外文翻譯--股利源于金融危機(jī)的背景下美國(guó)銀行控股公司的證據(jù)

1、共 頁(yè) ， 第 1 頁(yè)┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 裝 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 訂 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 線 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊附錄 附錄原文 原文:Dividend payouts: Evidence from U.S. bank holding companiesin the context of the financial crisisJosé Filipe A

2、breu, Mohamed Azzim Gulamhussen AbstractWe study dividend payouts of 462 U.S. bank holding companies before and during the 2007–09 financial crisis. Fama and French (2001) characteristics (size, profitability and growth

3、opportunities) explain dividend payouts before and during the financial crisis. The agency cost hypothesis explains dividend payouts before and during (more pronouncedly) the financial crisis. The signaling hypothesis ex

4、plains dividend payouts during the financial crisis. Regulatory pressure was ineffective in limiting dividend payouts by undercapitalized banks before the financial crisis. Our findings have implications for corporate fi

5、nance and governance theories, and also for the regulatory reforms that are being discussed among policymakers.1. IntroductionResearchers apply corporate finance and governance theories to financial firms on the grounds

6、of the inherent interplay of interests of a wider set of stakeholders (depositors and regulators, as well as shareholders and managers), which make their agency and governance problems more complex, and the relevance of

7、financial firms for the good functioning and soundness of modern financial systems (see, among others, Anderson and Campbell, 2004; Brook et al., 2000). The financial crisis has further enhanced the interest in the appli

8、cation of corporate finance and governance theories due to the unique macroeconomic context and the regulatory shift which is believed to have hit financial firms the most (see, for example, Erkens et al., 2012). We cont

9、ribute to this emerging strand in the literature by studying banks' dividend payout decisions before and during the financial crisis. Of the several corporate finance and governance issues that are attracting the att

10、ention of scholars, dividend policy is receiving significant attention, particularly from regulators and investors. The recent proposals to increase oversight of the dividend payouts by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB, 20

11、11) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2011) point towards the increasing regulatory relevance of banks' dividend payout policy. Forcing banks to plowback their earnings may however have the uninte

12、nded consequence of reducing their ability to both signal their future growth prospects to suppliers of debt and equity, and reduce agency conflicts of their managers with dispersed shareholders. Our paper sheds critical

13、 light on the tension between the dividend payout decisions (before and) during the financial crisis by explicitly considering 共 頁(yè) ， 第 3 頁(yè)┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 裝 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 訂 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ 線 ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊ ┊

14、indicator of future prospects; (iii) the agency cost hypothesis, which states that dividends counterbalance the increased need for monitoring associated with independent banks; and (iv) the regulatory pressure hypothesis

15、, which states that undercapitalized banks tend to retain earnings rather than pay dividends. The analysis covers two distinct macroeconomic environments: before and during the financial crisis. The sample includes 462 U

16、.S. bank holding companies and contains 435 observations made before the financial crisis (i.e., from 2004 to 2006) and 441 observations made during the financial crisis (i.e., from 2007 to 2009), for a total of 876 obse

17、rvations. Focusing on the U.S. provides a large dataset, while restricting the sample to bank holding companies reduces the problems associated with unobserved heterogeneity.3. Sample, variables and descriptive statistic

18、sWe collected firm-level data from Bankscope for U.S. listed bank holding companies with minimum total assets of 100 million USD, which yielded 462 institutions. Banks that entered bankruptcy during the financial crisis

19、were not considered. Our sample spans two distinct macroeconomic environments: the period before the financial crisis, from 2004 to 2006 (435 observations), and the period during the financial crisis, from 2007 to 2009 (

20、441 observations). The final sample is an unbalanced panel with a total of 876 observations.We used the dividend payout (dividend payout) as the dependent variable and constructed it by averaging the dividend-to-total as

21、set ratio for each reference period. We used total assets to scale dividends to ensure that the results were not driven by stock price and earning volatility associated with the financial crisis. We focus on the characte

22、ristics of regular dividend payouts rather than on the prediction of the next year's dividend. Therefore, we use an averaging period that is longer than one year. We opt a three-year averaging period for two main rea

23、sons. First, this choice avoids the impact of the 2003 tax cut on dividend payouts in the U.S. (see, among others, Brown et al., 2007). Second, a three-year period covers the time span of the entire financial crisis (200

24、7 to 2009).The signaling hypothesis states that banks with positive future growth opportunities (expected growth) are expected to pay out higher dividends to signal their banks' prospects and increase their potential

25、 to attract debt and equity financing when required; therefore a positive relationship between expected growth and dividend payout is expected. Conversely, just like historical growth, banks with positive future growth o

26、pportunities (expected growth) will plowback their earnings to avoid costly debt and equity financing; therefore a negative relationship is expected between expected growth and dividend payout. Thus, the relationship bet

27、ween expected growth and dividend payout can be positive or negative. We measured expected growth through the ratio of market-to-book value of equity at the end of the observation period. The signaling hypothesis cannot