[雙語翻譯]行政問責(zé)外文翻譯--治理的競爭傳統(tǒng)與行政問責(zé)的困境丹麥的案例（英文）

1、Public Administration Vol. 87, No. 1, 2009 (117–131) © 2009 The Author. Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

2、doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2008.00727.xCOMPETING TRADITIONS OF GOVERNANCE AND DILEMMAS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE CASE OF DENMARK BIRGITTE POULSEN This article offers a study of the changing role of the stat

3、e in Denmark under the condition of the overall transformation from government to governance with particular emphasis on the corre- sponding transition from process accountability to performance accountability. It is ar

4、gued that although new modes of governance have been introduced, and new interpretations of account- ability have been proliferated, neither conventional modes of governance nor older interpretations of accountability

5、disappear. Thus, what we see is a co-existence of competing traditions of gover- nance and different and sometimes contradictory interpretations of administrative accountability, which create potential dilemmas and cont

6、radictions for the individual civil servant. Employing an interpretative approach to governance and public administration, the article analyses the constitu- tion of competing traditions of governance and interpretation

7、s of accountability, and the way in which these competing traditions and interpretations lead to accountability dilemmas for the indi- vidual civil servant. INTRODUCTION Different scholars from both the political scienc

8、es and the field of public administration have been occupied with the changing role of the state in Western democracies. Whether the emphasis is on the impact of globalization, the consequences of the new public man- a

9、gement (NPM), or the widely used notion of a development from government to gov- ernance, there seems to be a profound sense of change in the literature on the role of the state in current society (see, for example, B

10、evir et al. 2003 ). This article offers a study of this changing role, examining the situation in Denmark, and in particular the Danish na- tional administration. More specifically, the article offers an empirical st

11、udy of the devel- opment from government to governance and the changing and competing interpretations of accountability. The first claim advanced by this article is that the transition from government to gov- ernance co

12、rresponds to a change in the interpretation of administrative accountability. Within the vast literature on administrative accountability, it is widely recognized that a paradigm shift from procedure accountability to

13、performance accountability has taken place. However, the link between this paradigm shift and the transition from government to governance has yet to be fully recognized (but see Esmark 2006 for a democratic per- spe

14、ctive). Similarly, governance research has yet to provide a more detailed analysis of this link. The second claim advanced by this article is that although new modes of gov- ernance have been introduced, and new interpr

15、etations of accountability have become more and more comprehensive, neither conventional modes of governance nor older in- terpretations of accountability have disappeared. Thus what we see is a co-existence of competi

16、ng traditions of governance, and thereby different and sometimes contradictory interpretations of administrative accountability, which, for the individual civil servant, create potential dilemmas. Employing an interpre

17、tative approach to governance and Birgitte Poulsen is Associate Professor in the Department of Society and Globalization, Roskilde University. ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE CASE OF DENMARK 119 Public Administration

18、Vol. 87, No. 1, 2009 (117–131)© 2009 The Author. Journal compilation © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.PROCEDURE AND PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY Although not often recognized, the debate on administrative accounta

19、bility has to some extent come to mirror the debate on the development from government to governance. More specifically, the development towards governance seems to imply an increasing reliance on ‘ performance ’

20、accountability. In general, more recent literature on administra- tive accountability has developed a threefold definition of accountability, reflecting the different public demands on the political system: accountabili

21、ty for finances (financial accountability), accountability for fairness (legal accountability), and accountability for performance (see, for example, Behn 2001 , p. 6; Bovens 2006 , p. 10). Accountability for fin

22、ances and fairness make up the conventional forms of account- ability, largely corresponding to the notion of ‘ government ’ within governance research. Accountability, understood in this way, states that public off

23、icials can be held accountable for the improper use of public funds and the unfair and unequal treatment of any citizen ( Bovens 2006 , p. 10). Thus, the ‘ accountability for the use (or abuse) of power is nothing

24、 more than accountability for finances and fairness ’ ( Behn 2001 , p. 9). Accountability for finances and fairness is often linked to the Weberian bureaucracy and the culture of the Rechtsstaat . As bureaucrats, c

25、ivil servants must follow orders within the hierarchical sys- tem of command and can be held accountable for disobeying the rules. Bureaucrats, however, are not responsible for adverse consequences stemming from the exe

26、cution of appropriate rules in proper ways ( March and Olsen 1995 , pp. 154 – 5). This form of ac- countability is often referred to as ‘ hierarchical accountability ’ ( Hill 2005 , p. 261; Bovens 2006 , p

27、. 19), which highlights the link with ‘ government ’ as understood within the area of governance research. However, I prefer the term ‘ procedure accountability ’ , in order to emphasize that the focus is on t

28、he adherence to proper procedure. Procedure account- ability has led to criticism. Some see it as an impediment to the invention of new and creative policy solutions, since it tends to reduce risk-taking, and thereby fa

29、vour the sta- tus quo (see March and Olsen 1995 , p. 144). It is argued that when procedure account- ability dominates in public administration, public officials become afraid to make mistakes that might become publi

30、c ( March and Olsen 1995 , p. 146). The more recent alternative to procedure accountability identified in the literature is performance accountability. Performance accountability brings the ‘ right result ’ into f

31、o- cus, while the ‘ right procedure ’ recedes into the background. ‘ Government is not only supposed to use money prudently and to treat everyone fairly [ … ] we also care what government does – what it actu

32、ally accomplishes [ … ] are the policies, programs, and ac- tivities of government producing the results that they were designed to produce? ’ ( Behn 2001 , pp. 9 – 10). What I argue here is that the addition of

33、performance accountability has to a large extent been brought about by the increased reliance on new modes of gover- nance in public administration. However, just as old forms of government remain impor- tant, so does p

34、rocedure accountability. Accountability for performance has been linked to the expansion of the welfare state and the new professions that have been brought into public administration through the institutions of the we

35、lfare state (such as medicine, economics and social work). These professions embrace a much more consequence-orientated rhetoric than did the profes- sions of law and public administration that they replaced ( March an

36、d Olsen 1995 , p. 155). It seems clear, however, that performance accountability cannot be limited to welfare state institutions and professions. Rather, during the 1980s, the importance of performance accountability