股權(quán)基金投資的真正影響：證據(jù)來自創(chuàng)新企業(yè)</p><p>　　資料來源：私募股權(quán)基金投資的真正影響：來自創(chuàng)新企業(yè)的證據(jù)，歐洲中心銀行工作論文系列，2009年8月，第1078期 </p><p>　　作者：亞歷山大·波波

30、夫，彼得·盧斯布恩</p><p><b>　　摘 要</b></p><p>　　通過使用歐洲市場的綜合數(shù)據(jù)庫，我們來研究私募股權(quán)基金如何影響企業(yè)的市場進(jìn)入率。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)私募股權(quán)基金投資對那些創(chuàng)新企業(yè)有利，尤其是對那些天生有較高市場進(jìn)入率的產(chǎn)業(yè)和有較高研究開發(fā)強度的高新行業(yè)。一兩個私募股權(quán)基金投資的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)偏差的上升，是因為在高市場進(jìn)入率和低市場進(jìn)入率產(chǎn)業(yè)之間

31、存在著5.5%的變化。我們通過利用對管理養(yǎng)老金的私募股權(quán)投資在法律上的數(shù)據(jù)提出了內(nèi)生性問題。我們的研究結(jié)果在獲得信貸，知識產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)和勞動法規(guī)時適用。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞：私募股權(quán)基金，風(fēng)險資本，進(jìn)入市場</p><p>　　JEL分類：G24，L26，M13</p><p><b>　　引言</b></p><p&g

32、t;　　人們普遍接受，獲得信貸是企業(yè)進(jìn)入市場和發(fā)展的重要決定因素（拉詹和津蓋爾（1998））。然而，銀行往往因為小型新企業(yè)的高度不確定性，信息不對稱和代理成本不愿為其提供資金（貝克等（2005））。私募股權(quán)投資者是通過分階段融資，私人承包，并積極監(jiān)測來專門克服這些問題（郝爾曼（1998）;龔帕斯和萊納（1999，2001）; 卡普蘭和斯特龍伯格（2001）），因此相對于向銀行融資，科技公司更易從私募股權(quán)基金獲得早期階段的融資。在本文中，

33、我們研究了在歐洲的那些曾經(jīng)未開發(fā)的私募股權(quán)基金創(chuàng)造的新業(yè)務(wù)。高度相關(guān)的政策制定者意識到一個問題，風(fēng)險資本作為一個重要貢獻(xiàn)者，它在美國企業(yè)的高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)崛起中起著領(lǐng)導(dǎo)作用（龔帕斯和萊納（2001b））。為了跟這一成功抗衡，歐洲聯(lián)盟刺激風(fēng)險資本，試圖為歐洲的企業(yè)家搭建一個溫床（阿爾恩特（1999）; 吉爾森（2003））。本文提出了風(fēng)險投資的觀念并對培養(yǎng)新企業(yè)進(jìn)行了實驗。我們的研究做出了兩項重要貢獻(xiàn)。首先，雖然有大量實證文獻(xiàn)是從進(jìn)入市場的效

34、果來研究，但它絕大多數(shù)研究影響著商業(yè)銀行的發(fā)展，并有一定成果。彼得森和拉詹（1995）表明，金融自由化傷害了一些小型新企業(yè)，因為</p><p>　　我們首先研究私募股權(quán)基金投資的投資量，合計或階段分配，以及合并程度帶來的影響，使用的是1998至1999年的數(shù)據(jù)。我們的目標(biāo)是按照不同的方法鑒定最早由拉詹和津蓋爾（1998）提出并專注于跨國跨產(chǎn)業(yè)的互動效應(yīng)。事實上，我們研究的是當(dāng)有更多私募股權(quán)基金流入該國時，是否存

35、在著小部分新企業(yè)擁有較高的“固有的”市場進(jìn)入率。這種方法使我們能通過對照各國商業(yè)環(huán)境下的企業(yè)利益等特征，從而避免傳統(tǒng)研究中出現(xiàn)的遺漏變量的問題。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，私募股權(quán)基金的投資量較大的企業(yè)的市場進(jìn)入率明顯較高，特別是對小企業(yè)適用。這同樣適用于更多高新技術(shù)行業(yè)。</p><p>　　傾向入市的選擇性措施</p><p>　　我們可能考慮到對于入市傾向我們的入市措施是不是最好的。在此之前（例如格里

36、特茲（1995））表明，對于傾向入市，退出率是一個好指標(biāo)，因為較高的企業(yè)創(chuàng)造一定伴隨著較高的企業(yè)破壞。我們使用鄧恩和布拉德斯特里特的數(shù)據(jù)來計算1998-1999年每兩個產(chǎn)業(yè)中退出企業(yè)的平均股份。美國產(chǎn)業(yè)的退出率被證明是傾向入市的良好指標(biāo)，從這種意義上講，對于有較高退出率的產(chǎn)業(yè)，私募股權(quán)投資基金的影響相對較高，這重復(fù)了以前的意見。然而，該結(jié)果只對少于10個員工的新企業(yè)有效。</p><p>　　由于市場進(jìn)入可能反映

37、出大企業(yè)的并購活動，因此下一步我們將運用一個事實：新企業(yè)通常都很小。而這個也同樣適用于世界各地，它也應(yīng)該適用于我們美國的情況。因此我們將固有的市場進(jìn)入率取代了原有的指標(biāo)，并為1998-1999年的中小企業(yè)或是為少于250名員工的企業(yè)的平均市場進(jìn)入率采取措施。當(dāng)我們運用這些方法以保證得到積極評價的時候，這就意味著是由于私募股權(quán)基金對其產(chǎn)業(yè)的投資才導(dǎo)致美國中小企業(yè)有較高的市場進(jìn)入率。這些概算是有意義的。這個結(jié)果在不同規(guī)模的新公司中有效。&l

38、t;/p><p>　　私募股權(quán)基金和市場進(jìn)入：主要的結(jié)果</p><p>　　某些指定國家在對私募股權(quán)基金的投資量（EVCA報告）進(jìn)行匯總時，提出了基本OLS回歸。它的系數(shù)是顯著的，這意味著在私募股權(quán)基金投資水平較大的國家中企業(yè)的市場進(jìn)入率相對較高。系數(shù)是指什么數(shù)值：我們拿一個市場進(jìn)入率高的產(chǎn)業(yè)和一個市場進(jìn)入率低的產(chǎn)業(yè)，比較兩個國家在私募股權(quán)基金投資上的數(shù)值高低。兩個國家是匈牙利（低）和丹麥（

39、高），兩者的數(shù)值差是0.859。系數(shù)表明在高市場進(jìn)入率的產(chǎn)業(yè)和低市場進(jìn)入率的產(chǎn)業(yè)比較中，市場進(jìn)入率有區(qū)別，丹麥比匈牙利高0.44個百分比。這樣，其他一切都平等，一個企業(yè)家在市場進(jìn)入率高的產(chǎn)業(yè)中經(jīng)營一家企業(yè)和在市場進(jìn)入率低的產(chǎn)業(yè)中經(jīng)營一家企業(yè)進(jìn)行比較，在丹麥經(jīng)營比在匈牙利經(jīng)營來的好。</p><p>　　簡單的實證檢驗表明，私募股權(quán)基金投資對于企業(yè)的創(chuàng)新有實際效果。在以后的檢驗中，我們執(zhí)行回歸來比較分析私募股權(quán)基金

40、在產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)，稅收負(fù)擔(dān)和其他方面帶來的影響，總之，任何情況下，在跨國跨業(yè)的市場進(jìn)入率的變化上，私募股權(quán)基金都是一個重要的預(yù)測家。</p><p>　　私募股權(quán)基金和市場進(jìn)入：同期影響和長期影響</p><p>　　有許多穩(wěn)定性調(diào)查顯示，我們需要執(zhí)行私募股權(quán)基金投資的相關(guān)措施。首先，我們先觀察1998-1999年中進(jìn)行私募股權(quán)基金投資的新企業(yè)的市場進(jìn)入情況。另外，我們可以利用過去幾年的私募股權(quán)

41、基金投資情況進(jìn)行平均數(shù)的測量。這個方法能確保估計的結(jié)果不是片面的?？梢韵氲降氖?，新的行業(yè)進(jìn)入者更關(guān)注的是私募股權(quán)基金產(chǎn)業(yè)的長期發(fā)展?fàn)顟B(tài)而不是當(dāng)前的投資，因為長期投資模式往往能傳達(dá)更多關(guān)于未來私募股權(quán)基金的資金可用性的信息。例如，商業(yè)登記費用和初始資金往往是用自己的基金或家庭，朋友的資金支持。因此，經(jīng)營一家企業(yè)并在以后通過風(fēng)險資本融資或擴(kuò)張資金，是通過長期的私募股權(quán)基金投資而不是當(dāng)前市場狀況下的短暫投資。</p><p

42、><b>　　結(jié) 論</b></p><p>　　本文運用這種估計操作法來顯現(xiàn)出私募股權(quán)基金和風(fēng)險資本投資在一般情況和啟動階段帶來的影響，特別是對一個企業(yè)家的影響。我們使用的數(shù)據(jù)庫，里面包括了來自歐洲的300萬個企業(yè)的數(shù)據(jù)：是1998-1999年主要的實證分析的一個樣本。該數(shù)據(jù)代表了這些時期歐洲企業(yè)中最大的數(shù)據(jù)庫，特別有利的是其中包含著中小企業(yè)和私募股權(quán)投資的上市公司等大量數(shù)據(jù)。它包

43、括的數(shù)據(jù)還有企業(yè)的年齡等。</p><p>　　我們發(fā)現(xiàn)私募股權(quán)基金投資在市場進(jìn)入方面存在有益的影響，即本身就有較高市場進(jìn)入率的行業(yè)和那些高新技術(shù)企業(yè)的市場進(jìn)入率會相對高一點。早期階段的融資是重要的。在我們提出內(nèi)生性問題后結(jié)果保持不變，國家嚴(yán)厲整頓并指導(dǎo)投資歐洲養(yǎng)老基金，這是私募股權(quán)基金投資的一個政府機(jī)構(gòu)。我們表明，通過一系列的鼓勵措施，私募股權(quán)基金投資似乎降低了啟動資金的成本，并引起了更高的行業(yè)動態(tài)。</