[雙語翻譯]安全工程外文翻譯--事故調(diào)查，風險分析和安全管理之間的關系（英文）

1、Journal of Hazardous Materials 111 (2004) 13–19Relationships between accident investigations, risk analysis, and safety managementLars Harms-Ringdahl a,b,?a Royal Institute of Technology, Industrial Economics and Managem

2、ent, Stockholm, Sweden b Institute for Risk Management and Safety Analysis, Stockholm, SwedenAvailable online 15 April 2004AbstractSeveral different approaches to achieve safety are in common use, and examples are accide

3、nt investigations (AI), risk analysis (RA), and safety management systems (SMS). The meaning of these concepts and their practical applications vary quite a lot, which might cause confusion. A summary of definitions is p

4、resented. A general comparison is made of application areas and methodology. A proposal is made how to indicate parameters of variation. At one end of the scale there are organisations, which are highly organised in resp

5、ect to safety. At the other end are small companies with informal safety routines. Although the three concepts differ in a number of respects, there are many links between them which is illustrated in a model. A number o

6、f relations have been described mainly concerned with more advanced organisations. Behind the practical safety work, there are varying sets of more or less explicit explanations and theories on safety and accident causat

7、ion. Depending on the theory applied, the relations between approaches can be more or less clear and essential. © 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V.Keywords: Risk analysis; Safety; Accident; Accident investigation; Saf

8、ety management1. IntroductionSafety is a prominent feature in complex systems, and there is an abundance of different traditions how to deal with this. Obviously there is a terminology which differs quite a lot. Risk ana

9、lysis would be a completely different thing for a toxicologist or a bank official. Also among the technological disciplines the concepts vary much, even if you limit the discussion to accidents. However, it is not only t

10、echnical terms that might differ, there are also underlying concepts and theories, as well as various methods for analysis and investigations. The aim of this paper is to compare and discuss differ- ent definitions and c

11、oncepts related to accident investiga- tions (AI), risk analysis (RA), and safety management (SM). The intention is to consider high-risk as well as low-risk aspects.? Tel.: +46-8-643-2080; fax: +46-8-643-6340. E-mail ad

12、dress: lars.harms-ringdahl@indek.kth.se (L. Harms-Ringdahl).2. Definitions2.1. GeneralAt first, it appears easy to find a set of general def- initions that could work for most occasions. However, it quickly emerges quite

13、 a lot of competing definitions of terms. One essential source for technically oriented terms is an IEC-standard [1], which has given a set of related terms. However, this does not include all aspects, and there are al-

14、ternatives to the viewpoints in the standard. Just a small selection of the definitions in the safety area will be given here. However, it should be noted that defini- tions are formulated in different ways. They could:?

15、 give a simple statement of the meaning of a term, and/ or ? sum up all elements which usually is included in practical use, and/or ? include the good characteristics aiming at perfect results.The first type of definitio

16、ns might be classified as descrip- tive, and others as normative (saying how it should be done).0304-3894/$ – see front matter © 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V. doi:10.1016/j.jhazmat.2004.02.003L. Harms-Ringdahl / J

17、ournal of Hazardous Materials 111 (2004) 13–19 15However, many companies do not have a formulated pol- icy (especially SME), but they have safety management to deal with their hazards, in one way or another. Accordingly,

18、 there is a need for a comprehensive and descriptive defini- tion. One suggestion for a simple definition of occupational health and safety management—a systematic way of man- aging the occupational health and safety ris

19、ks of a company [8]. However, management can exist without being “syste- matic”, which is related to some kind of norm. This leads to a suggestion of a simple definition:Safety management is a way of managing the hazards

20、 (safety risks) of a company.3. Variations in concepts and goals3.1. Spread in applicationsThere is a large spread in application areas and need for efficient approaches. Take for example nuclear installations, aviation

21、companies, and large chemical industries, which often are associated with a potential for major accidents and also rigorous SMS. On the other hand, you can have more uncomplicated types of production, where minor acciden

22、ts are frequent and safety is managed in a much more relaxed way.Table 1 gives a summary of parameters defining differ- ent situations. In discussions of advanced safety features, you can easily get trapped by a stereoty

23、pe related to Group A. It is easy to focus on the first type and neglect the second type, which produces much more injuries and dam- ages (e.g. [5]). It is a reason, why also less sophisticated applications have been con

24、sidered in the section about definitions. It should be noted that a specific company or organi- sation could have parameters in both groups at the same time. For example, the company has a formal safety man- agement syst

25、em, but changes are common which give im- provisations and informal safety actions a more prominent role.Table 1 Parameters of management and risksParameter Group A Group BAccidents Large consequences, infrequent Small c

26、onsequences, occasional Organisation size Large, complex Small, simple Regulation Precise, strictly enforced GeneralGeneral management Structured, formal Informal Safety management Formal Informal Economy and resources G

27、ood Poor Stability Invariable Changes are common3.2. Event investigationEvent investigations can be seen as collection and anal- ysis of facts resulting in a report with a number of recom- mendations. A second view is th

28、at the investigation is an organisational learning process with a search for opportuni- ties for improvement. All levels of the organisation can and should learn [9]. In both perspectives there can be a number of conflic

29、ting goals. Especially related to responsibility issues, when lia- bility should be fixed, punishment meted out, and compen- sation claimed. It is common with difficulties to establish links between the accidents and wit

30、h safety management or regulatory systems.3.3. Methods and toolsMethods are regarded as almost inevitable when a risk analysis is performed on a technical or socio-technical system. The analyst is supposed to apply one o

31、r more recognised analysis methods, of which there a large amount published in the literature [5,10,11]. Also for investigations of accidents there are several meth- ods in use. According to a recent study in Europe [12]

32、, the use of methods is less common and self-evident compared to applications in risk analysis.3.4. Concepts and theoriesExplanations and theories about accidents and their pre- vention are numerous. They are essential a

33、lso in the practical world, as they influence how (safety) management systems are designed, the application of risk analysis tools, and the accomplishment of event investigations. Hale [9] points out that there is some c

34、onsensus for the two first “ages” of safety, which are related to technical and human failures respectively. In the third “age”, with concern for complex socio-technical and safety management systems, developments are st

35、ill in an early stage. Although there might be a basic agreement in the scientific community concerning technical and human failures, as a whole the variation on conceptions about accident causation is large. An interest

36、ing aspect is the coupling between accident models and how an event analysis is accomplished. Holl- nagel [13] has made a classification of methods in accident investigations, which are divided in three major groups. The

37、 first is “Sequential accident models”, which describe the ac- cident as the result of a sequence of events in a specific or- der, e.g. the Domino theory. Such models often turned out to be limited in their capability to

38、 explain what happened in more complex systems. “Epidemiological accident models” describe an accident in analogy with a disease, i.e. as a combination of “agents” and environmental factors that can generate unhappy cond