外文翻譯--對于碳排放量的邊界調(diào)節(jié)稅影響大小的研究（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　1870單詞，2174漢字</p><p>　　出處：YAN DONG, JOHN WALLEY. HOW LARGE ARE THE IMPACTS OF CARBON MOTIVATED BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS?[J]. Climate Change Economics, 2012, 03(01): 1250001-1-1250001-28.</p>

2、<p><b>　　外文翻譯 </b></p><p><b>　　原文 </b></p><p>　　HOW LARGE ARE THE IMPACTS OF CARBON MOTIVATED BORDER TAX DJUSTMENTS</p><p>　　Author:John Whalley,Ya

3、n Dong </p><p>　　This paper discusses the size of impact of carbon motivated border tax adjustments on world trade .We report numerical simulation results which suggest that impacts on welfare, trade, and em

4、issions will likely be small. This is because proposed measures use carbon emissions in the importing country in producing goods similar to imports rather than carbon content in calculating the size of barriers. Moreover

5、, because border adjustments involve both tariffs and export rebates, it is the difference</p><p>　　In our numerical simulation analyses border tax adjustments accompany carbon emission reduction commitments

6、 made either unilaterally, or as part of a global treaty and to be applied against non signatories. We use a four-region US, EU, China, ROW general equilibrium structure which captures energy trade and has endogenously d

7、etermined energy supply so that global emissions can change with policy changes. We calibrate our model to 2006 data and analyze the potential impacts of both EU and US carb</p><p>　　Emerging policy proposal

8、s for carbon based tariffs or border tax adjustments by EU, US and other OECD countries against developing countries that do not participate in global emissions reduction agreements are a central issue for current climat

9、e change negotiations1.Although not formally part of the post Bali road map, de facto the threat of such measures is a central part of the negotiation process. Proposals for carbon motivated tax adjustments include both

10、import tariffs carbon tariffs and ex</p><p>　　Such border adjustments by participating countries are driven by two related objectives. One is to provide competitiveness offsets for domestic producers since t

11、he added costs for domestic producers involved with domestic carbon pricing impose a competitive disadvantage on them. The other is leakage, i.e. that the reductions in emissions in participating countries such as the EU

12、 and the US generate increases in emissions elsewhere. For countries such as China, who are heavily export-oriented, an</p><p>　　Border tax adjustments and both their rational and effects on trade is not a n

13、ew topic. Earlier debate on border tax adjustments occurred following the adoption of the value added tax in the EU as a tax harmonization target in the early 1960’s see Dosser 1967, Shibata 1967, Krauss & Johnson 19

14、72. The academic literature at that time suggested that with BTAs, a change between origin and destination is simply that between a broadly based production and consumption rate both of which are neutral, w</p>&l

15、t;p>　　This paper presents numerical simulation results exploring the effects of carbon motivated border tax adjustments in large OECD economies on welfare, global and country emissions, trade flows and production1. We

16、 use a multi-region general equilibrium structure covering the US, EU, China and a residual rest of the world. In this, countries produce commodities of varying emissions intensities using substitutable fossil fuel based

17、 oil and non-oil inputs. Unlike in conventional trade models in which</p><p>　　In our numerical simulation analysis of BTA’s we construct a benchmark global equilibrium data set based on data for 2006 using

18、a number of data sources. This covers production, consumption , and trade between the four regions China,EU,US, ROW .We calibrate our model to this data set using literature based estimates of key elasticities. </p>

19、;<p>　　Results show that BTAs effects generally are small, depending on the carbon pricing or size of emissions mitigations adopted by importing countries. This is because both using carbon emissions in production

20、 of comparable goods in importing countries produces small barriers compared to using direct carbon content of goods and what produces real side effects is the difference in emission intensity across goods not the level

21、of emission. Carbon border adjustments are not neutral since border tax ad</p><p>　　The impacts generally on all countries from carbon motivated border measures are small. These reflect both the calculation

22、of border measures discussed earlier and based on the emissions generated by comparable domestic production in the importing country, rather than the carbon contained in the imported good, and the role played by the diff

23、erence in emission intensity across sectors rather than levels. We use carbon emissions by domestic production in the importing country measure as this corre</p><p>　　We have used the resulting calibrated mo

24、del based on the date in section 3 above to simulate the impacts of carbon pricing and border tax adjustments on country welfare and global emissions, cross country trade flows and on production by country. The carbon mo

25、tivated policies include domestic carbon pricing at various assumed prices without BTAs, similar carbon pricing with BTAs , and carbon pricing with only an import tariff no export rebates. Results from comparing the base

26、 case data to model </p><p>　　The impacts generally on all countries from carbon motivated border measures are small. These reflect both the calculation of border measures discussed earlier and based on the

27、emissions generated by comparable domestic production in the importing country, rather than the carbon contained in the imported good, and the role played by the difference in emission intensity across sectors rather tha

28、n levels. We use carbon emissions by domestic production in the importing country measure as this corre</p><p>　　The result also confirm that BTAs are not neutral in their impacts due to sector specificity ,

29、 and hence relative price effects occurs. As for the effects of BTAs on emissions, BTAs alleviate leakage effects as expected1, which counteract the emissions reduction effects of country carbon pricing. As for trade flo

30、ws, compared with no BTA .BTAs reduce the imports of countries implementing measures and increase the imports of other countries. With carbon pricing and BTAs the value of production in </p><p>　　In this pap

31、er, we present models from a numerical multi country general equilibrium model with endogenous determined energy extraction which we use to analyze the potential impacts of carbon motivated border adjustments on welfare,

32、 trade, and emissions. We calibrate our model to 2006 benchmark data, and using the calibrated parameters analyze the impacts of EU and US’s carbon motivated BTAs on welfare, emissions, trade flows and productions. We co

33、mpare cases of no carbon pricing, carbon pricing </p><p>　　The most striking feature of model results is that the impacts, while of the sign predicted, are generally very small. This, in turn, reflects the r

34、elatively small barriers involved if carbon emissions in production in the importing country are used. If BTAs are uniform across industries when the carbon content of the goods are same, price level effects result in ne

35、utral impact. Smallness of result thus also reflects the impact of differences in carbon emissions intensity across production rathe</p><p>　　As for the effects of BTAs on emissions, though BTAs alleviate le

36、akage effects as expected, they also counteract the emissions reduction effects of carbon pricing. For trade flows, compared with no BTAs, BTAs reduce imports of the domestic country, and increase the imports of other co

37、untries. EU or US BTAs against China reduce exports in value terms by China. With BTAs, the value of production in the implementing country increases with carbon pricing, and the value of production in other countri</

38、p><p>　　The negotiation in Copenhagen in December 2009 and to follow is to set a new series of arrangements in place on climate change which will come to play after 2012 in Post-Kyoto world. Developing countrie

39、s, such as China, Brazil, India who did not participate in the Kyoto negotiation face pressures from the developed world to participate in the new round of negotiation, and the prospect of border tax adjustments if they

40、do not participate is a major consideration for them. </p><p>　　Our results suggest that though the sign of the effects might be as predicted, the size of effects might quite small. This reflects both small

41、barriers when carbon emissions in importing countries are used as the basis of barriers, and also that it is the difference in emissions intensities across production sectors that matters rather than the level of emissio

42、ns. </p><p><b>　　譯文 </b></p><p>　　對于碳排放量的邊界調(diào)節(jié)稅影響大小的研究</p><p>　　作者:約翰沃利、東艷 </p><p>　　本文論述了碳關(guān)稅的征收對國際貿(mào)易的影響,通過數(shù)字模擬結(jié)果表明:碳關(guān)稅的征收對福利、貿(mào)易、碳排放的影響將會很小。這是因為這些擬采取的措施

43、使用的是同進(jìn)口國生產(chǎn)的類似貨物來計算碳排放而不是碳含量的障礙計算大小。此外,由于邊境調(diào)節(jié)措施同時涉及邊境稅和出口退稅,他的差異在于跨區(qū)域排放而不是排放數(shù)量的問題?？鐓^(qū)域的碳排放并沒有差異,勒納對稱表明邊境調(diào)節(jié)并沒有相對的影響發(fā)生。 </p><p>　　在我們的數(shù)字模擬分析中,邊境稅調(diào)節(jié)及減排的承諾并不是單方面的,或者是作為全球性條約的一部分,適用于非締約國。我們運用四個地區(qū)(美國,歐盟,中國,世界其他地區(qū))的可

44、計算一般均衡模型,通過能源貿(mào)易跟具有內(nèi)生決定的能源供應(yīng)查看政策改變對全球碳排放量的影響。我們以2006年數(shù)據(jù)為基準(zhǔn)建立模型,分析不同的碳關(guān)稅對歐盟和美國的潛在影響,以及雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)定對福利、碳減排、貿(mào)易流通、生產(chǎn)的影響。結(jié)果表明這些措施對全球減排、貿(mào)易、福利的影響甚小,但其影響是可預(yù)見的。雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)定對泄漏的減少作用是可預(yù)見的,在貿(mào)易方面的影響,跟沒有雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)定相比,雙邊貿(mào)易能夠減少不利于國家的產(chǎn)品進(jìn)口。歐盟和美國的雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)定都要求減

45、少對中國產(chǎn)品的進(jìn)口。在雙邊貿(mào)易下,國家的生產(chǎn)成本會隨著碳關(guān)稅措施而增加,而其他國家的生產(chǎn)相對與不是雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)定的國家來說減少了。金融危機使世界貿(mào)易流量萎縮,碳稅雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)定產(chǎn)生的影響將是復(fù)雜的,在保護(hù)環(huán)境減少碳排放的同時,對促進(jìn)雙邊貿(mào)易的作用不大。 </p><p>　　近來歐盟、美國、經(jīng)合組織成員國新出的政策建議多是對不參與全球減排協(xié)議的發(fā)展中國家征收關(guān)稅或邊境調(diào)節(jié)稅,這也是是當(dāng)前氣候變化談判的中心問題。雖然不

46、是巴厘協(xié)議的正式組成部分,但實際上對這些措施的威脅是談判過程的核心部分。碳稅包括進(jìn)口關(guān)稅(碳關(guān)稅),并通過與不承諾對那些減排承諾的國家出口退稅。 </p><p>　　參與邊境調(diào)節(jié)措施的國家有兩個目標(biāo)。第一為國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)者提供競爭偏移,國內(nèi)的碳稅征收增加了他們的生產(chǎn)成本,使其處于競爭劣勢。另一個是碳泄漏問題,即參加國的排放量減少如歐盟和美國,其他地方產(chǎn)生的排放量增加。對于像中國這樣的國家來說,以大量出口為導(dǎo)向,以生產(chǎn)

47、為主,其前景在于成為低碳排放的國家,在持續(xù)低迷的金融危機下反對貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義。 </p><p>　　邊境調(diào)節(jié)稅對貿(mào)易的影響并非一個新問題。早期的邊境調(diào)節(jié)稅爭論是發(fā)生在1960年初的關(guān)于歐盟提出增加稅收以此來作為歐盟的統(tǒng)一稅收。當(dāng)時的學(xué)術(shù)文獻(xiàn)表明,雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)定對原產(chǎn)地和目的地之間的變化是顯而易見的,僅僅是有著廣泛基礎(chǔ)生產(chǎn)和消費率這兩者之間,而這兩者是中立的與貿(mào)易沒有直接影響。中立的貿(mào)易,生產(chǎn)和消費的影響將因此優(yōu)先與

48、稅收的變化。正如最近洛克伍德&沃利(2008)指出的碳動機邊境稅的調(diào)整按產(chǎn)品和行業(yè)各有不同,所以不像關(guān)于增值稅的辯論那樣需要區(qū)分價格水平和相對價格效應(yīng)。隨著產(chǎn)品或特定行業(yè)的雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)定,相對價格的影響將開始發(fā)揮作用,中立只有在特殊情況下成立。 </p><p>　　本文采用的數(shù)值模擬結(jié)果探索了碳機動邊境稅的調(diào)整對大型經(jīng)合組織中對福利,全球和國家的排放量,經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易流通和生產(chǎn)的影響。我們使用的多區(qū)域一般均衡結(jié)

49、構(gòu)覆蓋了美國,歐盟,中國和世界其他地區(qū)。不同國家生產(chǎn)的商品排放強度不同主要在于使用石油或者是非石油投入為基礎(chǔ)的代化石燃料。不同于每個國家都有固定的生產(chǎn)要素稟賦的傳統(tǒng)貿(mào)易模式,提供了能源出口國采購成本增加的供應(yīng)功能。由于排放跟能源在生產(chǎn)中的使用有直接關(guān)系,全球排放水平能夠被確定,隨著政策而改變。 </p><p>　　在對BTA的數(shù)值模擬分析中,我們以2006年使用的數(shù)據(jù)源為基礎(chǔ)建立了一個全球平衡數(shù)據(jù)集,包括了四個

50、地區(qū)(中國,歐盟,美國,世界其他地區(qū))的生產(chǎn),消費和貿(mào)易。并通過這些使用基于估計關(guān)鍵彈性的文獻(xiàn)所得的數(shù)據(jù)來校準(zhǔn)我們的模型。模型結(jié)果表明,雙邊貿(mào)易影響通常很小,主要取決于采取措施的進(jìn)口國對碳定價(或減排大小)。這是因為進(jìn)口國使用含二氧化碳相對少的商品所產(chǎn)生的損害相對與直接含有二氧化碳的商品所產(chǎn)生的副作用在不同區(qū)域是不同的而不是排放水平。對于二氧化碳的邊境調(diào)節(jié)并不是中立的,邊境調(diào)節(jié)稅在二氧化碳的問題上是特定行業(yè)和相對價格效應(yīng)所產(chǎn)生的影響。二

51、氧化的雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)定正如預(yù)期的減輕了碳泄漏,但是抵消了全球排放量的減少對碳定價的影響。雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)定減少了締約國家的進(jìn)口,其他國家的進(jìn)口增加。在雙邊貿(mào)易下,碳稅增加了國家的生產(chǎn)成本,其他國家的產(chǎn)量相比減少了。 </p><p>　　該模型的結(jié)果最引人注目的特點是影響,而該標(biāo)志的預(yù)測,一般都非常小。當(dāng)產(chǎn)品的碳含量相同,價格水平影響較中立時,不同產(chǎn)業(yè)的雙邊貿(mào)易相統(tǒng)一。當(dāng)邊境調(diào)節(jié)稅是針對特定行業(yè)時二氧化碳機動雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)定時

52、是不中立的。對碳排放的雙邊貿(mào)易的影響,雖然如預(yù)期的那樣減輕了碳泄漏,但也抵消了碳排放量所產(chǎn)生的價格。對于貿(mào)易流量,雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)定的國家減少了國內(nèi)進(jìn)口,并增加其他國家的進(jìn)口。歐盟或美國的雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)定降低了中國對中國的進(jìn)口。雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)定在執(zhí)行國家增加了碳價格,與其他國家相比,產(chǎn)值下降。 </p><p>　　在2009年12月召開的哥本哈根會議中,不少國家提出要在2012 年后京都議定書第二減排承諾期 對來自不承擔(dān)減排