[雙語(yǔ)翻譯]行政問(wèn)責(zé)外文翻譯--治理的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)傳統(tǒng)與行政問(wèn)責(zé)的困境丹麥的案例

1、7700 英文單詞， 英文單詞，4.3 萬(wàn)英文字符，中文 萬(wàn)英文字符，中文 12600 字文獻(xiàn)出處： 文獻(xiàn)出處：Poulsen B . Competing traditions of governance and dilemmas of administrative accountability: The case of Denmark[J]. Public Administration, 2010, 87(1):117-131.COM

2、PETING TRADITIONS OF GOVERNANCE AND DILEMMAS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE CASE OF DENMARKBIRGITTE POULSENThis article offers a study of the changing role of the state in Denmark under the condition of the overal

3、l transformation from government to governance with particular emphasis on the corresponding transition from process accountability to performance accountability. It is argued that although new modes of governance have b

4、een introduced, and new interpretations of accountability have been proliferated, neither conventional modes of governance nor older interpretations of accountability disappear. Thus, what we see is a co-existence of com

5、peting traditions of governance and different and sometimes contradictory interpretations of administrative accountability, which create potential dilemmas and contradictions for the individual civil servant. Employing a

6、n interpretative approach to governance and public administration, the article analyses the constitution of competing traditions of governance and interpretations of accountability, and the way in which these competing t

7、raditions and interpretations lead to accountability dilemmas for the individual civil servant.INTRODUCTIONDifferent scholars from both the political sciences and the field of public administration have been occupied wit

8、h the changing role of the state in Western democracies. Whether the emphasis is on the impact of globalization, the consequences of the new public management (NPM), or the widely used notion of a development from govern

9、ment to governance, there seems to be a profound sense of change in the literature on the role of the state in current society (see, for example, Bevir et al. 2003). This article offers a study of this changing role, exa

10、mining the situation in Denmark, and in particular the Danish national administration. More specifically, the article offers an empirical study of the development from government to governance and the changing and compet

11、ing interpretations of accountability.The first claim advanced by this article is that the transition from government to governance corresponds to a change in the interpretation of administrative accountability. Within t

12、he vast literature on administrative accountability, it is widely recognized that a paradigm shift from procedure accountability to performance accountability has taken place. However, the link between this paradigm shif

13、t and the transition from government to governance has yet to be fully recognized (but see Esmark 2006 for a democratic perspective). Similarly, governance research has yet to provide a more detailed analysis of this lin

14、k. The second claim advanced by this article is that although new modes of governance have been introduced, and new interpretations of accountability have become more and more comprehensive, neither conventional modes of

15、 governance nor older interpretations of accountability have disappeared. Thus what we see is a co-existence of competing traditions of governance, and thereby different and sometimes contradictory interpretations of adm

16、inistrative accountability, which, for the individual civil servant, create potential dilemmas. Employing an interpretative approach to governance and public administration, the article analyses the constitution of compe

17、ting traditions of governance and interpretations of accountability, and how these lead to accountability dilemmas for civil servants.the political system: accountability for finances (financial accountability), accounta

18、bility for fairness (legal accountability), and accountability for performance (see, for example, Behn 2001, p. 6; Bovens 2006, p. 10).Accountability for finances and fairness make up the conventional forms of accountabi

19、lity, largely corresponding to the notion of ‘government’ within governance research. Accountability, understood in this way, states that public officials can be held accountable for the improper use of public funds and

20、the unfair and unequal treatment of any citizen (Bovens 2006, p. 10). Thus, the ‘a(chǎn)ccountability for the use (or abuse) of power is nothing more than accountability for finances and fairness’ (Behn 2001, p. 9). Accountabi

21、lity for finances and fairness is often linked to the Weberian bureaucracy and the culture of the Rechtsstaat. As bureaucrats, civil servants must follow orders within the hierarchical system of command and can be held a

22、ccountable for disobeying the rules. Bureaucrats, however, are not responsible for adverse consequences stemming from the execution of appropriate rules in proper ways (March and Olsen 1995, pp. 154–5). This form of acco

23、untability is often referred to as ‘hierarchical accountability’ (Hill 2005, p. 261; Bovens 2006, p. 19), which highlights the link with ‘government’ as understood within the area of governance research. However, I prefe

24、r the term ‘procedure accountability’, in order to emphasize that the focus is on the adherence to proper procedure. Procedure accountability has led to criticism. Some see it as an impediment to the invention of new and

25、 creative policy solutions, since it tends to reduce risk-taking, and thereby favour the status quo (see March and Olsen 1995, p. 144). It is argued that when procedure accountability dominates in public administration,

26、public officials become afraid to make mistakes that might become public (March and Olsen 1995, p. 146).The more recent alternative to procedure accountability identified in the literature is performance accountability.

27、Performance accountability brings the ‘right result’ into focus, while the ‘right procedure’ recedes into the background. ‘Government is not only supposed to use money prudently and to treat everyone fairly […] we also c

28、are what government does – what it actually accomplishes […] are the policies, programs, and activities of government producing the results that they were designed to produce?’ (Behn 2001, pp. 9–10). What I argue here is

29、 that the addition of performance accountability has to a large extent been brought about by the increased reliance on new modes of governance in public administration. However, just as old forms of government remain imp

30、ortant, so does procedure accountability.Accountability for performance has been linked to the expansion of the welfare state and the new professions that have been brought into public administration through the institut

31、ions of the welfare state (such as medicine, economics and social work). These professions embrace a much more consequence-orientated rhetoric than did the professions of law and public administration that they replaced

32、(March and Olsen 1995, p. 155). It seems clear, however, that performance accountability cannot be limited to welfare state institutions and professions. Rather, during the 1980s, the importance of performance accountabi

33、lity increased, when European governments tried to fundamentally ‘change concepts of bureaucratic accountability even more towards emphasis upon results and away from emphasis on the procedures and rules that guide offic

34、ial behaviour’ (March and Olsen 1995, p. 155).In terms of a civil service, the increasing emphasis on performance introduces new criteria for administrative success and what it means to be accountable as a civil servant.